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PREFACE
This study is an output of the research project: “The EU harmonization in Key Infrastructure 
Services (Telecommunications, Energy and Transport) and productivity growth” carried out by 
EDAM (Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) in Istanbul and CEPS (Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies) in Brussels. This project is supported by the European Union’s Civil Society 
Dialogue: Europa – Bridges of Knowledge Programme which is being implemented by Secretariat 
General for EU Affairs. 
Given that Turkey has by and large been able to overcome the challenge of macro-economic 
stability, the focus of policy makers shifted to second generation reforms including the overhaul 
of structural policies. Yet at the same time, Turkey has initiated full membership negotiations 
with the EU which involves regulatory harmonisation in several fields. Therefore the relationship 
between EU harmonisation and the need for second generation reforms in a country like Turkey 
should be examined in more detail. 
This study brings together in-depth analysis of second generation structural reforms and de-re-
gulation in three key infrastructure sectors, namely telecommunications, energy and transport. A 
final chapter elaborates on the interplay between regulatory good governance and EU acquis adop-
tion. 
The objective of this study is essentially twofold. It aims to carry out a gap analysis regarding the 
level of regulatory harmonisation in these key infrastructure sectors. As a result, the main short-
comings in terms of regulatory harmonisation are highlighted. The focus is however on the part 
of the acquis that has a bearing on economic productivity since the second aim of the study is to 
uncover the linkages between EU acquis adoption, regulatory good governance and productivity 
growth. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview
Turkey has undertaken major reforms aiming at better functioning markets both in terms of en-
suring competition and productivity growth. These reforms are aimed at narrowing the scope of 
regulation and ensuring that regulations better serve public interests. Mainly, reforms address mar-
ket opening, privatisation, liberalising restrictions on entry, prices and normal business practices as 
well as ensuring competition. This study focuses on the regulatory reform and EU harmonisation 
in three main infrastructure services namely telecommunications, energy and transport sectors. 
The performance of these industries is crucial for the performance of the whole economy due to 
their “knock on” effects on the rest of the economy. The impact of regulation in these sectors goes 
beyond the sectoral frontier and affects indirectly many other sectors where firms use the output 
of these industries as intermediate inputs in their production process.    
Turkey has moved towards a regulatory reform targeting a gradual shift from coercive use of 
public policy instruments such as strict regulation or the public ownership of enterprises to a 
greater reliance on market mechanisms as well as private investment. Turkey’s progress in terms of 
harmonization with the EU acquis has been uneven, but overall, not too disappointing. It seems 
that compared with the gap in the legal frameworks the gap in implementation and more impor-
tantly, in terms of impact, that is, the degree of development of effective competition, is larger. 
The reasons are as follows.
The regulation of competition is an intrinsic part of the overall regulatory approach. Therefore 
the implementations of competition rules as well as the nature of the relationship between the 
competition authority and the sectoral independent regulatory authorities have a significant im-
pact on sectoral policies. In Turkey, competition law is an area where significant progress has been 
made. However problems remain in essentially three areas: a) Relationship between the competi-
tion authority and other regulatory bodies b) State aids and c) Judicial review. 
The uncertainties created for businesses by the twin implementation of competition and secto-
ral legislation and the lack of clarity in the legislation of the boundaries or competencies are critical 
problems. The codification of the relationship between the Competition Authority and the IRAs 
should be achieved to eliminate the resulting barriers to investment. In this respect, the law should 
introduce a consultation requirement with clearly defined deadlines. The law should also clearly 
spell out the division of tasks between the Competition Authority and IRAs. 
The absence of state aids legislation in Turkey acts as a serious barrier to the development of 
competition in infrastructure industries. Given the prevalence of state ownership in infrastructure, 
state aids legislation is necessary to ensure that state actions do not have anti-competitive effects. 
Turkey had assumed the responsibility with the Customs Union Decision to adopt a state aids mo-
nitoring regime by 1997. Since then Turkish policy makers were unable to overcome the instituti-
onal reticence to adopt a state aids monitoring legislation so as to comply with the Customs Union 
commitments of the country. The adoption of state aids legislation has now become a benchmark 
for the opening of the competition chapter of the full membership negotiations. 
De-regulation and the introduction of competition in some service sectors usually trigger the 
question of the continued universal availability of these services. The EU has developed a specific 
strategy to deal with the supply of services of general interest under a competitive framework. State 
owned or even private companies can be entrusted with a public service obligation provided that 
the loss making part of the business is financed in a transparent and non discriminatory manner. 
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This framework ensures that the level playing field is maintained for service providers while the 
universal availability of core services is ensured.  Turkey lacks a specific framework dealing with 
this critical issue. The question of public service obligations is not treated in a uniform and trans-
parent manner. A legal and regulatory framework for public service obligations is a critical compo-
nent for regulatory reform as it attempts to minimize potential conflicts between social objectives 
and the development of competition. The lack of a proper regulatory framework applicable for all 
service industries which takes into account the need to implement a rule based and transparent 
public service obligation methodology leads state authorities to apply ad hoc solutions for safe-
guarding the widespread availability of core services. This increases costs at best and induces rent 
seeking behavior at worst. It is also doubtful that universal access can be achieved in a cost-effici-
ent manner through such ad-hoc means. In addition, the lack of an overall framework on public 
service obligations introduces uncertainties for economic operators in the network industries who 
may at any time face new constraints or conditions imposed by public authorities aiming to attain 
universal service goals.
In addition to pro-competitive regulation, foreign direct investments (FDI) represents an ad-
ditional dimension linking regulatory reform and productivity. FDI is generally believed to have a 
positive impact on sectoral productivity. A regulatory climate conducive to FDI should contribute 
to higher productivity growth.  Viewed from this perspective, the adoption of the EU acquis in 
the network industries should enable Turkey to significantly enhance its potential for attracting 
foreign investment in those industries given that the Turkish sectoral legislation still contains a 
number of barriers to foreign investments in particular in the fields of energy, air transport and 
maritime transport.
A key component of regulatory reforms in the network industries has been the privatisation 
process. EU law is in fact agnostic regarding the nature of ownership. In other words, there is no 
requirement in EU law for the privatisation of state companies or monopolies. The EU acquis 
is more concerned with the introduction and regulation of competition in previously state held 
industries. Therefore the requirement to adopt the EU acquis has not been a factor in Turkey’s 
approach to privatisation in the network industries. Successive Turkish governments’ approach to 
privatisation has rather been influenced by the need to raise revenues to assist the maintenance of 
fiscal balance. Even after the macro economic stabilisation, the primary objective of the govern-
ment is still to raise a maximum amount of revenues. The downside of this approach is the lack 
of proper attention to the ex-post regulatory framework. Indeed as long as privatisation revenue 
remains the overriding concern, insufficient attention is devoted to achieving longer term efficient 
market outcomes in the industry concerned. At least in the short run the objective of revenue 
maximization may conflict with measures that need to be taken in order to ensure the develop-
ment of competition in those sectors.  In the Turkish case the authorities seem to have resolved 
this trade-off in favour of revenues with less regard for competition. Evidence for this argument 
exists in both the telecommunications and electricity industries. Overall, it can be said that the 
authorities seem to discount the importance of competition in generating social welfare gains out 
of ownership changes.
Improvements can be obtained in the performance of Independent Regulatory Authorities. 
Given the importance regulatory bodies have in implementing the new competitive framework, 
their performances have a significant impact on the performance of the regulated industry. The 
track record of the independent regulatory authorities in Turkey has been mixed. Improvements 
in appointment mechanisms to guarantee the establishment of a governance structure consisting 
of professional and knowledgeable “wise men” would improve the performance of the IRAs. The 
performance of the regulatory authorities depended on the effectiveness of the individuals which 
happened to be appointed to the governing board. Improvements in the appointment mechanisms 
can be obtained by making the process more transparent and creating platforms whereby candida-
tes can be questioned by stakeholders. Additional measures that would improve the quality of the 
EdamENG.indd   20 1/3/08   2:19:15 PM
21
design and enforcement of regulations include: further increasing transparency and accountability, 
in particular requiring IRAs to present justifications for their decisions; improving the quality of 
consultative mechanisms and increasing the technical capacity of the IRAs, especially in economi-
cs, possibly by creating the position of a “chief economist”.
Reform in infrastructure industries can improve welfare only if it is guided by a clearly articula-
ted strategy and strong political ownership. The Turkish experience suggests that without the sup-
port of these two components regulatory reform may be seriously delayed in generating benefits, 
or, worse, it may not generate them at all. Hence one of the crucial recommendations for success 
of regulatory reform is clear ownership of reform efforts at the political level. But ownership is not 
sufficient. Reform policy needs to be translated into an implementation strategy.
Sectoral Outlook
Telecommunications: With the privatisation of the incumbent operator and a significant uptake 
of mobile telephony, the Turkish telecommunications market has experienced significant changes 
in the past years : a 27% penetration rate of fixed –line telephony, 60% penetration of 2G mobile, 
very low broadband penetration and potential growth in 3G. The absence of adequate competitive 
safeguards and a poor investment climate have caused inadequate broadband uptake in Turkey.
Liberalisation has started in 2004, however quite limited and slow. In 2006 several legal chan-
ges have been introduced in line with the EU acquis. Some of those changes have not yet taken 
effect in the market. Compared to OECD countries, Turkey is seriously behind in broadband 
take-up.  Moreover, most telecommunications services are still more expensive than comparable 
services in the OECD countries. The Telecommunications Authority needs to be more speedy and 
effective in enforcing and operationalizing its interventions. Moreover, individual licensing regime 
remains to constitute a major burden and acts as a barrier to entry. In mobile services taxation is 
exceptionally high and may hamper the growth of penetration rate. 
Full adoption of the EU acquis may not suffice to bring Turkey in line with other EU countries. 
This process should be supported by the improvement in the business environment, removal of 
burdensome taxation – especially on the mobile services, as well as closing the gaps in competition 
policy especially state aids, improving the independence of sectoral regulators and making judicial 
review more effective. Nevertheless, it has been estimated that the potential welfare increase from 
Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis and implementation of a policy and regulatory framework 
at par with those in the UK or Finland would amount to about 0.43% of GDP. 
Electricity: Turkey launched an ambitious programme in 2001 to introduce competition into a 
previously vertically integrated industry through liberalisation and privatization. The Electricity 
Market Law (EML) provided a radically new regulatory and legal framework for the organizati-
on of the Turkish electricity industry. In the new market structure generation and retail supply 
need to develop competitively whereas transmission and distribution are regulated so as to ensure 
non-discriminatory access to all market participants. The law also established Energy Market Re-
gulatory Agency (EMRA).  An important part of the needed regulatory infrastructure including 
secondary legislation, ordinances, communiqués etc. has been prepared and adopted. These are 
more or less in line with the current legislation in the EU, with a few exceptions. Nevertheless, 
progress with actual development of a competitive wholesale market has been relatively slow.
Privatization of distribution companies was taken as milestone in restructuring of the Turkish 
electricity but has so far not taken effect. The transmission system is organized as a separate state 
owned legal entity which satisfies the unbundling requirement of the EU 2003 directive. Howe-
ver, this is not the case in the distribution segment.  In Turkey, distribution is subject to only 
accounting separation from generation and retail supply. Hence the current arrangements are not 
in line with the EU Directives. Regarding separation between distribution and retail activities, 
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the situation is moderated by the Competition Authority decision requiring legal separation after 
privatization. The most important factor that has delayed the development of electricity markets 
has been the fact that the government has been unwilling to raise the tariffs on the default services 
provided by distribution companies, squeezing the margins of independent generators between 
low retail prices and rising gas costs. 
Gas: Regarding the dependence of electricity generation to gas, security and economy in the supp-
ly of gas is an important condition for growth in the sector. The Natural Gas market Law which 
was enacted in April 2001 ended the monopoly of BOTAŞ except for “national transmission li-
nes”. Private transmission companies can build and own transmission lines, under the condition 
that these lines be interconnected with the existing system. Distribution of natural gas has been 
undertaken by the municipalities and private companies. Despite some progress in harmonization, 
actual competition in the natural gas industry has not been accomplished, and BOTAŞ continues 
to keep an almost monopoly position in wholesale gas trade.
Although some progress has been experienced in harmonization with the EU acquis, develop-
ment of competition in the gas industry faces deeper problems than the electricity industry. The 
main problem has to do with the fact that BOTAŞ holds gas contracts with suppliers and only 
a small percentage has been so far released to the private sector.. BOTAŞ’s vertical unbundling 
should proceed as planned to prevent any incentives to discriminate against new entrants. 
Rail Transport: The share of rail transport among all transport means has declined drastically 
both in Europe and Turkey. In 1950, 78% of Turkish freight transport was carried by railways; by 
1999 the ratio had decreased to 5%. Efficient rail transport requires investing in railway infrastru-
cture to increase geographic reach, technology level and interoperability; while restructuring any 
incumbent railway operator, liberalising the market to allow new entrants and boosting competi-
tiveness of railway industry to gain market share, especially from road transport.
Turkish railway infrastructure which connects only 37 of 81 provincial centres has suffered from 
underinvestment. Furthermore, the Turkish regulatory framework remains unsatisfactory.  A draft 
law entitled “Railway Framework Law” was prepared to establish the legislative and institutional 
framework to deregulate the railways market in accordance with the EU acquis. According to the 
new law, infrastructure management and operations will be separate Directorates General under 
the common roof of a holding structure. The framework law establishes the railway authority in-
dependent from any railway undertaking to ensure fair competition in the rail market, supervising 
the railway companies and infrastructure manager on safety issues, licensing and interoperability. 
Vertical separation of TCDD is a necessary step for rail reform in order to allow service companies 
to compete with equal access rights to infrastructures at non-discriminating charges.
De-regulation and liberalisation of rail services is a complex and difficult process. The process 
of de-regulation and liberalisation is still ongoing in the EU. Vertical separation, accounting or 
institutional, constitutes the backbone of EU regulation in the railway sector. This is complemen-
ted by allowing free and non-discriminatory access to the railway network and enhanced by the 
separation of accounting for transport services (passenger & freight) and PSOs. Turkey uses the 
EU acquis as a blueprint for its own regulatory reforms. Regulatory reforms aim to provide better 
conditions for competition in the markets, quality services at competitive prices for customers as 
well as transparency and accountability. Furthermore, better identification of inefficiencies and 
loss making operations and preventing the cross-subsidization of competitive activities from non-
competitive ones for predatory purposes.
Road Transport: Road is the primary mode of transport in Turkey.  Thanks to the investment in 
highways over the past 20 years Turkish road network is quite developed. The sector boasts a consi-
derable number of service providers. As a result sector remains competitive with regard to alterna-
tive modes of transport.  In 2005, 95% of total freight was carried by road transport in Turkey.
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In Turkish road transport market, there has been a serious progress in terms of harmonising the 
Turkish road transport legislation with the EU acquis. A new Road Transport Law and the bylaws 
adopted in 2003 and 2004 have created a similar regulatory framework for road transport services; 
and defined market access rules based on the criteria of good repute, financial standing and profes-
sional competence, as in the EU. There are nonetheless some residual differences in the regulatory 
framework stemming from the difference of the market structures. The Road Transport Law and 
Bylaws address the fact that the sector is too fragmented and the vast majority of players are too 
small. As a result, market access rules and licensing provisions are adapted to Turkish market. The 
proper implementation of the law is expected to lead to consolidation and transformation of the 
sector, and allow market players to achieve economies of scale. The sector would then be able to 
assume the EU directives more precisely.
Air Transport: The tariff liberalisation bill introduced in 2001 enabled the fast development of 
the airline industry. In the last three years the number of planes increased from 150 to 261; num-
ber of domestic passengers increased from 9,1 million to 28,8 million and number of domestic 
flights increased from 156.301 to 343.956. Along with the public private partnership model and 
in particular the build-operate-transfer option, 1.15 billion USD was channeled in the last couple 
of years for airport construction.
The Turkish legislation in the area of air transport is compatible in many respects with the EU 
acquis e.g. licensing, flights permits and slot allocation.  However, harmonisation is not comp-
lete. The current opaque system of imposing public service obligations (PSOs) on air carriers as 
a condition to grant route permits would be replaced with a more objective and transparent set 
of conditions which would also be compatible with the EU acquis. A regulatory harmonisation 
would also require Turkey to amend its existing bilateral air transport agreements and do away 
with the legal duopolies and price fixing arrangements created on some international routes to the 
benefit of the national flag carrier THY. This would enable other privately owned air carriers to 
compete on a more equal footing with THY on these routes. Moreover, Turkey has not adopted 
yet a state aids monitoring legislation. There are some areas that can be considered to run afoul 
competition rules.  
Further harmonisation with the EU acquis should bring additional benefits as increased com-
petition, productivity and transparency, and positive impact on cost and quality. The incorporati-
on of Turkey within the Single European Space will increase the competition in the sector as EU 
carriers can begin to service the Turkish market as Turkish carriers can then operate between and 
within EU countries without any discrimination. 
Maritime Transport: Turkish maritime sector is in a transition phase characterized by a gradual 
shift from state run and state held assets to private enterprise. In the area of port management, 
the privatization process is well under way and some of Turkey’s main ports have been successfully 
privatized. In the area of maritime transport, the focus is on the need for a more business friendly 
regulation so as to eliminate the current impediments to the growth of cabotage as well as transit 
trade. As mentioned in the Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey regarding maritime transport, 
progress remains limited as regards the degree of the adoption of the EU acquis. The full range 
of IMO’s sea safety and security regulations including SOLAS 78, SOLAS 88, Load Line 88 and 
Mar-Pol are yet to be adopted by Turkey. In terms of market entry regulations, the discriminatory 
provisions of the ship registry are to be overhauled. Finally additional investments in institutional 
enforcement capacity would lead to an enhanced reputation for Turkish ships traveling in interna-
tional waters. The corresponding decrease in detention rates would increase the competitiveness of 
the Turkish fleet in providing international maritime transport services. Adoption of the EU acquis 
in sea transport is expected to have a relatively large impact on the Turkish sea transport industry 
with respect to an increase in competition in cabotage services, and a lessening of red-tape in port 
services and customs procedures.
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1.1. Introduction
The liberalisation of telecom services significantly contributed to economic growth and competi-
tiveness in many developed and developing countries over the past decades. Economists widely 
agree on the “enabling” nature of promoting competitive telecom infrastructures, which pave the 
way towards the development of innovative services, thus boosting competitiveness, growth and 
jobs, to the ultimate benefit of consumers. Among the many contributions that can be found 
in the economic literature, Roller and Waverman (2001) found that one-third of the economic 
growth in a group of 21 OECD countries over the 20-year period 1970–1990 could be attributed 
to the direct and indirect impact of investments in the telecommunications sector. Today, elec-
tronic communications account for at least 45% of productivity growth in the EU27, and in other 
geographic areas such as the US and the Far East the contribution is even greater.1 
Economists also agree on the importance of Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) investment as a key driver of productivity. Likewise, a vibrant and competitive telecom-
munications sector contributes to economic growth and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth 
through many direct and indirect channels. In Europe, slow uptake of ICT by businesses seems 
to have hampered labour productivity growth in the past few years, but in 2006 an inverted trend 
was observed. Hourly labour productivity growth in the telecom sector accelerated from 4.9% to 
8.4% over the periods 1980-1995 and 1996-2004.2 As reported by the European Commission in 
the 2007 progress report on the i2010 strategy, electronic communication services today “account 
for 35% of value added of the ICT sector, or 1.8% of the EU economy, and drive 12% of overall 
labour productivity growth”.3
Not surprisingly, the liberalisation of telecom services has become one of the key pillars of the 
EU Lisbon strategy, later renamed “partnership for growth and jobs”, and noticeable steps in the 
direction of creating a “world-class, competitive telecommunication infrastructure” have been 
made after the 2002 regulatory framework for electronic communications entered into force. The 
adoption, in June 2005, of the i2010 strategy has marked a new step forward in the direction of 
creating the “information society for all” in Europe, and Brussels policymakers have constantly 
been striving to boost the development of competitive and innovative telecoms markets to reach 
the ambitious goals set in the EU agenda. 
The recent 12th Report on the implementation of the 2002 regulatory framework has confir-
med that significant progress has been made in Europe as regards the liberalisation of telecom 
services.4 This trend – also confirmed by industry documents such as the ECTA scorecard – must 
be carefully assessed in light of the more general perspective of increasingly mature fixed and 2G 
mobile markets, the slow uptake of 3G telephony, and the need to encourage investment in Next 
Generation Access Networks, which promise to contribute substantially to the creation of those 
digital interactive platforms that will shape the “information society for all”. Accordingly, the Eu-
ropean Commission is currently working on the review of the 2002 framework, which will argu-
ably feature, i.a., the removal of ex ante regulation in some retail markets, increased coordination 
1  See Renda (2007), Transatlantic Telecoms: the Pros and Cons of Convergence, forthcoming in “Sleeping Giant”, 
Johns Hopkins University. 
2  By comparison in the US, hourly labour productivity grew by 3.4% and 4.4% over the same periods in the 
telecommunication sectors, as reported by Jean Claude Trichet, President of the ECB in a recent speech. 
See The need for structural reforms in Europe, 4 June 2007, available online at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/
date/2007/html/ sp070604.en.html. 
3  For examples of ways in which lower telecommunication costs increase productivity, see, e.g., Burnham 
(2007), at 3. 
4  Communication, European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets 2006 (12th Report), 
COM(2007)155, 29 March 2007. 
EdamENG.indd   27 1/3/08   2:19:16 PM
28
of spectrum policy, and a revision of the definition of universal service and users’ rights.5 
With the European enlargement process, adoption of the EU acquis in the telecom sector 
(Chapter 19 of the acquis) has become one of the most challenging tasks for accession countries: 
new member states were called to conform to the new regulatory framework within a rather short 
timeframe, and many of them are still struggling with the complexity of the framework. As a 
result, the current state of telecoms liberalisation in Europe portrays a rather mixed picture, with 
some countries – especially those who could count on a legacy cable infrastructure – experiencing 
fast growth and a significantly dynamic environment; whereas others, including most Southern 
European countries, still lag behind in terms of the implementation of the regulatory framework, 
and consequently of broadband deployment, entry of new players and availability of innovative, 
appealing services for consumers. 
Against this background, the Turkish telecommunication market experienced important chan-
ges in the past few years, with the privatisation of the incumbent operator Turk Telecom and a 
significant uptake of mobile telephony. As occurred in many Southern Mediterranean countries, 
Turkey adopted a regulatory regime broadly in line with the EU framework, although primary 
legislation is more in line with the 1998 framework (the so-called “Open Network Provisions”) 
than with the subsequent, far-reaching regulatory framework. As remarked by the European Com-
mission in its recent 2006 progress report, in many areas “Turkey has not adopted new legislation 
that would align it with the 2002 framework”.6 
As of today, Turkey certainly represents one of the most important emerging telecommunicati-
ons markets: with a population of approximately 70 million, the lowest per capita GDP in OECD 
countries, a 27% penetration rate of fixed-line telephony, 60% penetration of 2G mobile, very 
low broadband penetration, potential growth in 3G and important regulatory reforms, it is fair to 
state that the potential for vibrant developments in this country is remarkable.7 The acquisition of 
mobile operator Telsim by Vodafone at the end of 2005 testifies of the attractiveness, as well as the 
growth potential, of the Turkish market for foreign, global operators.8
The absence of adequate competitive safeguards and a poor investment climate have been con-
sidered as major causes of the currently inadequate broadband uptake in Turkey. Figure 1-1 below 
shows that Turkey, with a 3.8% broadband penetration rate, lags behind most OECD countri-
es. In addition, Turkey exhibits also the lowest subscription rate, i.e. even if broadband covered 
the whole territory, broadband subscriptions would not overcome 21.8% according to recent 
calculations.9 Furthermore, as shown in the figure, Turkey’s broadband infrastructure is entirely 
dependent on the DSL technology with almost no endowment of cable, fibre/LAN and other te-
chnologies, including 3G. Accordingly, Turkey hardly compares to the OECD average penetration 
rate, currently at 10.8%. 
5  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the review of the EU regulatory framework for 
electronic communications networks and services, COM(2006) 334 final, 28 June 2006.
6  See Turkey 2006 Progress Report, SEC(2006) 1390, 8 November 2006, p. 42. 
7  See, e.g., Burnham, J. B., (2007), Telecommunications Policy in Turkey: Dismantling Barriers to Growth, Tel-
ecommunications Policy 31, at 197–208. 
8  See Vodafone press release at http://www.vodafone.com/start/media_relations/news/ group_press_releas-
es/2005/press_release13_12.html. 
9  See Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak (2007), The Broadband Performance Index: A Policy-Relevant Method of 
Comparing Broadband Adoption Among Countries, Phoenix Center Policy Paper n. 29, July 2007. 
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Figure 1-1: Broadband penetration in OECD countries, December 2006 
Source: OECD
Needless to say, as fixed and mobile markets in Europe become more mature, there seem to be 
rather interesting prospects for further aligning the Turkish telecoms regulation with the EU acquis, 
as Turkey may experience increased investment in telecoms infrastructure and welfare-enhancing, 
committed entry of EU players into its quite attractive market. At the same time, fully adopting the 
EU acquis may not suffice to bring Turkey in line with other EU countries. Progress in competition 
policy as well as in the independence of sectoral regulators and the judicial are needed to improve 
the business environment, and the removal of overly burdensome taxation – especially on mobile 
services – seems essential for the pace of development of Turkish telecom service providers. 
On the other hand, Turkey may profit from past experience in devising its future regulatory 
framework. First, as occurred also in many new member states, mobile telephony has outpaced 
landline penetration since 2001, with many households now becoming “mobile only”. Data on 
the penetration rate of fixed and mobile telephony in Turkey show that, mobile penetration is 
now approaching 70% in 2006. This, in turn, means that investment in broadband deployment 
to fill the significant gap shown in Figure 1-1 may concentrate on mobile broadband, as well as 
in broadband wireless access technologies. This would allow Turkey to fill in the broadband gap 
relatively quickly, as occurred, for example, in Baltic states, where WiFi and WiMax are in a good 
state of deployment.  
Secondly, as the Turkish regulatory framework is still partly based on the ONP regime, adop-
ting legislation to fully align with the EU acquis may allow Turkey to rely on the European expe-
rience since mid-2003, when the 2002 framework became operational; useful lessons can also be 
drawn from the ongoing review process, which aims to remedy some of the key problems faced by 
EU member states in coping with the 2002 framework – not least, patchy implementation of the 
framework, burdensome market review processes, and lengthy appeals processes. 
Thirdly, Turkey may draw useful lessons from the current EU acquis in trying to devise a 
flexible and technology-neutral regulatory regime, which does not miss the “broader” picture. For 
example, the importance of spectrum availability and management, the need to carefully appraise 
the importance of content and IPR protection in the digital environment, and the need to enable 
the creation of digital platforms by adopting a “business model” approach would contribute to the 
creation of an efficient and effective set of rules, to the benefit of Turkish consumers. After all, the 
EU acquis on telecoms is not only limited to the five Directives that compose the 2002 regulatory 
framework for e-communications: it includes the Recommendation on relevant markets, the Te-
levision Without Frontiers directive, the Directives on data protection, the 2002 Radio Spectrum 
Decision, and a sophisticated corpus of legislation on consumer protection and IPR protection, 
not to mention its well-developed competition law. 
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This Chapter contains a comparative analysis of the EU and Turkish regulatory frameworks 
for e-communications, as well as of market developments in the two areas, and aims to assess the 
potential welfare improvement that would accrue to Turkish citizens, if Turkey fully aligned with 
the EU acquis in this field. The main issues tackled in the next sections are thus the following: 
How does the Regulatory framework in Turkey compare with that in the EU? Would Turkey profit 
from aligning with the EU telecom acquis at all? What impact would be felt on prices for telecom 
services, on productivity, growth and employment? Are there any features in the ongoing review of 
the 2002 framework that would significantly affect Turkey’s position vis-à-vis the alignment with 
the EU acquis?
Accordingly, Section 1.2 summarises the EU acquis in the telecom field, and reports current 
problems and prospects in the implementation of the (revised) framework in future years. Section 
1.3 describes the current state of the Turkish regulatory regime, highlights the most relevant and 
recent market data, by comparing them with corresponding data from EU member states; iden-
tifies the main impacts that would result from aligning Turkey’s regulatory regime with the EU 
acquis; and finally draws some policy conclusions and recommendations. 
1.2. The EU Acquis on e-Communications
The current regulatory framework on electronic communications in Europe is the result of two 
decades of constant attempts to promote the liberalisation of telecom equipment, infrastructure 
and services. Until the mid-nineties, the EU telecom sector was mostly dominated by state-owned 
incumbents, which retained the exclusive right to operate networks and supply telecom services. 
The growing importance of the sector – testified also by the inclusion in the list of Trans-European 
Networks referred to at Art. 154 EU Treaty, introduced after the Maastricht Treaty – and the iner-
tia of most national regulators in launching ambitious liberalisation programmes were such that 
the European Commission eventually took the lead in promoting technical harmonisation and 
the elimination of special and exclusive rights attributed to public monopolists. The most relevant 
early initiative in this respect was the 1987 Green Paper on the Development of the Common 
Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, followed by a Commission Communi-
cation of 9 February 1988 and a Council Resolution of 30 June 1988, which set the end of 1992 
as a deadline for implementation; however, the deadline was eventually not met.10 
Liberalisation was initially focused on telecommunication equipment, with Directive 88/301, 
based on Art. 86 EU Treaty; and on telecom services, with Directive 388/90, which laid the foun-
dations for liberalising value-added services, but excluded voice telephony.11 According to Directi-
ve 388/90, member states were bound to: (i) eliminate special and exclusive rights to supply value-
added services granted to state monopolists; (ii) ensure that information on technical interfaces 
needed for access to public networks were published by 31 December 1990; (iii) adopt measures 
to ensure that access to public telephone networks was granted at objective and non-discrimina-
10  Green Paper, Towards a Dynamic European Economy. Green Paper on the Development of the Common 
Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment. COM (87) 290 final, 30 June 1987.
11  Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications 
services. OJ L 192, 24 July 1990, p. 9. Article 2 of this Directive stated that Member States should withdraw 
all special or exclusive rights for the supply of telecommunications services other than voice telephony. As 
regards packet-switched data services, Article 3 stated that Member States could prohibit economic operators 
from offering leased line capacity for simple resale to the public. Article 4 said that Member States which 
maintained special or exclusive rights for the provision and operation of public telecommunications net-
works would take the necessary measures to ensure that the conditions governing access to the networks, and 
in particular leased circuits, were fair and non-discriminatory. In addition, Article 5 asked the Member States 
to publish the technical interface characteristics necessary for the use of networks before 31 December 1990. 
Finally, Article 7 called for the appointment of independent regulatory bodies at national level to carry out 
the tasks specified in the directive from 1 July 1991. 
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tory conditions.12 This Directive was later amended in many occasions, and its scope was extended 
to satellite networks (Directive 94/46), cable networks (Directive 95/51), and cellular networks 
(Directive 96/2). 
1.2.1. The “1998 Package”
As already recalled, Directive 388/90 did not mandate the removal of special and exclusive rights 
for voice telephony services, which were granted a temporary derogation ex Article 90.2 of the EU 
Treaty. The main reason for this derogation was the need to preserve the financial viability and 
the universal service mission of incumbent firms, tightly linked to voice telephony revenues. Only 
in 1996, with Directive 96/19, the Commission announced the upcoming liberalisation of voice 
services, as well as of the supply of telecom infrastructures, by 1 January 1998. This Directive man-
dated that member states granted interconnection with the PSTN at transparent and non-discri-
minatory conditions, by requiring wireline incumbents to publish their reference interconnection 
offer not later than 1 July 1997.  
The problem of funding universal service obligations (USO) had been tackled already in the 
1994 Council Resolution on the principles of universal service in the telecommunications sector, 
as well as in the 1996 Commission Communication on “universal service for telecommunications 
in the perspective of a fully-liberalized environment”.13 A more precise definition was introduced 
with Directive 97/33 of the European Parliament and the Council, on “interconnection in Tele-
communications with regard to ensuring universal service and interoperability through applicati-
on of the principles of Open Network Provision (ONP)”. This Directive – which adopted a broad 
and flexible definition of universal service – was coupled with a Communication on “Assessment 
Criteria for National Schemes for the Costing and Financing of Universal Service in Telecommu-
nications and Guidelines for the Member States on Operation of Such Schemes”.14 
Once again, however, the deadline set by Directive 96/19 was not met by the majority of mem-
ber states. Interconnection offers had not been published, nor had national regulatory authorities 
been created in all countries.15 These disappointing results starkly contrasted with the emphasis 
12  Directive 388/90/EEC led to resistance by member states such as Spain, France, Belgium and Italy. Spain, 
with the support of France, lodged an appeal with the ECJ for the annulment of the Directive in relation to 
Article 2 insofar as it affected special rights and also in relation to articles 8 and 9. Italy applied for the full an-
nulment of articles 2, 4 and 8, whereas Belgium applied for the annulment of the whole Directive. The Court 
of Justice published its Judgment on 17th November 1992, stating that “The Court has held that the mere fact 
of creating a dominant position by granting exclusive rights within the meaning of Article 90(1) of the Treaty is not 
as such incompatible with Article 86” [currently Article 82]. In addition the ECJ stated that “the extension of 
the monopoly on the establishment and operation of the telephone network to the market in telephone equipment, 
without any objective justification, was prohibited as such by Article 86, or by Article 90(1) in conjunction with 
Article 86, where that extension resulted from a State measure, thus leading to the elimination of competition … 
The same conclusion necessarily follows where the monopoly on establishment and operation extends to the market 
in telecommunications services”. Judgment of the Court of 17 November 1992. - Kingdom of Spain, Kingdom 
of Belgium and Italian Republic v Commission of the European Communities. - Competition in the mar-
kets for telecommunications services. – Joined cases C-271/90, C-281/90 and C-289/90. Luxembourg, 17 
November 1992. 
13  See Council Resolution of 7 February 1994 on universal service principles in the telecommunicati-
ons sector, OJ C 48, 16.2.1994, p. 1–2; and the Communication to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Universal service 
for telecommunications in the perspective of a fully liberalised environment, COM (96)73, 13 March 
1996. 
14  COM (96) 608 final, 27.11.1996
15  The state of advancement of the liberalisation process was, in other words, unsatisfactory, although between 
1998 and 1999 prices for international calls had fallen on average by 40%, domestic non-local calls by 30% 
and local calls by 13%; meanwhile, the sector’s value had increased by 12.6%, reaching 161 billion euros.
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with which the Commission announced the liberalisation of telecom services in 1998, a mismatch 
similar to that occurred in the US when the 1996 Communications Act was defined as a “Came-
lot moment”16. For this reason, the “1999 Review” was launched to develop what would later be 
called the “new regulatory framework”, entered into force in the EU15 in July 2003. 
1.2.2. The “2002 Regulatory Framework” and the “Investment 
Ladder”
The 2002 regulatory framework is composed by five Directives and a Council decision, and relies 
on three fundamental pillars17:
• Technology neutrality. This principle refers to the need to avoid regulating different tech-
nologies differently, and implies that a flexible, horizontal regulatory regime is applied to all 
technologies, in order to ensure a level playing field between industry players. 
• Gradual transition to ex post competition policy. Ex ante sectoral regulation is expected to 
fade away once sufficient competition has developed in the market, leaving scrutiny of 
competition in the market only to ex post competition policy. To this end, the 2003 Recom-
mendation on the relevant markets introduced three main criteria, against which the need 
to regulate a market ex ante should be assessed. According o the “three criteria test”, if a 
given relevant market is characterised by: (i) significant structural, legal or regulatory entry 
barriers; (ii) the absence of a long-run tendency towards competition; and (iii) features such 
that ex post competition seems to be insufficient, then the market should be regulated ex 
ante, if any of the players is found to hold Significant Market Power (SMP). With the 2003 
Recommendation, the Commission already identified eighteen relevant markets, which pre-
sumptively fulfil the three criteria. Each national regulatory authority (NRA) was called to 
analyse the eighteen markets, notify players with SMP and apply proportionate remedies 
from a list of available options included in the Access Directive.18 Under Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive, the European Commission has then the possibility of challenging the 
NRAs’ market definition and finding of SMP, but not the choice of remedies. 
• Emerging markets. The new regulatory framework adopts a cautious approach as regards 
16  See the speech by Van Miert at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/ text/sp1998_001_en.html. And 
See Renda (2005), Telecom Services: a Transatlantic Perspective, in Hamilton, D.S. and J. P. Quinlan, “Deep Integ-
ration. How Transatlantic Markets are Leading Globalization”, CEPS Paperback Books, Chapter 11, 2005.
17  The new regulatory framework is composed by Directive (2002/21/EC) on a Common Regulatory Fra-
mework, OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.33; Directive (2002/19/EC) on Access and Interconnection, OJ L 108, 
24.4.2002, p.7; Directive (2002/20/EC) on Authorisations, OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.21; Directive (2002/21/
EC) on Universal Service and User’s Rights, OJ L 108, 24.4.2002, p.51; Directive (2002/21/EC) concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Dire-
ctive on privacy and electronic communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p.37; Decision no 676/2002/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a regulatory framework for radio spectrum 
policy in the European Community (Radio Spectrum Decision), OJ L 108 of 24.04.2002. In addition, two 
recommendations were issued by the Commission: the Commission Recommendation of 23 July 2003 on 
notifications, time limits and consultations provided for in Article 7 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic com-
munications networks and services (C(2003)2647 final); and The Communication on Relevant Product and 
Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance 
with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory fra-
mework for electronic communication networks and services, C(2003)497, 11.02.2003. Finally, it is worth 
mentioning the Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power 
under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (2002/C 
165/03). 
18  For the choice of remedies, see the 2003 ERG Common Position on the Approach to Appropriate Remedies 
in the New Regulatory Framework, ERG(03)30 rev1. 
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emerging markets, where the competitive equilibrium is in fieri, and it is consequently hard 
to predict whether stable SMP will emerge overtime. The Framework Directive – at Article 
4 – states that under these assumptions, the relevant market should not be regulated ex 
ante.19 
Technology neutrality and the extensive use of tools borrowed from the realm of antitrust sc-
rutiny were the most praised features of the new regulatory framework, to the extent that some 
US commentators pointed at the EU rules as a useful reference in the ongoing review of the 1996 
Communications Act.20 In the implementation phase, a significant role was played by the Europe-
an Regulators Group (ERG), which undertook the difficult task of coordinating regulatory activi-
ties carried out by NRAs.21 In particular, the ERG recommended in several occasions that NRAs 
make extensive reference to the “investment ladder” model, originally rooted in the US “stepping 
stones” approach and proposed for Europe by Cave et al. (2001). This reference model entails 
that no real trade-off is established between short-run service-based competition and long-run, 
infrastructure-based competition – i.e., the only type of competition recognised as sustainable in 
the long-run, and the real objective of the framework. Figure 1-2 below illustrates an example of 
the investment ladder. 
Figure 1-2: The ‘investment ladder’
 
In order to make the ladder operational, according to Cave (2006), NRAs are called to follow a 
precise sequence of actions, as follows.
• Define replicability. The guiding principle available for NRAs is found in the first of the three 
criteria provided by the Commission in the Recommendation on relevant markets, i.e. the 
existence of “high and non-transitory” barriers to entry. Of course, while some assets will 
always be defined as inherently non-replicable in the short-term – the prominent example 
being the local loop – the inclusion of other assets would depend on how broadly replicabil-
ity is interpreted. 
• Identify easily-replicable assets, non-replicable assets and assets in an intermediate position to sort 
out rungs that warrant access regulation. This includes a thorough and forward-looking as-
sessment of replication possibilities and/or potential facilities-based competition in the long 
run. As a result, NRAs will have to pursue actual replication of observed components both 
19  See, for example, Recital 27 of Directive 2002/21/EC and Recital 15 of the 2003 Recommendation on rele-
vant markets, C(2003)497. 
20  Speta (2006), Rewriting US Telecommunications Law with an Eye on Europe, in Preissl and Mueller, “Govern-
ance of Communications Networks“, Phisica-Verlag, 2006, at 11-36. 
21  The European Regulators Group (“ERG”) was created by Commission Decision 2002/627/EC adopted on 
29 July 2002. It is composed of the heads of the NRAs, and acts as an interface between them and the Eu-
ropean Commission in order to “advise and assist the Commission in consolidating the internal market for 
electronic communications networks and services”. See http://erg.eu.int. 
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when this is already feasible and when it is likely to become feasible in the near future.
• Rank non-replicable components in the value chain. In other words, NRAs must build the 
ladder and identify all rungs. This step is crucial and challenging, as rungs must not be too 
distant in terms of incremental investment needed, and accurate timing needs to be set in 
order for the transition to facilities-based competition to be as rapid as possible, without 
distorting competition and/or creating possibilities for arbitrage by new entrants. 
• Identify where on the ladder market players are located. This is another delicate task, in that it 
aims at preventing the ladder to proceed too slowly or even backwards, with players falling 
down the ladder. Without this mapping exercise, arbitrage becomes almost inevitable: the 
ladder cannot be successfully implemented if the regulator does not know which players are 
on which rung. 
• Choose the most appropriate rung on which intervention should be focused. As specified by 
Martin Cave (2005), this decision must be based “on an analysis of the scale and prospects 
of the operators at various points, with a bias in favour of what might be described as ‘lead-
ing competitors’, defined as those more advanced in their infrastructure-building and satis-
fying a minimum market share criterion”.
• Estimate the amount of investment needed to move from one rung to another up the ladder and 
the correct timing of such move. This depends on how distant are the chosen rungs, but also 
on market conditions, such as the time needed for a new entrant to achieve sufficient econo-
mies of scale and installed customer base to be able to climb the ladder. 
• Identify the most appropriate remedy, which in the case of the investment ladder normally im-
plies granting access to the incumbent’s infrastructure through cost-oriented charges. Given 
the high investments at stake and the degree of uncertainty inevitably brought by the ladder 
on the possibility to recover sunk investments, access pricing might not be limited to LRIC 
(long-run incremental cost) pricing or other forms of cost-based pricing, and might include 
some remuneration of investment risk, e.g. ‘real option pricing’.22
• Monitor market structure. In the ladder model, NRAs have a fairly heavy responsibility: they 
have to provide efficient entry incentives with the right timing. This implies that the NRA 
mandates access at rather low prices at the chosen rung, while keeping access charges high 
at other rungs. After the new entrants have achieved enough scale, the NRA will raise the 
price for access to that rung and mandate access to the upper rung at more appealing prices, 
so that players will have an incentive to move up the ladder.23
Most NRAs reportedly followed the investment ladder approach in the first years of implementati-
on of the new framework. The ERG also reported that the investment ladder model can – at least 
a posteriori – explain some of the achievements of the new framework.24 
1.2.2.1. Did the 2002 Framework Deliver?
As the Turkish regulatory framework on telecoms still echoes the EU 1998 package, it is worth 
assessing whether the subsequent step made by the EU, the 2002 framework, actually delivered 
significant results in terms of opening up markets to competition and boosting growth and jobs. 
22  See Cave (2006). 
23  This would be best achieved if new entrants could climb the ladder simultaneously: otherwise, later entrants 
might find it unfeasible to undertake very high investments to enter at a high level of the ladder, and might 
also experience problems in entering the market at lower rungs, if NRAs are currently discouraging existing 
players from remaining on those rungs through high access charges.
24  See ERG, Broadband Market Competition Report, ERG(05)23, 25 May 2005. 
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This way, we would be able to comment on the welfare-enhancing potential of Turkey’s full adop-
tion of the 2002 framework. 
After four years from the entry into force of the new regulatory framework, the results are 
mixed. On the one hand, the 12th Report shows some tangible signs of improvement. In particu-
lar, ongoing consolidation of the internal market has created new opportunities for cross-border 
intra-EU investment, with some telecom firms now earning a substantial part of their shares in 
non-domestic markets. Since 2005, M&A activity has resurged, and cross-border transactions 
– driven by the search for economies of scale and the implementation of pan-European strategies 
– were conservatively estimated by the European Commission at approximately €70 billion in 
both 2005 and 2006.25 
The list of recent mergers includes the following: 
• Spanish Telefonica acquired UK mobile operator O2 for €24 billion; 
• Wind (Italy) was acquired by Orascom (Egypt) for €12.1 billion;
• TDC, the Danish incumbent, was acquired by the US/UK firm NTC for €8.2 billion;
• France Telecom acquired the Spanish mobile operator Amena for €6.4 billion;
• In the UK, NTL acquired both Telewest (€5 billion) and Virgin Mobile (€1.3 billion);
• Cesky Telecom (Czech Republic) was acquired by Vodafone for €3.7 billion;
• The US-based Blackstone Group invested 2.7 billion euros to buy a 4.5% stake of the Ger-
man incumbent Deutsche Telekom;
• Deutsche Telekom, in turn, acquired Austrian Tele-ring for €1.3 billion. 
On top of this, European players have started investing more heavily in non-EU operations. As 
shown in Figure 1-3 below, players such as Vodafone, Telefonica, Telenor, Portugal Telecom and 
Deutsche Telekom are very active outside the European borders. In addition, most of the larger 
players are now present in other national markets, and there has been a notable trend in invest-
ment in the new Member States by some of the more established players as well as by pan-Euro-
pean and local new entrants. In 2006, for example, France Telecom expanded its mobile phone 
network operations (under the Orange brand) in as many as ten EU member states, and challenges 
the position of truly global operators such as Vodafone.
Figure 1-3: Geographical breakdown of sales for leading EU telcos in 2005
 
25  According to an Apr. 20 report from Standard & Poor’s Equity Research, in the first quarter of 2006, M&A 
deals where the value was disclosed totaled €380 billion – almost triple the amount in the comparable period 
of 2005. See also European Commission, European Electronic Communications Regulation and Markets, 12th 
Report, COM (2007)155, 29 March 2007, Vol. 1, at 10.
* Sales of O2 not consolidated with those of Telefonica at the end of 2005 Source: IDATE (2006)
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As regards price levels, Figures below show that prices for local and national call charges have 
fallen significantly between 1998 and 2006, especially for national calls, where the most signifi-
cant reduction was observed,26 about 75%. 
Figure 1-4: Local and national call charges in the EU25, 1999-2006
 
Source: Teligen (2006)
In addition:
• Mobile termination rates, traditionally high in Europe also as a result of the application of 
the calling-party-pays (CPP) principle, have fallen down to an average 11.4 €cents/minute, 
a reduction of 22% since October 2004. 
• During the same timeframe, the average mobile penetration rate has risen from 84.6% to 
103.2%. A significant example is that of Poland, a member state since 2004, which saw a 
36% increase in mobile penetration from October 2004 to October 2006. The penetration 
rate in most Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece) and in many new 
member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) has now overcome 100%. 
• The average market share of leading operators in the mobile sector is also declining, down 
from 40% to 39.4% between October 2004 and October 2006, although in some countries 
(e.g. Cyprus, Slovenia) the leading operator still holds a share between 70% and 90%. 
• In the fixed-line sector, the incumbent’s market share has constantly declined in the past few 
years, down to an average 65.8% at December 2005. 
• As regards wholesale services, the EU average monthly price for LLU declined from 13.3€ 
to 11.5€ between October 2004 and October 2006. 
• The Commission reports evidence in support of the ladder of investment, by showing that 
bitstream access (5.13 million lines) slightly fell between 2005 and 2006, whereas local loop 
unbundling rose to 13.9 million lines in October 2006 (+58% from October 2005). At the 
same time, however, also resale increased significantly. 
However, delays in the implementation of the framework at national level – with one member 
state (Greece) completing the transposition of primary legislation only in June 2006 – and difficul-
ties in market analyses and in implementing the ‘ladder’ approach have led to slow liberalization 
of most national markets, as well as regulatory uncertainty for industry players. Accordingly, real 
infrastructure-based competition is missing in many EU member states.27 As recalled by Commis-
26  See Teligen, Report on Telecoms Price Developments from 1998 to 2006, a Report for the European Commis-
sion, December 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/ doc/info_centre/
studies_ext_consult/price_developments_1998_2006/Infso_tariff_trends_report_1998_2006_en.pdf.
27  See the survey by London Economics and PwC for the European Commission, An assessment of the regula-
tory framework for electronic communications: growth and investment in the EU e-Communications sector, 
July 2006. 
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sioner Reding in a recent speech, Europe has moved to “a competitive environment where a large 
number of telecom service providers thrive. This is based to a good part on service-based compe-
tition but whenever possible we should increasingly seek more infrastructure-based competition 
which is sustainable in the long term”28. As an example, only in a few European countries cable 
holds a significant share of the broadband market, whereas DSL dominates the scene and 3G still 
offers a barely comparable customer experience.
In particular, in 2006 CEPS (2006) reported the following problems:
• Market analyses are too resource-intensive and time-consuming for both NRAs and market play-
ers. As acknowledged also by Commissioner Viviane Reding, defining at least 450 markets 
in a timely manner is not an easy task, and adds considerable complexity to the New Regu-
latory Framework (NRF).29 Moreover, national regulatory authorities (NRAs) had to cope 
with new policy tools – partially borrowed from competition policy practice – and this 
might have slowed down the process even further. A cause of delay in the implementation of 
the NRF was also the suspensory effect of appeals procedures before national courts, which 
also deserve careful attention in the upcoming review.
• Other problems have emerged as a result of the fact that the NRF has only partially adopted 
the tools of competition policy. The equation between a finding of SMP (significant market 
power), i.e. dominance, and the application of regulatory remedies might be justified by the 
need to open up previous monopolies (e.g. by mandating access to incumbents’ fixed net-
works), but is far less justified where no previous monopolies existed (e.g. in mobile termi-
nation). To be sure, with the migration to IP-based (internet protocol) networks, such a link 
will become weaker. In addition, concerns emerged on the partial application of the ‘three-
criteria test’. Uncertainty might emerge since the three-criteria test is to be considered as a 
gating mechanism to decide whether or not it is appropriate to carry out a market review in 
a specific sector or market. However, peculiar features of national markets may suggest the 
definition of relevant markets that are either narrower or (more likely) broader than those 
listed in the Recommendation. If the three-criteria test is applied only as an ex ante gating 
mechanism generally valid for the EU25, then regulatory intervention might end up being 
less precise than it would be with a full application of the three criteria. 
• The ‘ladder of investment’ model adopted by most NRAs still has to fully demonstrate its 
potential to promote investments and infrastructure-based competition in the EU25. Recent 
empirical evidence – especially in some EU member states – is consistent with the ladder 
hypothesis, as it shows a decrease in resale accompanied by an increase of bitstream access 
and shared access in Europe. However, it is probably still too early to draw conclusions on 
the actual explanatory power of the investment ladder metaphor. 
• The treatment of emerging markets under the NRF led to regulatory uncertainty. NRAs had 
limited guidance on how to identify emerging markets: the current approach leads to a 
short-circuit between the technology-neutrality principle and regulatory forbearance for 
new services, and the SSNIP test – currently recommended – seems far from appropriate, as 
it often leads to a denial that an emerging market is really separate from an already existing 
one.
• The Article 7 procedure was not responsible for the lengthy implementation of the NRF, but 
might prove burdensome in the future. Its scope should be clarified to make it more sustain-
able in the long term, and consistent with principles of better regulation. 
28  Viviane Reding, SPEECH/06/697, 16 November 2006. 
29  Recently, the European Commission announced that more than 500 market analyses had been analysed by 
member states.
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More recently, the 12th Report on the implementation of the 2002 framework concluded that 
the framework is working properly, but that in a number of areas a single market for e-commu-
nications services “is not attainable under the current framework”, as the “full range of tools for 
ensuring consistent regulation across the single market is not currently available”.30 Such tool no-
tably refer to spectrum policy, the possibility for the Commission to veto also remedies chosen by 
NRAs, but also the regulation of roaming prices, which was found to fall outside the reach of the 
2002 framework due to its peculiar nature of cross-border service. The first two issues are being 
tackled in the ongoing review of the regulatory framework; whereas the third one was addressed 
by a specific regulation, which imposed pan-European wholesale and retail price caps. 
1.2.2.2. The Ongoing Review of the 2002 Regulatory Framework
In 2006, the Commission decided to propose a substantial simplification of the list of relevant 
markets that are presumed to warrant ex ante regulation, by repealing most of the retail mar-
kets included in the 2003 Recommendation.31 Other two markets, wholesale mobile origination 
(former market 15) and broadcasting transmission services (former market 18) have been subject 
to consultation, in order to assess the merit of retaining them in the list of markets warranting ex 
ante regulation. Another market, that for wholesale international roaming (former market 17), 
was dealt with separately by the Commission, which issued a proposal to regulate roaming charges 
at the retail and wholesale level and impose transparency obligations on mobile operators to the 
benefit of roaming customers.32 
In addition, currently proposed changes include: 
• A more coordinated approach to spectrum policy. The European Commission rightly noted 
that new services such as Mobile TV, or new technologies such as WiMAX need at least a 
pan-European scale and adequate certainty on the availability of spectrum to reach a “busi-
ness case”. Accordingly, it seeks to identify bands to be devoted to specific pan-European 
services, also in line with the work carried out under the WAPECS project in the past few 
years. In Europe, spectrum trading and liberalization is expected to generate benefits of 
as much as €900 billion yearly, whereas trading without liberalization would yield much 
lower welfare gains, at around €900 million yearly. A recent study by Mott McDonald et al. 
(2006) estimated the net present value of the harmonisation of collective uses of spectrum 
in the EU in a range between €463 billion and €898 billion; this means a yearly contribu-
tion to GDP of up to 0.17%. Current proposals include the endorsement of principles 
of technology and service neutrality, and the identification of certain bands for spectrum 
trading/liberalisation, as well as bands for unlicensed uses of spectrum. Recently, the Com-
mission adopted a “Communication on Strengthening the Internal Market for Mobile TV“, 
where it endorses the DVB-H standard for mobile broadcasting and calls upon Member 
States to make spectrum available for mobile broadcasting as quickly as possible, including 
in the UHF band (470-862 MHz) as it becomes available33. The Commission also called 
for more bandwidth in the 900Mhz and 1800Mhz bands to be allocated to 3G and inter-
net phone services, which could cut network costs by up to 40%.34 However, the future of 
30  See 12th Report, cit., at 19. 
31  Markets warranting ex ante regulation are those that fulfil three basic criteria: a) existence of significant barri-
ers to entry; b) absence of a tendency towards effective competition; and c) the insufficiency of competition 
law to address the market failure.  
32  See the Commission’s proposed regulation, COM(2006)382, 12 July 2006. 
33  See SEC(2007) 409, 18 July 2007. 
34  See the recent Commission proposal repealing Council Directive 87/372/EEC of 25 June 1987 on the fre-
quency bands to be reserved for the coordinated introduction of public pan-European cellular digital land-
based mobile communications in the Community (hereinafter GSM Directive), COM(2007)367 final, 25 
EdamENG.indd   38 1/3/08   2:19:20 PM
39
spectrum liberalisation in Europe is still uncertain, and the ‘command and control’ method 
of spectrum allocation will dominate the scene in most of the EU27 in the next few years. 
Some countries have taken action to liberalise uses of spectrum in certain bands, although 
the Commission’s project to reach agreement with member states on a number of selected 
bands for wireless access services is currently stalled.35 A notable example of progress in spec-
trum policy is the upcoming ‘digital dividend’ auction of spectrum for mobile television and 
wireless broadband in the UK, expected by late 2008. 
• Restrictions on appeals to NRA decisions. The European Commission proposes to tackle the 
problem of routine suspension of regulatory decisions by amending the provisions of Article 
4 – which reportedly slowed down the implementation of the 2002 framework in at least 
17 of the formerly 25 member states – by laying down legal criteria, based on European 
case-law, that national courts “must use in deciding whether to suspend NRA decisions on 
appeal”.36 In particular, the Commission wishes to ensure that NRA decisions are suspended 
“only where irreparable harm to the appellant can be shown”.  
• The extension of the Commission veto power under Article 7 of the Framework Directive – cur-
rently covering only market analysis and SMP assessment – also to remedies identified by 
NRAs, in the attempt to achieve greater harmonisation in the implementation of EU rules in 
the 27 member states.37 This proposal stems from the significant differences emerged in the 
first years of implementation of the framework as regards the remedies identified by NRAs 
in tackling similar problems. Such proposal, however, is fiercely opposed by some member 
states, and raised concerns as to the possibility of appealing the Commission’s veto over 
remedies. 
• Updating the definition of universal service. As technology advances, the definition of univer-
sal service, currently PSTN-based, may warrant a thorough reconsideration. The European 
Commission plans to issue a Green Paper on Universal Service by the end of 2007, where 
the possibility of defining universal service in a technology-neutral way and, when appropri-
ate, extending it to “access to IP” will be addressed. 
Interestingly, the Commission did not take any specific stance as regards the encouragement of 
investments in NGNs in its proposed review. This was motivated by the technologically neutral 
features embedded in the current framework, which allegedly make it perfectly fit to regulate also 
new technologies. However, many industry players and some national regulators disagree with the 
Commission’s view. As a result, the issue of encouraging investments in all-IP networks is entirely 
dealt with at national level, with widely different approaches.
Some industry players – e.g. Deutsche Telekom – advocate for a ‘regulatory forbearance’ app-
roach, similar to that adopted in the United States since 2003 to stimulate investments in FTTH, 
FTTC and DSL technologies.38 However, Commissioner Reding has in several occasions clarifi-
ed that regulatory forbearance for investments in New Generation Networks (NGNs) is “not a 
July 2007. 
35  WAPECS project. On this, see the final report by the Radio Spectrum Policy Group, at http://rspg.groups.
eu.int/doc/documents/meeting/rspg8/rspg_05_102.pdf. 
36  Commission staff working document - Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the Council, 
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regi-
ons on the Review of the EU Regulatory Framework for electronic communications networks and services 
{COM(2006) 334 final}. 
37  See Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Econom-
ic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the review of the EU Regulatory Framework 
for electronic communications networks and services (SEC(2006) 816) (SEC(2006) 817), 29 June 2006. 
38  See Renda (2007a). 
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policy option” for the review of the 2002 framework.39 Other players, such as British Telecom, 
rejected this approach and chose to focus on the deployment of one core NGN and on access to 
such networks by alternative operators. This, in turn, led to a more extensive consideration of the 
incumbent’s investments when determining access charges for new entrants. 
As a result, at least two extremely different regulatory approaches emerged in largest EU coun-
tries:
• The UK regulator Ofcom chose to initially rely on a single core NGN (the 21st Century 
Network being deployed by British Telecom) to be made available for access to all indus-
try players. Ofcom has reached an agreement with BT, which imposes a comprehensive 
range of undertakings, under which BT commits not to foreclose network access, to ensure 
equivalence of inputs (EoI) between its downstream operations and competing players; and 
to make access available to all operators wishing to launch services at higher layers, with 
reasonable timing to allow for the simultaneous launch of competing products. 
• In Germany, concerns have emerged that unbundling obligations could jeopardise the busi-
ness case for Deutsche Telekom’s new high-speed VDSL infrastructure – which currently 
covers 10 German metropolitan areas. As a result, the government recently approved a bill 
exempting Deutsche Telekom from mandatory unbundling of the new network, provided 
that the German incumbent proves that it offers innovative services, such as IPTV and 
VOD. Such move was heavily criticised by the European Commission, which reacted by 
starting a “fast track” infringement proceeding in February 2007.40 
Of these two emerging models, the former seems to have been endorsed by the European Com-
mission, which is currently working on including “functional separation” as a possible remedy 
available to NRAs under the EU regulatory framework.41 In other large European countries – e.g., 
Italy and Sweden – the sectoral regulator has already declared that it intends to pursue vertical 
separation and equivalence of inputs along with the UK model.42
The new framework will be debated by the European Parliament and the Council from the 
end of 2007, as the Commission’s final proposal is expected not earlier than October 2007. As a 
result, the implementation in member states is likely to be completed after 2010, which makes the 
revised regulatory framework a “post-Lisbon” piece of legislation, i.e. a set of rules that will govern 
EU telecoms after many important events such as the digital switchover and the migration towards 
Next Generation Networks. Figure 1-5 below shows the current timetable of the review. 
Figure 1-5: Current timetable for the review of the 2002 framework 
39  Viviane Reding, SPEECH/06/697, 16 November 2006.
40  See Press Release, Commission launches “fast track” infringement proceedings against Germany for “regula-
tory holidays” for Deutsche Telekom, 26 February 2007, IP/07/237. 
41  Viviane Reding, SPEECH/06/697, cit.
42  See press release by the Chairman of the Italian NRA Agcom, Calabrò, 26 July 2007. 
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1.3. Telecommunications Sector in Turkey
1.3.1. The Regulatory Regime in Turkey43
As was the case in Europe, until the 1990s the telecommunications services in Turkey was provi-
ded by the Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) under the ministry responsible for communica-
tions. The legal basis was Law No. 406 on Telegraph and Telephony which was enacted in 1924, 
a year after the republic was formed. Liberalization of telecommunications equipment occurred 
early on in the 1980s, along with the privatization of equipment manufacturers that were sub-
sidiaries of PTT. In 1994, through Law No. 4000, telecommunications services were separated 
from post and telegraph and Türk Telekomünikasyon AŞ (TTAŞ) was created as a joint stock 
company, as a step to prepare it for privatization. TTAŞ was granted exclusive rights for all telecom 
infrastructures, with the exception of mobile. The same law liberalized value added services and 
allowed the Ministry of Transport to issue licenses to private companies, provided that this would 
not lead to monopolies. In 1994 two companies started to provide mobile telephony services over 
the GSM 900 standard through revenue agreements with TTAŞ; these revenue agreements were 
turned into licenses in 1998. Hence in the mobile industry, there were elements of competition in 
the 1990s. In the fixed line segment, however, the main preoccupation of successive governments 
in the 1990s was to privatize TTAŞ, and it seems that not enough thought was given to issues of 
competition and access. Hence creating a legal framework that would encourage entry and com-
petition was not on the political agenda. In any case, until 2005, these efforts to privatize TTAŞ 
proved unsuccessful.
The emergence of a regulatory framework for the telecommunications industry in Turkey star-
ted in the year 2000 when Law No. 450244 was adopted by the parliament.45  Law No. 4502 was 
basically an amending law and it introduced changes to Law No. 406 and the Wireless Law (Law 
No. 2183, originally dated April 1983). First, it envisaged that the monopoly rights of the state 
owned incumbent, TTAŞ, would be terminated on December 31, 2003. As will become clear 
below, in the Turkish context termination of monopoly rights does not mean full liberalization, 
as new entry can still be prevented by a restrictive licensing regime. Second, it established the Te-
lecommunications Authority (TA) as an independent administrative agency with power to design 
and implement secondary legislation. In particular, the TA was authorized to issue regulations for 
the telecommunications industry, determine operators which are responsible to provide intercon-
nection and roaming services, regulate or set tariffs, monitor compliance and impose fines in case 
of non-compliance, issue technical standards, test the equipment to check compliance with such 
standards. Initially, the authority to issue licenses remained with the Ministry of Transport. The 
TA started functioning in August 2000. Later, partly as a result of pressures from the IMF, licen-
sing authority was also transferred to the TA through Law No. 4673 (May 2001). 46 This law also 
introduced new rules on the ownership of TTAŞ.
43  For reviews of the evolution of telecommunications industry in Turkey see Yılmaz (2000), OECD (2002), 
Başçı, Kandemir and Locksley (2003), Atiyas (2005), Burnham (2006).
44  “Law Amending Certain Articles of the Telegram and Telephone Law, Law on Organisation and Responsibili-
ties of the Ministry of Transport and Wireless Law, Law on Savings and Aid Fund of the Posts Telegraphs and 
Telephone Administration and Organisational Charts attached to the Decree with the Force of Law on the 
General Cadrees and Procedures”, Published in the Official Gazette, 29 January 2000. 
45  A list of the main laws and secondary legislation regarding the telecommunications industry is provided in 
Annex 1.
46  “Law Amending Certain Articles of the Telegram and Telephone Law, Law on Savings and Aid Fund of the 
Posts Telegraphs and Telephone Administration and Law on Organisation and Responsibilities of the Min-
istry of Transport“. An English text of both Law n. 4502 and n. 4673 is available at http://www.oib.gov.
tr/telekom/telecom_law.htm. 
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Several factors have influenced the nature and pace of the evolution of the regulatory framework 
for telecommunications in Turkey. One important factor was timing. The original framework laid 
out in Law No. 4502 was quite inspired by the 1998 regulatory framework in the European Union 
and was broadly in line with the ONP provisions. It did not contain the “competition law” based 
logic of the new EU regulatory framework that was adopted in 2002 and launched in 2003. The 
secondary legislation put out by the TA has been increasingly modeled after the 2003 package and 
is based on the concept of SMP. Nevertheless, the framework law, as laid out by Law No. 4502, has 
put significant constraints on how closely the TA can emulate the 2003 framework and significant 
divergences exist, especially in the area of authorizations, as discussed below. 
A second important factor was the prospect of privatization of TTAŞ. While at the surface 
privatization was expressed as a means to improve economic efficiency, in reality it was primarily 
driven by revenue considerations. Privatization revenues were seen as a means to reduce public 
debt and relax constraints on public spending. At the same time, governments also were anxious 
to avoid accusations that they sold public assets cheaply to private interest groups. When revenue 
considerations dominate the privatization process, then this creates a political incentive to derail 
the introduction of competition as competition reduces privatization revenues by reducing mo-
nopoly rents.
One additional important factor that has influenced the evolution of the regulatory framework 
was the perceptions of the regulator. At least during the initial years of liberalization the regula-
tory authority was weary of rapid liberalization. It was thought that a step-by-step approach to 
liberalization would allow the authority to step in cases of adverse developments, whereas rapid 
liberalization could lead to irreversibilities that would prevent timely intervention. These worries 
were not so much based on economic analysis but on stories of failures from experiences around 
the world. Initially there was a worry of excess or low quality entry, images of ill-informed consu-
mers that would left unprotected in the market when inexperienced would go bankrupt (or worse 
disappear after making a quick buck).  This world view seems to have changed substantially over 
the years when it has become clear that the industry is much more likely to suffer from insufficient 
competition rather than too much of it. 
1.3.1.1. The Telecommunications Authority
The decision making body of the TA is the Telecommunications Board that consists of 7 members, 
including a Chairman and a Vice Chairman. The Chairman of the Board is also responsible for 
the general management and representation of the Authority. Board members are appointed for a 
period of 5 years and can only be dismissed before expiration of a term by the Council of Ministers 
for inability to work due to serious illness, professional misconduct or criminal offences. 
Article 14 of Law 4502 (amending article 5 of Law No. 2813) sates that the TA is an “indepen-
dent budget entity having public legal personality and administrative and financial autonomy”. 
The TA has independent sources of finance, including frequency fees, pre-determined contribu-
tions from operators, any fines it levies on operators and revenues obtained through consultancy 
and training. In 2006 total revenues of the TA was about 850 million TRL (about 485 million €). 
Of this about 760 million YTL was transferred to the Treasury and about the operational budget 
of the TA was about 93 million YTL (53 million €). 
When the TA was established, academic work on the law and economics of telecommunicati-
ons regulation was almost non-existent, and these are still not highly developed fields in Turkey. 
Hence, contrary to many countries in Europe, the TA functions without a strong academic infras-
tructure that it can tap. When it was established, it was also seriously constrained in terms of hu-
man resources. Upon its formation about 350 civil servants from the former General Directorate 
of Radio-communication, most of who were frequency management experts with no background 
or expertise in regulatory issues, were transferred to the TA. Hence the regulator was stuck with 
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an obligation to employ people not of its choosing.  Indeed, the main source of fresh intellectual 
capacity of the TA was going to be young university graduates (“experts and deputy experts”) that 
were going to be recruited over the years. The TA currently has over 500 staff. Of these, about 100 
work on regulatory issues. There are 120 experts and deputy experts, all of whom are recruited 
through competitive exams. Experts and assistant experts constitute the main brain power of the 
TA. 
The TA has three main kinds of instruments at its disposal to execute its regulatory interventi-
on. Ordinances (or Regulations) come below laws in terms of legal hierarchy.  Communiqués are 
at the second level of hierarchy and are often issued on the legal basis of Ordinances. At the lowest 
level of hierarchy are the decisions of the Board. Secondary legislation and Board decisions can be 
appealed at district administrative courts or the Council of State, the highest administrative court 
in Turkey. There has been a desire to make the Council of State the sole appeal body for the inter-
ventions of the Authority, because the Council of State is thought to be better able to develop the 
expertise that is needed to adjudicate in regulatory issues. This has not been accomplished yet. 
1.3.1.2. Competition Law versus Sector Specific Regulation
In Turkey general competition policy is governed by Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Com-
petition (enacted in 1994, Competition Law, for short). The critical articles of the Competition 
Law are modeled after Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty Establishing European Community (with 
some differences). Hence Article 4 of the Competition Law prohibits agreements and concerted 
practices that restrict competition and Article 6 prohibits abuse of dominant position. Article 7 
regulates mergers. The Competition Law is enforced by the Competition Authority (CA).47
The division of responsibilities between the TA and the CA is not clear cut. Article 7 of the Wi-
reless Law (No. 2183, as amended by Law No. 4502, Art. 16) provides the TA with the authority 
to investigate anti-competitive practices in the telecommunications industry. It also states that the 
CA should take the TA’s opinion into consideration before taking any decisions on the telecom-
munications industry. Hence effectively Turkey has a system of concurrent powers.
In 2002 the two authorities signed a protocol of cooperation. While the protocol did provide a 
workable set of rules in practice the dialogue between the two agencies has not been intense, and 
in certain cases, it has been confrontational. Over time, an equilibrium seems to have been reached 
whereby the CA does not investigate allegations of anti-competitive practice when the practice in 
question is in an area regulated by the TA. On the other hand, merger control in the industry is 
exercised by the CA. 
The CA has had a number of important decisions in the telecommunications sector both in the 
mobile and fixed segments. Some of these decisions will be reviewed in section 1.3.2.6 below. In 
addition to the regular enforcement of anti-trust rules the CA has a second channel through which 
it has influenced the development of competition in the industry, namely through its oversight 
regarding privatization decisions.  The basis of CA oversight is Communiqué issued by the Board 
of the CA in 1998 (No. 1998/4). The Communiqué allows the CA to intervene in two instances. 
First, tenders involving transactions with certain characteristics48 require advance notification to 
the Board, upon which the Board issues its views about the tender. Then, once the tender is held, i) 
if there was an advance notification requirement, or ii) if the acquiring firm has a pre-merger mar-
ket share of over 25% or turnover above TRL 25 trillion, then the transaction needs the approval 
of the CA. Hence at the pre-notification stage the CA performs an advocacy role, where after the 
47  See OECD (2005) for a detailed analysis of competition law and policy in Turkey.
48  Namely, where the entity being privatized has a market share over 20%, has turnover over TRL 20 trillion, 
possesses a legal monopoly or enjoys statutory privileges not accorded to private firms in the relevant mar-
ket.
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sale it simply enforces the Competition Law. As discussed below, the oversight of the CA played 
an important role during the privatization of TTAŞ.
1.3.1.3. Authorization
The authorization regime in Turkey is governed by the Ordinance on the Authorization of Te-
lecommunications Services and Infrastructure (Official Gazette, 26.08.2004, hereafter referred 
to as the Authorization Ordinance). The ordinance outlines a regime of individual licenses. The 
main text of the ordinance describes the different kinds of authorizations and the conditions th-
rough which hey are granted. The specific types of authorizations required for different types of 
services are described in individual annexes. Over the years several changes have been made to the 
Ordinance, most of which had to do with addition of new annexes to cover the authorization of 
new services. In its latest form (as of June 2007) the Ordinance prescribes the following types of 
authorizations:
• Operators where the state holds more than 50% ownership share are authorized through Au-
thorization Agreements. This was originally designed for TTAŞ and its subsidiary in the mo-
bile industry. Since the privatization of TTAŞ, authorization agreements have been replaced 
by concession agreements. Currently state owned satellite and cable TV company (Türksat) 
and the General Directorate of Coast Guard operate under an authorization agreement. 
• Telecommunications services to be provided and/or telecommunications infrastructures to 
be built up or operated by a limited number of operators are authorized by a Concession 
Agreement if the services are provided on a national level and through a 1st Type Telecom-
munications License if they are provided on a regional or local basis. Both types of au-
thorizations are to be provided through auctions. Currently TTAŞ and mobile operators are 
authorized through concession agreements. Broadband fixed wireless access services are to 
be authorized through 1st Type telecommunications licenses but no such licenses have been 
issued yet.
• 2nd Type Telecommunications License provides authorization for provision of services and 
operation of infrastructure that do not need to be provided through a limited number of 
operators. Long distance and international call services are authorized through 2nd Type 
Telecommunications Licenses (which are further divided into types A, B and C, as explained 
below. 2nd Type Telecommunications licenses have also been granted for satellite telecom-
munications services, satellite platform services, GMPCS mobile telephony services, direc-
tory services, telephone message services, data transmission services over terrestrial lines, 
PMR/PAMR services, infrastructure operation services and cable platform services.  
• Finally, ISPs (both wired and wireless) are authorized through General Authorizations.
The licensing regime is the area which is most divergent from the EU regime. The Authori-
zation Directive stipulates two types of authorizations: The first is rights of use, limited to cases 
where operators use a scarce resource such as frequencies, numbers, or rights of way. The second 
type is general authorizations, which should not require any explicit administrative decision or 
act, and where any procedural requirements are limited to notification only. In the case of Turkey, 
individual licenses are limited to narrowly defined services or activities. Because the boundaries of 
these activities are not always clear, the licensing regime adds to regulatory and legal uncertainty. 
In fact, the Council of State (the Turkish High Administrative Court) has recently cancelled the 
authorization of “cable platform services” on the grounds that it provides the operator with the 
opportunity to provide more than one service.
Another important difference between the Turkish and EU regime is that in Turkey “minimum 
fees” for different authorizations are determined by the Ministry of Transport. Further in the EU 
regime administrative charges are restricted to cover the administrative costs of the management, 
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control and the enforcement of the authorization regime, whereas in the Turkish case there is no 
such stipulation. In fact, as discussed further in section 1.3.2.1 below, license fees are high in Tur-
key and act ostensibly as an instrument to screen entrants.
As of June 2007, there is no authorization yet for local telephone services (“fixed telecommu-
nications services” in the Turkish parlance, which includes local calls as well as public phones and 
value added services). Hence competition for local calls is not yet legally possible.49 
A draft Electronic Communications Law, which was presented to the parliament on October 
2005, brings the licensing regime closer to that of the 2003 EU framework. However, this law has 
not yet been adopted. It had been discussed in the Parliamentary Committee and presented to the 
General Assembly for enactment. However, the government recently has withdrawn it from the 
General Assembly and returned to the Parliamentary Committee with no publicly stated reason.
It is without doubt that the Turkish licensing regime has acted as a constraint on new entry. At 
the same time, it suited the regulator’s initial overly cautious approach to liberalization.
1.3.1.4. Access and Interconnection
The authority of the TA to impose access related obligations has been recognized in Law No. 406 
(especially Art. 10, as amended by Law No. 4502). The TA has issued an Ordinance of Access and 
Interconnection first in May 2003; this has been replaced with a new Ordinance in June 2007 
(see in section 1.4). The main logic of the current regime is similar to that in the EU. The TA does 
market analyses, on the basis of which it identifies markets susceptible to ex-ante regulation as well 
as operators with SMP. On the basis of this analysis it imposes obligations on operators. According 
to Art. 7 of the Ordinance, the TA can impose access obligations on SMP operators in case the 
operator does not allow access to other operators or requests unreasonable conditions and when 
the TA deems that this prevents competition or harms users. Article 8 states that SMP operators 
have interconnection obligations. The TA can impose interconnection obligations on any operator 
if that operator does not allow access to other operators or requests unreasonable conditions and 
when the TA deems that this prevents competition or harms users. 
Other obligations that the TA can impose on SMP operators include:
• Non-discrimination (Art. 9) 
• Transparency; including obligation to prepare sufficiently unbundled Reference Intercon-
nection Offers. The TA may request changes in the RIO and the operator is obliged to fol-
low them (Art. 10)
• Cost orientation; if the TA decides that interconnection tariffs are not cost-oriented, then it 
can directly determine these tariffs (Art. 11)
• Accounting separation and cost accounting (Art. 12)
• Carrier selection (Art. 15; this includes pre-selection as well).
By contrast, co-location and facility sharing obligations can be imposed on any operator (Ar-
ticles 13 and 14, respectively). 
Article 16/c states that operators that have interconnection obligations (which according to 
article 8 include all SMP operators) carry in any case non-discrimination, transparency and cost 
orientation obligations. Hence once the TA designates an operator as SMP as a result of market 
49  It has been reported in the daily press that the TA has finally decided to go ahead with the authorization of 
local call services and is waiting fort he determination of minimum license fees by the Council of Ministers 
(July 30, 2007, http://turk.internet.com/haber/yazigoster.php3?yaziid=18772 ).
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analysis (Art. 16/b), these operators are automatically imposed non-discrimination, transparency 
and cost orientation obligations. This represents a significant divergence from the EU regime, 
where obligations imposed on SMPs under in Articles 8-13 of the Access Directive have to be 
“proportional”. This divergence arises mainly due to the Law No. 406, where article 10 states 
that all operators that have interconnection obligations have to meet such requests based on the 
principles of equity, non-discrimination, transparency and cost-orientation.50 Accounting separa-
tion and cost accounting obligations, as well as carrier selection obligations are at the discretion 
of the TA. 
In any case, the 2007 Ordinance contains significant changes relative to the 2003 Ordinance, 
and the changes bring the Turkish regime closer to the EU regime. First, in the 2003 Ordinance 
SMP operators had automatic cost accounting obligations. Further, in the 2003 Ordinance the 
TA had the authority to impose access obligations on any operator in situations where refusal to 
provide access or imposition of unreasonable terms was deemed to hinder the emergence of a com-
petitive market, whereas now this is restricted to SMP operators. Finally, in the 2003 Ordinance, 
carrier selection could be imposed on any operator, whereas in the 2007 Ordinance this is limited 
to operators with SMP. 
Operators are free to conclude interconnection agreements. In case an agreement cannot be a 
reached within 3 months, a party can request dispute resolution by the TK. In case the parties still 
fail to reach an agreement, the TK may impose the terms of an agreement. In the interim period, 
the TK can take temporary measures, including the determination of interconnection tariffs. (Art. 
18).
The TA issued a Communiqué on Principles and Procedures Regarding Unbundled Access to 
the Local Loop (ULL) in July 2004. According to the Communiqué Türk Telekom has to meet all 
reasonable requests for full or shared access to the local loop, except when this would require bu-
ilding infrastructure for new access networks. The communiqué does not address bitstream access 
but states that the Authority may issue additional regulations for this. It also requires Türk Tele-
kom to publish a reference unbundling offer. TTAŞ was to prepare an offer and present it to the 
TA within three months after the Communiqué took effect, subject to approval by the Authority. 
The TA had authority to make changes in the reference offer.  The Communiqué was going to be 
effective on July 1, 2005. Developments in ULL and bitstream are discussed in more detail in the 
next section on Internet and Broadband.
1.3.1.5. Market Reviews and Identification of SMP Operators
The procedures for the designation of operators as having SMP have gone through some evolu-
tion in Turkey. The framework law of 4502 did not mention the term “operator with significant 
market power”. It only mentioned the term “operator with dominant position” in Art. 6, where 
it was indicated that the TA had the authority to determine the upper limits and calculation met-
hodologies of tariffs in cases where it determined that an operator was in dominant position in 
the related telecommunications service. The concept of SMP was introduced through subsequent 
secondary legislation, namely the Tariff Ordinance (2001) and the Ordinance on Access and Inter-
connection (2003). Following the latter, the TA issued two Communiqués (June 2003) to define 
dominance and SMP. “Significant market power” was defined as the power of an operator or group 
of operators to influence economic parameters such as the sale or purchase price of services that 
they sell to users or other operators, the quantity of demand or supply, market conditions, main 
telecommunications network components that are used to provide telecommunications services 
50  Interestingly, Law No. 406 (as amended by Law No. 4502) doe snot contain the concept of “access” but only 
interconnection. The TA’s Access Ordinance has been challenged on the grounds that the TA does not have 
the authority to impose access obligations since that is not mentioned in the law. However, the Council of 
State has rejected the case.
EdamENG.indd   46 1/3/08   2:19:23 PM
47
and access to users. By contrast, the term “dominance” was defined as the power of a single or 
multiple operators to determine economic parameters such as price, production and quantity of 
distribution. Hence dominance is a stronger concept, a dominant operator was also an operator 
with SMP but the reverse was not true. The confusion here again reflects both the lack of intel-
lectual preparation of the Turkish authorities and the constraints the TA faced in being obliged 
to function in a framework law that did not reflect 2003 EU framework which the TA wanted to 
increasingly emulate.
In any case, based on the secondary legislation, in August 2003 the TA identified Turkcell as 
having SMP in the market for mobile services and both Turkcell and Telsim in the market for mo-
bile call termination. In June 2004, Turkcell was designated as a dominant operator in the mobile 
communications market and in December 2004 as possessing SMP in the mobile call termination 
market. Telsim was no longer designated as having SMP.51 These designations did not rely on any 
publicly available analysis of relevant markets. 
In 2005, with a view to aligning to the prescriptions of Chapter 19 of the EU acquis, the 
TA launched a market analysis process. In the explanatory document entitled “The Concepts of 
Relevant Market and Significant Market Power” (March 2005, in Turkish)52 the TA stated this 
would focus on the markets identified in the Recommendations of the European Commission and 
would engage the solicitation of the opinion of the public. The process ended in 2006. Note that, 
because Turkey has not yet started a formal process of transposition of the EU 2003 acquis for 
electronic communications, the TA is under no obligation to notify its market analysis decisions 
to the Commission. 
By 2006, the results the following reports were published:53 
• Access and call origination in mobile networks (December 2005)
• Call termination over mobile networks (December 2005)
• Call origination and transit services in the fixed network (February 2006)
• Wholesale call termination in the fixed network (February 20006)
• Market for access to the fixed network (February 2006)
• Relevant markets regarding call services over the fixed network (February 2006)
• Retail leased lines market and wholesale leased lines market (February 2006)
• Wholesale broadband access including bitstream (February 2006)
• Wholesale unbundled access market for broadband and voice, including bitstream (Febru-
ary 2006)
The analysis of the two remaining markets, the market for wholesale national market for inter-
national roaming on public mobile networks (n. 17) and broadcasting transmission services (n. 
18), are being finalised by the Telecommunication Authority. 54
While there is substantial overlap between the market definitions adopted by the TA and the 
51  See TA “İlgili Piyasa Ve Etkin Piyasa Gücü Kavramları”, March 2005, Ankara available at http://www.tk.gov.
tr/srth/2005-R-0-1.pdf. 
52  Ibid.
53  See http://www.tk.gov.tr/srth/piyasa-analizleri.htm
54  Frontier Economics (2007), Country Analysis 2007, A report for NATPII, January 2007, available online at 
http://www.natp2.org/midtermnews/Country%20analysis%202007.pdf (last visit: 29 July 2007). 
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Commission recommendations, there are some divergences. For example, while in the European 
framework the relevant market for call termination over mobile networks are defined at the level 
of individual networks, the TA has treated this as a single market covering all operators.
Subsequent designations of SMP have been based on the market analyses. Hence in December 
2005, after the analyses regarding mobile services were concluded, the TA issued a decision de-
signating Turkcell as having SMP in the mobile access and call origination market, and Turkcell, 
Telsim and Avea as having SMP in the mobile call termination market. In another decision in 
February 2006 Türk Telekom was designated as having SMP in the relevant fixed markets. 
Finally in January 2007, the TA issued a regulation on Rules and Procedures for the Designa-
tion of Operators with SMP. According to the regulation, the principles to be followed in market 
analysis are technological neutrality, transparency, non-discrimination and ensuring a competitive 
environment. Analysis of relevant markets identified by the TA is to be renewed at most every 
three years. The market analysis procedure entails identification of the relevant market, analysis 
of the degree of competition in the relevant market and identification of SMP operators. These 
principles are broadly in line with the EU approach. Art. 10 lists the following as obligations that 
can be imposed on operators with SMP: transparency, obligation to publish reference interconne-
ction or access offers, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access, price control, and cost 
accounting. Art. 11 states that operators in the same market can be made subject to different obli-
gations. Hence the regulation intended to clarify the legal framework for market analyses actually 
was issued after the market analysis exercise was completed.
Accounting separation and cost accounting were imposed on SMP operators in February 2004 
with a transition period of two years, although the methodology to be used and the actual deadli-
nes for implementing it are reportedly not clear.55
1.3.1.6. Retail Price Control
The control of retail tariffs is governed by the Tariff Ordinance (August 2001).56 The Ordinance 
outlines procedures to be followed in the approval and auditing of telecom tariffs of operators with 
a monopoly or dominant position or those with significant market power. Note that the Ordinan-
ce provides the TA with the authority to “approve” rather than “set” tariffs. This is more restrictive 
authority than what was allowed in Law No. 4502 and reflected TA’s desire not to be too intrusive. 
The distinction was barely noticed when the draft of the Ordinance was put out for discussion. It 
later became the legal basis through which TTAŞ challenged TA’s decision that imposed on TTAŞ 
the obligation to provide bitstream access to ISPs (see section 1.3.2.4). 
According to the Ordinance, the basic principles to be followed in tariff approvals include the 
following (Art. 6): tariffs need to be based on cost of efficient service provision, they should prec-
lude both excessively high prices that may result from possession of SMP and large price discounts 
that may restrict competition. Tariffs also should be fair, should not discriminate among different 
users, and should not allow for cross-subsidization unless there is a justifiable reason. 
The Ordinance stipulates two methodologies to approve tariffs (Art. 7): “cost of efficient service 
provision”57, the “price-cap method applied to average prices of baskets of services”. The cost of 
an efficient service provision is defined as the ‘long-run incremental costs (LRIC) of providing these 
55  Frontier Economics (2007), cit. 
56  The Ordinance was amended through an Ordinance to Amend the Tariff Ordinance (January 2007). The 
purpose of the change was to eliminate the definitions of dominance and SMP since these had become out-
dated.
57  That, in turn is defined as the sum of long run incremental cost plus that portion of common costs that can 
be attributed the service in question.
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services plus an appropriate amount of volume-neutral common costs, both inclusive of an appropriate 
return on capital employed’. However, this requirement of LRIC modelling has not been imple-
mented in practice since the Telecommunication Authority still needs to establish the exact cost 
modelling approach. All tariff approvals are currently based on international comparative analysis, 
but will soon become LRIC-based. The methods used for approval are determined for 2 years, the 
TA can extend that period for one more year.
The TA has made three determinations of retail price control since the issuance of the Ordinan-
ce (“price-cap communiqués”, see Annex in section 1.4). In the first, issued in January 2002 and 
valid until end-2003, the TA imposed a price cap over two different service baskets: services provi-
ded over fixed lines, and, leased lines. With competition ahead, tariffs of Türk Telekom had to go 
through substantial rebalancing, it was thought that regulation through a price cap would provide 
Türk Telekom with the necessary flexibility. It was also stated in Article 4 of that communiqué 
that after January 1, 2003, leased line tariffs could be approved on the basis of the method of cost 
of efficient service provision and required TTAŞ to make the necessary preparation. In effect, cost-
based regulation of leased line tariffs started in June 1, 2004 because TTAŞ was delayed making 
the necessary preparation in terms of cost accounting and accounting separation. 
In the second determination at the end of 2003, the cap was revised and a single basket was 
defined but this time caps were introduced on individual products for which the TA deemed that 
insufficient rebalancing of tariffs had taken place. The basket included connection charges, trans-
fer fees, monthly rental fee for PSTN, ISDN PA and ISDN BA services, and per minute charges 
for intra-city, inter-city international and internet calls. Of these, ISDN PA connection, transfer 
and monthly rental fees, international calls and internet calls have individual sub-caps.58
The most recent determination was made in January 2007 valid until the end of 2008. In this 
determination the service basket included 1) Relevant services in market of access to fixed telep-
hone network: PSTN, ISDN BA, ISDN PA Connection, Transfer and Monthly Rental, and 2) 
Relevant services in the markets of call services across fixed network: Local, National, Internet, 
PSTN-GSM and International Call Services. ISDN PA Monthly Rental prices and local call prices 
were subject to individual caps.
In general, the caps used in these determinations are defined in terms of the rate of increase of the 
consumer price index minus a productivity actor. In the latest determination, the productivity factor 
was set at 3.3% for the basket and local calls, and at zero for ISDN Monthly rental prices. 
Concession agreements granted to mobile operators also stipulate a price cap regime where caps 
are revised every six months by the regulator. Mobile operators are obliged to submit any tariff 
changes or proposals for new tariffs to the TA a week before publishing them. However, except 
for a brief period during a major macroeconomic crisis in 2001, the caps applied to mobile phone 
tariffs have not been binding in the sense that competition has driven prices well below the caps.
1.3.1.7. Universal Service
The design of the universal service regime is under the authority of the Ministry of Transport. The 
Universal Service Law was enacted in June 2005. Art. 3 of the law states that universal services will 
be provided at reasonable prices, taking into consideration the per capita gross domestic product 
of the country, and that measures will be taken to ensure that people with low income, disabled 
people and groups that need social support will be able to use universal services. Universal service 
policy will be conducted by the Ministry. The TA will be responsible for quality control. 
The scope of universal service encompasses fixed telephone services, public phone services, 
printed or electronic directory services, emergency call services, basic internet services and passen-
58  These were international calls, dial-up charges for access to internet, and ISDN-PA leased lines.
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ger transport services to places that can be reached only through sea transport and maritime emer-
gency and security communications services. (Art. 4). Apparently the passenger transport services 
relate to two islands in the Aegean where private companies are not willing to provide services 
during the winter. Two additions were made later to this list by Council of Ministers decisions: i) 
services oriented to spread information technologies, including computer literacy so as to help the 
development of information society (February 2006), and ii) services regarding the provision of 
the digital broadcasting performed by the utilization of various broadcast media and technology 
via digital terrestrial transmitters to cover the entire settlements country-wide (April 2006)
The revenues of universal service consist of the following (Art. 6).
• 2% of the authorization fees collected by the TA
• 1% of net sales revenues of all operators except for GSM operators
• 10% of payments by GSM operators to the Treasury
• 20% of administrative fines collected by the TA
• 20% of what remains in the budget of the TA budget after all expenditures are deducted
These percentages can be increased by up to 20% by the Council of Ministers. These revenues 
are collected in the public budget and allocated to the budget of the Ministry of Transport. 
The net cost of universal service of an operator is to be calculated as the difference between net 
costs of the operator when the operator is under universal service obligations and the net costs if 
it were not under universal service obligations. However, in this evaluation, the benefits that the 
operator will receive because of providing universal service obligations will also be taken into ac-
count. (Art. 7) The method which will be used in the calculation of net cost will be determined by 
the Ministry of Transport. (Art. 8). Law No. 406 (as amended by Law No. 4052) had stipulated 
that Türk Telekom has universal service obligations. The new law on universal service has elimina-
ted that stipulation. However Türk Telekom is still under universal service obligations as stated in 
the concession agreement signed with the TA.
In June 2006 the Ministry of Transport issued an Ordinance on Principles and Procedures for 
the Collection of Universal Service Revenues and Execution of Expenditures. The ordinance defi-
nes the funding mechanism for the universal service fund and also the procedure for compensating 
the costs incurred by the designated universal service providers. 
Article 8 clarifies the mechanism for the designation of the universal service providers by the 
Ministry. First, the Ministry determines the relevant elements of the universal services and the spe-
cific locations where these services are to be provided. Then the providers of the universal services 
are designated on the basis of a tender procedure. In rural regions, where the cost of the service 
provision is high, the Ministry is also authorized to designate the providers of universal service on 
the basis of their market shares. In such cases, the designated providers have to “prove their costs” 
to be eligible for compensation from the universal service fund. 
Article 10 explains the principles for calculating net costs of the universal service provision, 
based on the difference between the net costs of an operator when it provides universal service 
and those when it does not. The calculation of net costs will be based on long run incremental 
fixed and variable costs associated with the addition of each universal service component to the 
operator’s existing services. This calculation includes an assessment of indirect benefits that the 
operator may obtain as a result of providing universal services.
Article 11 further provides that the Ministry may consider special measures for user groups 
with special social needs, low income or the disabled. In order to ensure that these groups can 
access universal services at affordable prices, the Ministry will determine the universal service pri-
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ces based on cost information provided by the designated universal service provider. It can also 
determine prices directly, after obtaining an opinion of the TA.
The universal service legislation has not been applied yet. Hence, as of July 2007, only TTAŞ 
is designated as a universal service provider and there have been no further tenders to challenge 
that position. TTAŞ’ designation as universal service provider is per article 10 of its concession 
agreement. Hence the current situation deviates from EU Directive on Universal Service which 
states that member states need to designate undertakings through an “efficient, objective, transpa-
rent and non-discriminatory designation mechanism, whereby no undertaking is a priori excluded 
from being designated” (Art. 8/2). Also, the increase in the scope of universal service executed by 
the Council of Ministers goes beyond the scope identified in the Universal Service Directive. Fi-
nally, as underlined by Akdemir et al. (2006), the fact that control over the universal service fund 
(USF) is allocated to the Ministry and there is no clear policy on what the fund can be used for 
puts further distance between the EU and the regime in Turkey. 59
1.3.1.8. The Draft Electronic Communications Law
As mentioned above, a draft electronic communications law was presented to the parliament in 
October 2005. After being discussed in the relevant parliamentary committee and presented to 
the general assembly for enactment, it was recently withdrawn back to the committee. While the 
law presents a significant improvement over the current primary legislation, it still deviates from 
the EU framework in a number of important respects. The biggest improvement in the law is in 
the area of authorizations. The draft law prescribes two main types of authorizations: notificati-
ons and the granting of rights of use. If the notifying undertakings do not require allocation of 
resources (such as frequency), then the act of notification is sufficient for being authorized. In 
case the undertaking requests a resource, then the TA has to decide whether there is need to limit 
the number of undertakings. If there is no such need, then the TA issues a right of use within 
30 days. In case a restriction is warranted and the activity requires a satellite position or national 
frequency band, then the start date of the service, the period of authorization and the number of 
operators are decided by the Ministry. Otherwise authorization procedures are carried out by the 
TA. In both cases, the TA implements procedures to ensure that resources are allocated efficiently 
through auctions. 
In the area of access and interconnection, in terms of proximity to the EU framework, the 
draft law is actually behind the current secondary legislation (the 2007 Ordinance on Access and 
Interconnection) and needs to be revised. For example, the draft law stipulates that TA can impose 
access obligations on any operator (Art. 16) whereas in the Ordinance this is explicitly restricted 
to operators with SMP. In general, the Ordinance is closer to the EU Directives in terms of obli-
gations that can be imposed on SMP and non-SMP operators.
1.3.1.9. Information Society Strategy and Action Plan
Turkey adopted an Information Society Strategy and Action Plan on June 28, 2006.60 According to 
the Strategy, Turkey’s process of transformation into an information society will be carried out around 
the following basic strategy priorities: Social Transformation; Adoption of ICT by Business; Citizen-
centred Service Transformation; Modernization in Public Administration; A Globally Competitive 
ICT Sector; Competitive, Widespread and Affordable Communication Infrastructure and Services 
and Improvement of R&D and Innovation. The Strategy has an action plan with 111 actions under 
7 strategic priorities. The Strategy will be the basic reference document for citizens, the public sector, 
the business world and the NGOs, in other words for all segments of the society. 
59  For example, stakeholders have stated that a recent update of the Ministry’s personal computer stock was 
financed by the USF.
60  See the document at http://www.bilgitoplumu.gov.tr. 
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Table 1-1 below shows the ambitious objectives pursued by the Strategy. 
Table 1-1: The goals of Turkey’s Information Society Strategy, 2006-2010
Social Transformation Current 2010
Internet user penetration 14% 51%
Broadband subscriber penetration 2% 12,5%
Number of public internet access points n.a 4,500
ICT adoption by business
Enterprises having computer 87% 95%
Enterprises with broadband access 20% 70%
Citizen Oriented public service position
Electronic public service provision n.a 70%
Transactions realised electronically n.a 33%
Provision on 20 basic public services of EU 53% 100%
User satisfaction n.a 80%
Modernization of public management
Electronic public procurement n.a 90%
Savings on current expenditures n.a 9%
Online back office services n.a 100%
Positioning of Turkey in globally competitive IT sector
IT sector in GDP 0,8% 2,2%
Exports (software and services) (million USD) 80 407
Competitive, widespread and affordable telecom infrastructure and 
services 
Broadband coverage 75% 95%
Cost of broadband to end-user/income per capita 5,4% 2%
R&D and innovation
Share of R&D on GDP 0,8% 2%
Share of ICT R&D on total GDP n.a 20%
Number of total researchers 28,964 40,000
Source: Developments in the Information Society: Turkey, presentation at the 1st European Summit: Observing the IT Society, Cakal, 
2006.
As shown in the table, the goals set by the Turkish government are quite ambitious, and represent 
the will to “realize sustainable economic growth by increasing [Turkey’s] global competitiveness and 
productivity as a result of the network effect, which will be created by constructing the relationship 
between and within the government, the citizens and the businesses based on the ICT”.61
The expected impacts of such a comprehensive strategy include the following:
• An additional GNP growth of 2% annually, of which 1.4% will be through increased labour 
productivity and 0.6% through increased employment. 
• Turkey’s IT exports are targeted to increase to USD 400 million from its current level of 
USD 80 million, with an average annual growth rate of 38%. 
• The domestic IT market is targeted to achieve an annual average growth rate of 24% and 
reach USD 9,160 million in 2010.    
• Alleviating the tax burden on data and Internet services will enable expansion of com-
munication services and increase productivity with a yearly 0.38% GDP growth rate as of 
2010. 
61  Information Society Strategy, July 2006, cit., at 4-5.
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• Monthly broadband access costs will be pulled down to 2% of per capita national income at 
the end of 2010, which is the average in OECD countries.
1.3.1.10. Beyond the Telecoms Framework
In this section, we briefly describe the alignment of Turkey’s rules with the EU acquis beyond the 
2002 regulatory framework for e-communications. As technological convergence is increasing the 
importance of rules on content, audiovisual services and data protection, these rules would drama-
tically impact the incentive to develop new products and services in Turkey in the years to come. 
In this respect, the 2006 EU Progress Report on Turkey highlighted that:
• Audiovisual services. “Turkey’s alignment with the audiovisual acquis remains limited to some 
provisions concerning advertising and the protection of minors”. The Turkish Law on the Es-
tablishment of Radio and Television broadcast reportedly creates problems in terms of defini-
tions, jurisdiction, freedom of reception, major events, promotion of independent works and 
restrictions on the share of foreign capital in television enterprises. With regard to the admin-
istration of the broadcasting sector, the Radio and Television Higher Council (RTÜK) has so 
far not been able to reallocate frequencies and review the temporary licences effectively.
• E-commerce. “Turkey is not aligned with EU standards on electronic commerce and condi-
tional services.” 
• Cybercrime law. “Legislation on cyber crime is not adopted”.
• Data protection. “No law has been adopted so far. In April 2000, the government introduced 
a new bill proposing the establishment of a Council for the Security of National Informa-
tion and its Duties within the Prime Minister’s office. The Council was to address issues 
including data protection, encryption and security of information systems. The draft Bill 
was heavily criticized and was eventually dropped. Under the National Program for the 
Harmonization of Turkish Legislation with European Union Law, published in 2003, the 
Turkish Government has committed to harmonize its legislation. Accordingly, a Draft Law 
was adopted, which mainly follows EU Directive 95/46/EC.62”
As a result, relative to telecommunications per-se there seems a wider gap between Turkey and 
the EU on the framework that shapes the business environment for providers and users of e-com-
munications services. 
1.3.2. Overview of Market Evolution
Some data on the overall state of telecommunications markets in Turkey is provided in Table 1-
2. Fixed line penetration ratio is about 26-27%, lower than the EU average of 45%. The mobile 
market has developed very fast in the last few years, but the penetration level (65 subscribers per 
100 inhabitants in 2007) is still very low compared to Europe (an average of 103 subscribers per 
100 inhabitants).63 Internet and broadband penetration are also very low, though increasing. 
Competition has existed in the mobile segment since the late 1990s and in the dial-up internet 
market. Competition has started to develop, albeit slowly, in fixed line domestic long distance and 
international calls. There is yet no ULL or bitstream, though the legal and regulatory infrastructu-
re for these services has been put out. 
62  The Draft Law is envisaged to govern issues such as the protection of personal data and fundamental rights 
and freedoms; recording and use of data within certain clear purposes in line with the rule of law; reliability 
and accuracy of data, its renewal and erasure when necessary; security of confidential personal data such as 
race, political opinion, religion, health, sexual life, and the right of persons regarding provision of informa-
tion related to themselves.
63  European Commission, 12th Implementation Report.
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Table 1-2: Basic telecommunications indicators for Turkey
Main telephone 
lines (fixed 
lines) per 100 
inhabitants
Mobile cellular 
telephone 
subscribers per 
100 inhabitants
Personal 
computers 
per 100 
inhabitants
Internet 
subscribers (Total 
broadband) per 
100 inhabitants
Internet 
subscribers 
(Total) per 100 
inhabitants
Internet 
users per 100 
inhabitants
1990 12,0 0,1 0,5 .. .. 0,0
1995 21,0 0,7 1,5 .. .. 0,1
2000 27,0 23,6 3,7 0,0 2,2 3,7
2001 27,3 28,3 3,9 0,0 .. 5,1
2002 26,9 33,2 4,3 0,0 .. 6,1
2003 26,5 39,1 4,7 0,3 1,7 8,4
2004 26,5 48,1 5,1 0,8 2,1 14,2
2005 25,9 59,6 .. 2,2 3,1 15,3
Source: ITU 
There are no 3G/UMTS services yet. An auction for 4 UMTS licenses was set to take place in 
May 2007, but was cancelled. The Vice President of TK was quote as stating that the cancellation 
was due to the fact that there was insufficient interest in the tender.  On June 16, 2007 the TA 
has announced that 4 licenses for IMT-2000/UMTS services and infrastructures will be awarded 
through auctions to be held on September 7, 2007. Only Turkcell participated in this tender and 
won one license on a bid of 311 million Euros plus VAT. The rest of the licenses were not sold.64 
The tender was eventually cancelled due to the insufficient number of bids.
1.3.2.1. Competition in Fixed Line Telephony
Entry into the fixed long distance and international call market is governed by three types of li-
censes: Type A is for operators which will use carrier pre-selection (CPS). Type B is for operators 
using carrier selection (CS) on a call-by-call basis. Finally, Type C license is reserved for operators 
providing service through a 10-digit access code (basically through calling cards). The fees for the-
se licenses are quite high: there is a one-time fee of more than 200,000 € for type A, about 100,000 
€ for type B and about 50,000 € for type C licenses. In addition, each has an annual fee of 0.5% 
of annual sales or 1/15 of the one-time fee, whichever is higher. The fees were set high specifically 
as a measure to screen entrants.
The development of competition in the long distance call market has been extremely slow. 
The licenses were granted 4 months after the termination of monopoly rights of Türk Telekom.65 
However, these licenses could not become operational because it took a long time to conclude 
interconnection agreements with TTAŞ. Originally, TTAŞ was supposed to have completed tech-
nical preparations for Type B and Type A licenses by November 2004 and May 2005 respectively, 
but this never materialized. Operators holding Type B licenses, concluded first interconnection 
agreements with Türk Telekom in March 2006. Five operators holding Type A licenses (Superon-
line, Global Iletişim, Borusan Telekom, Koc.net and Dogan Telekom) were able to sign signed 
interconnection agreements with TTAŞ in July 2006. As of July 2007, there are 12 Type A, 13 
Type B and 9 Type C licenses. In 2005, more than 50 operators had obtained licenses, but some 
exited and others merged.66 Currently Type C licenses are fully operational; carrier selection and 
pre-selection services are provided on a very limited basis.
64  As of yet (September 10, 2007), it is not clear whether the fact that there was only one participant at the 
auction will generate legal problems.
65  A total of 27 licenses were granted at that time: 7 Type A, 13 type B and 11 Type C licenses. 
66  Daily Referans, 29.11. 2006; interview with Doğan Telekom.
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The evolution of interconnection policy is revealing in this regard. The initial offers of TTAŞ 
were about 2.7 and 3.7 Eurocents/min for in-zone and out-zone areas, respectively.67 Many ope-
rators refrained form signing agreements with Türk Telekom and applied for dispute resolution 
by the TA. In September 2004 the TA announced Standard Interconnection Reference Tariffs 
(SIRT). The Tariffs announced in the SIRT were not mandatory. However, it was understood that 
if operators failed to conclude interconnection agreements and apply to the TA for dispute resolu-
tion, the TA would impose the interconnection tariffs determined in the SIRT.68
The rates determined in the SIRT are listed in Table 1-3 below. For comparison, the table also 
lists the EU averages of call termination on the fixed incumbent’s network taken from the Euro-
pean Commission’s 12th Implementation Report, as well as more recent SIRT determinations of 
the TA. The table shows that the SIRT tariffs show a declining trend. In fact, initially there was 
a large gap between the tariffs determined by the TA and the EU average. This difference started 
to diminish substantially starting the end of 2006. The initial tariff for October-December 2004 
was higher than not only the EU average of 2004, but even the Commission’s recommended 
best practice in 1998 (which was 0.9-1.8 Eurocents for single transit and 1.5-2.6 Eurocents for 
double transit, see European Commission Implementation Report, 1998). High access charges 
imply lower profitability for new entry. Clearly the interconnection tariffs determined by the TA 
do not suggest that TA was in a hurry to introduce competition at the time. As will be discussed 
in more detail in the next section the attitude of the TA in the mobile industry was much more 
pro-competitive.
The market share of new entrants in fixed line call services is still very small, though increasing 
in international calls. In 2005-2006, about 50% of TTAŞ revenues are obtained from local calls, 
whereas the share of domestic long distance and international calls are 16 and 4.6%, respectively.69 
The revenue share of calls from TTAŞ to GSM operators is about 27%. New entrants’ market 
share (in terms of call minutes) in long distance calls is still very low (about 5%). New entrants’ 
share in outgoing international calls is about 14%, and that in incoming international calls has 
increased from 39% to 67% between 2005-2006.  Another area where new long distance opera-
tors are having an impact is in calls from fixed line to GSM with a market share in terms of call 
minutes of 34% in 2006. 
Table 1-3: Standard interconnection tariffs set by the Telecommunications Authority
Effective during
Call Origination and call termination on TTAS network EU Average (*)
Ykr/minIn-zone area Out-zone area
Ykr/min Eurocent/min 5,90 Eurocent/min Single Transit Double Transit
01.10.2004 - 31.12.2004 4,10 2,28 5,10 3,28 1,01 1,61
01.01.2005 -30.09.2005 3,40 1,89 3,70 2,83 0,94 1,39
01.10.2005 - 01.03.2007 2,00 1,11 3,00 2,06 0,86 1,25
01.03.2007- 1,89 1,05 3,00 1,67   
€1 = 1.8 YTL  
Note: net of taxes 
(*) Source: European Commission 12th Implementation report, Annex 2 (2006), Figure 22.
67  At the then current (September 2004) exchange rate of 1 Euro= 1,875,000 TL. In-zone versus out-zone access 
areas refer to the level at which physical interconnection is made in the network hierarchy. This two-way 
classification is different from the three-way classification used by the EU, namely local, single transit and 
double transit. As a rough approximation, in-zone area can be taken as being between the local and single 
transit switches, and out-zone area to a level between single and double transit. 
68  The underlying interconnection charges are currently based on international benchmarks and margin analysis, 
but the TA is aiming to determine cost-based charges in the long term.
69  Data from Karabacak (2007), especially chapter 8.
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Karabacak (2007) reports that between 2003-2006 TTAŞ revenues from fixed call services have 
declined by about 45%, reversing an increasing trend since the 1960s. Several factors account for 
this, including significant reductions in tariffs that have occurred since the start of liberalization at 
the end of 2003. However, there are also signs that TTAŞ is increasingly facing competition from 
mobile operators.  There is an almost 35% decline in domestic long distance call minutes, where 
as shown above the new long distance operators have made little inroad. The competitive threat in 
domestic long distance calls seems to be from the mobile operators. 
The threat of entry has had a significant impact on long distance and international call charges. 
One important change occurred in the summer of 2004, when TTAŞ reduced its international cal 
tariffs by 50-70%. Table 1-4 provides data on fixed line call tariffs in comparison to EU averages. 
The table shows that monthly rental fees are lower than the EU average. Local calls and domestic 
long distance calls are close to EU averages in nominal terms, but higher when corrected for PPP. 
By contrast, international calls seem to be lower than the EU average in nominal terms, and close 
to EU average in PPP. 
In the beginning of 2007, TTAŞ announced another radical change in tariffs, to be effective 
March 1, 2007. This time fixed monthly fees and local call tariffs were increased by about 23% 
and 18%, respectively, whereas tariffs of domestic long distance and international calls and calls 
to GSM operators were reduced by another 50-60%. The fact that TTAŞ reduced tariffs in the 
competitive segments and increased tariffs of calls where it still held effective monopoly position 
caused an outrage. The TA approved the tariffs. Again, there was no formal analysis to back the de-
cision, but it was argued that TTAŞ had not increased local call charges for two years even though 
the inflation rate was above 10%.
Table 1-4: Fixed line call tariffs (Eurocents, 2006)
 Türk Telekom
Türk Telekom 
PPP
Turkey alternative 
operator
EU 25 
Average
Standard Monthly Rental residentail users (incl. VAT) 5.8 10.4  14.3
Standard Monthly Rental business users (incl. VAT) 4.9   14.0
3 minute local call 10.9 19.4  13.1
10 minute locall call 36.0 64.3  36.5
3 minute domestic long distance call 29.8 53.2 25.2 25.0
10 minute domestic long distance call 90.0 160.7 80.0 73.9
10 minute international call to UK 1.3 2.3 1.0 2.3
10 minute international call to USA 1.3 2.3 1.0 2.1
Source: Cullen International (2007) 
PPP factor for Turkey: 0.56
The Turkish Competitive Telco Operators Association (Telkoder) filed a petition against the 
TA decision approving the tariffs. The Council of State (the high administrative court of Turkey) 
issued an injunction against the TA decision. 
1.3.2.2. Privatization of Türk Telekom
Attempts to privatize TTAŞ started in the 1990s. Law No. 4000 (dated 1994), which separated 
telecommunications services from the Ministry and established TTAŞ as a joint stock company 
gave the Ministry the authority to determine rules and procedures to sell 49% of the company’s 
shares. The constitutional court struck down the articles related to privatization on the ground 
that privatization had to be done not through a ministerial decision but through a law. Another 
attempt in 1995 was also struck down in by the Constitutional Court on the grounds that the 
authority to determine the tender conditions for the sale of Türk Telekom could not be delegated 
to an administrative agency (in this case the High Council of Privatization) and that these also 
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needed to be determined by law.70 Several articles of the Privatization Law (1994) were also can-
celled by the Constitutional Court during those years on similar grounds. The legal basis for the 
privatization of Türk Telekom was finally completed through amendments to the Privatization 
Law and the enactment of Law No. 4161 (in 1996). Accordingly, 51% of TTAŞ were to remain in 
government hands, 20% was to be sold as a block to a consortium of strategic investors, 14% to be 
floated on stock markets and 5% to be sold to employees and 10% to be transferred to the postal 
administration. A tender was held in 2000 with no success. Then, Law No. 4673 was enacted in 
2001 this time stipulating that 1% golden share would be retained by the Treasury, employees 
would be entitled to 5% share and the rest would be available for block sale or IPOs. This law 
stipulated a 45% limit on foreign ownership. This limit was later removed through Law No. 5189 
in adopted in June 2004.
Finally a tender was held in July 2005, and Oger Telecom, a subsidiary of TTAŞ purchased 
55% of the shares of TTAŞ. Telecom Italia was a junior partner in the winning consortium; howe-
ver, they sold their shares in TTAŞ and Avea in 2006.
TTAŞ now operates under a 25-year concession agreement with the TA. A potentially prob-
lematic aspect of the concession agreement is related to what happens upon the termination of 
the contract. According to the agreement, TTAŞ may request from the TA the renewal of the 
contract. There are no guidelines on how the TA is supposed to decide on whether to renew the 
contract or not. If the contract is not renewed, then the contract specifies that TTAŞ’ infrastru-
cture is to be handed over to the TA or to an institution identified by the TA. This clause intro-
duces significant uncertainty and is likely to fundamentally affect TTAŞ’ investment incentives 
during the final years of the contract.71 Similar clauses exist in the concession agreements of the 
mobile operators.
1.3.2.3. Developments in Mobile Communications72
The Turkish mobile telecommunications industry consists of three GSM (900) operators, Turk-
cell, Vodafone (formerly Telsim) and Avea. The industry was launched in 1994 when Turkcell and 
Telsim entered the market signed through revenue sharing agreements with TTAŞ. Remarkably, 
and in contrast to many European countries, the authorities did not push the incumbent fixed 
operator into this market and both Turkcell and Telsim belonged to private industrial/financial 
groups. The founding partners of Turkcell were Sonem Holding (currently Telia Sonera), a lea-
ding Finnish telecommunications company and Çukurova group, the third largest conglomerate 
in Turkey, which was active in a wide range of industries, in particular the banking sector. Telsim 
was a partnership between Rumeli Holding, a Turkish group owned by the Uzan family, active in 
a variety of sectors including energy and banking. 
In 1998 the two operators were granted concession agreements (each costing 500 million 
USD). 1998 can be treated as the year of introduction of true competition in the industry for two 
reasons. First, under the revenue agreements, the two operators did not have control over retail 
tariffs which were controlled by TTAŞ. Under the concession agreement tariffs were under the 
control of operators themselves (subject to caps). Second, the licenses made the operators the resi-
dual claimants of profits, thereby providing much stronger incentives for investment and network 
rollout. 
Data in Table 1-5, obtained from ITU World Telecommunications Indicators shows the subs-
tantial reduction in 3-minute call charges from over 1 USD in 1997 to about 60 cents in 1998. 
70  See Atiyas and Oder (2007) for details on the evolution of privatization policy n Turkey. 
71  This uncertainty is partly reduced by the concession regime in Turkey. The Concession Law of 1910 has some 
provisions that would allow the contractor to recuperate the cost of investments under certain conditions. 
72  This section draws heavily from Atiyas and Doğan (2007)
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According to data in a competition inquiry carried out during that period Turkcell investment 
increased from 136 million USD in 1996 to over 1 billion in 2000.73
Table 1-5: Indicators for the mobile industry
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1994 .. 175 0.3 60,590 347 338 6.8 0.9
1995 .. 437 0.7 142,763 327 262 5.5 1.0
1996 .. 806 1.3 302,181 375 184 6.1 1.1
1997 .. 1,610 2.5 621,506 386 153 12.3 1.5
1998 50.2 3,506 5.3 416,985 119 .. 5.8 0.6
1999 .. 8,122 12.1 2,303,847 284 29 4.8 0.5
2000 50.2 16,133 23.6 3,484,559 216 NA 3.4 0.6
2001 87.5 19,573 28.3 2,819,831 144 NA 2.9 0.6
2002 88.2 23,323 33.2 2,816,250 121 NA 0.0 0.5
2003 95.0 27,888 39.1 3,655,993 131 NA NA 0.6
2004 95.0 34,708 48.1 4,764,767 137 NA NA NA
2005 96.3 43,609 59.6 6,418,805 147 NA NA NA
 Source: ITU
The authorities decided to issue three additional GSM licenses in 2000. Two of the licenses 
were going to be sold through competitive tenders and one license was going to be given to Türk 
Telekom which would finally establish a subsidiary to operate in the mobile market. In the event, 
the authorities were able to sell only two additional licenses.74 The first license was bought at 2.5 
billion USD by Is-TIM, a consortium consisting of TIM, the mobile subsidiary of Telecom Italia, 
and Is Bank, a private bank in Turkey. The third license was bought by Türk Telekom at the same 
price as paid by Is-TIM. Is-Tim started operations in March 2001 under the brand name Aria. 
Türk Telekom’s subsidiary, Aycell, started operations in December 2001. In 2003 Aria and Aycell 
were merged to form Avea. In 2005 Telsim was bought by Vodafone.
As can be seen from Table 1-5, mobile penetration increased significantly after new entry, 
from about 28% in 2001 to 60% in 2006. One can also note the decline in revenue per subscri-
ber from over 200 USD to below 150 USD, possibly a reflection of new entry as well. Table 1-6 
shows the evolution of operators’ market share in Turkey before and after new entry. The table 
shows that Turkcell instituted dominance in the market right from the start, and new entry did 
very little to break that dominance. This is especially interesting since the authorities’ approach to 
competition in the mobile industry has been much more aggressive than their stance in the fixed 
line segments. As discussed below, this was evident in their approach both to national roaming 
and interconnection. Despite this more aggressive approach, however, the mobile industry is still 
highly concentrated.
73  Quoted in Atiyas and Doğan, 2007.
74  The failure to sell the third licenses has been attributed to bad auction design. See Atiyas and Doğan (2007) 
for details.
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Table 1-6: Mobile operators’ market shares 
Mobile 
Operators
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Turkcell 78.0 68.0 80.0 76.9 68.5 69.2 69.0 67.0 67.3 67.9 67.0 63.0
Telsim 22.0 32.0 20.0 23.1 31.5 30.8 31.0 29.2 25.4 19.6 19.0 20.5
Aria -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.7 5.1 -- -- --
Aycell -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.1 2.1 -- -- --
Avea -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12.5 14.0 16.5
Source: Atiyas and Doğan (2007) Table 2
As discussed in more detail in Atiyas and Doğan (2007) the answer lies in the fact that the mobi-
le industry exhibits significant first mover advantages that arise from asymmetric subscriber bases. 
Further two important characteristics of the industry, namely network externalities and switching 
costs further reinforce these first mover advantages. The authorities had a number of instruments 
to reduce these first mover advantages: roaming policy, the interconnection regime and number 
portability.  The Turkish authorities tried to implement roaming policy but the incumbents were 
able to render this policy ineffective through legal challenges. TA’s interconnection policy, especi-
ally in comparison to that in the fixed line market were more favorable to new entrants, but the 
entrants did not make good use of it. Finally, number portability was never implemented during 
this period; the Ordinance on Number Portability was only issued in 2007 and as of September 
2007, it is not yet operational. These issues are discussed in more detail below.
The importance of first mover advantage was already apparent during the early years of the in-
dustry. Turkcell entered a few months earlier than Telsim. In addition, Telsim’s activities were sus-
pended between November 1995 and July 1996, further constraining its growth. Turkcell estab-
lished an initial lead that Telsim was never able to fully catch up with. Before new entry, Turkcell’s 
market share was about 70%. In turn, the fact that the authorities waited for 7 years before issuing 
new licenses put the new entrants at a serious disadvantage. Table 1-6 shows that Turkcell’s market 
share did drop somewhat after new entry. Telsim’s loss of market share to new entrants was larger. 
In any case, after 4 years of entry, the new entrants’ market share was still below 20%.
One important problem that new entrants face after delayed entry is that incumbents have a 
significant advantage due to already established coverage. With no or very low coverage initially, 
it is difficult for new entrants to attract subscribers until they also roll out their network. Aware of 
this problem, the Turkish authorities tried to implement mandatory national roaming was already 
mentioned in article 6 of Law No. 4502 which stated “mobile telecommunication, data operators 
or operators of other services and infrastructure as determined by the Authority are also required 
to satisfy reasonable, economically proportionate and technically feasible roaming requests of ot-
her operators”.  In 2000 the TA issued Principles and Procedures to be followed in Mediations 
regarding Disagreements on National Roaming, and in 2002 the Ordinance on Principles and 
Procedures for Making Roaming Agreements. Those provided the legal basis on which the TA 
would intervene to enforce mandatory roaming. The policy was that the parties would first try to 
reach an agreement among themselves. If that failed, and if there was a request for dispute resolu-
tion, the TA would intervene with the authority to impose the terms of an agreement.
When the incumbents and new entrants could not conclude roaming agreements, the TA 
did intervene and determine the terms of an agreement in November 2001. The incumbents 
applied both to the civil court and the administrative court and were able to obtain injunc-
tions against the decision of the TA. They also applied to the for international arbitration at 
the International Chamber of Commerce’s (ICC) International Court of Arbitration with the 
request that Turkcell had no obligation to sign a roaming agreement with the terms and con-
ditions determined by the TA.
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Mandatory roaming would only have been effective if it was implemented without much delay, 
because the concession agreements of the new entrants required them to reach a coverage of 50% 
in 3 years and 90% in 5 years. Hence the delays caused by the legal challenges were really sufficient 
to render the policy ineffective. In 2003 Is-TIM also filed a lawsuit at the ICC for damages against 
the TA on the grounds that promised roaming policy was not made available. Finally, the deadlock 
was broken when in a meting between the Italian and Turkish prime ministers it was decided that 
Is-TIM would merge with Aycell.
Another problem that new entrants may face has to do with the existence of network externali-
ties. In countries where the “calling party pays” principle holds, the cost of a call that terminates on 
a rival’s network (off-net calls) depends on the mobile termination charge that a mobile operator 
pays to its rival. When that charge is high, the perceived cost of an off-net call is higher than a call 
terminating on the operator’s own network, even though the physical cost of the two calls is not 
very different. That may create a wedge between on-net and off-net retail tariffs. That, in turn, 
makes an operator with a larger subscriber base more attractive to potential customers, since in 
a larger network, it is likely that a higher proportion of a subscriber’s call will be on-net. This is 
called a “tariff-mediated network externality” and further exacerbates the first mover advantage of 
incumbents. Regulators may try to counter this externality through their interconnection policy, 
that is, by regulating mobile termination rates.
Just before Aria entered the market in March 2001, the two incumbent mobile operators re-
newed their interconnection agreement and increased charges for terminating calls from 1.4 US 
cents/min to 20 US cents/min. The new entrants also signed interconnection agreements at 20 US 
cents/min, even though that meant that their off-net calls would be high and would thus create 
a unfavorable network externality. They could have requested for lower termination charges or 
seek dispute resolution from the TA, but they chose not to do so, apparently expecting that high 
termination charges would yield high revenues from incoming calls, and apparently disregarding 
the fact that they would have difficulties attracting subscribers in the first place.
These interconnection agreements lasted until 2003, when the Access and Interconnection 
Ordinance came into effect and which required that existing agreements be revised in light of the 
ordinance. This time the parties failed to reach an agreement. The TA intervened and in Septem-
ber 2003 determined interconnection charges, setting termination charges for calls terminating at 
Aria and Aycell networks at 233,750 TL/min, which, at the prevailing exchange rate was about 14 
Eurocents/min. Termination charges for calls terminating at Turkcell and Telsim networks were 
set at 178,750 TL, or about 11 Eurocents/min. In the European Union, in July 2003 the weighted 
average of mobile termination charges was 13.7 eurocents/min for SMP operators, and about 16.4 
eurocents/min for non-SMP operators. Hence the termination charges determined in Turkey were 
a bit lower than the weighted average in the EU.
Later, in October 2004 the TA issued the SIRT. The SIRT is important because it can be taken 
to reflect the overall stance of the TA regarding the development of competition. The determina-
tions in successive SIRTs are given in Table 1-7. What the Table shows is that the determinations 
for mobile termination rates are significantly lower than the EU averages found in the 2006 Imp-
lementation Report. Compared with the data in Table 1-3, it would be safe to conclude that the 
TA’s stance in the mobile markets was more in favour of new entrants than in the fixed markets. 
There is one more conclusion that can be drawn from these comparisons: In Turkey, the wedge 
between charges for call termination on the fixed network and those for call termination on mobi-
le networks is smaller than in Europe. Hence overall, it can be said between the fixed incumbent 
and the mobile industry, the TA has been more favourable towards the former. 
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Table 1-7: Mobile call termination charges: SIRT vs� EU average 
Standard Interconnection Reference Tariffs EU Average (*)
Effective during Imposed on Ykr/min Eurocent/min SMP date
01.10.2004 - 31.12.2004 SMP operators 15.60 8.67 14.58  July 2004
01.01.2005 -30.09.2005 SMP operators 14.80 8.22 12.53  October 2005
01.10.2005 - 01.03.2007 SMP operators 14.00 7.78 11.40  October 2006 
01.03.2007- Turkcell 14.00 7.78 NA
Vodafone 15.20 8.44
Avea 17.50 9.72
1 Euro = 1.8 YTL 
(*) Source: European Commission, 12th Implementation Report 2006
The initial interconnection agreements significantly constrained the competitiveness of new 
entrants. Just before new entry occurred, Turkcell introduced a new tariff package significantly 
reducing the tariffs for on-net calls and increasing those on off-net calls. The existence of signifi-
cantly asymmetric subscriber bases meant that consumers would compare entrants’ off-net tariffs 
with those of incumbents’ on-net tariffs. The entrants’ off-net tariffs were constrained below by 
the high termination rates. Aria responded to this situation initially by offering tariffs that did not 
discriminate between on-net and off-net, but overall, Aria’s off-net prices were significantly higher 
than Turkcell’s on-net prices. This constrained Aria/Avea’s ability to capture market share.
Finally, a few words can be said on the level of retail prices. It is notoriously difficult to compare 
prices because of the variety of packages. Atiyas and Doğan report that tariffs in the Turkish mobi-
le industry are relatively high. According to data in OECD (2005) on a PPP basis, Turkcell tariffs 
were among the highest in Europe in 2004. A similar message comes from the comparison against 
European operators. Data on mobile tariffs presented in Cullen International (2007, see figures 
42-44) are nominal. But with a PPP factor of 0.56 (see Table 1-4) PPP adjusted tariffs would be 
above the median values in EU.
More recent data are provided in Table 1-8, taken from the OECD Communications Outlook 
2007. The table shows that among OECD countries, Turkey has the fifth most expensive charges 
for OECD low usage mobile call basket and the most expensive for the high usage basket.75
1.3.2.4. Internet and Broadband
There are currently 73 ISPs operating in Turkey. Private ISPs have been operating since the second 
half of the 1990s, and Türk Telekom’s internet subsidiary, TTNet, was launched in 1998. TTNet 
both operated the internet backbone and provides internet access services to end users. TTNet 
was legally separated from Türk Telekom and established as a joint stock company on April 26, 
2006. This was a condition put forward by the Competition Authority for the approval of the 
privatization of Türk Telekom.
According to ITU data in 2005 there were 3.1 internet subscribers and 15.3 internet users per 
100 inhabitants in Turkey. Cullen International (2007) reports 18.1 internet users per 100 inha-
bitants and 75 internet users per 100 households. The number of internet users in Turkey is much 
lower than the EU average of close to 40 per 100 inhabitants. According to the most updated 
OECD statistics, the Internet access rate is higher, at 19%, in urban areas, while in rural areas it’s 
stuck at 6 %. Meanwhile, 19% of men use the Internet as opposed to only 9% of women.
The market for dial-up internet services has traditionally been more or less competitive in Tur-
key. However, recent data suggests that this may be changing. Cullen International (2007, Figure 
73) suggest that the share of TTNet has increased from about 50% in 2004 to over 80% in 2006.
75  Another important problem in the mobile industry is the very high taxes, discussed in section 3.7.
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Table 1-8: OECD basket of mobile telephone charges (2005, USD PPP)
Country, Service Low usage Medium usage High usage
Denmark, TDC Mobil 68.82 89.16  184.39 
Sweden, Tele 2 Comviq 87.92 184.70  319.07 
Finland, Elisa 99.89 177.91  296.79 
Norway, Telenor 111.20 219.21  386.77 
Luxembourg, Tango 112.84 216.33  400.14 
Netherlands, Vodafone 119.63 187.99  341.80 
Germany, T-Mobile 123.55 411.43  703.18 
Iceland, Siminn 142.61 335.96  580.99 
Switzerland, Sunrise 145.11 369.24  496.18 
UK, T-Mobile 170.53 392.61  490.76 
Belgium, Mobistar 175.51 437.56  651.47 
Canada, Rogers 177.14 474.95  513.59 
Portugal, Vodafone 178.44 471.49  891.74 
USA, Cingular 190.31 629.04  636.92 
Austria, Mobilkom 193.43 379.32  640.38 
Ireland, Vodafone 202.95 390.22  552.50 
Poland, Orange 209.79 414.37  845.22 
New Zealand, Vodafone 221.38 441.97  655.23 
Korea, SK Telecom 225.62 328.43  548.63 
Hungary, Pannon 230.48 491.66  641.10 
Italy, Vodafone 233.39 576.57  797.98 
France, SFR 239.68 409.86  619.70 
Australia, Optus 243.57 426.73  815.83 
Slovak Republic, Orange 255.40 504.70  951.35 
Spain, MoviStar 258.02 525.13  999.81 
Turkey, Telsim 280.31 635.07 1 165.94 
Greece, Cosmote 302.47 451.36  680.63 
Czech Republic, O2 302.98 673.37 1 066.33 
Mexico, Telcel 309.30 434.01  727.71 
Japan, KDDI au 319.71 574.33  888.90 
OECD average 197.73 408.49  649.70 
Source: OECD (2007)
According to OECD broadband statistics76, as of December 2006, Turkey, with a total of 3.8 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants, ranks 29th among 30 OECD countries. The only country with 
a lower broadband penetration rate is Mexico (3.8). The OECD average was 16.9 and the EU15 
average was 18.6 subscribers per 100 inhabitants. The share of the incumbent is over 99%. Private 
entry so far is in the form of pure resale. 
TTAŞ started to provide ADSL access in 2003, as the sole provider of that service. In February 
2004 the TA instituted a resale arrangement for a small portion of the ADSL ports installed by 
TTAŞ (with a margin allowed to resellers of 18%), but this attracted little enthusiasm from private 
ISPs. In October 2004, the TA Board decided to launch bitstream access and adopted a decision 
on bitstream access. Türk Telekom was providing two types of retail ADSL products: those whose 
tariffs depended on the amount of usage and those that did not. Usage-dependant tariffs were lower 
provided that subscribers’ monthly downloads were below pre-specified amounts (3 GB and 5 GB). 
Bitstream access provided to ISPs was priced on a retail-minus basis and allowed a margin of 40-
50% for ISPs relative to TTAŞ’ non-usage-dependent retail products. However, margins relative to 
usage dependant retail products were lower. The initial reaction of the ADSL community was that 
based on these margins, it was impossible to compete with TTAŞ’ usage-dependant products.
76  Available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband.
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In any case, TTAŞ challenged the TA decision and the decision was struck down by an admi-
nistrative court on the grounds that the TA had authority to approve tariffs offered by TTAŞ, but 
not to dictate tariffs.
In July 2005 TTAŞ made a new tariff offer for bitstream access. This time the margin between 
TTAŞ non-usage-dependant retail ADSL tariffs and bitstream access tariffs allowed margins of 
about 30-35% to ISPs, again relative to non-usage-based TTAŞ retail tariffs. Pure resale was still 
available at an 18% margin. The ISP response to that offer was again that while the offer allowed 
competition in non-usage-based ADSL products, the allowed margin against TTAŞ usage-based 
products was still negative.77 Moreover, the ISPs also complained that the problem of bitstream ac-
cess was not dealt with in a comprehensive manner; there were many non-tariff issues that needed 
to be settled to make bitstream access feasible. One ISP applied to the TA for dispute resolution 
in May 2006 which was concluded in an agreement in February 2007. As of July 2007, this is the 
only bitstream agreement available in the industry.
These problems seems to have pushed the TA to take a more structured approach to the issue 
of wholesale broadband access and in March 2007 the TA requested from TTAŞ to prepare refe-
rence offers for wholesale broadband products. In June 2007 TTAŞ came up with draft reference 
offers both for resale and bitstream ADSL and the TA has initiated a public consultation process 
on these offers. 
In the meantime, TTAŞ’ draft reference unbundling offer was put up for consultation on De-
cember 2005 and finalized in November 2006. Two ISPs, Netone and Superonline, signed LLU 
agreements with TTAŞ in May 2007.78 As of July 2007, there is no service provision yet through 
bitstream or ULL.
The initial intent of the TA was somewhat in line with the “ladder of investment” approach 
(ERG, 2005, Cave, 2006). One of the findings of the “Broadband Competition Report” ERG 
(2005) is that there is a migration by new entrants from pure resale to bitstream access, and un-
bundled access, suggesting that entrants are moving “up” the investment ladder, from those steps 
with lowest investment to those with higher investment. The TA wanted to take quick action on 
pure resale and bitstream and have especially bitstream readily available to ISPs even before TTAŞ’ 
reference unbundling offer would be ready. However, TTAŞ success in challenging the TA deci-
sions, as well as TA’s initial tendency to see bitstream purely as a matter of pricing seems to have 
delayed bitstream from becoming a commercial reality. 
Broadband services in Turkey are expensive. In 2005, Turkey had the highest ratio of broad-
band access costs to average per capita income among OECD countries. 
Figure 1-6: Ratio of broadband access costs to average per capita income, 2005
 
Source: OECD Communications outlook 2005
77  See http://turk.internet.com/haber/yaziyaz.php3?yaziid=13460
78  http://turk.internet.com/haber/yazigoster.php3?yaziid=18324 
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The relative underdevelopment of broadband in Turkey is certainly not surprising, given that 
the Turkish economy still exhibits a significant margin for development. At the other extreme, 
some authors have observed that broadband performs relatively well in Turkey. The Broadband 
Performance Index developed by Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak (2007) ranks countries through a reg-
ression based on a number of variables, which include expectations, price levels, GDP per capita, 
level of education, income inequality, the percent of the population living in the country’s largest 
city, the number of telephones (landline and mobile) per 100 persons, etc. 
As shown in Figure 1-7 below, Turkey ranks fifth in terms of performance relative to all the 
abovementioned variables. In this respect, it is the country that exhibits the starkest difference 
between the OECD ranking and the BPI ranking. 
Figure 1-7: Turkey in the Broadband Performance index, at December 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak (2007) on OECD data
As regards advanced services, Turkey has experienced the introduction of double-play packages 
on the market. Prices of these services are still quite high, as shown in Table 1-9. 
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Table 1-9: Double play prices (voice and data) in OECD Countries, USD, September 2005
Company Type Country Price USD (PPP) Price USD Down (kbits/s) Bit Cap (MB)
Arcor ADSL Germany 48.23 54.98 6000
Og Vodafone ADSL  Iceland 49.89 80.33 6000 2000
Dial Telecom ADSL Slovak Rep. 50.44 29.76  512
T-Com ADSL Germany 54.66 62.31 6016
Hanaro ADSL Korea 55.74 47.94 50000
Glocalnet ADSL Sweden 56.11 69.02 24000
Versatel ADSL Belgium 63.50 69.85 1000 500
Jazztel ADSL Spain 70.08 65.88 4000
Intemode ADSL Australia 70.40 75.33 24000 30000
Ote ADSL Greece 71.92 64.73 1024
Bluewin ADSL Switzerland 72.47 103.63 2400
Hive ADSL Iceland 73.34 118.08 12000
Tele2 ADSL Switzerland 74.12 106.00 2400
Cybercity ADSL Denmark 74.28 106.22 3072
Bt ADSL Uk 81.48 91.25 2200 15000
Cegecom ADSL Luxembourg 85.16 94.53 2000 25000
Eircom ADSL Ireland 86.30 115.64 2048 16000
İnode ADSL Austria 111.40 124.77 4096 2000
Telmex ADSL Mexico 113.59 80.65 1024
Slovak Telecom ADSL Slovak Rep. 118.05 69.65 1024
Nextra ADSL Czech Rep. 125.97 75.58 4096
GTS Datanet ADSL Hungary 136.93 90.37 3008
Vivodi ADSL Greece 149.14 134.23 4096
TP ADSL Poland 196.41 117.85 6144
T-Com ADSL Hungary 200.00 132.00 2048
Dialog ADSL Poland 221.86 133.12 2000
Portugal Telecom ADSL Portugal 243.19 201.85 8000
Turk Telecom ADSL Turkey 265.29 185.70 2048
Cesky Telecom ADSL Czech Rep. 276.00 165.60 1024
1.3.2.5. Cable TV
TTAŞ initially invested in traditional unidirectional cable TV infrastructure until 1994 in 9 cities. 
This development was stopped due to budgetary constraints. Then in 1997 TTAŞ made revenue 
agreements with private operators to build and operate infrastructure entailing cables that would 
allow two-way traffic of data and voice in 11 additional cities. In 1998 the earlier investments were 
turned into revenue sharing agreements. These agreements stipulated that investments, mainte-
nance and repair of the network were carried out by the operators whereas content provision and 
subscriber services were done by TTAŞ.  The agreements were for 10 years and at the end of the 
10 years the network was going to be taken over by TTAŞ.
According to ITU data, in 2005 there were about 1.2 million cable TV subscribers, and the num-
ber of cable modem subscribers was a low 50,000. Hence, even though initial roll out of the cable 
TV infrastructure started in the 1990s, the contribution of cable TV to broadband development 
has been very small. Internet services over the cable TV network are provided only by TTNet.
The lack of development of the cable TV network was at least partly due to insufficient incenti-
ves. Especially as the end of the contract period approached, the operators became less and less keen 
in investing in infrastructure that they would eventually hand over to TTAŞ (Decdeli, 2004). 
Another important development regarding the cable TV network occurred during the pri-
vatization of TTAŞ. As part of its review of the privatization at the pre-notification stage, the 
Competition Authority gave the opinion that the Cable TV infrastructure, including all rights to 
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own and operate it should be organized as a separate legal entity within a year of transfer of ow-
nership of Türk Telekom. 79  The basic reasoning of the CA in its decision was that the cable TV 
was potentially a network through which facilities based competition could be introduced into the 
industry.80 The cable TV network was indeed separated from the TTAŞ, and it was placed under 
the ownership of Türksat, the state-owned satellite operator.81 As indicated above, in the same 
decision, the Competition Authority also requested that Türk Telekom’s internet business unit, 
TTNet, be legally separated from Türk Telekom - by creation of a separate subsidiary. 
The TA issued on February 2005 an authorization for the cable TV operators called Cable TV 
Platform Licenses. This was designated as Annex 10 to the Authorization Ordinance. Cable plat-
form services were defined as the one-way and two-way provision of all kinds of sound, data, ima-
ge and radio/TV signals over the cable platform network, hence they include telephone services as 
well as radio, TV, Internet and data. The authorization includes provision of local wireless Inter-
net services. Finally, it also includes establishment of infrastructure. The authorization requires a 
type 2 telecommunications license valid for 20 years. The actual issuance of licenses were delayed 
because the Council of Ministers decided the minimum fees only in December 2005. Then, TA 
issued first licenses for cable TV broadcasting services to three operators Kablonet, Ultra Kablo 
and Interaktif on April 2006, and to Topaz on June 2006. 
However, cable TV providers are currently in a legal dispute with Türksat. Cable TV providers 
have revenue sharing agreements with Türksat that expire in 2007. Türksat claims that once cable 
TV providers have obtained own licenses, revenue sharing agreements are no longer valid, and the 
cable TV network infrastructure must be returned to Türksat and the operators have to build their 
own infrastructure. 
In the meantime, the authorization of cable platform services was cancelled by the Council of 
State on the grounds that separate authorizations had to be issued for the provision of different 
services, adding to the legal confusion surrounding cable TV. 
1.3.2.6. The Role of Competition Law Enforcement
Turkey seems more aligned with the EU acquis in the field of competition policy.82 As indicated 
above, even though Law No. 2183 does not provide a clear-cut division of labor between the TA 
and the Competition Authority, the current tendency is that the CA does not investigate allega-
tions of violation of Competition Law in areas that are regulated by the TA. The CA did have a 
number of important decisions in the industry.
The first important decision in the mobile industry was on allegations put forward by Telsim 
in September 1999 that Turkcell’s exclusive agreements with handset distributors and dealers dis-
torted competition and acted as barriers that impeded Telsim’s entry. In effect, Turkcell was able 
to tie the sale of handsets of some major mobile phone brands (such as Ericsson) to the purchase 
of a Turkcell subscription, effectively making it costly for Telsim to attract subscriptions among 
consumers who favor those brands. Mobile handsets in Turkey were often sold with operators’ 
SIM cards and subscriber lines, a practice that apparently developed to prevent sale of handsets 
that were not compatible with the GSM standard. The investigation revealed that Turkcell’s agre-
79  “The prior opinion of the Competition Board on the Privatization of Türk Telekom,” (in Turkish) at  http://
www.rekabet.gov.tr/word/gorus/telekom.doc
80  This decision was not without controversy. While the TA did not issue a public statement on the issue, the 
then president of TA was quoted as saying that divestiture of the cable TV network was not necessary, that 
legal separation was sufficient and any competition concerns could be addressed by the TA (Interview in the 
Turkish daily Hürriyet, 31.10.2004). In the end the CA prevailed.
81  This was done through Law No. 5335 (Official Gazette, April 27, 2005).
82  See Renda et al. (2007). 
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ements with distributors of major brands of handsets such as Ericsson and Panasonic prevented 
these distributors from marketing Telsim SIM cards and subscriber lines. In effect, these exclusi-
onary clauses restricted end-users’ ability to use these brands of handsets with Telsim subscriber 
lines; in other words, these clauses made it more difficult for potential Telsim subscribers to access 
these handsets. Since these were popular handsets, the exclusionary clauses made it more difficult 
for Telsim to attract subscribers. Turkcell effectively penalized distributors that did not accept 
exclusionary agreements by reducing the amount of business Turkcell did with these distributors 
and/or by reducing handset subsidies. Turkcell was also found to use its dominance in the mobile 
calls market to distort competition in headset market by discriminating in favor of a distribution 
company with which it has ownership ties. The Competition Authority decided that Turkcell vio-
lated the Competition Law and imposed a fine of about USD 5 million.
Another important decision in the mobile industry was on roaming. When Turkcell and Tel-
sim failed to provide roaming agreements to new entrants Aria and Aycell, CA launched an 
investigation to assess whether this amounted to an infringement of Competition Law. The CA 
first concluded that Turkcell and Telsim had joint dominance over the GSM infrastructure mar-
ket. The Board then argued that Turkcell and Telsim had effectively refused providing roaming 
services and that this refusal amounted to an abuse of dominant position by denying access to 
an essential facility. Normally the essential facility doctrine covers instances where a competitor 
lacks a realistic ability to duplicate a facility that it needs in order to provide its services. In the 
Turkish roaming case, the entrants eventually were obliged to construct a GSM infrastructure 
due to their license conditions. Hence the CA argument of essential facility was not that the 
entrants did not have an ability to duplicate the GSM infrastructure, but that full roll out of the 
facility would take time and that the passage of time would make it more difficult for Is-TIM to 
attract subscribers. The CA listed technical, legal and economic difficulties that would prohibit 
the installation of infrastructure in a short period of time (say one year), and that delays in atta-
ining full coverage would seriously increase the cost of attracting subscribers, and the resulting 
delay in revenues would jeopardize the viability of the company and reduce its ability to compete 
with the incumbents. The investigation was concluded in June 2003 and Turkcell and Telsim 
were handed fines of USD 15.4 million and USD 6.1 million respectively. This decision of the 
Board was cancelled by Council of State.
The CA also had a number of important decisions in the fixed line market. One important 
decision was launched in 2001, on allegations that TTAŞ abused its dominant position in the in-
ternet and internet infrastructure markets by, inter alia, refusal to supply infrastructure elements, 
especially for broadband internet services, raising lease line tariffs applied to competitors of TT-
Net in a discriminatory manner, and below-cost retail pricing by TTNet. The Board decided that 
TTAŞ abused its dominant position by keeping tariffs charged to both residential and (broadband) 
corporate users of internet services below the cost of lines it was leasing to ISPs. The Board handed 
a fine of 1.1 trillion TRL (almost USD 700 million at the prevailing exchange rate). In another 
decision in 2003, the CA forced TTAŞ to cease acquiring new ADSL subscriptions until the TA 
would come up with regulations regarding access. In 2005 the Board investigated whether the 
failure of TTAŞ to allow independent ISPs to provide internet services over the cable TV network 
amounted to an abuse of dominant position. The CA decided that TTAŞ did abuse of dominant 
position, but did not impose a fine because TTAŞ was found to be working with the TA with the 
purpose to open up the cable TV network to internet service providers.
The CA has received a large number of complaints from alternative operators in the last few 
years regarding anti-competitive practices by TTAŞ. The CA has refused to act on many of them 
mainly on the grounds that the allegations related to areas that were regulated by the TA. For 
example, in 2005 an independent ISP complained to the CA that a TTAŞ discount campaign 
for ADSL services for teachers and students constituted an abuse of dominant position. The CA 
decided that the campaign was conducted with the approval of the TA and therefore could not be 
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investigated under competition law. Again in 2005 there was a complaint that TTAŞ was creating 
difficulties for long distance service providers by various delaying tactics on issues such as intercon-
nection agreements and technical preparations needed for the alternative operators to launch their 
services. The CA basically decided that the right address for such complaints was the TA. 
A recent important decision of the CA concerns an ADSL “summer campaign” launched by 
TTNet that entailed discounts in retails prices reaching 50%. According to press reports, the CA 
asked TTNet to terminate the discounts. TA’s intervention in the retail broadband market is not 
surprising since the market is not regulated. Still, the TA decision on this case is not published yet 
hence the specific logic that the TA has used is not yet known.
Overall, these development in competition policy testify that Turkey, just as the EU, applies ex 
ante regulation and ex post competition policy as complementary instruments, not as alternative 
routes to market liberalization – as occurred, for many years, in the US.83 
1.3.2.7. Taxation of Mobile Charges
In Turkey, mobile operators are subject to an impressive conundrum of taxes, which include a 
Special Communication Tax, the Treasury Share Premium, the Stamp Duty, the TGM Handset 
License Fee and TGM Handset Usage Fee. As a result, Turkey exhibits the highest tax rate worl-
dwide with over 60%. Mobile operators in Turkey pay more than 60% of the money they earn 
from their customers as taxes, compared to an EU average of around 20%. A Turkish operator 
pays 80% of a typical pre-pay customer’s first-year revenues directly to the government. 
Such a high tax rate inevitably exerts a restrictive effect on the penetration rate. With lower 
rates, a much higher market penetration could have been achieved instead of the current 60%. 
A similar concern for high tax rates was expressed by the World Bank in its March 2004 “Tur-
key Knowledge Economy Assessment Study”, in which a key recommendation was to “reduce 
the tax and regulatory burden on ICT”. More recently, GSMA (2005) published a study on the 
impact of taxation on mobile market growth, highlighting that “the degree to which taxation acts 
as a barrier for users, preventing potentially hundreds of millions people from affording mobile 
communications and holding back economic growth and social development in many countries”, 
and showing the magnitude of the Turkish ‘anomaly’, as depicted in Figure 1-8 below.
Figure 1-8: Tax as a share of total cost of mobile ownership (TCMO)
 
 
 
 
Source: Global Mobile Tax Review, 2006-2007, Deloitte.
83 See, e.g. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
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1.3.3. Prospects of Turkey’s Adoption of the EU Acquis in the 
Telecommunications Sector
As Turkey approaches the debate on the new telecommunications law, it is important to take stock 
and assess what impacts could be expected in terms of productivity and growth from the full align-
ment of Turkey’s regulatory regime with the EU acquis. In this respect, the previous section led us 
to conclude that in 2006 several legal changes in Turkey have paved the way for a greater align-
ment with the acquis, although some of these changes are yet to fully take effect in the market. In 
particular, the TA seems to need to be more speedy and effective in enforcing and operationalizing 
its interventions. In addition, the individual licensing regime seems to constitute a major burden 
for operators wishing to enter the market. In the mobile sector – certainly the most promising 
sector for potential investors – taxation may hamper the growth of the penetration rate, as well as 
the transition towards 3G and more advanced mobile broadband technologies. Finally, spectrum 
policy still relies on an inflexible “command and control” management, with neither secondary 
markets nor auctions to allocate frequencies to more valuable uses. 
Against this background, the European Commission has issued rather satisfactory statements 
on the ongoing alignment of Turkey with the EU acquis in the field of telecom services. By con-
trast, Turkey was found not to be aligned with EU standards on electronic commerce and condi-
tional services, and “overall alignment in this area remains limited”, as highlighted by the Euro-
pean Commission in its 2006 Progress Report on Turkey. Also, significant concerns were expressed 
as regards the alignment of Turkish legislation with the EU acquis on audiovisual services and 
European standards, where progress “on most of the related priorities of the Accession Partnership 
is lagging behind considerably”.
As a more general note, there is scope to improve Turkey’s business climate and regulatory ef-
fectiveness in the next few years. Authoritative economic studies have found that Turkey’s greatest 
potential does not lie in the alignment with the acquis, but in the improvement of the institutional 
stability, regulatory transparency and accountability, and in the reduction of corruption.84 As re-
called by Burnham (2007), Turkey still ranks rather low in both the World Bank’s Doing Business 
and in the Global Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Rankings. Also, Renda et al. (2007) 
report that Turkey’s competition law still suffers from a number of enforcement problems. More 
generally, the positive relationship between regulatory effectiveness and investment levels has been 
confirmed in several occasions by the ECTA Scorecard and by authors, such as Jones and Salsas 
(2006). 
As a result, it is fair to state that Turkey could reap significant benefits from a further alignment 
with the EU acquis. However, this depends on whether the acquis is correctly implemented. The 
precondition for achieving growth and jobs as a result of better telecommunication regulation is 
above all the achievement of regulatory certainty and a business environment conducive to invest-
ment and innovation. In this respect, a lot can be done to improve the TA’s institutional capacity 
and competences.
Were Turkey to effectively undertake regulation of fixed and mobile telecommunications, the 
first visible effect that would follow would be a reduction in prices. A recent paper by Akdemir 
et al. (2007) calculates the potential price reduction that would be observed if Turkey aligned its 
regulatory framework with the EU acquis and then adopted a liberal telecommunication policy 
similar to that implemented in the UK and Finland. 
The authors use a range of restrictiveness indexes, such as those used in Boylaud and Nicoletti 
(2000), Warren (2000) and Kimura et al. (2003) and determine the ad valorem equivalent of bar-
riers to the telecommunications services industry to derive a potential impact on prices. The result 
84  See Lejour and De Mooij (2005). 
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is that telecom prices would fall by an average 33.53%, with enormous benefits for the economy. 
In particular, Table 1-10, reproduced from Akdemir et. al. (2007), shows the restrictiveness index 
scores for telecom services as derived by Warren (2000), which shows that in 2000 Turkey ranked 
very low compared to almost all the EU27, with the exception of Malta. 
Table 1-10 - Restrictiveness index scores for telecom services, EU27 and Turkey
Economy
Domestic Index
Restrictions on establishment Restrictions on ongoing operations
Restrictions on 
direct investment 
in fixed network 
services
Restriction on 
direct investment 
in cellular 
mobile phone 
services
Restriction on 
establishement 
total
Restrictions 
on cross-
border trade
Restrictions 
on ongoing 
operations 
total
Domestic 
index total
Finland 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
United Kingdom 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
Netherlands 0,0150 0,0150 0,0300 0,0000 0,0000 0,0300
Denmark 0,0000 0,0333 0,0333 0,0000 0,0000 0,0333
Germany 0,0247 0,0247 0,0493 0,0000 0,0000 0,0493
France 0,0250 0,0250 0,0500 0,0000 0,0000 0,0500
Sweden 0,0667 0,0333 0,1000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1000
Belgium 0,0167 0,0167 0,0334 0,0667 0,0667 0,1001
Austria 0,1000 0,0333 0,1333 0,0000 0,0000 0,1333
Italy 0,0851 0,0518 0,1369 0,0000 0,0000 0,1369
Luxembourg 0,1000 0,0667 0,1667 0,0000 0,0000 0,1667
Ireland 0,1333 0,0600 0,1933 0,0000 0,0000 0,1933
Estonia 0,1170 0,0170 0,1340 0,0667 0,0667 0,2007
Spain 0,1197 0,0597 0,1793 0,0333 0,0333 0,2127
Lithuania 0,1333 0,0333 0,1667 0,0667 0,0667 0,2333
Greece 0,1338 0,0271 0,1609 0,1000 0,1000 0,2609
Czech Republic 0,1170 0,0170 0,1340 0,1333 0,1333 0,2673
Hungary 0,1087 0,0020 0,1107 0,1667 0,1667 0,2774
Romania 0,1333 0,0333 0,1667 0,1333 0,1333 0,3000
Portugal 0,1017 0,0083 0,1100 0,2000 0,2000 0,3100
Slovak Republic 0,1400 0,0667 0,0667 0,1333 0,1333 0,3400
Poland 0,1267 0,0333 0,1600 0,2000 0,2000 0,3600
Latvia 0,1370 0,0503 0,1873 0,2000 0,2000 0,3873
Bulgaria 0,1533 0,0667 0,2200 0,2000 0,2000 0,4200
Cyprus 0,1667 0,1667 0,3333 0,1333 0,1333 0,4666
Turkey 0,1667 0,1000 0,2667 0,2000 0,2000 0,4667
Malta 0,1667 0,1667 0,3333 0,2000 0,2000 0,5333
Source: Warren, T. 2000, ‘The identification of impediments to trade and investment in telecommunications services’, in Findlay, C. 
and Warren, T. (eds) 2000, Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, Routledge, London and New York. 
Note: The restrictiveness indexes are calculated from Warren 2000. The domestic and foreign restrictiveness index scores ranges from 0 to 
1. The higher the score, the greater the restrictions for an economy. 
The price reduction effect found by Akdemir et al. (2007) reverberates on consumption in all 
sectors of the economy. To account for the nature of telecom services as input of other commodi-
ties, the authors build a price vector for the 97 sectors in which the Turkish economy can be divi-
ded. Without taking into account the increased demand that would follow from a price reduction 
in each of the sectors – which would require a complex calculation of demand elasticities for each 
and every sector – the authors reach a conservative estimate of the potential welfare increase from 
Turkey’s alignment with the EU acquis and implementation of a UK-like or Finland-line telecoms 
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policy. The result is an increase in Turkish GDP of 0.428%. 
It is useful to assess this figure in light of the estimated “Economic cost of non-Lisbon” as cal-
culated by the European Commission in 2003. At that time, the EU15 were about to start imp-
lementing the 2002 framework in a situation in which, also due to the imperfect functioning of 
the 1998 package, the telecoms market was still dominated by incumbent firms, and most markets 
had yet to unleash the true welfare and growth potential of telecoms liberalisation. At that time, 
the Commission estimated that the full liberalization of the telecommunication and electricity 
markets would lead to GDP and employment levels increase of 0.4% and 0.6% respectively, four 
years after the liberalization, and a GDP level increase of 0.6%, ten years after liberalization.85 
More recently, the Commission also calculated that increasing total EU R&D expenditure 
from 1.9% to 3% of GDP by 2010 (in order to reach the Lisbon target), when compared to a 
status quo scenario (no increase in R&D spending) would lead to a GDP level increase of 1.7% 
by 2010 (0.25% per year), increases of Total Factor Productivity (0.8%), employment (1.4%) and 
real income (3%) by 2010 and further GDP level increases of 4.2%, 7.5% and 12.1% in 2015, 
2020 and 2030, respectively.86 
As Turkey exhibits one of the lowest per capita GDP level in OECD countries, it seems fair to 
assume that the growth potential would be even higher, if Turkey were to follow the i2010 strategy 
and reach the corresponding ambitious objectives in term of R&D investment over GDP (3%) by 
2010.87 The goal currently set by the 2006-2010 information society strategy is 2% of GDP. 
However, faced with such a challenge, Turkey may take advantage of the European experience 
with the 2002 regulatory framework in the past few years, and move faster towards the realisation 
of the “information society for all”. As the major weaknesses of Turkey are low fixed-line and bro-
adband penetration and higher, but still less that satisfactory mobile penetration, then extending 
universal service, mobilising valuable spectrum resources and removing taxation from mobile re-
tail services appear as key priorities for the next few years. 
1.3.4. Evaluation and Recommendations
Even though significant progress has been achieved in the introduction of competition in the te-
lecommunications industry, Turkey is still in the early stages of competition and much remains to 
be done to improve the regulatory framework. Accordingly there are significant potential welfare 
gains from further development of competition. 
1.3.4.1. Adopting a “Policy Mix” Tailored to Turkey
As we observed in the previous sections, aligning Turkey’s regulatory framework with the EU 
acquis is a useful, but not decisive step for Turkey to enter the digital era. The European experience 
suggests that the countries where static and dynamic competition has developed more rapidly are 
those where infrastructure-based competition exists, and that those countries that do not have a 
legacy cable infrastructure should carefully look at expanding the number of local loops over time 
to liberalize fixed-line retail markets, but mostly to broadband wireless access technologies as a 
possible shortcut towards the emergence of New Generation Networks.
This is only an example of a more general principle that can be drawn from the observation of 
national experiences in EU and non-EU countries: the peculiar geography and the technological 
85  European Commission, Chapter 2 - Structural reforms in labour and product markets and macroeconomic 
performance in the EU, in: The EU Economy: 2002 Review. 
86  European Commission, A 3% R&D effort in Europe in 2010: an analysis of the consequences, study prepared by 
the Research Directorate General of the European Commission, 2004. 
87  See http://trendchart.cordis.lu/tc_article.cfm?ID=3475&NEWSID=20. 
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endowment of a given country are essential factors in the definition of the right policy mix. For 
example, where a legacy cable infrastructure is not present – i.e. in those markets that would be 
called “0.x” or “1.x”, following a definition coined by Eli Noam – the road to infrastructure-based 
competition may entail short-run service-based competition, i.e. a careful application of the in-
vestment ladder and a limited degree of market micromanagement.88 At the same time, alternative 
access technologies should be promoted in order to ensure sustainable long-run competition. 
But this, again, is only part of the story. Both supply-side and demand-side policies are needed 
to help the emergence of the information society. On the supply-side, besides access obligations, 
also spectrum availability and policies to encourage investment in telecom infrastructure are essen-
tial to improve fixed-line penetration. In metropolitan areas, FTTx technologies may have a bu-
siness case in Turkey, if demand is adequately stimulated. However, evidence that the 3G auction 
was postponed from May to September 2007 for lack of interest on the side of operators reveals 
that the demand for such advanced multimedia services is still poor in Turkey. Here, the removal 
of overly burdensome taxation and policies aimed at the gradual reduction of mobile charges ap-
pear as key priorities for the Turkish government. 
Moreover, devising the right policy mix for the digital era also entails the enactment of effective 
legislation in the field of content and applications. In the layered architecture of digital platforms, 
the incentive to deploy innovative services crucially depends on whether network operators will 
be able to reap revenues from traffic prioritization, as well as from advertising. This, in turn, calls 
into question important issues such as the net neutrality debate, recently addressed, i.a., by the 
UK regulator Ofcom in its consultation document on New Generation Networks. 
Finally, the quality of the customer experience is essential to stimulate the transition towards 
the information society. In this respect, consumers are often the weakest link of modern business 
models: operators competing for the attention of the final users are then called to offer multi-play 
bundles where end users are offered an integrated and comprehensive set of services, which include 
premium content, killer applications and the use of DRM, privacy-enhancing technologies and 
integrated payment systems that enhance consumer confidence and thus boost internet use.
1.3.4.2. Issues in the Regulatory Framework and Capacity
The 2003 Regulatory Framework of the EU has provided the TA with an important set of prin-
ciples and guidelines to follow. The emerging regulatory framework is increasingly inspired by 
that in the EU, but there are a number of important divergences. The most glaring is the autho-
rization regime, which is cumbersome, costly and acts as a barrier to entry. Improvements in the 
authorization regime require changes in primary legislation. The second area is universal service. 
The current (extended) scope of universal service is beyond those specified in the Universal Service 
Directive. Even though procedures for designating operators with universal service obligations and 
their financing are close to the EU regime, the legislation is not yet implemented. 
In part, the difficulties faced by the TA reflect the fact that initially it was caught between the 
old (1998) and the new (2003) framework of the EU. The Framework Law No. 4502 (or the 
amendments it introduced to laws No. 406 and 2183) was largely inspired by the 1998 framework 
but the TA itself tried to orient itself towards the new framework. Hence, at this point the most 
important action that needs to be undertaken is possibly the enactment of a comprehensive ele-
ctronic communications law to provide a sound legal basis for ex-ante regulation. The draft law 
currently at the parliamentary committee may be a good start but needs to be revised to better 
reflect the basic approach in the EU framework. 
Second, besides a more solid legal foundation, it seems important that the authorities adopt a com-
88  See Noam, E. (2005), American Telecom 2005: Directions for Change, October (available at http://www.think-
tel.org/documenti/051117-250.pdf ).
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prehensive medium term policy framework to guide the sequencing of policy actions. It seems a docu-
ment, say a “white paper”, would be helpful in developing a more precise forward looking approach. 
This seems important especially since, in many instances, delays in new entry and competition have 
occurred despite significant intent and effort by the TA to enhance competition, reflecting the absence 
of a cohesive, strategic outlook. A case in point is the policy of mandatory national roaming discussed 
above.  In that case, the incumbents used the legal system to delay the enforcement of regulations until 
they became irrelevant. Another important example is the TA’s effort to introduce bitstream access. 
In that case as well, the incumbent used the legal system to delay enforcement. It also turned out that 
mandating bitstream in an effective manner required an approach that went beyond determination 
of tariffs and margins, and regulation of non-price elements as well. In both cases, more foresight ca-
pacity would have enhanced the effectiveness of implementation. In the case of roaming, that would 
have required including roaming obligations into the concession agreements of the incumbents. In 
the case of bitstream, it would have entailed a more comprehensive approach that focused on non-
price elements of bitstream access from the start.
Delays in the development of competition also reflect some degree of ambivalence especially on 
the part of the Ministry. This was especially true before the privatization of TTAŞ, when liberali-
zation and new entry was delayed apparently to increase the sale value of TTAŞ. This stage of the 
process of liberalization is now over. However, it still seems that a stronger political commitment 
by the Ministry to further the development of competition is necessary. In principle the cause of 
competition should be foremost owned at the policy level, by the Ministry, and the TA should be 
accountable to the political level in terms of implementation. Currently, ownership at the political 
level seems lacking.
One important factor that affects the overall quality of regulation is the extent to which regu-
latory authorities are transparent and accountable. Enhancing accountability enhances regulatory 
independence, decreases the threat of regulatory capture, improves incentives for better regulation, 
reduces regulator discretion, increases regulatory credibility and reduces regulatory uncertainty.
Relative to traditional administrative agencies, independent regulatory authorities in Turkey 
are more transparent and accountable. Importantly, undertaking public consultations on draft se-
condary legislation has become a routine practice. However, there is still much that can be done in 
order to enhance accountability. First, even though ordinance and communiqués are published in 
the Official Gazette, and posted on TA’s website, the TA is not obliged to publish Board decisions. 
Whether or not to make public its decisions is left to the discretion of the Board. The Board does 
publish some of its decisions on its website but this is true only for a subset of is decisions. 
Second, the TA is not required to provide justifications neither for draft secondary legislati-
on, nor for the final form of the secondary legislation, nor for the Board decisions. It is also not 
required to make public technical reports prepared by its staff that the Board uses in reaching its 
decisions. Hence, for example, when the Board approves the tariffs of the incumbent operator, or 
determines access charges it does not disclose how those decisions are reached. An obligation to 
make public the reasoning behind regulations and decisions would impose a tighter discipline on 
the TA and would greatly enhance its accountability.
One reason why the TA may be timid in disclosing the background to its decisions may be that 
the TA may still have insufficient technical capacity to fully justify its decisions; in other words, in 
some cases it employs rules of thumb and judgments which are hard to provide explicit justifica-
tions for. Or else, it may be employing models which are not yet fully developed. Another reason 
could be that it is worried about making itself more vulnerable to appeals and legal challenges. 
However, even on that count, it is not clear that lack of transparency always works in favor of the 
TA. Insufficient justification allows more discretion to appeal bodies and may induce them to “fill 
in the blanks”. 
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A related issue is that in public consultations, the TA does not make public the opinions it has 
received. This probably reduces the collective learning impact of public consultations. However, 
there is some progress in that respect. The final reports on market analyses do contain information 
about comments received during the consultation and the TA’s responses to these comments. 89
In relation to transparency and accountability, the founding law of the Competition Authority 
provides a better example. The CA has to publish at the official gazette all the Board decisions. 
Moreover, Board decisions need to include justifications, as well as a summary of the analysis and 
main conclusions of the committee that carries out the investigation in anti-trust and merger ca-
ses. Even in that case, however, the full report of the investigation committee is not made public.
Another issue that needs to be raised in terms of transparency has to do with appeals against 
the regulations and decisions of the Board. The decisions of administrative courts and the Council 
of State are not made public. The Council of State is not required to publish all its decisions, and 
indeed some of the important decisions in the field of telecommunications regulation cannot be 
found on its web site.90 Making these decisions public on the TA’s web site would add significantly 
to transparency.
Several stakeholders have also raised their concern that the TA currently lacks the ability to 
enforce most of its decisions and obligations on to SMP operators. For example, Türk Telekom 
has failed to meet deadlines imposed on it in several occasions (for example, in submitting its 
reference unbundling offer). In many occasions, this failure to comply has remained unpunished 
by the regulator, creating significant concerns as to the enforcement capabilities of the Telecom-
munication Authority. 
1.3.4.3. Specific Actions
In light of the conclusions drawn in the previous sections, the following “decalogue” seems to 
depict the most appropriate strategy for Turkey to enter the information society: 
1. Penetration. Promote investment in telecom infrastructure and consequently on the deploy-
ment of fixed and mobile broadband networks, to bridge the digital divide;
2. Universal service. Enhance transparency in the destination of the universal service fund, 
to be used to promote internet access and usage in both metropolitan and rural areas, e.g. 
through deployment of Wi-Fi and WiMAX technologies; 
3. Number portability. Operationalize the number portability regulation;
4. Full alignment with the acquis. Enact laws to align with the acquis on online data protection 
and online privacy, cybercrime, audiovisual services;
5. Taxation. Drastically reduce the burden of taxation on mobile services, to encourage use of 
mobile phones and boost mobile penetration rates;
6. Wholesale access policy. Carefully enforce mandatory network sharing in fixed-line networks, 
while at the same time establishing a clear migration path towards ex post competition policy 
when sufficient competition has developed in the fixed-line sector;
7. Convergence. Merge/coordinate the competencies of the TA and the radio and television 
regulator (RTUK), to adequately account for technological convergence;
89  For example, the TA does not keep minutes of public hearings since – as was reported by Handan Karacabey 
of the TA of Turkey in a response to the ITU Global Regulators Exchange Database - “it causes a formal 
mood preventing a sincere and efficient discussion.”
90  A case in point is the Council of State decision cancelling the authorization of cable platform services. 
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8. Independence. Enhance the status, independence and powers of the TA;
9. Better regulation. Enact a comprehensive electronic communications law; increase the trans-
parency and accountability of regulators; in particular, replace the individual licensing re-
gime with a general authorisation regime; 
10. Enforcement of law. Improve enforcement in the fields of IPRs, regulatory decisions, anti-
piracy laws, etc. 
1.4. Annex: Main Ingredients of the Regulatory Framework for the 
Türk Telekom Industry
General
Amending Law No. 4502 January 2000 - Monopoly rights of Türk Telekom will be terminated 
on December 31, 2003. The TA is established as an independent regulator. Also has provisions on 
issues such as interconnection, 
Law No. 4673, May 2001. The law transfers licensing authority from the Ministry of Transport 
to the TA.
Law No. 406 – Telegraph and Telephone Law, originally dated 1924.
Law No. 2183 – Wireless Law, originally dated 1983.
Authorization
March 2001 - Telecommunication Services Regulation (replaced by Ordinance on the Authoriza-
tion of Telecommunications Services and Infrastructure in 2004)
August 2004 – Ordinance on the Authorization of Telecommunications Services and Infrastructu-
re (Official Gazette, August 26, 2004). The original ordinance included 9 Annexes for the autho-
rization of GSM mobile services, satellite telecommunications services, satellite platform services, 
GMPCS mobile phone services, telephone message services, ISP services, data transmission over 
terrestrial lines, PAMR services, and long distance telephone services, respectively. The Ordinance 
was later amended to include cable platform services (Annex A10, February 2005-cancelled by 
the Council of State), broadband fixed wireless access (Annex A11, February 2005), infrastructure 
services (Annex A12, September 2005), directory services (Annex A13, July 2006). 
Access and Interconnection
May 2003 - Ordinance on Access and Interconnection May 2003 (Official Gazette, 23.05.03)
December 2003 - Communiqué On Principles And Procedures Regarding Co-Location And Fa-
cility Sharing (Official Gazette, December 31, 2003 No. 25333)
July 2004 - Communiqué on Principles and Procedures on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop 
(Official Gazette, July 20, 2004; amended in 2007 through Communiqué on Making Changes 
on Communiqué on Principles and Procedures on Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, Official 
Gazette, June 14, 2007).
September 2004 – TA issues Standard Interconnection Reference Tariffs
October 2004 - The TA adopts a decision on ADSL resale and bitstream access (Board Decision 
No. 2004/535 of October 6, 2004, not published in the official gazette).
June 2007 -Ordinance on Access and Interconnection (Official Gazette, 14 June 2007).
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Retail Price Control
August 2001 –Tariff Ordinance (Official Gazette, August 28, 2001 no. 24507)
January 2002 - Communiqué on Principles and Procedures to Apply Price Cap Regulation to 
Türk Telekom Tariffs (Official Gazette, 11.01.2002) (Price Cap Communiqué I)
December 2003 –Price Cap Communiqué II (Official Gazette, December 31, 2003)
January 2007 – Ordinance to Amend the Tariff Ordinance (Official Gazette, January 7, 2007). 
January 2007 – Price Cap Communiqué III (Official Gazette, January 16, 2007)
Market Analysis / SMP Operators
June 2003 – Communiqué on Principles and Procedures Regarding the Determination of Opera-
tors with Significant Market Power (Official Gazette June 3, 2003, No. 25127)
June 2003 - Communiqué on Principles Regarding the Determination of Operators with Domi-
nant Position (Official Gazette June 3, 2003, No. 25127)
January 2007 - Regulation on Rules and Procedures on the Determination of Operators with 
Significant Market Power (Official Gazette, No. 26396, January 7, 2007)
Universal Service
June 2005 – Law No. 5369 - Law on the Provision of Universal Service and Amendments to Some 
Laws (Official Gazette 25.06.2005).  
June 2006 - Ordinance on Principles and Procedures Regarding the Collection of Universal Servi-
ce Revenues and making Universal Service Expenditures (Official Gazette, June 29, 2006)
Other
September 2000 – TA issues Principles and Procedures to be followed in Mediations regarding 
Disagreements on National Roaming
March 2002 – Ordinance on Principles and Procedures for Making Roaming Agreements
February 2004 - Regulation for Numbering
February 2004 – Ordinance on the Processing of Personal Information and Protection of Privacy 
(Official Gazette, 26.02.2004)
May 2006 – Ordinance on Rights of Way in Telecommunications Services
February 2007 – Number Portability Ordinance 
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2.1. Introduction
The reform and restructuring of the energy industries in Turkey is relatively recent. While private 
participation existed in some segments, a more thorough and ambitious program of restructuring 
was launched in the early 2000s. Primary laws were followed by a comprehensive set of secondary 
legislation, especially in electricity. Most of the legal and regulatory effort was inspired by the ad-
vances in the European Union (EU). In fact, as argued in more detail below, the legal framework 
established in Turkey through the Electricity Market Law of 2001 was at least as competitive, if 
not more, than the 1996 Electricity Directive of the EU. However, progress so far has not been 
impressive. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to review the restructuring process of electricity and gas indus-
tries in Turkey in light of the EU acquis. The process of regulatory reform in the EU is rewieved, 
as well as progress with implementation and an overview of market outcomes is presented. Then 
evaluates the emerging regulatory framework in Turkey is evaluated and progress with imple-
mentation is described. While there are certain gaps between the Turkish and EU frameworks for 
electricity, it is argued below that the real reason behind the disappointing performance in terms of 
restructuring lies not so much in lack of harmonization or a pro-competitive legal and regulatory 
framework, but inconsistencies between the economic incentives embedded in the reform strategy, 
especially as regards to market prices.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the regulatory framework in the EU, 
and examines implementation across member states and asseses the impact of reform on market 
outcomes. Section 2.3 discusses the regulatory framework in Turkey as well as problems and di-
lemmas faced in implementation.2.2. Energy Market in the EU
2.2.1. Review of the EU Energy Regulatory Framework
The creation of an internal market for energy was not part of the Single European Act of 1986, 
which launched the EC-1992 programme, i.e. the EU internal market. However, the implemen-
tation of the internal market soon required action in the electricity and gas markets. The energy 
sector was quickly affected by public procurement rules and tax and environmental legislation. 
However, the real pressure came with the implications for competition policy.1 The existence of 
nationalised energy grids and national policies of autarchy in the sector created a particularly dif-
ficult environment for the realisation of a single market. 
Initial steps concentrated on increasing the interconnection of gas and electricity grids of the 
Members States2 and transparency3. Following these initial, cautious steps, the EU moved towards 
full liberalisation of the energy market from the mid-nineties onwards, resulting in the adoption 
of two liberalisation packages. A third liberalisation package was recently adopted by the Com-
mission.
1  A more detailed description can be found in : Jacques Pelkmans and Ole Jess Olsen (1996), Towards a Single 
market for Utilities. CEPS Working Party Report. 
2  Council Directive 90/547/EEC of 29 October 1990 on the transit of electricity through transmission grids, 
followed by the Council Directive 91/296/EEC of 31 May 1991 on the transit of natural gas through 
grids.
3  The Council Directive 90/337/EEC of 29 June 1990 to improve the transparency of gas and electricity pri-
ces charged to industrial end-users was a first attempt to ensure that competition was not distorted in the 
common market, by introducing energy price transparency. Directive 90/547/EEC on electricity foresaw the 
interconnection of major European grids so as increase trade of electricity and transfers between electricity 
grids and lay down the measures by which the Member States were called upon to facilitate the transit of 
electricity between high voltage grids.
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2.2.1.1. The First Liberalisation Package
The first liberalisation package of Europe’s energy markets arrived with two Directives concerning 
common rules for the internal market in electricity and gas (96/92/EC and 98/03/EC) respecti-
vely. Both directives “fixed a minimum level of competition at member state level by way of com-
mon rules while progressively bringing down barriers to cross-border trade.”4
The 1996 electricity directive concentrated on the full liberalisation of energy generation and 
introduced a six-year phase-in period to allow large and medium-sized companies to choose their 
supplier and the freedom to construct independent distribution grids. It foresaw unbundling the 
accounts of integrated companies, coupled with a number of additional access rules to guarantee 
non-discriminatory grid access. 
The 1998 gas directive chose the same approach in principle, but with two modifications: first, 
the transition period was to be ten years to accommodate long-term investment needs, and second, 
the unbundling provisions were lighter to avoid undermining EU companies’ bargaining powers with 
non-EU suppliers. The gas directive allowed each power generator to choose its own supplier.5
These directives were, however, unable to ensure the unrestricted and non-discriminatory third-
party access to networks due to vertical integration of generation and distribution activities. The 
markets remained highly concentrated and lacked liquidity and competition was virtually non-
existent. 
2.2.1.2. The Second Liberalisation Package or the So-Called 
Acceleration Package
In response to the limited success of the first liberalisation package two new electricity and gas 
directives6 entered into force in 2003 as well as two regulations on cross-border trade in electri-
city and gas.7 The second liberalisation package recognized the fact that there existed important 
shortcomings towards the creation of an internal market for electricity and gas. Notably, both 
Directives 2003/54/EC on electricity and 2003/55/EC on natural gas considered that “concrete 
provisions are needed to ensure a level playing field in generation and to reduce the risks of market 
dominance and predatory behaviour, ensuring non-discriminatory transmission and distribution 
tariffs, through access to network on the basis of tariffs published prior to their entry into force, 
and ensuring that the rights of small and vulnerable customers are protected.”8
In the meantime the Lisbon European Council on 23 and 24 March 2000 established the 
Lisbon Agenda, calling for the rapid completion of the internal market. Both directives were 
therefore meant to speed up the liberalisation of the electricity and gas sectors and identified the 
remaining obstacles as being the limited access to the networks, tariffication issues and different 
degrees of market opening between the Member States. The second liberalisation package, or oth-
4  Christian Egenhofer & Kyriakos Gialoglou, “Rethinking the EU Regulatory Strategy for the Internal Mar-
ket”, CEPS Task Force Report No. 52, December 2004, p. 14.
5  Ibid.
6  Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC. Directive 2003/55/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market 
in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC.
7  Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on condi-
tions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 September 2005 on conditions for access to the natural 
gas transmission networks.
8  Ibid.
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erwise called the ‘Acceleration’ package provided for the full opening of markets to competition for 
non-household customers as of 1 July 2004 and for all customers by 1 July 2007.9 The Directives 
also stressed the fact that the non-discriminatory access to networks can only be ensured if there 
exists legal unbundling into separate entities for distribution and transmission where vertically 
integrated undertakings exist. The Directives made a clear distinction between legal unbundling 
and ownership unbundling and stressed that it was still too early in the liberalisation process to 
press ahead with ownership unbundling. Another way of ensuring non-discriminatory access to 
networks was the establishment of national regulators having a minimum set of competences 
(such as fixing and approving tariffs) set down by the Directives. 
In addition, the second liberalisation package mandated regulated third-party access (TPA) and 
published network tariffs, reinforced public service obligations especially for vulnerable customers 
and introduced monitoring of security of supply. For electricity it also set up mandatory electricity 
labelling for fuel mix and for selected emissions data. The regulation on cross-border electricity 
trade provided for common tariff structures (including tariffs for cross-border trade), rules for con-
gestion management and the requirement to provide information on interconnection capacities. 
The proposed regulation on access conditions to the gas networks attempted in a similar way to 
remove barriers to natural gas trade. It addressed partial or non-compliance with agreed guidelines 
for a transparent and cost-reflective system for cross-border trade.10
The electricity and gas Directives (2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC) also established consumer 
rights in the energy field along with safeguards for vulnerable citizens, however, these rights need 
further clarification in view of full market opening.11 Finally, both directives also repealed the pre-
vious directives and were to be implemented by 1 July 2004.
2.2.1.3. The Need for a Third Liberalisation Package
Commission Reports in 200512 and an inquiry on the energy markets completed in 200713 indi-
cated that the second gas and electricity directives had not yet been properly implemented. Many 
member states presented only a patchy implementation, which benefited incumbent utilities, whi-
ch were former public run, and often remain under government control as the state continues as 
major shareholder, in some cases up to 100%. These factors also still allowed for the continuation 
of vertically integrated production and distribution. 
The March 2006 European Council Conclusions also called for “ensuring full, effective and 
transparent implementation of existing legislation”, making reference to the incomplete imple-
mentation of the second liberalisation package. The March European Council urged Member 
States to develop regional energy cooperation, notably through adequate interconnection, which 
would lead to the further development of the EU internal market. The EU leaders also recognised 
the need to strengthen cooperation and coordination between regulators and system operators 
by strengthening the coordinating role at a Community level of the European Energy Regulators 
Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG). 
9  Christian Egenhofer & Kyriakos Gialoglou, “Rethinking the EU Regulatory Strategy for the Internal Mar-
ket”, CEPS Task Force Report No. 52, December 2004, p. 15.
10  Christian Egenhofer & Kyriakos Gialoglou, “Rethinking the EU Regulatory Strategy for the Internal Mar-
ket”, CEPS Task Force Report No. 52, December 2004, p. 15.
11  European Commission press release IP/07/1026, “Towards a European Charter on the Rights of Energy Con-
sumers, Brussels”, 5 July 2007, 
12  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Report on progress in 
creating the internal gas and electricity market, Brussels, 15 November 2005, COM(2005) 568 final. 
13  Communication from the Commission, “Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 into 
the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)”, COM/2006/0851 final. 
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The European Regulators’ Group for electricity and gas (ERGEG) was set up by the European 
Commission Decision 2003/796/EC14 on 11 November 2003. It is an Advisory Group of inde-
pendent national regulatory authorities, with the mission to assist the Commission in consolida-
ting the Internal Market for electricity and gas. Its Members are the heads of the national energy 
regulatory authorities in the 27 Member States.
The inquiry into the European gas and electricity sectors was released together with the EU 
Energy Policy Package on 10 January 200715 assessing the prevailing competitive conditions and 
establishing the causes of the perceived market malfunctioning. The Energy Sector Inquiry identi-
fied a number of key areas in which competition was not functioning well16 and called for urgent 
action in the following four areas: (1) achieving effective unbundling of network and supply activi-
ties, (2) removing the regulatory gaps (in particular for cross border issues), (3) addressing market 
concentration and barriers to entry, and (4) increasing transparency in market operations.17
In parallel to the Inquiry the European Commission also published a communication on pros-
pects for the internal gas and electricity market18 in which it set out its intentions concerning re-
gulatory proposals to be made in order to address the shortcomings uncovered by the Inquiry and 
previous reports. The European Commission considers it necessary to tackle two main elements 
in the forthcoming third legislative package: (1) strengthen the powers and independence of the 
energy regulators, so as to allow for the proper and efficient regulation of the cross border issues 
relating to gas and electricity network access, and (2) push for ownership unbundling, recognizing 
that the legal and functional unbundling of network operators that are vertically integrated with 
production and supply activities is by itself not sufficient to ensure equal access to the networks 
for all suppliers. 
2.2.1.4. Next Steps Towards Completing the Internal Energy Market
The Spring 2007 European Council (Brussels, 8-9 March 2007) adopted a comprehensive energy 
Action Plan for the period 2007-2009 based on the Commission’s Communication “An Energy 
Policy for Europe”, in which the Council endorsed the Commission’s views and mapped out the 
concrete steps which need to be taken towards completing the internal energy market. The Coun-
cil agreed on the need for:
•	 Effective separation of supply and production activities from network operations (unbun-
dling), based on independently run and adequately regulated network operation systems 
which guarantee equal and open access to transport infrastructures and independence of 
decisions on investment in infrastructure; 
•	 Further harmonisation of the powers and strengthening of the independence of national 
energy regulators; 
14  2003/796/EC: Commission Decision of 11 November 2003 on establishing the European Regulators Group 
for Electricity and Gas, OJ L 296, 14.11.2003, p. 34–35
15  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “An Energy Policy for 
Europe”, COM(2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10 January 2007.
16  Key areas in which competition does not function well: market concentration/market power, vertical foreclo-
sure (most prominently inadequate unbundling of network and supply), lack of market integration (inclu-
ding lack of regulatory oversight for cross border issues), lack of transparency, price formation, downstream 
markets, balancing markets, and liquefied natural gas (LNG).
17  Communication from the Commission, “Inquiry pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
into the European gas and electricity sectors (Final Report)”, COM/2006/0851 final, Brussels, 10 January 
2007.
18  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “Prospects for the in-
ternal gas and electricity market, COM(2006) 841 final, Brussels, 10 January 2007. 
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•	 The establishment of an independent mechanism for national regulators to cooperate and 
take decisions on important cross-border issues; 
•	 The creation of a new Community mechanism for Transmission System Operators to im-
prove coordination of network operation and grid security building on existing cooperation 
practices; 
•	 A more efficient and integrated system for cross-border electricity trade and grid operation, 
including elaboration of technical standards; 
•	 The enhancement of competition and security of supply through facilitated integration of 
new power plants into the electricity grid in all Member States, in particular encouraging 
new market entrants; 
•	 Relevant investment signals contributing to the efficient and more secure operation of the 
transmission grid; 
•	 Increased transparency in energy market operations; 
•	 Better consumer protection, e.g. through the development of an Energy Customers' Char-
ter. 
The Council mandated the Commission to come forward with new legislative proposals, by 
building as much as possible on existing legislation. The European Commission has released the 
new proposals in September 2007. The proposed “third legislative package” includes the following 
measures: 19
•	 Separation of production and supply from transmission networks: The main proposal of the 
Commission regarding separation is “ownership unbundling”, that is, not allowing a single 
company to own transmission and be engaged in generation and supply activities. A single 
entity would still be allowed to hold non-controlling minority interests in transmission 
and generation. However, such a minority shareholder would not be able to hold blocking 
rights in both undertakings. The Commission also provides a less-preferred option, namely 
allowing common ownership but requiring the transmission network be operated by an 
“independent system operator” (ISO), which would be an entity that would be entirely 
separate from the vertically integrated company. The Commission also decided that the cur-
rent unbundling rules (i.e. legal and functional unbundling) are sufficient for distribution 
system operators. 
•	 The proposals require that companies from third countries which wish to acquire significant 
interest or control over an EU network will have to comply with the same unbundling re-
quirements as EU companies. This provision, dubbed the “Gazprom clause” in the press, is 
largely regarded as a reciprocity provision targeting the Russian company.
•	 The Commission proposes to enhance the powers of national energy regulators. Regula-
tors would be given a clear mandate to cooperate at the European level and have powers to 
monitor compliance with unbundling and transparency regulations, review transmission 
investment plans, monitor market opening and promote competition in cooperation with 
competition agencies. 
•	 It is proposed to enhance transparency by requiring companies to keep data on operational 
decisions for five years at the disposal of national regulatory and competition authorities as 
well as the Commission.
•	 The proposals also have provisions to facilitate cross-border trade, among others, through 
19  See European Commission (2007e and 2007f ). 
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the establishment of a European level cooperation agency with binding decision powers to 
complement national regulators. There are also measures to enhance cooperation between 
transmission system operators.
•	 There are proposed provisions to provide exemptions to new infrastructure from third party 
access obligations for a pre-determined period.
2.2.1.5. Energy Security, Efficiency and Renewable Energy
In addition to the liberalisation package, other decisions and regulations affect the energy sector. 
Environmental and energy security concerns have prompted the introduction of targets on produ-
ction methods and decisions on security. These affect the energy sector and simultaneously affect 
the regulatory aspects of a liberalised sector. 
For renewable energy, the European Commission already set a target in 1997 to increase the share 
of renewable energy to 12% in 2010. 20 In 2001 the EU adopted the target of increasing the share of 
electricity produced from renewable sources of energy to 21% of electricity production by 2010.21 
In March 2007 the Council calls for a binding target of 20% of energy to come from renewab-
les, based on the renewable Energy Roadmap by the European Commission.22
In addition to the targets on renewable energy, the EU has a system of CO² trading the Emissi-
on Trading System (ETS)23, which forces polluting industries to buy carbon credits, thus creating 
an effective tax on carbon emissions. Such a carbon cost incites industries to adopt cleaner techno-
logies if the cost is punitive enough. It reduces the competitive interest of using dirty fuel, such as 
coal based energy production (unless effective carbon capture technology is adopted). 
2.2.2. State of Implementation of the Energy Liberalisation 
Regulations
To create at EU level efficient and liberalised electricity and gas markets, the following conditions 
are necessary:
•	 Harmonisation of the legislation governing the energy and gas sectors in the member 
states. 
•	 Create the infrastructure to allow interconnectivity between markets
•	 Deconcentration of the energy suppliers nationally
•	 Unbundling of the of transmission and distribution system operators
•	 Elimination of discriminatory third party access to the network, in particular as regards 
preferential access being granted to incumbents for historical long term contracts
•	 Elimination of regulated prices preventing entry to new market players
The European Union’s regulatory framework addresses these needs and is regularly adapting it 
20  Communication from the Commission, Energy for the Future: Renewable Sources of Energy, White Paper 
for a Community Strategy and Action Plan, COM(97)599 final (26/11/1997).
21  Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the promo-
tion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in the internal electricity Market.
22  Renewable Energy Road Map Renewable energies in the 21st century: building a more sustainable future, 
COM(2006) 848 final, Brussels, 10.1.2007
23  Directive 2003/87/EC of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance tra-
ding within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC.
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to counter new or remaining barriers. 
The agenda of liberalisation is dominated by the Directives 96/92/CE and 2003/54/CE and 
the regulations on cross border trade. The Directives concentrate on opening the market to new 
entrants and increasing the choices for consumers. It also should open the energy distribution 
networks to new companies. 
There is a common scheme in the liberalisation process. 
•	 A vertical segmentation of producers and distribution networks and the privatisation of 
national monopolies. 
•	 Open competition for production and commercialisation, and the independence of the 
distribution network, usually remaining a monopoly but with open access to all producers 
under equal conditions, necessary - as these are natural monopolies - for optional economies 
of scale.
•	 The creation of exchange systems and markets for producers, distributors and consumers.
•	 The creation of national system operators to guarantee the equilibrium between supply and 
demand and the quality of supply. 
This is a complex process, and in those countries where production and distribution were to-
tally integrated and nationalised such changes are very complex and politically delicate. 
Due to the freedom offered by the Directives in the modality of implementation, the process 
of liberalisation has created a large number of national and regional markets which are highly iso-
lated. Far from the single market objective and in some cases reducing rather than increasing the 
number of suppliers, by opening the market to large mergers and acquisitions. 
2.2.2.1. Legal Harmonisation and Implementation – Progress and 
Barriers
Member States have a weak record in implementing the EU ‘liberalisation directives’, with virtual-
ly all of them behind schedule to ensure the correct functioning of the markets as specified in the 
Directives. Although the framework for energy regulation is largely in place in the Member States, 
there remain significant problems of implementation – both in terms of effective unbundling of 
wholesale and retail operators and in view of the need to open up retail electricity and gas markets 
in line with the Community timetable.
Directives by nature allow member states a certain level of discretion in the implementation; 
this is part of the powers conferred by the subsidiarity principle. In the case of the energy mar-
kets this has created not only varying speeds of implementation, but also varying legislative fra-
meworks across member states, de facto building new indirect barriers to internal as well as cross 
border trade in energy. 
In late 2006, the Commission launched 34 infringement procedures against 20 Member States 
for violation and non transposition of the existing Directives. Apart from the obstacles to com-
petition in the energy market outlined in the inquiry, the present report also identified the main 
deficiencies of the transposition of the new internal market directives as being: regulated prices, 
insufficient unbundling, discriminatory third party access to the network, insufficient competen-
ces of the regulators, lack of transparency on regulated supply tariffs and insufficient indication of 
the origin of electricity. The report concluded that: “the persistent nature of these infringements, 
almost two and a half years after the obligation to transpose the Directives on 1 July 2004, clearly 
demonstrates the insufficiencies and shortcomings of the current EC legal framework arising from 
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the Directives.” 24
When comparing the behaviour of member states in the implementation of the Directives the 
existing power of the incumbent energy companies is clearly visible. As a result the speed and steps 
of liberalisation in each Member State has often reflected the interest of the large energy produ-
cers, often former nationalised energy industries. The result has been a cartelisation in the gas and 
electricity markets, strengthening rather than weakening national or regional monopolies, such as 
the industry sector in France, dominated by EDF for electricity and GDF for gas or an existing 
oligopoly in Germany.25
This selective interpretation of the Directives has for example allowed large incumbent nati-
onal companies to maintain a monopolistic or oligopolistic control over pricing while using the 
liberalisation process to acquire other companies in other European countries. Analysts often refer 
to EDF as a clear case, where domestically the Directives have been implemented in its favour, 
allowing the company to avoid the discomforts of open competition while taking advantage of 
the possibility to acquire foreign European utilities, which in cases have near to monopoly powers 
in the regions these operated. This may threaten to reduce the benefits of free cross border ener-
gy trade, allowing companies to influence prices on both sides of the border. It also creates an 
asymmetric market in the EU, where countries limiting liberalisation and protecting incumbent 
companies allow those to create unfair competitive conditions to companies in countries where 
liberalisation has been more complete. 
A combination of increasing prices (not explainable by increasing oil prices alone) and the 
consolidation rather than the fragmentation of the energy companies in Europe prompted the 
European Commission to launch an inquiry in 2005, which was completed in 2007. The result of 
the inquiry suggest that effectively, trade between countries is limited, allowing for strong national 
disparities in price levels, and that prices in national markets are in most countries dominated by 
one or a few companies. Monopoly and oligopoly power are still present. The enquiry blames nati-
onal authorities for failing to implement directives in full. It also transpires that national regulators 
are either influenced to rule in favour of the national incumbent companies, or do not have the 
power to enforce price liberalisation principles. 
In addition, there have been blatant examples of government intervention to favour national 
companies. The acquisition by EDF (France) of SUEZ (Belgium) was highly politically charged, 
with a forced intervention of the French government. In another case, Italy’s ENEL acquisition of 
Spanish ENDESA was marred by strong obstructionist interventions by the Spanish government. 
The existing regulatory framework thus leaves considerable scope for companies to abuse wides-
pread dominant positions. The largest incumbents, in particular those operating long established 
power plants, are making large profits and introducing considerable imbalances in the sector.
2.2.2.2. Different Approaches to Liberalisation
Three particular cases are often presented as examples of different approaches, the ones of France, 
Germany and the UK. These three countries represent quite different initial starting situations and 
therefore also contrasting liberalisation practices and implementation speeds. France for example 
represents an extreme case of a totally nationalised energy sector with integrated production and 
distribution systems, a large state monopoly with overall control. For Germany, energy production 
was concentrated in the hands of a small number of federal industries which today has created an 
oligopoly. The UK liberalised the energy market before liberalisation became an EU objective, and 
24  Ibid.
25  Durant G. (2006), Gas and electricity in Europe: the elusive common interest, Policy Brief, ECP, Brussels
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thus the starting point was very much in line with the Directives. For Britain the liberalisation at 
EU level represents the adoption of their model in other countries, and an opportunity for UK 
energy players to gain access to other EU markets. 
France
The energy sector was in its entirety publicly owned. Electricité de France (EDF) and Gaz de 
France (GDF) were entrusted with monopoly powers with respect to production, transmission, 
distribution, and the import and export of electricity (in the case of EDF) and distribution, trans-
port, and the import and export of gas (in the case of GDF). Nevertheless, the energy sector was 
relatively efficient and national ownership of energy production and distribution had very strong 
political and social support. Liberalisation transformed EDF and GDF into shareholding compa-
nies. The state retained control over 80% of the shares and legally it cannot have less then 70%.
Based on this situation France did not embrace energy market liberalisation easily and was very 
slow in implementing the energy directives. For example, the law for deregulation of electricity 
was adopted a year later than the directive of 1996 required. Other laws on electricity and gas 
were adopted with very strong delays. France has also made sure that only the bare minimum of 
the Directives are adopted, in the slowest possible timeframe, and breaching the deadlines of the 
Directives. According to the Commission the opening of the market has occurred largely at the-
oretical level only.
For electricity, in July 2006, competition to EDF was only for 4,8% of the national market, 
and for small and medium enterprises only 0,6% of the energy is produced by a competitor. Fo-
reign imports were only of 0,03% of the energy.26
The end of the monopoly by EDF and GDF were seen as an attack on the French public service 
by the European Commission and a risk for the services of common public interest guaranteed by 
the state. The regulations however allow for those interests to be guaranteed by the energy opera-
tors, which can be publicly or privately run. 
The cautious liberalisation process in France is claimed to be biased towards maintaining the 
central role of the EDF and GDF. Looking at the electricity market (Figure 2-1), the result is quite 
striking. EDF today is by far largest single electricity producer in Europe. 
In fact the Commission is very critical towards France, considering that state interference, weak 
regulatory bodies and planned lack of transparency severely hinder the creation of a competitive 
market. 
The regulators (Commission de Régulation de l’Energie) CRE is the independent administrati-
ve body in charge of ensuring the correct functioning of the electricity and gas markets. However, 
it shares the responsibility with the government, which has a veto power over its tariff settings. 
EDF and GDF dominate still the electricity and gas, production, import and transmission 
and distribution. Juridical unbundling has occurred for the transmission, but ownership is not 
separated. 
Liberalisation in principle allows consumers to search for competitors. Yet as the regulated 
network dominates the energy sector nearly completely, choice is more fictitious than real. France 
keeps regulated prices for existing private customers, with price liberalisation only open for new 
connections after 1 July 2007. The European Commission has condemned the practice as it dis-
torts pricing and may affect negatively new entrants, if a large share of the potential customers is 
26  Commission staff working document SEC(2006) 1709, Accompanying document to the Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Prospects for the internal gas and elec-
tricity market, Implementation report COM(2006) 841 final.
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captured under a subsidised price level by EDF. The price is considered to be well below the mar-
ket price. 50% of the consumers still ignored the theoretical possibility of changing supplier. 
Figure 2-1: Electricity production of major companies 
Source: Vattenfal (2006), p. 31
A particularity which needs consideration is the large share of state ownership of the major pro-
ducers: EDF is 85% state owned, Vattenfall in Sweden by 100%, EnBW in Germany is owned by 
EDF by 45.01%, Enel in Italy is 32.2% owned by the Italian state, Fortum in Finland by 50.82% 
to mention some.27 
What is clear is that state interests and the interest of the company are strongly linked. The 
large state control over EDF has caused some concern with its acquisitions of foreign electricity 
companies. EDF is suspected to maintain a dominant position and profitability thanks to indirect 
state protection, which then allows it to have particular strength in acquiring foreign assets, an 
issue that will be discussed in a latter section.
While officially France has accepted the unbundling of production and distribution and al-
lowed for competition, the market still seems to be controlled by a monopolistic player. EDF has 
in the last minute adapted to the minimum requirements allowing for choice for individual consu-
mers on 1 July 2007, but services are run by subsidiaries which often have preferential agreements 
or are controlled by the main body. EDF still controls the whole network, and with a large state 
control of the company, the state has a strong influence at all levels.
Unbundling has largely been interpreted as the creation of EDF subsidiaries, rather than the 
appearance of various fully independent operators. Liberalisation is still far from becoming a rea-
lity and the rules adopted seem to reinforce rather than reduce cartelisation. EDF controls through 
a subsidiary RTE transmission and 95% of the distribution. It controls all exports, but in 2005 the 
regulator banned the preferential treatment of EDF in the networks.
27  Vattenfall 2006 annual report
EdamENG.indd   90 1/3/08   2:19:38 PM
91
For gas, GDF shares the market with the energy company Total. GDF controls 88% of the 
transport sector and 96% of the distribution through a subsidiary. 
Gaz and electricity run preferential tariffs, which the government defends under the banner of 
universal service obligation for vulnerable customers, but the tariff is unrelated to the circumstances 
of the consumers. The European Commission opened infringement procedures also in this area. 
Similar problems as in France can be found, for example, in Belgium, Greece and Poland.
Germany
In Germany the market seems to be characterised by an oligopoly 28 of companies with a high 
vertical integration. This together with low interconnectivity allows these operators to capture the 
market and restrict imports. 
Nevertheless, a new and more powerful regulatory body is bringing improvements to the mar-
ket, but progress is low and the German markets are complex. The oligopolistic nature of the 
market prevents the easy identification of ensuing market distortions contrary to the strong inter-
ventionist and monolithic influence of the two energy giants of France.
Unbundling is still only legal and functional, and only for Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs). Distribution System Operators (DSOs) are excluded from the unbundling requirements 
except those serving more than 100.000 customers. No ownership unbundling is foreseen.
The Government has been far less obstructionist than France, granting the regulators (the 
Bundesnetzagentur für Elektrizität, Gas, Telekommunikation, Post und Eisenbahnen (BNA)) far 
reaching powers, without a veto power of the state and transparent systems when disputes arise. 
The area where regulators have little power in relation to the security of supply, especially in the 
gas sector, which depends on imports. 
Generally, the unbundling obligations are taken seriously by the German authorities, even if 
the Government is not very favourable to ownership unbundling, but prefers a well regulated 
legal and functional unbundling, including the physical separation of the companies, even under 
shared ownership. 
The United Kingdom
The UK has led the way in the privatisation of the energy sector across the world and not just 
within Europe. The process of liberalisation in the UK has been a driving force of the EU liberali-
sation process. The regulated monopolistic elements of the sector (transmission and distribution) 
operate separately from generation and supply. The UK has an entirely privately-owned industry, 
with all consumers free to switch their supplier. 
The liberalisation process has been a precursor to the Commission directives and has affected 
their format. The Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher considered necessary to 
reduce public intervention in the sector to improve efficiency in the market. The UK was the first 
undertaking such a move worldwide, even if in Japan, energy operators have been private since 
1951. 
While initial liberalisation started as early as 1983, which allowed private energy producers ac-
cess to the networks, a process of complete privatisation and unbundling of the sectors was under-
taken in 1992. This is considered to have increased efficiency and reduced prices. Before, the UK 
was serviced by nationalised vertically integrated utilities in four regions of the country serving 
the specific regions. Liberalisation radically changed the energy sector, with companies completely 
28  Durant G. (2006), Gas and electricity in Europe: the elusive common interest, Policy Brief, ECP, Brussels
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privatised. Today 10 major companies compete in the market for 80% of the power generation, 
with another 40 operating in the remaining 20%. 
Table 2-1: Main electricity generating companies 
Company Capacity (MW) Percentage of total UK capacity
British Energy 11,551 15
Npower (RWE, Germany) 9,886 13
Powergen (E.ON, Germany) 9,154 12
Scottish & Southern 7,852 10
ScottishPower 6,137 8
EDF Energy (France) 4,820 6
Drax 3,945 5
Centrica 3,139 4
International Power 2,756 4
Source: Pond R. (2006), Liberalisation, privatisation and regulation in the UK electricity sector, Privatisation of Public Services and 
the impact on quality, employment and productivity (PIQUE), FP6, (CIT5-2006-028478), p. 8
The nationalised BNFL runs four nuclear power stations which are all due for decommission-
ing over the next three years.
Interestingly, since 1998, energy generation companies were allowed to purchase retail provi-
ders, allowing for vertical integration to reappear. However, the energy regulator required legal 
separation of functions. 
The level of activity in the market is very high with consumers switching companies with ease. 
42% of consumers have switched suppliers since 1998 and monthly switches in 2006 have reached 
the hundreds of thousands a month. However, the savings for consumers failed to materialise for 
many consumers as prices rapidly change. 
The UK is the most liberalised member state in the energy sector. The present concern in the 
UK is that unfair competition by incompletely liberalised markets in other EU countries may 
harm British utilities. 
Implementation across Markets
To see how member states have advanced in the process one can observe the 17 infringement 
proceedings for the lack of application of the energy directives. It is clear from the list that imple-
mentation remains problematic.
Table 2-2: Letters of Formal Notice for Directives 2003/54/CE and 2003/55/CE 
Member State Observations Market
AUSTRIA
Electricity+gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient legal unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators in 
order to guarantee their independence
2) Insufficient competences of the regulators in relation to the directives, in particular with respect 
to the possibilities to file complaints to the regulator
3) Preferential access for certain historical contracts in the market of electricity and gas
4) absence of some regional laws  
GAS
 
EL+GAS 
 
EL+GAS 
EL
BELGIUM
Electricity + gas
1) Absence of formal designation of transmission operator 
2) Discriminatory system of third party access to the transmission and distribution systems and the 
insufficient transparency of the connection tariffs
3 ) exemption of regulation for certain new investments 
GAS
EL+GAS
 
EL+GAS
EdamENG.indd   92 1/3/08   2:19:38 PM
93
Member State Observations Market
CZECH REPUBLIC
Electricity + gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient legal unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators in 
order to guarantee their independence
2) non publication of conditions for access to storage discriminatory system of third party access to 
the transmission and distribution systems and the insufficient transparency of the connection tariffs
3) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
4) Preferential access for certain historical contracts in the market of electricity and gas
EL+GAS
GAS
 
 
EL+GAS
EL+GAS
ESTONIA
Electricity
1) absence of independence of the transmission system operator and distribution system m 
operator in the management
2 )Insufficient competences of the regulators in relation to the management ad allocation of 
interconnection capacity 
3) existence of regulated prices which block arrival of new suppliers
4) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
EL
 
EL
EL
EL
FINLAND
Electricity
Absence of, or insufficient functional unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators 
in order to guarantee their independence EL
FRANCE
Electricity + gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient legal unbundling distribution system operators in order to guarantee 
their independence
2) Existence of regulated prices which block the arrival of new suppliers
3) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
4) Preferential access for certain l contracts in the market of electricity 
5) non publication of commercial conditions for access to storage
EL+GAS 
EL+GAS 
EL+GAS 
EL 
GAS 
GERMANY
Electricity
1) Absence of the notification of public service obligations
2) Preferential access for certain historical contracts in the market of electricity 
EL
EL
GREECE
Electricity+gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient legal and management unbundling of transmission and distribution 
system operators in order to guarantee their independence
2) Freedom to choose supplier
3) absence of the notification of the public service obligations 
EL
 
GAS
EL
IRELAND
Electricity+gas
1) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
2) Absence of legal unbundling TSO
3) Regulated prices 
EL+GAS
EL+GAS
EL+GAS
ITALY
Electricity+gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient functional unbundling of transmission and system operators in order 
to guarantee its independence
2) absence of /or insufficient unbundling of distribution system operators in order to guarantee 
their independence 
3) Existence of regulated prices which block the arrival of new suppliers
4) Preferential access for certain historical contracts in the market of electricity and gas
GAS
 
EL+GAS  
 
EL 
EL 
LATVIA
Electricity
1) Existence of regulated prices which block the arrival of new suppliers
2) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
LITHUANIA
Electricity + gas
1) delay in the entry into force of legal unbundling of transmission and distribution system 
operators 
2) Discriminatory system of third party access to the transmission and distribution systems and the 
insufficient transparency of the access conditions 
3) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
EL 
 
GAS
EL+GAS
POLAND
Electricity + gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient legal unbundling of and distribution system operators in order to 
guarantee their independence
2) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
3) Preferential access for certain historical contracts in the market of electricity 
4) No labelling provisions in national legislation
EL+GAS
EL+GAS 
EL
EL
SLOVAKIA
Electricity+gas
1) Absence of, or insufficient legal unbundling of transmission and distribution system operators in 
order to guarantee their independence
2) Absence of the notification of the public service obligations
3) Preferential access for certain contracts in the market of electricity 
EL+GAS
 
EL+GAS
EL
SPAIN
Electricity+gas
1) Existence of regulated prices which block the arrival of new suppliers.
2) Absence / insufficient functional and accounting unbundling of transmission and distribution 
system operators in order to guarantee their independence
EL
GAS 
SWEDEN
Electricity
1) Absence of, or insufficient functional unbundling of and distribution system operators in order 
to guarantee their independence
2) Insufficient competences of the regulators in relation to the directives, in particular for fixing the 
tariffs of access to the networks
EL
EL
UNITED 
KINGDOM
Electricity
Preferential access for certain historical contracts in the market of electricity EL
Source: Europa press release MEMO/06/152    Date:  04/04/2006
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2.2.3. Impact Assessment of the Present EU Regulatory Framework
The underlying reason for the liberalisation of the energy industry is largely motivated by expected 
efficiency improvements in addition to the creation of a single European market. A more efficient 
supply of energy should contribute to the competitiveness of the European economy: reducing 
costs, increasing quality of service and increasing welfare. The efficiency increases are in producti-
on, allocation and in dynamic terms. 
Productive efficiency is mainly related to cost-minimisation and profit-maximisation behaviour 
of companies, which requires efficiency in production. Allocative efficiency arises from the exist-
ence of real market prices ensuring the undistorted allocation of resources in the economy. Dy-
namic efficiency ensures that only companies able to produce efficiently under competitive prices 
and costs will remain, thus competition would also encourage innovation, the market dynamism 
increases. 
It is difficult to assess market efficiency in all member states, but studies by London Economics 
(2007)29 and CPB (2006)30 show that there are indications that we are far from operating in an 
efficient and perfectly competitive market. The distortions also may cause unintended negative 
effects, such as the creation of cartels and regional monopolies. 
The indications that there is a problem in the market has been the limited price approximation 
in the EU and the existence of prices which seem to be above the levels expected in a competitive 
market. As lower prices are usually expected compared to the non liberalised sector, this is a worry-
ing conclusion. The studies reveal an excessive market power of incumbent operators in a number 
of countries. These operators shifted from being state controlled to be semi-parastatal monopolists 
with large control on the distribution and transport networks, which are often dependent subsidi-
aries. Efficiency in the allocation of resources has thus not occurred.
Price reductions are seen in more liberalised and market incentive based systems of regulation 
and operation. The UK and the Netherlands show the lowest transmission costs, lowest prices and 
high price convergence. Both countries are well interconnected and trade in electricity. Price con-
vergence can also be found in the Northern countries which are interconnected Nord Pool. 
According to the CPB (2006) it is difficult to determinate the extent of any change in dynamic 
efficiency, but one of the effects of new market rules has been a fall in the level of R&D for inno-
vation into fundamental research, such as fuel cell technology or clean coal-technology. The firms’ 
incentives have changed towards costs reduction technologies and consumer services. However, 
the quality of allocation of R&D spending pre-liberalisation cannot be determined, thus it is not 
possible to determine if this is a deterioration of efficiency or a reduction of previously misallo-
cated resources. 
2.2.3.1. Changes in Market Structure
Operators have reacted quickly to the process of liberalisation through the financial markets, 
which is not surprising. Companies have used the lack of proactive regulation, weak regulatory 
bodies and soft roles in unbundling requirements. The electricity companies started a merger and 
acquisition process which has increased market concentration. 
Very few member states applied reforms which induced a fragmentation of the industry and 
thus it is the norm rather that the exception that some national utilities control more than 60% 
29  London Economics (2007), Structure and Performance of Six European Wholesale Electricity Markets in 
2003, 2004 and 2005, DG Competition report 
30  CPB (2006), Liberalisation of European energy markets: challenges and policy options, CPB document No 
138
EdamENG.indd   94 1/3/08   2:19:39 PM
95
of the domestic wholesale market (Table 2-3) and shares are similar in the retail market. Some 
of those national utilities are also still largely state owned. Furthermore, the companies have also 
acquired companies in other EU member states making a future EU competitive market less ef-
fective. 
Table 2-3: Market power of largest electricity producers and gas distributors 
Wholesale market Retail market
Electricity Gas Electricity Gas
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Austria 5 54 1 80 5 60 4 -
Belgium c 2 95 2 - 92 to 100 92-100 3/5 90-100
Denmark 10 40 2 97 - - 3 92 and 100
Finland d 10 40 5 35-40
France 1 96 2 98 1 91 and 96 2 -
Germany 5 72 5 ca. 80 4 - 1 -
Greece 1 97 1 97 and 100
Ireland 2 93 5 84 3 99 3 100
Italy 5 65 3 62 6 33 and 93 5 54 and 33
Luxembourg 1 88 1 - 4 94 and 95 4 93
Netherlands e 4 69 1 85 3 83 3 83
Portugal 3 76 2 98
Spain 3 69 4 73 5 82 and 85 5 72 and 90
Sweden 10 40 1 78 3 50 - -
UK 8 39 7 36 6 65 and 59 6 53
Norway f 10 40 4 95 and 31
Estonia 1 95 1 100 1 95 1 100
Latvia 1 95 1 100 1 - 1 100
Lithuania 3 92 4 92 3 100 2 100
Poland 7 45 1 100 6 50 and 47 7 -
Czech Rep. 1 76 - - 3 95 7 51 and 57
Slovakia 1 86 1 - 1 86 and 100 1 100
Hungary 7 66 2 100 7 7 and 51 7 77 and 79
Slovenia 3 87 1 100 6 67 and 77 6 -
Cyprus 1 100
Malta 1 100
Source: EC(2005), based on Regulators data. 
a Data for Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland relate to entire Nordic market 
b Where C3 differs per customer group, we first give C3 for the group of large industrial users and then C3 for the group of small (resi-
dential) users. 
c Belgium: C3 shows the range for Flanders and Wallonia. No data for Brussels region. 
d Finland: C3 shows the range for middle and small custumer groups 
e The Netherlands: C3 indicates the market share for small customers 
f Norway data from 2003  
Data Source: CPB (2006), Liberalisation of European energy markets: challenges and policy options, CPB document No 138
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This market power distribution and the state control of the companies (85% for EDS or 100% 
Vattenfall) becomes a concern, specially if those acquire the assets and control of other EU compa-
nies, such as EnBW in Gemany owned by 45,01% by EDF. It is ironical that a state that defends 
the right to national “champions” with a resistance for foreign ownership has no ideological prob-
lem in acting as a free market player in purchasing foreign utility companies. Lack of unbundling 
and break up of state monopolies have allowed the emergence of large players which could domi-
nate price setting in the EU even with much stronger cross border trade. 
European utilities have quickly moved to establish their positions, faster than the legislative 
changes. Some acquisitions have involved considerable funds reflecting the sectors’ expected be-
nefits from expanding their control in the market. Consequently, more than two-thirds of the Eu-
ropean market is now concentrated in the hands of eight large companies, with the Europe-wide 
four-firm concentration ratio at 50%. The ownership structure is complex with partial sharehol-
ding in many cases, making an analysis of the consequences difficult. 
This horizontal integration triggered the concern of the European Parliament, which called for 
the dismantling European giants, specially state owned companies31. It is an anathema in the EU 
to have state controlled companies buy foreign utilities, given that their market power is artificially 
maintained. 
In the same document, the Parliament calls for the complete unbundling of distribution and 
transport infrastructures for gas and electricity. The present framework for unbundling does not 
require the full separation of the companies, thus allowing for subsidiaries of the producer to run 
this infrastructure. 
2.2.3.2. Unbundling
In a state controlled energy market, it was normal to have vertical integration between producers 
and transmission and distribution channels for electricity and gas. However, the opening of the 
market with the maintenance of utility giants has induced a number of merger and acquisitions of 
vertically integrated companies, or have re-integrated the downstream sectors. 
However, according to the EU Directives on the liberalization of the electricity and natural 
gas market, the management of both transmission and distribution networks has to be legally and 
functionally unbundled from commercial activities by 2007. In the case of transmission networks 
this has been the case, but less for the gas sector. 
Furthermore, concerns on the lack of obligatory ownership unbundling has created a situation 
in which producers and the transmission and distribution networks are owned by one and the 
same company, even if legally and managerially independent. The European Commission consi-
ders this a cause for reported barriers to entry for new utilities. In particular in the gas market it 
appears that third party shippers are subjected to higher access procedures compared to historical 
suppliers. Distribution system operators often remain closely linked to the supply business of the 
incumbents in several of EU countries. Table 2-4 presents the level of unbundling.
31  P6_TA(2006)0110, ‘Security of energy supply in the European Union’, European Parliament resolution on 
security of energy supply in the European Union
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Table 2-4: Level of unbundling of network operators 
Electricity Gas
TSO a DSO TSO a DSO
Austria yes no yes yes
Belgium yes yes yes yes
Denmark yes and ownership yes yes and ownership yes
Finland yes, state overlap yes
France yes, state overlap no yes, state overlap no
Germany yes no partly no
Greece yes, state overlap no
Ireland yes, state overlap no no no
Italy yes and ownership see note b yes and ownership yes
Luxembourg yes no no no
Netherlands yes and ownership yes yes and ownership yes
Portugal yes and ownership see note b
Spain yes and ownership see note b yes see note b
Sweden yes, state overlap yes yes and ownership no
UK yes and ownership yes yes and ownership yes and ownership
Norway yes, state overlap yes
Estonia yes yes no no
Latvia yes no no no
Lithuania yes, state overlap yes no no
Poland yes, state overlap no yes no
Czech Rep. yes, state overlap no no no
Slovakia yes, state overlap no no no
Hungary yes, state overlap see note b yes no
Slovenia yes, state overlap yesc no
Cyprus no
Malta -
Document No 138, December 2006; EC(2005), based on Regulators data. 
a “State overlap” where the state owns the TSO and also has a shareholding in one or more suppliers. 
b In Italy, Portugal, Hungary (electricity) and Spain (electricity and gas) the DSO is also a default supplier. However, suppliers to non-
regulated customers must be legally unbundled. 
c Incorporating corrections.
Even in the UK where unbundling was large and where liberalisation ensured fragmentation of 
producers, a level of re-integration horizontally and vertically has been accompanied by increased 
retail supply margins. 
Vertical separation of networks and competitive activities can yield significant benefits for total 
welfare, but vertical integration between retailing and generation appears to have a strong com-
mercial rationale, inciting utilities to maintain a level of control offer in the retailing network. The 
utilities can integrate their operational risk into retailing. 
National regulators have not shown much interest in stopping the trend, and the tendency of 
governments to foster national champions may have played a role. In fact national competition 
bodies have hardly reacted to reintegration inducing the European Commission to start using 
its competence through competition policy, but the Commission’s influence in mergers within 
countries is not strong. Table 2-5 ranks the level of unbundling in the electricity sector. While for 
transmission some progress has happened, the same cannot be said for distribution. 
Initial structural differences and the flexibility allowed by the first Directives have meant that 
member states have adopted different approaches to separate the functions of production, trans-
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mission, distribution and transport. Effective separation of transmission system operators from 
generation is important for effective wholesale competition. Recognising this, the separation of 
transmission system operators has generally been more stringent than for distribution system ope-
rators, and more countries have applied ownership or at least legal separation.
Table 2-5: Extent of network unbundling for electricity 
Transmission System Operator 
Score/5
Distribution System Operator 
Score/5
Austria 4 3
Belgium 4 3.5*
Denmark 4 3
Finland 5 1.5
France 4 1
Germany 4 1.5
Greece 1 0
Ireland 3 3
Italy 5 3
Luxembourg 1 1
Netherlands 5 3
Portugal 5 3
Spain 5 4
Sweden 5 4
UK 5 4.5
Norway 5 1.5
• TSO: Ownership unbundling, Yes=1, No=0; 
• DSO: Legal unbundling, Yes=1, No=0 
• Published accounts, Yes=1, No=0 
• Compliance officer, Yes=1, No=0 
• Separate corporate identity, Yes=1, No=0, Often=0.5 
• Separate locations, Yes=1, No=0, Partly=0.5 
* Brussels region not yet legally unbundled and no compliance officer in Flanders region. 
Source: Tooraj and Pollitt (2005)32, based on European Commission (2005)
Despite the years of preparation for the liberalisation of the energy markets active competition 
for household consumers remains the exception in the electricity sector and is almost totally absent 
from the gas sector. The official liberalisation for households on the 1 July 2007 has rarely been 
followed by a freedom to choose between companies. Price regulation and monopoly power still 
dominate the sector. 
In the gas sector the situation is considerably worse than in the electricity sector, as the level 
of vertical integration was higher and the infrastructures less simple to unbundle. In particular a 
rather limited capacity for gas storage facilities is under the control of former incumbent gas com-
panies that control imports and distribution and often allows preferential access based on historical 
contracts. Even in the liquid gas market contracts between transport companies and distribution 
companies are still dominated by historical links and block the access of new entrants. 
2.2.3.3. Cross-Border Network Development
As the yearly benchmarking exercise by the Commission in 200633 demonstrates, the develop-
32  J. Tooraj and Pollitt M. (2005), Electricity Market Reform in the European Union: Review of Progress toward 
Liberalization & Integration, CEEPR, March 2005
33  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, “An Energy Policy for 
Europe”, COM(2007) 1 final, Brussels, 10 January 2007
EdamENG.indd   98 1/3/08   2:19:41 PM
99
ment of cross-border networks in the electricity sector has been slower than anticipated and is 
only relatively well integrated between Nordic countries, in the Nord Pool exchange, and between 
Germany and Austria. The EU electricity market is for the moment fragmented into regional mar-
kets.34 In the Nord Pool area the system is sufficiently integrated through a bidding system which 
sets the flows a day ahead. The system automatically optimises flows.
Unsurprisingly, price convergence in the northern countries has increased. However, no system 
of cross-border trade functions down to the retail level, only at wholesale through TSOs. Custo-
mers need still to purchase the energy through their national grid operators. 
The overall cross-border trade in the EU reaches only 10% of the energy in use. Trading is still 
hindered by national barriers and does not reach the potential. Auctions for supply of energy are 
dominated by national incumbents and still vertically integrated systems, giving preferential access 
to domestic incumbents. This is against the ruling of the Court of Justice in case C-17/0335, which 
forbids preferential treatment. Legal action against such cases has been started by the European 
Commission. 
A signal that cross border trade is still not fully functional is the differences of tariffs between 
countries to use the transmission network. Work is still ongoing to harmonise ratification prac-
tices, especially on the network tariff to connect a generator to the transmission network, which 
can affect the access to an integrated network of producers in different geographical locations in 
Europe, affecting the level playing field. 
2.2.3.4. Liberalisation and Renewable Energy
The greening of the electricity sector has been relatively successful, despite the targets on renewab-
le energy as a whole well behind schedule, electricity production is expected to be produced by 
nearly 19% from renewable sources by 2010. The performance varies between member states. 
Only nine are expected to reach the national targets for renewable energy: Denmark, Germany, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
The European Commission considers the completion of the market liberalisation a central 
cornerstone of the renewable energy policy, as free markets encourage efficiency improvements 
in production. There are, however, concerns over the overall effect. If a liberalised system is more 
effective and costs of production and thus prices for consumers fall, this could increase demand 
for energy. 
There is also the disturbing discovery that liberalisation has reduced R&D in alternative ener-
gies, even if it is unclear if previous subsidised levels of research were efficiently used.
Another central instrument to increase efficiency is the EU’s emission’s trading system. Carbon 
taxes should incite the energy sector to use cleaner technologies. The system is under review to 
create incentives for investing in low carbon technologies, while avoiding damage to the competi-
tiveness of energy intensive industries. 
2.2.3.5. Conclusions
The energy markets in the European Union are still far from being fully liberalised. Member 
States have generally used the subsidiarity rights granted by the Directive to protect the national 
incumbent companies. This is damaging the creation of a single market for energy and jeopardi-
34  Regions are: UK and Ireland, Central Western Europe, Iberian Peninsula, Italy, Norther Europe, Baltic coun-
tries, Central and Eastern Europe, South East Europe
35  Vereniging voor Energie, Milieu en Water and Others v Directeur van de Dienst uitvoering en toezicht ener-
gie, OJ C 182 of 23.7.2005, p.2.
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ses the benefits in productive, allocative and dynamic market efficiency emerging from effective 
competition. 
Partial or “selective” transposition or interpretation of the Directives has allowed former natio-
nal state monopolies to maintain monopolistic powers in their region or country. Horizontal and 
vertical integration has occurred and four operators control 50% of the energy market in the EU. 
Consequently these companies have a considerable control over market prices. 
Unbundling of transport, transmission and distribution networks for electricity and gas need 
preferably a separation of ownership. Results show that legal and managerial formal independence 
does not guarantee fair operation of these services. 
The Commission will need to use all its powers as competition watchdog to counter the distor-
tions caused. Cross-border trade has to be increased and interconnectivity needs to be reinforced 
to increase the competitive pressure on prices across Europe, and balance better the supply poten-
tial of each member state. 
Liberalisation of the energy markets is, however, causing unease for the security of supply, 
especially in the gas market. The Commission insists that liberalisation is a guarantee for energy 
security, as prices respond to market needs better. 
The European Commission should observe carefully if the level of R&D and the investments 
to improve energy efficiency are sufficient for the challenges ahead. Liberalisation seems to have 
reduced the incentive to invest in future capacity.
2.3. Restructuring in the Turkish Electricity Industry
In 2001, Turkey launched an ambitious program to restructure her electricity industry by adop-
ting Law No. 4628 (the Energy Market Law, EML) aiming to introduce competition into a pre-
viously vertically integrated industry through liberalization and privatization. In the new market 
structure, generation and retail supply are to develop competitively whereas transmission and 
distribution are regulated so as to ensure non-discriminatory access to all market participants. The 
law also established the Energy Market Regulatory Agency (EMRA) and gave it the task of desig-
ning and implementing the regulatory infrastructure of the new regime. When it came out, the 
Law was rightly hailed for providing a regulatory framework that was even more advanced than 
the regulatory framework prevailing in Europe at the time.
However, progress since then has been very slow. Most of the needed regulatory infrastructure 
(secondary legislation, ordinances, communiqués etc) has been prepared and adopted. Significant-
ly, a balancing market has been launched in August 2006, allowing for the first time the forma-
tion of a market clearing price for electricity albeit on the basis of a very short term time horizon. 
However, there have been significant regressions and set backs as well, as reflected most recently 
in the surprise and last minute cancellation of the privatization of three distribution companies in 
January 2007. The most important factor behind the cancellation seems to be the government’s 
wish to minimize any risks, especially of increases in retail prices, before the elections in that took 
place in July 2007.
Electricity demand has been growing at 7-8% annually and investment needs over the next 
decade is expected to remain at 2-3 billion USD per year. The expectation is that under restruc-
tured electricity markets, the majority of this investment would be undertaken by the private sec-
tor. More importantly, it is widely accepted that public resources to finance an investment drive 
of this magnitude is not available. So far, this investment response has not been forthcoming. So 
Turkey is faced with a strange paradox where demand is soon to outstrip supply but this does not 
generate any supply response, despite a general environment that wants to support private invest-
ment. The reasons behind this paradox are examined below. 
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2.3.1. The Current Structure of the Industry
2.3.1.1. Demand, Capacity and Production
Electricity consumption has been growing fast in Turkey, averaging about 6-8% per year except 
for 1999 and 2001, when consumption was low due to negative economic growth. 1999 was the 
year of the devastating earthquake and 2001 was the year of a severe economic crisis when GNP 
declined by more then 9% (Figure 2-2).
Figure 2-2: Electricity consumption growth (%) 
 
Imports and exports exist but have been negligible in the last few years. As of 2005, total ca-
pacity is about 39 GW. Table 2-6 provides data on distribution of capacity by type of fuel. The 
distinguishing feature is the increase in the share of gas-based plants at the expense of both coal 
and hydro, a relic of times when natural gas prices were low. Concomitant with the increase in the 
share of gas has been an increase in the share of the private sector in installed capacity (Table 2-7). 
The share of the private sector has reached 38% in 2005 (up from 18% in 2000). 
As of 2005, total generation is about 162 TWh. The share of gas-based production is about 45% 
(Table 2-8). The share of the private sector in generation is even larger than its share in capacity, 
reaching 55% in 2005. About 11% of all generation is carried out by the so-called auto-producers 
(Table 2-9). The category “production companies” includes plants built under BOT and BO36 
contracts (34% of total generation in 2005) and independent power producers (IPPs) (7%).
Table 2-6: Installed capacity by primary sources (MW) 
 Coal Fuel Oil Natural Gas Other Total Thermal Hydro Total
  %  %  %  %  %  %  %
1990 5,206 32 1,202 7 2,210 14 918 6 9,536 58 6,764 41 16,318 100
1995 6,374 30 1,149 5 2,925 14 626 3 11,074 53 9,863 47 20,954 100
2000 6,989 26 1,261 5 7,044 26 759 3 16,053 59 11,175 41 27,264 100
2003 8,239 23 2,331 7 11,510 32 895 3 22,974 65 12,579 35 35,587 100
2005 9,117 23 2,253 6 13,774 35 759 2 25,902 67 12,906 33 38,844 100
Source: TEIAŞ
36  These contracts are explained in section 2.3.2.1.
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Table 2-7: Installed capacity by legal status (MW)
 EUAS
Privatization 
Programme
Autoproducers
Production 
companies
Mobile Plants TORs Total
1990 14729 0 1194 16 0 0 16318
1995 18858 0 1345 35 0 0 17670
2000 21252 0 2996 1985 91 330 27264
2003 20113 1680 4542 7806 796 650 35587
2005 20905 1680 4062 10797 750 650 38844
Source: TEIAŞ
Table 2-8: Generation by source (MW)
Coal Natural Gas Total Thermal Hydro Total
  %  %  %  %  %
1990 20,181 35 10,192 18 34,315 60 23,148 40 57,543 100
1995 28,047 33 16,579 19 50,621 59 35,541 41 86,247 100
2000 38,186 31 46,217 37 93,934 75 30,879 25 124,922 100
2003 32,253 23 63,536 45 105,101 75 35,330 25 140,581 100
2005 43,193 27 73,445 45 122,242 75 39,561 24 161,956 100
Source: TEIAŞ
Table 2-9: Generation by legal status (MW)
 EUAS
Under 
Privatization
Autoproducers
Production 
Companies
TORs Total
  %  %  %  %  %  %
1990 52,854 92 0 0 3,361 6 23 0 0 0 57,543 100
1995 78,195 91 0 0 5,625 7 126 0 0 0 86,247 100
2000 93,234 75 0 0 15,962 13 12,039 10 1,141 1 124,922 100
2003 60,506 43 2,591 2 23,127 16 45,461 32 4,317 3 140,581 100
2005 66,931 41 6,531 4 17,087 11 66,409 41 4,121 3 161,956 100
Note: Production Companies include BOT, BO and IPP plants
2.3.1.2. The Need for New Capacity
In the 1990s worries about insufficient capacity and perceptions that public finances would not 
allow large public investment projects had led governments to encourage private investments un-
der build-operate-transfer (BOT) and build-operate (BO) contracts. The severe macroeconomic 
crisis of 2000-2001, which resulted in an unprecedented economic recession proved these forecast 
wrong and Turkey found itself in a temporary situation of excess capacity in the early 2000s. 
This situation is changing fast and capacity projections recently prepared by TEIAŞ37 point to 
an impending capacity shortfall. The TEIAŞ report makes capacity projections under two demand 
scenarios prepared by the MENR. The high and low demand scenarios (where demand grows by 
8.4 and 6.3% per annum, respectively).  Under the high demand scenario, capacity already avai-
lable, under construction and capacity which has been licensed by EMRA and which is expected 
to become available, just meets peak demand with no reserves available, in 2013. Reserves start 
falling below 26% after 2009. To maintain a reserve ratio of 28-29%, additional capacity needed 
amounts to 1075, 3843 and 7689 MW in 2009-2011. Under “normal” or “project” producti-
37  TEİAŞ “Turkish Electricity Energy 10 Year Production Capacity Projection (2006-2015)”, June 2006 (in 
Turkish), Tables 22, 23 and 24.
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on conditions, supply generated by existing capacity, capacity under construction and capacity 
licensed by EMRA and which is expected to become available starts to outstrip demand, with 
no reserves, by 2011. The report also makes projections under the assumption of rain shortfalls 
(called “reliable” production in the report). Under reliable generation, demand starts to outstrip 
supply by 2009. These are projections made under the assumption of no fuel shortages. Capacity 
shortfalls would appear earlier, for example, if it is assumed that gas based plants produce not at 
full capacity, but at level of production projected in 2006 (about 75% capacity). 
2.3.1.3. A Complicating Factor: Distribution Losses
As of 2005, the average ratio of losses, including technical losses and theft, to total billed and un-
billed consumption was about 16% (Figure 2-3). A further complicating factor is that loss ratios 
vary significantly across distribution regions. In two regions in eastern and south eastern Anatolia 
the ratio of losses to total (billed and unbilled) consumption are around 50-60%. In terms of ab-
solute level of losses, the European part of Istanbul comes out as the region with second highest 
volume of losses (Table 2-10).
Figure 2-3: Loss-and-theft ratio in electricity (% of total supply)
 
Source: TEDAŞ
Loss ratios are highest in provinces that have suffered most from violence associated with clas-
hes between the army and Kurdish separatists, suggesting the presence of deeply rooted social 
factors as well as serious weaknesses in the rule of law. There is anecdotal evidence that theft is 
also high in shanty towns in some urban centres (most notably in Istanbul) and that in some cases 
industrialists engage in large amounts of theft in areas where law enforcement is weak. 
The high level of losses creates complications for restructured electricity markets. High variabi-
lity in losses creates high variability in distribution costs and cost-based pricing would create in-
ter-regional inequalities in pricing.  This would be both politically unacceptable and highly unfair 
on paying consumers.38 Under the current regime, these differences are handled through massive 
cross subsidies implicit under uniform retail tariffs applied by TEDAŞ. As discussed below, the 
way the authorities intended to deal with this problem changed over time.
38  See Bagdagioglu et. al. (2007) for an analysis of potential impact of cost-reflective prices on households.
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Table 2-10: Technical losses and theft in distribution regions (2006)
Distribution Company (%) Distribution Company MWh
VANGÖLÜ 63.8 DİCLE 6,513,057
DİCLE 57.8 BOĞAZİÇİ (Istanbul Batı) 2,214,967
ARAS 29.4 TOROSLAR 1,409,364
ÇORUH 12.3 VANGÖLÜ 1,333,906
BOĞAZİÇİ (Istanbul Batı) 12.3 BAŞKENT 934,460
FIRAT 11.7 GEDİZ 804,740
TOROSLAR 10.9 AYEDAŞ (Istanbul Doğu) 795,333
AYEDAŞ (Istanbul Doğu) 10.2 ULUDAĞ 696,032
SAKARYA 10.1 ARAS 587,206
BAŞKENT 9.6 SAKARYA 562,610
YEŞİLIRMAK 9.5 AKDENİZ 437,929
TRAKYA 9.3 MERAM 410,164
GÖKSU 9.3 TRAKYA 368,334
AKDENİZ EDAŞ 8.9 MENDERES 359,343
ULUDAĞ 8.8 YEŞİLIRMAK 356,222
ÇAMLIBEL 8.5 OSMANGAZİ 313,131
MERAM 7.8 GÖKSU 284,698
OSMANGAZİ 7.2 ÇORUH 262,177
MENDERES 7.1 FIRAT 252,913
GEDİZ 6.5 ÇAMLIBEL 164,806
Source: TEDAŞ
2.3.2. The Legal and Regulatory Environment39
2.3.2.1. Brief History
For most of its history, the Turkish electricity industry was dominated by a vertically integrated 
and state-owned enterprise, the Türkiye Elektrik Kurumu (TEK). In 1993 TEK was separated into 
the Turkish Electricity and Transmission Company (TEAS) and the Turkish Electricity Distribu-
tion Company (TEDAŞ).  
During the 1980s and 1990s several laws were passed to attract private capital into the indus-
try through build- operate-transfer (BOT), build-operate (BO) and transfer-of-operating-rights 
(TOR) contracts. The first law setting up a framework for private participation in electricity was 
enacted in 1984 (Law No. 3096). This law formed the legal basis for private participation through 
BOT contracts for new generation facilities, TOR contracts for existing generation and distribu-
tion assets, and the auto-producer system for companies wishing to produce their own electricity. 
Under a BOT concession, a private company would build and operate a plant for up to 99 years 
(later reduced to 49 years) and then transfer it to the state at no cost. Under a TOR, the private 
enterprise would operate (and rehabilitate where necessary) an existing government-owned facility 
through a lease-type arrangement. In 1994 Law No. 3996 and Implementing Decree 5907 were 
enacted to enhance the attractiveness of BOT projects. They authorized the Undersecretariat of 
the Treasury to grant guarantees and provided tax exemptions. An additional law was enacted in 
1997 for private sector participation in the construction and operation of new thermal power 
plants through a licensing system rather than concession award. The build-operate-own (BOO) 
law (Law No. 4283) again provided guarantees by the Treasury. Under the BOO model, investors 
retain ownership of the facility at the end of the contract period.
39  Previous reviews of the regulatory environment in electricity include Atiyas and Dutz (2005), Güney (2006) 
, Atiyas (2006), and Hepbaşlı (2005).
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A typical BOT, BOO, or TOR generation contract, signed between the private party and TEAS 
or TEDAŞ, includes exclusive “take or pay” obligations with fixed quantities and prices (or price 
formulas) over 15–30 years. Hence in fact they are similar to power purchase agreements. Howe-
ver, public opinion about these contracts has been highly critical. There are several reasons for 
this. First, some of these contracts have been awarded without a competitive bidding procedure. 
Second, especially BOT contracts were heavily front-loaded with high capacity charges to allow 
for early recovery of investment costs; hence especially in the early years, electricity purchased was 
purchased by the state from these projects at very high prices. Third, there have been allegations in 
reports prepared by the Turkish High Court of Accounts as well as other official audit bodies that 
there have been irregularities in the design and implementation of these contracts. At the least, 
it is believed that the state did not negotiate these contracts sufficiently rigorously and obtained 
poor bargains: the government has retained most of the commercial risks, while providing the 
private sector with substantial rewards, especially in the form of Treasury-provided guarantees to 
cover critical commercial take-or-pay payment obligations, such as minimum electricity genera-
tion levels and minimum quantities of gas in power station gas purchase contracts, at associated 
predetermined prices in U.S. dollars over the life of the contracts. On the other hand, project ow-
ners contend that the high initial prices were a reflection of Turkey’s high international risk rating 
which translated into a high cost of capital for these debt financed energy generation projects.
One important legacy of these efforts in the electricity industry has been that the public sector 
became unwilling to develop contracts with private investors. As will be discussed below, this be-
came a primary reason why privatization has become a major component of the Turkish reform 
process in electricity. 
In 2001 the Turkish Parliament passed Law No. 4628 (The Electricity Market Law, EML) 
which provided a radically new regulatory and legal framework for the organization of the Turkish 
electricity industry. The EML envisaged a thorough restructuring of the industry to introduce 
competition, liberalization of both supply and demand, and created a variety of roles for private 
participation. 
2.3.2.2. The Market Structure Envisaged Under the EML
The EML was landmark legislation in that it contained elements that are deemed crucial for the 
restructuring of the electricity industry towards a more market oriented system with significant 
participation by the private sector. These were liberalization of entry on the supply side, allowing 
consumers to choose their suppliers on the demand side, unbundling of transmission and distri-
bution from generation and retail supply, and ensuring that all interested parties have access to 
the network.
The main components of the new structure of the electricity industry under the EML are as 
follows:
The EML established a new Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA) as the regulator of 
energy markets with wide powers to issue secondary legislation. EMRA is governed by its own bo-
ard. Its main functions include implementing the licensing regime, preparing and implementing 
secondary legislation for the electricity and gas (and later oil) markets, regulating distribution and 
transmission activities and the provision of retail services to non-eligible consumers (see below), 
monitoring compliance and imposing penalties and fines in cases of non-compliance. 
The model envisaged in the law consisted of a bilateral contracts market supplemented by a 
balancing mechanism and financial reconciliation. The National Load Dispatch Centre (NLDC) 
established in TEIAŞ would operate the balancing mechanism. The Market Financial Reconcili-
ation Centre (MFRC) would then settle the accounts of all market participants. While initially 
the EML did not mention a spot market, the current plan is that a day-ahead market will be es-
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tablished. The MFRC started operations in 2003. After months of trial operations, the balancing 
mechanism was launched in August 2006. 
EML introduced further vertical separation of publicly owned assets by unbundling generati-
on and transmission. It thus created, in addition to TEDAŞ, the Turkish Electricity Generation 
Company (EUAS), and Turkish Electricity Transmission Company (TEIAŞ), each organized as a 
separate legal entity. EUAS took over and managed all state owned generation assets. TEIAŞ ow-
ned and managed the transmission system, and was also responsible for balancing and settlement 
of power transactions among the market participants. 
The Law also created Turkish Electricity Wholesale Company (TETAŞ). TETAŞ was formed as 
a transitional entity that would take over all the existing contracts (i.e. the BOTs, BOs and TORs) 
and would also act as the single buyer of electricity produced by EUAS for a transitional period. 
The main purpose of TETAŞ was to deal with the stranded cost of the exiting contracts, that is, it 
would dilute the high cost of stranded contracts with cheaper electricity obtained from EUAS so 
as to reach a reasonable wholesale cost of electricity. 
On the demand side, customers that consume more than a specified threshold of power were 
deemed eligible consumer. That threshold was specified as 9 GWh/year and was to be reset every 
year by EMRA. As of January 2007, it is set at 3 GWh.
EML stipulates the following type of activities:
•	 Generation: To be provided by EUAS, private generation companies operating with a gen-
eration license, auto-producers and auto-producer groups which are fundamentally estab-
lished for self-consumption but which may sell up to a certain ratio (which used to be 25% 
and has been set at 30% until end-2008) of their output in the competitive market (they 
have to obtain a generation license if the amount of electricity they sell to the market sur-
passes that limit).
•	 Transmission: would be performed by TEIAŞ, which will remain under state ownership.
•	 Distribution: To be performed by TEDAŞ, its affiliates and private sector distribution com-
panies that will be created through privatization. Distribution companies may provide retail 
services if they obtain a retail license.
•	 Wholesale: To be provided by TETAŞ and private wholesale companies 
•	 Retail: Carried out by retail companies and distribution companies holding a retail license. 
Retail companies can provide services to customers in any region; there are no regional con-
straints. 
•	 Export and import of electricity can be undertaken by TETAŞ, private sector wholesale 
companies, retail companies and distribution companies holding a retail license.
EML imposed the following restrictions:
•	 Generation companies may have affiliate relations with distribution companies but they 
cannot have control over one.
•	 The total market share of a generation company cannot exceed 20% of Turkey’s total in-
stalled capacity.
•	 A distribution company may set up generation facilities in its region but the total electricity 
they generate cannot be over 20% of consumption in that region. Also, the amount of elec-
tricity they can purchase from their own or affiliated generation companies cannot exceed 
20% of total consumption in that region. This restriction was later removed through Law 
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No. 5398 (July 2005) which stipulates that distribution companies can set up their genera-
tion facilities and may purchase electricity from them provided the price of the electricity is 
not higher than the “average national wholesale price”. 
•	 Market share of private wholesale companies not subject to regulation cannot exceed 10% 
of total consumption
•	 Accounting separation: Legal entities holding licenses for multiple activities were obliged to 
keep separate accounts for each of these activities.  
Viewed from the perspective of the EU electricity directive (2003/54/EC), then, the Turkish 
model entailed liberalization of supply through a licensing approach, liberalization of demand by 
allowing an increasing ratio of consumers to choose their suppliers, and accounting separation 
between different activities. In addition the Turkish program undertook some structural measures 
by separating the state owned transmission company from distribution, generation and supply, 
and putting upper limits on market share of generation. The degree of unbundling stipulated 
between distribution on the one hand, and generation and retail on the other, was lower than tho-
se stipulated in the 2003 electricity directive. The issue of unbundling will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
Regarding access, the EML stated that transmission and distribution licenses would ensure third 
party access to the transmission and distribution systems on a non-discriminatory basis. Among 
the various options available at the time in the European Union, the EML preferred regulated third 
party access (rTPA) over negotiated third party access (nTPA). Under rTPA the terms of access are 
not left to bilateral negotiations but access tariffs are directly regulated by regulatory authority. This 
approach is considered a more effective means to ensure non-discriminatory access. 
Prices of transactions in electricity would be freely determined by private parties, except for 
those tariffs which are regulated by EMRA. The main tariffs which are regulated are listed Table 
2-11. Regulated tariffs are proposed by the respective institutions and approved by EMRA. Pro-
posals for the subsequent year have to presented before the end of October in the current year 
and EMRA is expected to approve them by December 31 of the current year. If EMRA does not 
approve the tariffs, it requests that they be revised. Table 2-11 summarizes tariff regulation in the 
electricity industry.
Table 2-11: Regulated prices
Activity Regulated Price/Charge Method
Transmission
Connection Charge Project based
Use of System Price Revenue Cap 
System Operation Price Revenue Cap  
Distribution
Connection Charge Project based and Standard Connection Charge 
Use of System Price Revenue cap
Retail
Retail Service Price Revenue Cap
Average Retail Price Price Cap 
Wholesale (TETAŞ) Average Wholesale Price Cost based
Source: The tariff regulation and associated communiqués.
Distribution and transmission connection charges are intended to cover the costs (connection as-
sets and costs incurred in their construction) users incur when they connect to the grid. Users of the 
distribution system are also subject to a standard connection charge that depends on connection ca-
pacity and distance. Transmission and distribution system use charges, transmission system operation 
charges and retail service charges are regulated through revenue caps. The average retail price applied 
to non-eligible users is subject to a price cap. Retail prices for eligible consumers are not regulated. 
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Finally, the TETAŞ wholesale price is intended to cover average costs of wholesale electricity.
The most important step in the restructuring of the industry was the privatization of generation 
and distribution assets. The EML mentioned privatization but did not provide a timetable. It also 
stated that companies, as a result of privatization, “cannot have a market share that will enable 
them with a control power in the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors.” 
Transmission assets would remain under public ownership.
The law also attempted to provide instruments that would potentially be used to protect con-
sumers from the asymmetries that could be generated by the high and variable distribution losses 
mentioned above. It stated that “in cases where consumers in certain regions and/or in line with 
certain objectives need to be supported, such subsidy shall provided in the form direct cash re-
funds to consumers without affecting the prices”. The authority to design such subsidies was given 
to the Council of Ministers.
2.3.2.3. Implementation Strategy of the New Market Model
The execution of the new framework has been governed by the “Strategy Document” (SD)40, 
issued in March 2004, which provided an outline and timetable for the next steps of the imple-
mentation of the EML. 
The Turkish strategy for restructuring relies heavily on privatization. Rather than introducing 
competition where possible while generation assets are under public ownership, the strategy ma-
kes the privatization of distribution assets a crucial step in the success of the overall restructuring 
program. Hence, according to the SD privatizations starts with distribution and is to be followed 
by generation. The stated reason for this sequencing was the hope that successful privatization of 
distribution companies would create credible contractual counterparts for existing and especially 
new entrant generation companies. It s generally believed that if distribution companies remained 
under state ownership, managers would be unwilling to sign contracts with the private sector, 
especially given the public suspicion about the BOT, BO and TOR contracts signed under the 
previous regime. 
In the mean time generation assets would be grouped into portfolio generation companies 
(excluding some hydro generation assets, which would continue to sell their output to TETAŞ). 
The basic principles to be followed in the creation of portfolio companies were attaining financial 
feasibility and preventing market power. The privatisation of generation plants would start after 
the establishment of Market Management System within TEIAŞ and after significant progress in 
the privatisation of distribution companies. 
As part of the transition period, the SD stipulated that several types of transitional or vesting 
contracts have been implemented. These included 
•	 Transitional contracts between TETAŞ and EUAS hydroelectric plans. Some hydro plants 
will not be included in the generation portfolio companies and they will continue to sell 
their output to TETAŞ as long as it is deemed necessary to achieve an average TETAŞ sales 
price that reflects the expected market price. 
•	 Transitional contracts between TETAŞ and the distribution companies. Electricity pur-
chased by TETAŞ from EUAS and exiting contracts will be distributed among distribution 
companies. 
•	 Transitional purchase and sale contracts between distribution companies and generation 
groups. These contracts would last at most 5 years. As they are terminated, they would be 
replaced by market based contracts. 
40  Decision No. 2004/3 of the High Planning Council, Official Gazette 17.3.2004
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•	 Distribution companies would make agreements with suppliers for an amount covering at 
least 85% of estimated consumption of non-eligible consumers. 
Regarding distribution, Turkey has been divided into 21 distribution regions, and a regional 
distribution company has been created for each region. Licenses for distribution activities would 
be at most for 49 years. Since the restructuring strategy depended crucially on the privatization of 
distribution assets, the SD included steps that were perceived to reduce uncertainties and increase 
the attractiveness of these assets to potential investors. Tariffs would be specified on a multi-annual 
basis and the first tariff application period would be 5 years.  
The SD introduced a significant departure from the EML in the handling of inter-regional 
differences of distribution costs. Instead of direct subsidies to consumers, the SD stipulated that 
a “price-equalization scheme” would be introduced for a transitional period that ends in 2010. 
This means that cross-subsidies from low-loss regions would be used to finance losses in high-loss 
regions. As this required new legislation, Law No. 5496 introduced an amendment to EML and 
has given the EMRA the authority to design the equalization scheme. It is generally believed that 
the main reason for this change is the unwillingness of the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury 
to create any additional burdens to the budget. Relying on cross subsidies instead precludes direct 
support from the public budget, but is likely to create problems in incentives and pricing. 
Additional measures were intended, apparently with the objective of making distribution assets 
more attractive to potential buyers. The SD stated that the threshold for eligible consumers would 
be set at 7.8 GWh until 2009. This was not adhered to, and as of January 2007, the threshold has 
been reduced to 3 GWh. Finally, as discussed before, restrictions on the extent to which distribu-
tion companies can integrate backwards into generation has been lifted through Law No. 5398.
2.3.2.4. Privatization
Privatization of distribution companion companies was seen as a crucial milestone in the restruc-
turing of the Turkish electricity industry. Three distribution companies Başkent (Ankara), Sakarya 
and Istanbul Anadolu Yakası (responsible for the Anatolian Part of Istanbul) have been put up for 
tender. The tender was announced on August 31 2006, and the deadline for prequalification was 
set at October 4, 2006. The number of potential buyers who have obtained prequalification ran-
ged between 24-30 for each of the distribution companies. Then, in January 2007 the government 
cancelled the tenders. It is still expected that the privatization will proceed, hence it will be useful 
to review shortly the main approach adopted in privatization.  
Privatization has been delayed significantly. The SD had stated that “the main target will be to 
privatize all distribution companies/ regions until 31 December 2006.” One important reason for 
the delay was the search for the appropriate legal form of ownership of the distribution assets.  In 
the end it was decided that privatization would not entail the transfer of ownership rights, and 
the Transfer of Operating Rights (TOR) backed Share Sale model (“TSS model”) was adopted. 
According to this model, the ownership of the assets remains with TEDAŞ. The distribution com-
pany will have the right to operate the distribution network through a TOR with TEDAŞ. The 
company will hold a retail license and the sole distribution license in the region. All the shares of 
the company will be sold in the privatization, hence the investor will purchase a company that 
holds a TOR, a distribution license and a retail license.41
The investor that purchases the distribution company also bears responsibility to undertake ne-
cessary investments. The cost of these investments is to be recovered through tariffs. Any portion 
of investments that are not recovered through tariffs will be paid by TEDAŞ to the investor upon 
the expiration or termination of the contract. The investment program and expenditures of the 
41  The details of the model can found in “Teaser: Privatization of Turkey’s Electricity Distribution Industry” on 
PA’s website: www.oib.gov.tr
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distribution companies are to be monitored by the EMRA.
The ultimate aim of the restructuring process is to reach cost-based tariffs in line with the un-
bundling of electricity generation, transmission, distribution and retail sale. Ultimately, this would 
in principle allow for some regional differentiation of retail tariffs, especially for consumers who 
are not eligible or who continue to purchase electricity from their regional distribution company, 
reflecting, for example, differences in distribution costs. Given the large inter-regional differences 
in costs (especially distribution losses), it was decided that a transition period was needed during 
which a “price equalization scheme” would be implemented until these interregional differences 
would be reduced or eliminated. Hence the period 2006-2010 is set as a transition period (also 
called “the first tariff implementation period”) during which a set of single national tariffs will be 
applied to identified consumer groups without regional differentiation. The tariff structure will 
entail cross subsidies both across consumer groups and across regions. Cross subsidies across regi-
ons will be financed through a transfer mechanism that is going to be managed by TETAŞ. 
The retail tariffs that reflect these cross subsidies and which will be valid during the transition 
period have been proposed by TEDAŞ and approved by EMRA.42 The tariffs are unbundled and 
entail various components: Distribution charges and retail service charges are governed by reve-
nue caps. The revenue requirements are intended to cover the projected cost of distribution and 
retail services and allowances for target electricity losses. Retail sale prices are governed by a price 
cap which entails a mark-up over the average cost of electricity purchased by the distribution 
company. The transmission cost component consists of transmission charges that the distribution 
company pays to TEIAŞ and is fully passed through to the end-user piece. The transmission char-
ges are themselves regulated through caps on TEIAŞ revenues. 
These revenue requirements that form the basis of distribution revenue caps and tariffs are 
calculated on the basis of assumptions about the wholesale electricity prices and realizations of 
demand. The intention is that during the transition period it will be possible to make adjustments 
to these tariffs adjustments depending on demand realizations and changes in the wholesale cost 
of electricity, as well as other factors such as inflation. These adjustments will be governed by two 
recent communiqués published by EMRA.43 For example, when demand is different from the 
forecast on which the approved end-user tariffs are based, revenue requirements will be revised to 
incorporate any shortfall or surplus.
The approved prices will be revised in light of changes in the wholesale cost of electricity. 
EMRA’s recent communiqué on the revenue regulation of regional distribution companies defines 
a distribution company’s average cost of electricity as a weighted average of electricity purchased 
from TETAŞ, from EUAŞ portfolio companies based on the vesting contracts between EUAŞ 
and the distribution companies, from generators that have renewable energy resource certificates 
and finally from their own generators. Currently the average energy prices is set at 8.36 Ykr/kwh. 
Changes that may occur in the average wholesale price will be reflected in the cap of the retail sale 
component of the end-user price.
The strategy document required distribution companies to establish vesting contracts for 85% 
of the projected demand by non-eligible consumers. These contracts have been established with 
TETAŞ and EUAŞ portfolio companies. The contracts with EUAŞ portfolio companies have a mi-
nimum sales component that the distribution company has to purchase in any case. It also has an 
optional portion, which provides the distribution company with the option not to buy in case, for 
42  In fact, by the provisional article 9 of the EML (introduced by Law No. 5496, May 2006) EMRA had to 
approve these tariffs without any changes.
43  “20 Dağıtım Şirketinin İlk Uygulama Dönemine İlişkin gelir Düzenlemesi Hakkında Tebliğ” and “Elektrik 
Dağıtım Bölgelerinde Uygulanacak Fiyat Eşitleme Mekanizması Hakkında Tebliğ”, both published in Offi-
cial Gazette December 21, 2006.
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example, demand is lower than expected or alternative cheaper sources of energy become available. 
The contracts terminate at the end of the transition period (2010) after which the distribution 
companies will be free to procure electricity from alternative sources. 
Distribution companies hold both distribution and retail trade licenses. Currently integration 
between distribution, and generation and retail supply businesses are only subject to accounting 
separation. However, in its opinion on the privatization of distribution companies, the Com-
petition Authority (CA) has stated that its approval of privatization transactions will be made 
conditional on legal separation between distribution and retail businesses by the end of the tran-
sition period (2010). The CA has also stated that the strategy for distribution privatization has 
predominantly taken into consideration issues of security of supply and encouragement of foreign 
investments, but has insufficiently considered the institution of competition and protection of 
consumers. The CA decision does not touch on separation between distribution and generation, 
presumably because vertical integration was specifically allowed by Law No. 5398. The current 
expectation therefore is that legal unbundling between distribution and retail supply will eventu-
ally take hold. The degree of unbundling between generation and distribution remains somewhat 
uncertain since the current arrangement is not in line with the current EU Directives that require 
legal unbundling.
2.3.2.5. Renewable Energy Policy
On May 2005 the Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources for the Purpose of Genera-
ting Electrical Energy (Renewables Law; Law No. 5346) was enacted.44 The law covers wind, solar, 
geothermal, biomass, biogas, wave, stream, tidal, and river and arc type hydroelectric generation 
facilities, and the hydroelectric generation facilities with a reservoir area of less than fifteen square 
kilometres.45 The law authorizes EMRA to issue Renewable Energy Resources Certificates (RES 
Certificate). The law provides holders of RERs with several incentives, the most important being 
that holders of retail licenses are obliged to purchase a certain percentage of the amount of electri-
city that they sold in the previous year from the entities holding RES certificates. Each year EMRA 
will announce the total amount of RES certificate energy to be applied under the law, and EMRA 
will determine the amount each retailer has to buy “considering the proportion of the energy 
amount he has sold within the previous calendar year to the total electrical energy amount which 
all legal entities holding retail sale license offered for sale in Turkey.” In case there is sufficient RES 
certificate energy, that ratio will not be lower than 8%.
In the Renewables Law, the price of this energy was set at the average wholesale price in the pre-
vious year, as determined by EMRA, until the year 2011. The Council of Ministers could raise that 
price by 20%. As of 2011, this price was not going to be applicable to plants older than 7 years of 
age. Furthermore, after 2011 retailers are to buy their required RES certificate energy from plants 
younger than 7 years, switching to older plants only if the required ratios are not fulfilled. The 
pricing clause was later changed through Law No. 5627 on Energy Efficiency (Art. 17). Under the 
new arrangement each retail license holder has to buy RES certificate energy in proportion to their 
share in total retail sales of electricity. The price of this energy is still set equal to the average whole-
sale price of the previous year, provided it is not lower than 5 eurocents/KWh and higher than 5.5 
eurocents/KWh. RES certificate generators are allowed to sell their electricity in the free market. 
2.3.2.6. Competition Policy in the Electricity Industry
There is no explicit agreement between the Competition Authority and EMRA on how to divide 
responsibilities with respect to the development of competition in the energy sectors. In addi-
44  See Öztürk and Ergün (2005) for a discussion of the Renewables Law.
45  Geothermal energy is also under the purview of the renewables law. However, a separate law has been enacted 
(Law No. 5686 on Geothermal Resources and Waters with Natural Minerals).
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tion, while the telecommunications legislation specifically mentions consultations between the 
telecommunications regulator and the Competition Authority, no such stipulation exists in the 
electricity market law or the natural gas market law. Nevertheless, relations between EMRA and 
the Competition Authority have been quite smooth overall. The OECD peer review on compe-
tition policy in Turkey (OECD 2005) reports that EMRA has consulted with the Competition 
Authority on numerous draft regulations. 
One of the most important interventions of the Competition Authority in the developments in 
the electricity industry has been its opinion on the privatization of distribution companies men-
tioned above. Another well known case is the 2003 decision regarding ÇEAŞ, a company holding 
a monopoly concession for the distribution and transmission of electricity in one of the southern 
distribution regions. In that decision, the Board of the CA concluded that ÇEAŞ’ refusal to pro-
vide interconnection to independent generators was a violation of the competition law and fined 
the company for about 6.4 million USD (OECD, 2005, p. 22).
Another indicative decision relates to the complaint by the Association of Electricity Genera-
tors that TEDAŞ’ refusal to participate in financial reconciliation was a violation of competition 
law. The CA Board decided that TEDAŞ’ non-participation was not a violation of the relevant re-
gulation and that regulations whether or not TEDAŞ should participate in financial reconciliation 
was under the responsibility of EMRA.
2.3.3. Dilemmas of Transition: (Lack of ) Private Sector Response and 
the Launch of the Balancing Mechanism
The new regime has not yet been successful in attracting new investment from the private sector, 
even though projections estimate the arrival of capacity constraints and possible shortages as soon 
as 2009. Hence currently Turkey finds itself in this strange situation where an excess demand is 
imminent and the supply response is not forthcoming. 
There are several reasons for this. One obvious reason is delays in the privatization of distribu-
tion companies. As discussed above, the point of privatizing distribution companies first was the 
expectation that they would be willing to engage purchase contracts with new entrant generators. 
From the perspective of potential investors in generation, that was going to mean that their pro-
jects were going to be “bankable”. Under public management, while the various actors have been 
willing to contract among themselves as in the case of transition contracts described above, no 
such willingness exist to contract with potential private entrants. The bad publicity of previous 
experience with BOT and BO contracts possibly had a hindering effect. 
Another reason for the absence of an investment response is lack of price signals that can guide 
investment response. There are no future markets. Until very recently, all of the major prices in 
the system were determined by administrative mechanisms. TETAŞ would purchase power from 
EUAS and from plants under existing contracts and determine a wholesale price on the basis of 
average costs. TEDAŞ buys electricity on the basis of that price and sells electricity basically at a 
price that presumably covers costs including losses. 
In a market system the price of electricity would be determined by the marginal cost of the 
marginal plant. In an environment of impending scarcity, one would expect that some (especially 
peak) prices would start to rise, providing signals for additional investment. In the Turkish case, 
not only have these signals been absent until recently, in addition, uncertainty about whether mar-
ket prices would be available in the future has hindered investment into new capacity. 
Lack of prices that reflect the scarcity of value of power even in the short run has created 
problems for existing private generators as well. Private generators in the market (auto-producers, 
auto-producer groups and independent power producers) have been primarily competing with 
EdamENG.indd   112 1/3/08   2:19:46 PM
113
TEDAŞ for the patronage of eligible consumers and selling at a discount of 10-15%. Most private 
producers run gas-based stations, and with increases in gas prices, have been squeezed between ri-
sing costs and TEDAŞ prices that the government has been unwilling to increase. Botas gas prices 
have increased by more than 50% since mid-2005, and TEDAŞ retail prices have been constant. 
The squeeze is captured in Figure 2-4, which plots a rough measure of the margin between gas 
cost (BOTAŞ price applied to electricity producers) and retail price of electricity (TEDAŞ tariff 
for industrial consumers). The figure shows that while in 2002-2004 the TEDAŞ retail price was 
about 3.5-4.5 times the BOTAŞ gas price, towards the end of 2006 it was only two times higher. 
Everything else constant, that implies a significant drop in the margins of private producers. Priva-
te producers have complained that some prices determined by government agencies (such as those 
of power produced by EUAS hydro- plants) are superficially low. In 2006 the price squeeze led 
some producers to announce that they may start closing loss-making plants down. This problem 
has been resolved recently with the launching of the balancing mechanism.
Figure 2-4: Margin of retail price over gas cost (%)  
 
 
 
Source: See text.
More generally, however, the lack of investment response reflects a lack of regulatory credibility 
or trust as well. Given especially the seeming unwillingness of the government to adjust retail pri-
ces in response to what the private sector sees as rising costs, potential investors are not sure that 
fair or cost reflective prices will be available in the future once new plants come on line. Private 
sectors’ unwillingness to invest and requests for further assurances, in turn, seems to have been 
interpreted by many civil servants as straightforward rent-seeking. 
Several explanations have been advanced for the government’s unwillingness to raise prices. 
One explanation is that the government is worried that any increase in energy prices may hurt 
the disinflation program that has successfully reduced inflation from over 50% to 10-12%.  Ano-
ther hypothesis is that the government was not willing to raise prices before elections. Table 2-12 
provides some evidence of the dilemma that the government faces. The first two columns provide 
retail prices for electricity for industry and households, respectively. In international comparison, 
Turkish electricity prices are relatively high for industry and low for households. The last column 
of the table presents the ratio of prices for households over those for industry; in Turkey this ratio 
is exceptionally high. The evidence suggests that if prices were set more in line with costs, house-
hold prices would likely increase. 
On July 1, 2006 Turkey experienced a black-out that lasted about 5 hours and affected 13 
provinces. This occurred in an environment where a number of private generators announced that 
they would start cutting production in light of rising fuel costs and low retail prices. On August 
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1, 2006 the government launched the Balancing Mechanism (BM).
Table 2-12: Retail prices
Country
Electricity 
for Industry 
(USD/kwh)
Electricity for 
households 
(USD/kwh)
HH/I
Mexico 0.10 0.10 1.00
Turkey 0.11 0.12 1.11
Italy 0.17 0.20 1.18
Hungary 0.11 0.13 1.19
Czech R. 0.09 0.12 1.30
Chinese Taipei 0.05 0.07 1.35
Korea 0.06 0.09 1.40
Austria 0.11 0.16 1.53
Japan 0.13 0.20 1.54
U.K. 0.10 0.16 1.58
Switzerland 0.08 0.13 1.58
Slovak R., 0.08 0.13 1.62
Portugal 0.11 0.18 1.64
Norway 0.05 0.09 1.66
Greece 0.07 0.11 1.69
Poland 0.07 0.13 1.70
Finland 0.07 0.12 1.71
Ireland 0.11 0.18 1.72
U.S.A 0.05 0.10 1.75
Spain 0.08 0.15 1.84
New Zealand 0.05 0.13 2.54
Germany 0.08 0.20 2.57
France 0.05 0.14 2.83
Denmark 0.08 0.29 3.87
Source: IEA, Key World Energy Statistics 2006
The purpose of the BM is to equate the supply and demand of electricity on a real-time basis. 
Participants provide to the NLDC their final contract position (called final physical notification) 
and offer and bid prices for loading and de-loading power. The mechanism yields an hourly Sys-
tem Marginal Price (SMP) that is equal to the maximum accepted offer price or the minimum 
accepted bid price depending on whether the system is short or long. In effect, the SMP acts as a 
real time market clearing price of very short term power. The financial accounts of the participants 
are then cleared through the Market Financial Settlement Center.
The launching of the BM was a very important step in the process of restructuring because 
for the first time participants were able to carry out transactions at market prices. Up to then, fi-
nancial reconciliation was carried out at prices determined by TETAŞ, through an administrative 
accounting process rather than a market process. Indeed, with the launching of the BM many 
private generators terminated their contracts with their customers and started to sell electricity to 
the BM instead at more advantageous terms. That, in turn, helped resolve the short term supply 
security problem that would have arisen if private generators had instead leaned towards reducing 
their output, as they had announced before the BM became operational. In effect, the BM allowed 
the pricing of marginal capacity at a value closer to its marginal cost and postponed the short run 
supply security problem.
The launching of the BM has deeply affected the evolution of the market. The current trading 
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patterns are relatively simple. Most privately owned generators currently sell their output to the 
BM. There are a few wholesalers who sell electricity to organized industrial regions or in some 
cases hotels through relatively short term contracts (mostly one year). There are no private compa-
nies that specialize in the retail business.
The balancing market is primarily intended as a price-based mechanism through which the 
system operator maintains the equality of supply and demand. As such, it is crucial for system 
reliability in the short run. However, it is not intended as a market where bulk energy is sold and 
bought or as a market that acts as the main buyer of a portion of the country’s existing capacity, 
which is what the Turkish BM is doing at the moment. In most countries, the market design also 
includes a day-ahead or a spot market. The day-ahead market acts as the market where buyers and 
sellers engage in transactions regarding electricity to be delivered in 24 hours, and the resulting 
day-ahead prices act as crucial reference prices. While a day-ahead market was not mentioned in 
the EML, it is now frequently mentioned by the authorities as an important component of overall 
market design. It is not clear yet whether the authorities will make development of a day-ahead 
market a priority in the near future. 
It remains to be seen whether the launch of the balancing mechanism will positively affect the 
investment mood of the private sector. It has been reported that in the last three months there has 
been a rapid increase in applications to EMRA for licenses for new generation facilities. According 
to press reports, there have been 14 applications amounting to a total capacity of about 4,000 
MW. Most of these applications are for plants to run on imported coal.46 A similar rush seems to 
be evident in hydroelectric plants as well.47
In any case, however, the current situation is not likely to be sustainable. Currently TEDAŞ 
meets its electricity deficit through purchases from the Balancing Market. Keeping retail prices 
constant is causing significant difficulties for TEDAŞ finances. Moreover, the BM has deviated 
from its original function and is currently playing the role of a spot market.  There is general ag-
reement that Turkey needs a spot or a day ahead market and that the balancing market should be 
reserved for its original purpose, which is to equate supply and demand in the last minute. Given 
the low TEDAŞ prices, and given that TEDAŞ has the obligation to serve all customers deman-
ding electricity, new entrants will most likely not be able to find customers and sell all of its power 
in the BM, further increasing the share of BM in total electricity trade, and further transforming it 
into a spot market. In effect, this will mean that the private sector will continue to sell to TEDAŞ, 
albeit through the BM, and TEDAŞ will purchase an increasing share of its electricity at prices 
well above its retail prices.
It is interesting to observe that with the current constellation of prices, it is very difficult for a 
bilateral contracts market to develop. Hence the market structure will evolve in a way that is very 
different from that envisaged in the original EML unless the TEDAŞ retail prices are realigned to 
better reflect costs.
2.3.4. Developments in the Gas Industry48
Given the significant dependence of electricity generation of gas, security and economy in the 
supply of gas is an important condition for growth in the electricity industry. The consumption 
of natural gas in Turkey started in 1987. Since then, consumption has grown rapidly and reached 
30.5 bcm in 2006. About 55% of consumption is by electricity generators, 19% residential and 
16% industrial consumers. Until 2001, when the Natural Gas Market Law (NGML) was enacted 
46  The Turkish daily Referans, August 4, 2007.
47  Sevaioğlu (2007).
48  This section draws heavily from the survey of the gas industry in Turkey by Akçollu (2006) as well as ESMAP 
(2007a, 2007b).
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BOTAŞ, a state owned company, had monopoly rights over gas imports, trade, transmission and 
storage. Private entry into gas distribution had started already in the 1990s. 
The NGML (Law No. 4646) was enacted in April 2001. The law ended BOTAŞ’ monopoly 
rights in the gas industry, except for “national transmission lines”. It identified the following ac-
tivities, each requiring a separate license: Import, generation, transmission, storage, wholesale, 
export and city distribution. Notably, retail supply was not identified as a separate activity.
The existing transmission system is owned by BOTAŞ. Private transmission companies can 
build and own transmission lines, under the condition that these lines be interconnected with the 
existing system. Regarding storage, one storage facility in Silivri, Northern Marmara was opened 
in July 2007. This facility is a joint venture between BOTAŞ and the Turkish Petroleum Corpo-
ration. Another facility in the Salt Lake is planned to be in operation in 2010. The deadline for 
applications for pre-qualification for this facility was announced as November 23, 2007.49
Distribution of natural gas in the cities have been carried out by municipalities and private 
companies. As of September 2007, tenders for gas distribution in a total of 51 distribution re-
gions have been held, and 4 more are planned in the near future.50 Tenders are held on the basis 
of unit service and amortization charge. Other parameters such as the duration f the license and 
the customer connection charge are set by EMRA. While the NGML originally envisaged that a 
distribution company can own and operate facilities in at most two distribution regions, it also 
gave EMRA the authority to increase that number. In practice EMRA has allowed companies to 
operate in as high as 9 regions. In some regions, competition for the market has been fierce and 
some tenders have resulted in zero unit service and amortization charge and a customer connecti-
on charge lower than that set by EMRA.
The NGML was a significant step in terms of harmonization of the Turkish legal framework 
with the 2003 EU Directives. In terms of unbundling, the NGML subjects private companies to 
legal unbundling. BOTAŞ itself is under accounting unbundling and legal unbundling is envisa-
ged to take place by 2009 (provisional Article 2 of the NGML). That will ensure compliance with 
the 2003 directive as well as the proposed amendments to it. However, unbundling of distribution 
activities is not in line with the directive: while the 2003 directive requires legal unbundling of 
distribution activities, the NGML does not. The NGML requires regulated third party access for 
transmission and negotiated third party access for storage, both in line with directives. EMRA is 
authorized to set annually thresholds for eligible consumers; as of 2007 the thresholds are 1 mil-
lion cubic meters per annum for consumers or association in consumers old distribution regions 
and 15 million cubic meters for those in new distribution regions (i.e. distribution regions whose 
tenders have been completed). In addition, power generation companies, cogeneration companies 
and gas production companies are designated as eligible consumers (Art. 8 of the NGML).
Despite some progress in harmonization, actual competition in the natural gas industry has not 
been achieved and BOTAŞ continues to enjoy a monopoly position. The main problem has to do 
with existing long term contracts that Turkey has signed with six gas exporting countries in the 
1980s and especially 1990s (Table 2-13). Over-commitment by BOTAŞ, and the economic crisis 
in 2000 and 2001 mentioned above have resulted in a supply overhang. 
The provisional Article 2 of the NGML forbids BOTAŞ from developing new natural gas purc-
hase contracts until the ratio of its imports to total falls below 20%. It also requires BOTAŞ to re-
lease at least 10% of its import contracts, until the ratio of BOTAŞ’ imports to total consumption 
is reduced to 20% by the year 2009. The release of import contracts was seen as the main vehicle 
through which competition would develop in the wholesale market. After quite a bit of delay a 
49  The daily Zaman, September 23, 2007, http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=592152.
50  EMRA website (http://www.epdk.gov.tr/lisans/dogalgaz/lisansdatabase/ihale.asp)
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“gas release program” was launched at the end of 2004. The first tender was held in November 
2005. There were 37 companies that were granted import license qualification documents by 
EMRA to participate in the tender. Still, the private sector was reported to show little interest in 
the tender. While the release program entailed gas imports from a variety of countries, the tender 
attracted only four valid offers for release from a contract with Russia. These four offers amounted 
to total volume of 4.75 bcm.51 The main reason why other companies were not able to provide 
valid offers was that they were required to obtain sellers’ consent before the tender and failed to 
do so. There were also delays in approving the results of the tender by BOTAŞ, and the approvals 
were granted in 2007. To be effective, the new holders need to sign a contract with the seller, in 
this case Russia. 
Table 2-13: BOTAŞ’ gas import contracts
(Bcm/year, plateau) Date of Signature Date of Operation Duration (years) Expiration Date
Russian Fed. (west) 6  February 1986 1987 25 2012
Algeria (LNG) 4  April 1988 1994 20 1014
Nigeria (LNG) 1.2  November 1999 1999 22 2021
Iran 10  August 2001 2001 25 2026
Russian Fed. (Black Sea) 16  December 1997 2003 25 2028
Russian Fed. (Westward) 8  December 1998 1998 23 2021
Turkmenistan 16  May 1999 30
Azerbaijan 6.6  March 2001 2006 15 2021
Source: BOTAŞ (http://www.botas.gov.tr/eng/naturalgas/ng_buy_ant.asp) and Akcollu (2006)
The NGML in principle liberalized the importation of natural gas and authorized EMRA to 
issue gas import licenses. However, EMRA has refrained from doing so because of the supply over-
hang. As of September 2007 one company, Shell, has obtained an import license in the context of 
the contract release awarded to that company. 
The purpose of contract release is to introduce competition into the gas market and reduce 
the dominance of BOTAŞ. Of course, since the terms of the contracts transferred to new entrants 
are most likely to remain unchanged, the immediate impact of contract release on prices will be 
negligible. The real gain possibly will lie in the fact that without such a structural intervention, 
it would have been much more difficult for new entrants to gain market share and challenge the 
dominance of BOTAŞ. 
However, it is still too early to evaluate whether the contract release program will be successful. 
The general view is that the targets stated in the EGML are too ambitious and in international 
comparison, without precedent. In Europe, programs have entailed the release of less than 10% of 
demand in 3-4 years (Akçollu, 2006, p. 44). A report by the Energy Sector Management Assistan-
ce Program (ESMAP 2007a) is of the view that volume release would have been a more effective 
and feasible method to introduce competition. In fact an amendment to the EGML introduced 
in June 2005 through Law No. 5367 stipulates that in the event that the contract transfer is not 
successful (more specifically, in case the winners are not able to sign a new contract with the seller 
party, namely Russia in the present case), BOTAŞ will execute tenders for volume transfers (Tem-
porary Article 2 of the NGML, as amended by Law No. 5367). While volume release is legally 
easier when contract release, potential economic gains may be smaller: In a volume release the 
terms of the original contract do not change; this restricts flexibility from a business perspective. 
In the case of a contract release, there is at least the theoretical possibility that the terms of the 
contract may be renewed in mutually advantageous ways. In any case, there is currently substantial 
uncertainty regarding the feasibility of the gas release targets in the NMGL.
51  Shell 0.25 bcm, Enerco 2.5 bcm, Avrasyagaz 1.25 bcm and Bosphorus 0.75 bcm. See Akçollu (2006) Table 12.
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The contract release program suffers from some entry barriers. The requirement of the prior 
consent of the seller was mentioned above. The second is confidentiality clauses in the existing 
contracts that prevent potential bidders from examining them (unless they have some special 
access through affiliate relations, in which case unfair advantages arise). The NGML requires im-
porters to guarantee storage facilities of 10% of their import volumes within 5 years, increasing 
costs of entry. 
2.3.5. The Road Ahead
2.3.5.1. Overall Strategic Orientation
The initial design of the Turkish liberalization program in electricity has some important virtues. 
Most importantly, structural measures (both horizontal and vertical) implemented in the early 
stages of restructuring meant that at least for the time being Turkey would not face severe concen-
tration/competition problems that are currently afflicting many European countries. Also, early 
adoption of the regulated third party access regime gave EMRA an important legal instrument to 
protect independent electricity producers from the threat of foreclosure. 
Nevertheless, the original design is now facing serious problems. The Turkish strategy for res-
tructuring the electricity industry depended critically on privatization. Moreover, the sequencing 
of privatization was strange since privatization was to start with monopoly bottleneck segments 
rather than generation, where competition would be easier to introduce. Apparent reasons for this 
choice of sequencing were discussed above. Even if those reasons were valid at the time, at this 
point, there is no reason why introducing additional competition into generation needs to wait 
for the privatization of distribution companies. The strategy of unbundling generation assets ho-
rizontally should go ahead and portfolio companies should be created. 
Another gap has to do with capacity mechanisms. It is generally believed that an energy-only 
market may fail to provide sufficient incentives for the instalment of peak capacity that is used 
only for a few hours each year, especially when all the components of a well-functioning market 
system are not in place. Capacity mechanisms exist in many restructured electricity markets in 
various forms (for example, as capacity obligations or capacity payments). Apparently not much 
thought was given to this issue when the Turkish model was designed. Hence, one of the current 
discussions is about whether a capacity mechanism should be implemented to ensure resource 
adequacy over the medium term. The crucial point here is that problems in resource adequacy 
can also emerge not from market failures but because of inconsistency or lack of credibility in the 
overall regulatory framework. Mechanisms for ensuring resource adequacy should not substitute 
for bad regulation; in such cases improving the regulatory framework should assume priority.
In the Turkish context, designing mechanisms to ensure resource adequacy in the medium run 
can be differentiated from the question of addressing imminent capacity shortages in the very 
short term. Discussions about the latter are under way and the issue may require special (perhaps 
one-off) measures. 
The significant gap between TEDAŞ retail prices and the higher marginal market price of 
electricity, as reflected in the prices in the balancing market, is another crucial area that needs to 
be addressed. The current TEDAŞ retail prices contain significant subsidies for all types of consu-
mers. Directing subsidies to targeted groups of consumers who really need them, and to otherwise 
allow retail prices to be better aligned with costs is crucial if liberalization is to continue as origi-
nally planned. 
All of these problems strongly suggest that the industry is in need of a new strategic orientation. 
The Strategy Document that guided the reform program is now fundamentally outdated in light of 
the developments of the last 2-3 years. This new strategic orientation needs to be reflected in a new 
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document that addresses these problems in a clear and credible way so as to guide investment deci-
sions. Most importantly, this strategic orientation needs to be developed in a consultative manner.
In the gas industry, there is even less clarity about overall strategic orientation. As discussed above, the 
gas release targets of the NGML are seen as too ambitious by many observers. As of yet, there have been 
no public pronouncements about how these targets will be attained or whether they will be revised.
2.3.5.2. Unbundling
To start with electricity, since the Turkish transmission system is organized as a separate state ow-
ned legal entity the unbundling requirement of the 2003 directive (as well as the ownership un 
bundling requirement of the “third legislative package”) are satisfied. This is not the case with the 
situation in the distribution segment. There are two aspects of unbundling of distribution that are 
relevant: Unbundling from generation and unbundling from the retail supply business. The pros 
and cons of unbundling in both directions are well known. Vertical integration allows protection 
from wholesale price risk and ensures better certainty of supply to the distribution company. On 
the other hand, vertical integration may encourage anti-competitive conduct and foreclose mar-
kets to independent retailers and generators. 
Unbundling can take different forms such as accounting separation, legal unbundling, and 
ownership unbundling. The 2003 Electricity Directive of the European Union mandates legal 
unbundling and underlines that this does allow the distribution company to belong to a vertically 
integrated undertaking. However, in such cases the Directive requires additional measures that 
would ensure independence in terms of organization and decision making from activities unrela-
ted to distribution. The Commission’s proposed “third legislative package” unveiled in September 
2007 maintains the requirement for legal unbundling for distribution (without requesting ow-
nership unbundling) and introduces a few minor changes to strengthen the independence of the 
distribution system operator from other activities.52
In Turkey, integration between generation and distribution is subject to only accounting sepa-
ration; there are no other restrictions. Regarding unbundling of distribution from the retail supply 
business, EML only requires accounting separation in that case as well. Hence the current arrange-
ments are not in line with the European Directives. However, the situation there is moderated by 
the Competition Authority decision requiring legal separation after privatization.  
In the Turkish context, an approach which is better than the current arrangement is to push for 
legal unbundling between distribution and generation, while allowing integration between gene-
ration and retail businesses. Such an approach would have allowed investors to enjoy reduction in 
risk without creating incentives for foreclosure. The current arrangement is not likely to benefit 
investors anyway since any additional value emanating from additional market power is likely to 
be dissipated into higher bids during privatization.
In the case of gas, as mentioned above, the NGML requires unbundling of the transmission 
network of BOTAŞ by 2009. Legal unbundling of distribution, however, will probably require 
amendments to the NGML since currently retail supply is not identified as a separate activity.  
2.3.5.3. Governance Issues: Credibility, Transparency and 
Accountability
Lack of trust and regulatory uncertainty remain as important barriers to the restructuring of the 
industry. The policy making process in the electricity industry is more transparent than other 
52 For example, the 2003 Directive stipulated a body to monitor compliance with a compliance programe that en-
tails measures to ensure non-discriminatory conduct. The proposed amendments introduces the name “comp-
liance officer” for that body and ensures that it will be independent and will have access to information. . 
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areas of economic policy in Turkey. Draft laws and regulations are often circulated among market 
participants to solicit comments. Ministry and regulatory officials often get together with market 
participants in conferences to discuss problems of the industry. Nevertheless, the transparency and 
the accountability of the regulatory environment can be greatly improved. 
One important measure is to ensure that regulatory decisions are accompanied by justificati-
ons, explaining the reasons behind the decisions and why these were considered as superior than 
alternatives. Another is for the authorities to provide updates on progress with restructuring, 
explain reasons for delays, if any, and present perspectives on future steps than need to be under-
taken. Finally, as mentioned above, it would be very useful for the authorities to publish a public 
document clarifying the authorities’ overall strategy on the energy sector, discussing the tradeoffs, 
costs and benefits posed by alternative solutions, and the reasoning and justification about why the 
actual choices have been preferred to the alternatives. One important benefit of such policy docu-
ments is that they would clarify the intentions of the policy and regulatory authorities and would 
provide insights to the public and market participants about how policy makers would react when 
faced with unforeseen events. 
There are signs that the authorities are more aware of the benefits of improved transparency 
than before. The privatization of distribution companies, described in more detail below, is carried 
out in a more transparent manner, and documents providing information about both the privati-
zation process and the regulatory environment privatized companies will face are made available 
on the website of the Privatization Authority. To our best knowledge, this is a new practice and we 
do expect further improvements in transparency in the future. 
An additional problem in the governance of the regulatory environment is lack of cohesion and 
coordination among the various public agencies that have decision making authority or influence 
over the industry. Regulatory uncertainty would be greatly reduced if mechanisms were establis-
hed that would ensure that these agencies engage in sincere (and not just formal) consultation and 
exchanges of opinion. 
Governments will always be under pressure to make sure electricity prices are low or at least not 
very high. Hence governments always have incentives to intervene in market prices and this always 
poses a risk for investors. Moreover, given the current patterns of distribution of household inco-
me, one should expect that cost-reflective tariffs would seriously hurt some classes of households 
with low incomes (Bagdagioglu et. al. 2007). One way to address this distributional concern and 
at the same time reduce government’s incentives to distort prices (and therefore reduce regulatory 
risk) is to establish an explicit, transparent mechanism of public service obligations, which targets 
specifically the most vulnerable sections of society and ensure that they have access to electricity at 
affordable prices. Such a mechanism would work much more efficiently than cross subsidies.
2.3.6. Concluding Remarks and Policy Recommendations
Starting with the electricity industry, it can be said that the immediate impediments to the restru-
cturing of electricity markets faced in Turkey are rather different from those in Europe. In terms 
of competition, the European Commission’s main concern at the moment is to address very high 
levels of concentration and reduce the threat of foreclosure against independent suppliers. Even 
though similar concerns exist in Turkey as well, especially given the insufficient degree of vertical 
unbundling under the current regulatory framework, the most immediate concern in Turkey is 
one of lack of new investment and the consequent lack of supply security in the very short term. 
At least from the perspective of the original strategic design, that, in turn, is related to very signifi-
cant delays in the privatization of distribution companies and the government’s reluctance to allow 
regulated retail prices to reflect costs. 
The following are a set of policy recommendations that are likely to help Turkey to grow out of 
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the current deadlock and develop its energy markets in a sustainable manner.
1. Realign retail prices to make them more reflective of costs
2. Devise mechanisms to protect the vulnerable segments of the population from price in-
creases that may inevitably result from tariff rebalancing; finance these mechanisms in a 
transparent manner directly from the government budget rather than by creating distortions 
in retail prices
3. Ensure that any mechanisms instituted to alleviate the very short term supply security prob-
lem are consistent with the medium-term market design
4. Do not delay any further the horizontal separation of generation assets under government 
ownership
5. Enhance the alignment of the current regulatory framework with the current and emerging 
EU Directives, especially with respect to vertical unbundling in distribution
6. Undertake the necessary legal and institutional measures to establish a spot or day-ahead 
market
7. Allow the demand side to participate in the Balancing Market
8. Devise through a consultative process a new strategic orientation that clearly addresses the 
current impediments 
9. Enhance transparency and accountability of the regulatory and policy-making process
Despite some progress with harmonization with the EU acquis, development of competition 
in the gas industry faces deeper problems than the electricity industry. The main problem here 
is to reduce the dominance of BOTAŞ, which is difficult due to BOTAŞ’ existing gas purchase 
contracts. The most urgent policy recommendation with respect to the gas industry is to continue 
with gas release and at the same time, clarify the feasibility of the release targets in the NGML and 
revise them if necessary to reach more realistic and credible contract or volume release targets. This 
needs to be accompanied with a program to release contracted customers downstream. BOTAŞ’ 
vertical unbundling should proceed as planned so as to preclude any incentives to discriminate 
against new entrants. Harmonization with the EU acquis will also require steps towards the legal 
unbundling of distribution networks.
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3.1. Introduction
3.1.1. Overview of the Transport Market in Turkey
With increasing international and domestic trade and passenger traffic, the quality, cost and ef-
ficiency of transportation services gain more commercial prominence. Changes in world trade 
dynamics impact both the direction of trade flows as well as the volume of the trade to be trans-
ported. Along with these dynamics, while new transport hubs have emerged, world trade volume 
has grown significantly. In 2005 the overall amount of exports in world trade increased by 10%, 
while export of transportation services increased by 24% in 20041. Swelling trade volume levels 
in the East-West and the North-South axes places Turkey as a potential transport hub, between 
Europe, the Balkans and CIS, Middle Eastern and East Mediterranean countries. 
The development of a sound and efficient transport infrastructure in Turkey is also important 
for the integration of neighbouring countries with the European economies. However, it is not 
possible to say that Turkey’s transport infrastructure enables Turkey to leverage its geographical 
advantage between regions. The main reason stems from the late start of regulatory reforms.
In this Chapter, all modes of transport, namely rail, road, air and marine, as well as various 
methods for intermodal transportation are analysed. Following an overview of the market in each 
of the modes; an overview of the regulatory framework for transportation is provided for the EU 
and for Turkey. Consequently, an assessment is made regarding the impact of EU harmonisation 
for each of the modes, and policy recommendations drawn regarding the sectoral efficiency.
Priorities in Turkish transport policy have evolved since the early years of Turkish Republic. In 
the first three decades, rail transport was allocated a primary role in the development of the public 
transport infrastructure. The preponderant role of rail transport was however gradually eliminated 
and road transport replaced railways as the dominant mode. In 1950, 78 % of the freight transport 
was carried by railways, by 1999 the ratio had decreased to 5%. 
Increase in demand for transport services in Turkey may be observed from the growing capacity 
of transport modes. 
Table 3-1: Amount and percentage of transport modes (Million)
2001 % 2002 % 2003 % 2004 % 2005 %
Road Freight tons kilometers 151,421 90 150,912 92 152,163 91 156,853 94 166,770 95
Passenger 
kilometers 168,211 95 163 ,327 95 164,311 95 174,312 95 181,983 95
Maritime Freight tons kilometers 8 100 5 5,738  3 5 400  3  0  0  0  0
Passenger 
kilometers 31 0  21  0  22  0  0 0  0 0
Railway Freight tons kilometers 7,562 5 7 224 4 8 669  5 9 417 6  9 152  5 
Passenger 
kilometers 5 568  3 5 204  3 5 878  3 5 237  3 5 036  3
Air Freight tons kilometers  285  0  275  0  276  0  321  0  392  0
Passenger 
kilometers 2 859  2 2 706 2 2 752 2 3 223  2 3 992 2
Total Freight tons kilometers  167 368 100 164 149 100 166 508  100 166 591 100 176 314 100
Passenger 
kilometers  176 669 100 171 258  100 166 508  100 182 772  100 191 011 100
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), 2006
1  “Transportation Sector: Institutional Structure, Legal Framework and Indicators” (2007) TUSIAD Report
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The demand for air transport has tripled with the tariff liberalization in 2001. When compared 
to the other modes, the growth in demand is higher than the rest of the transport modes with an 
average of 16%. The annual growth in the number of trucks is 8%, double of the EU average.
Average annual growth of demand for modes of transport since 1950 2:
• Overall growth is 8%
• Annual growth of demand for road transport is 7.6%
• Annual growth of demand for rail transport is 2%
• Annual growth of demand for marine transport is 5%
• Annual growth of demand for air transport is 16%
If the average growth rate of previous 25 year period remains it can be expected that Turkish 
passenger traffic will grow by 3 times (540 billion passenger-km) and freight transport will grow 
by 2.5 times (300 billion ton-km) in the next 25 years. It should be noted that increasing demand 
and supply bring side effects of congestion, air pollution and accidents.
In the Turkish foreign trade carriages, maritime and road transport take the lead, while air and 
rail transport remain insignificant in transport percentages. When compared to Turkey, EU 25 has 
a more balanced distribution with its use of air transport. 
Table 3-2: External trade by mode of transport in the EU and Turkey 
External Trade ( 2005)
Value Based
 EU TR
Sea 0.45 0.48
Rail 0.01 0.01
Road 0.18 0.44
Air 0.24 0.05
Other 0.12 0.02
Total 100% 100%
Sources: TUİK and Scadplus
In order to meet the increasing demand, Turkish transport system needs more balanced, com-
petitive and liberal transport strategies. Turkish transport sector has begun to liberalize in 1990s. 
Introduction of the reforms have been accelerated by the EU accession process. Turkish Ministry 
of Transport has set its priorities to accomplish a more balanced and liberal regulatory framework, 
which is also compatible with EU regulations. 
3.1.2. Overview and Assessment of Regulatory Framework in the EU 
and in Turkey
Transport is one of the European Community’s earliest common policies. Since the Treaty of 
Rome, transport policy has focused on removing obstacles at the borders between Member States 
so as to facilitate the free movement of persons and goods. To that end, its prime objectives are the 
completion of the internal market for transport, ensuring sustainable development, the deploy-
2  Transport of Europe and Central Asia, The World Bank http://web.worldbank.org/WB-
SITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/EXTECAREGTOPTRANSPORT/
0,,contentMDK:20647543~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:571121,00.html
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ment of major networks in Europe, spatial management, improving safety and the development 
of international cooperation.
Transport sector occupies a very important position in the European economy. The sector ac-
counts for 7% of the EU gross national product (GNP), 7% of all jobs, 40% of Member States’ 
investment and 30% of Community energy consumption3. The transport services sector employs 
more than 8 million people in the EU25. Almost two thirds of them work in land transport (road, 
rail, inland waterways), 2% in sea transport, 5% in air transport and 29% in supporting and aux-
iliary transport activities, such as cargo handling, storage and warehousing, travel and transport 
agencies, tour operators. 
According to the EU Transport Commissioner Jacques Barrot, transport is set to double by 
2030, and one of the main consequences of this fact will be more pollution and congestion that 
will increase prices of products and impact negatively on the competitiveness of European industry 
and the quality of life of European citizens. Congestion is estimated to represent around 1.1% of 
the EU’s GDP, or more or less the EU budget (€ 100 billion). There are also adverse consequences 
for, the security of energy and the quality of the environment, where transport is responsible for 
30% of greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, European transport policy must promote the modal 
shift towards modes of transport which are less congested, safer and less polluting4.
In this sense, the European Commission had published the White Paper on Common Trans-
port Policy in 20015, set precise targets by the year 2010 and listed a considerable number of 
measures to achieve these targets. The White Paper proposed an Action Plan aimed at bringing 
about a transportation policy and a transportation network that increases the competitiveness and 
efficiency of Europe, including all modes of transport. It proposed a strategy designed in particu-
lar to revitalize railways and other alternative modes of transport growth and economic growth 
in order to reduce pressure on the environment and congestion without restricting the mobility 
needed for competitiveness. 
The main objectives of the White Paper on Transport were set out as:
• Shifting the balance between modes of transport (improving quality in the road transport 
sector, revitalizing the railways, controlling the growth in air transport, promoting transport 
by sea and inland waterway, and turning intermodality into reality);
• Eliminating bottlenecks (building the Trans-European transport network)
• Placing users at the heart of transport policy (improving road safety, effective charging for 
transport, recognizing the rights and obligations of users, developing high-quality urban 
transport, and putting research and technology at the service of clean, efficient transport);
• Managing the effects of globalisation
The White Paper also defines more than 70 measures needed to achieve the goals, among which 
controversial plans to harmonise fuel taxation for trucks and a series of ambitious infrastructure 
projects, which for the most part, have not been implemented due to lack of financing. 
In 2005, the Commission decided to conduct a mid-term review in 2005 in order to establish 
whether the quantitative targets had been attained or adjustments were required. The EU Com-
3  http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24040.htm
4  Jacques Barrot, Vice-President of the European Commission, Commissioner for Transport, SPEECH/05/714, 
Date: 22 November 2005 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/714
5  European Commission DG Energy and Transport: European Transport Policy for 2010: time to decide; COM 
(2001) 370 of 12 September 2001. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/white_paper/documents/doc/lb_texte_
complet_en.pdf 
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mission initiated this review with a consultation process started in late 2005 and published its 
mid-term review on June 20066.
This report will assess the degree of convergence in the regulatory framework for road, rail, 
maritime and air transport industries. 
3.2. Rail Transport
3.2.1. Rail Transport in the EU
The share of rail transport in total transport has been in a drastic decline in the last thirty years in 
Europe. In 1970, freight transport by railroads in EU15 was 282 billion tonne kilometers moved 
(tkm). This figure dropped to 257 billion tkm in 2005 for the old Member States of the EU. The 
share of freight transport by rail for all land transport modes dropped from 30 % in 1970 to 13.2 
% in 2004. For the EU25, the modal share of rail freight declined from 19.6 % in 1995 to 16.4 
% in 2004. In absolute terms, the number of tonne-kilometres dropped from 494.3 billion in 
1970 to 380.5 billion tkm in 2005 in the EU25, which represents a decrease of more than 23 %7. 
However, freight transport by road has tripled in the same period. 
Passenger transport by rail also declined, though less dramatically: in 1970, the modal share of 
rail was 10.2 % and fell to 6.3 % in 2003 in the EU15. The modal share of passenger transport by 
rail in the EU25 (excluding air and sea transport) dropped from 6.3 % in 1995 to 5.8 % in 2003. 
In absolute terms, the number of passengers-kilometers (pkm) rose from 300.6 billion pkm in 
1970 in the EU25 to 350 billion pkm in 2005. Transport carried out by high-speed trains accoun-
ted for 4.2 % of all rail transport in 1990. In 2004, this share rose to 21.6 % The main reason for 
this is usually shown as that the railways are not as competitive as road haulage8.
3.2.1.1.Declining Competition in Rail Transport
Today, most rail transport networks within the EU date back to a time that in the process of their 
planning only local and national concerns were considered. As expected, the result is a patchwork of 
different rail systems that are neither integrated nor interoperable. Interoperability refers to a train’s 
ability to run on any stretch of the railway network in the Union9. Planning obstacles, national and 
sub-national divergences over track alignment and platform levels, technological differences in roll-
ing stock and signalling systems, different staff training and different management systems are all 
obstacles to interoperability. This lack of integration reduces the railway companies’ chances of of-
fering fast, reliable and efficient international services. In fact, the main reason for declining market 
share of rail transport is its low level of competitiveness compared to other modes of transport. Road 
transport dominates transportation system as it is not hindered by interoperability problems. 
Furthermore, railway transport is less reliable than road haulage as regards to delivery times due 
mainly to very long stopping times en route, because other trains (passenger services especially) 
have priority, and because procedures at borders are complicated. With all the various delays, the 
average speed of international rail haulage is 18km/hour10. For the industries working with “just in 
6  European Commission DG Energy and Transport, Keep Europe Moving: Mid-term review of the 2001 
Transport White Paper, 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/transport_policy_review/doc/2006_3167_bro-
chure_en.pdf 
7  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/overview/current_en.htm 
8  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/overview/current_en.htm 
9  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/1555 
10  European Commission DG Energy and Transport: European Transport Policy for 2010: time to decide; COM 
(2001) 370 of 12 September 2001. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/white_paper/documents/doc/lb_texte_
complet_en.pdf
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time” principle, speed and punctuality are very crucial. So it is not surprising to see a development 
in favour of road haulage while the situation is that in rail sector.  
Still, rail transport has some competitive advantages; it is a safe and clean mode of transport, 
in terms of external costs it is the least costly mode within all modes. One train can contain up 
to 50-60 truckloads. Rail infrastructure covers a lot of territory and is generally in a good state. 
Nevertheless, in many cases railways no longer match modern-day customer requirements.
3.2.1.2. EU Regulations in Rail Transport
The regulatory involvement of the European Community in the rail transport sector started in 
1991, with a Directive requiring separate accounts to be kept for railway infrastructure manage-
ment and the provision of railway transport services. This directive introduced a degree of market 
opening into certain areas of rail transport and induced the railways to concentrate more on com-
petitiveness by specifying the need for sound financial management of railway undertakings and 
instructed member states to reduce their debt burden. It also assured rail transport operators the 
right of access to combined transport services in other member states. 
In 1990s, two other directives were introduced; Directive 95/18/EC, dealing with the licensing 
of railway undertakings, and Directive 95/19/EC, setting rules related to allocating railway inf-
rastructure capacity and charging for infrastructure costs. In 1996, the Commission published a 
White Paper with a Strategy for Revitalising the Community’s Railways11. The aim was to motivate 
competition in the sector, to encourage operators to improve services and to offer new products 
to attract more customers. The priority was to open access to the railway infrastructure for in-
ternational freight services, by the creation of “rail freight freeways”. General principles of these 
freeways were the open access of the national networks for international services and to improve 
the co-operation between national infrastructure managers. However, these freeways were not as 
successful as expected because little use was made of this open access12.
In 2001, three infrastructure directives aiming at improving the efficiency of the existing legis-
lation has been adopted 13. The Member States had to implement the provisions of the Directives 
in national legislation by 15 March 2003 at the latest, and all Member States have now complied 
with this requirement. 
In 2002, the Commission proposed a second railway package of measures that presents five 
proposals14:
• A new directive on the regulation of safety and investigation of accidents and incidents on 
the Community’s railways;
• A proposal to amend Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC on the interoperability of the 
European High-Speed Rail System and on the interoperability of the trans-European con-
ventional rail system;
11  European Commission DG Energy and Transport White Paper of 30 July 1996: “A strategy for revitalising 
the Community’s railways”. http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24014.htm 
12  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/overview/white_paper_1996_en.htm 
13  Directive 2001/12/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Coun-
cil Directive 91/440/EEC on the development of the Community’s railways, Directive 2001/13/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2001 amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the 
licensing of railway undertakings, and Directive 2001/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 February 2001 on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the 
use of railway infrastructure and safety certification; generally known as The First Railway Package (Railway 
Infrastructure Package)
14  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail_archive/package/proposals_en.htm 
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• A proposal for a regulation establishing a European Railway Safety and Interoperability 
Agency;
• A Commission recommendation for a Council Decision authorising the Commission to 
negotiate the conditions for Community accession to the Convention concerning Interna-
tional Carriage by Rail (COTIF);
• A proposal to amend Directive 91/440/EEC to open up access to the infrastructure for 
national services in order to open up the rail freight market completely. Member States had 
to implement the provisions of this package by 31 December 2005 (for the market opening 
Directive) and 30 April 2006.
In March 2004 the Commission adopted the third railway package containing four proposals 
as15:
• A directive on opening up the market for international rail passenger transport services by 
1st January 2010;
• A regulation on the rights and obligations for passengers in international rail traffic;
• A regulation on rail freight quality;
• A directive on the certification of locomotive and train drivers engaged in the carriage of 
passengers and goods in the Community. 
3.2.1.3. Implementation of Legislation by Member States
Based on the data on national implementation measures16, it is observed that all the countries of 
the EU have sent notifications to the Commission regarding the measures adopted to implement 
the EU rail acquis, except the failure of notification sent by Romania concerning the Directive 
2001/12/EC on the development of Community’s railways. 
The second railway package is far from achieving an implementation success like the first one. 
As most of the member states did not comply with the deadline of transposing legislative measures 
to national legislation, the European Commission has pursued infringement proceedings against 
these Member States that have failed to notify the Commission of the transposition of the provi-
sions of the second railway package into domestic legislation. 
The EU rail directives have left significant leeway for implementation at national level; con-
sequently member states have assumed different approaches for implementation of the Acquis.17
Accounting separation between infrastructure management and rail transport provision, whi-
ch was due already under Directive 91/440/EEC, has been implemented in almost all member 
states. Accounting separation between freight and passenger transport activities is gradually being 
introduced, although some member states need to make further progress. In order to ensure the 
independence of essential functions such as track access charging and train path allocation mem-
ber states have put different institutional structures in place. 
All countries (except the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Estonia, for one of two 
networks) have achieved accounting separation of infrastructure and operations. A number of 
countries have gone further in terms of separation by setting up separate entities for infrastruc-
ture management and rail service operations. In particular, the following countries have adopted 
15  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/package2003/new_en.htm 
16  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/rail/legislation/mne_table_en.htm 
17  Examples of rail sector organisation in different member states can be found in Appendix 1.
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a fully separated structure: Bulgaria, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain, Slovakia and Sweden. The fully integrated model (within a holding structure) is present 
in: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Greece, Estonia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary and Poland. A few countries (France, Czech Republic, Finland and Slovenia) 
have adopted a structure in between the fully separated and integrated models, such that separate 
entities are set up but some co-ordination between infrastructure and operations. 18 Examples of 
rail sector organization in different member states are provided in Annex 1.
Most new members of the EU (namely Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovak, Slovenia, Es-
tonia, Latvia and Lithuania) have a long rail history and a dense rail network. The share of freight 
transport by rail is still significantly higher than in the EU15. However, since 1990 railway trans-
port in the accession countries has decreased. Market share of railways fell considerably as a result. 
As within the EU15, the accession countries face interoperability problems, e.g. with different 
signalling systems or the different gauge systems in Central Europe and in the Baltic States.19
3.2.2. Rail Transport in Turkey
Efficient rail transport requires a railway infrastructure that connects urban and rural areas, tech-
nology for higher speed and safety, interoperability regarding neighbouring countries, as well as a 
rail transport services market where infrastructure management and operations are executed in a 
competitive environment with a commercial mindset. This implies investing in railway infrastruc-
ture to increase geographic reach, technology level and interoperability; while restructuring any 
incumbent railway operator, liberalising the market to allow new entrants and boosting competi-
tiveness of railway industry to gain market share, especially from road transport. 
Rail transport in Turkey fits this scenario well. Size, population distribution and geography of 
Turkey make rail transport a viable, clean and safe option for transportation of goods and pas-
sengers. Yet, current regulatory environment and management of the railway market by the state 
have so far not produced the infrastructure or the transport services that lead railways to be the 
preferred mode of transport.
3.2.2.1. Railway Infrastructure
The march that celebrates the tenth anniversary of the Turkish Republic in 1933 proudly an-
nounces that “every corner of the country is connected with an iron network.” However, 70 years 
later, the network is more or less what it was 70 years ago. When Turkey’s population was 23 mil-
lion, the railway network was 9,000 km long. Today the population exceeds 70 million and the 
railway network is only 13,000 km. State ownership has created a legacy of underinvestment.
Turkish railway infrastructure connects only 37 of 81 provincial centres. 28% of the populati-
on does not have access to railways. Some major industrial or commercial centres, like Bursa, 4th 
largest city, do not have a railway connection. Even though traditionally ports have been operated 
by the same body as railways, the Turkish State Railways (TCDD), some ports, such as Trabzon 
on the Black Sea, Antalya on the Mediterranean and Tekirdağ on the Aegean Sea lack railway con-
nections.20 Inability to connect with their hubs by rail leaves these ports underutilised for freight 
as well as for passenger transport.
Furthermore, the quality of railway tracks is not fit for modernisation of railway transportation. 
Of the 10,984 km of railways, only 5% are double or triple track. Only 21% of tracks are electri-
18  Railway Reforms in a European Context, Torben Holvad, European Railway Agency, 2006
19  Integration of accession countries in the EU: the case for railways, Hinne Groot, European Commission, 
Seconded National Expert
20  See section on Marine Transport.
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fied and 24% of tracks have signalization. 38% of tracks are non-standard. 34% of the rails are 
older than 25 years.21
As a result of the situation of the railway network and operations, transport of goods or passen-
gers by rail in Turkey is significantly less then by road. Public policies have been put into place to 
shift this balance. The Ministry of Transport has set the goal in 2002 to increase railways’ share in 
total transportation by 45% for passengers and by 20% for freight. 
An important mean to reach this goal is to upgrade and expand the railway network. The 
Government’s plan was to add 938 km of new tracks and to renovate 1.000 km of existing tracks. 
For passengers, there are projects of fast trains between major cities (Ankara – Istanbul, Ankara 
– Konya, Ankara-Sivas, Ankara – Afyonkarahisar - İzmir) and a project for connecting Turkey to 
Georgia (Kars – Tblisi). For freight, railways are planned to connect organised industrial zones 
to markets. Sincan and Gaziantep organized industrial zones have thus been connected by rail, 
Manisa and Konya are next in line.
Turkey’s most important ongoing rail project is Marmaray - connecting Europe with Asia via 
railway tunnel under the Bosphorus. Marmaray is one of the major transportation infrastructure 
projects in the world at present.22 This project is also among the TEN-T projects of EU and co-
financed by loans from the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) (€ 1.05 billion). The rolling stock of 440 cars will be deployed on the 
city’s rail system, on a 76 km railway line that connects Halkali on the European side of the city 
with suburban Gebze on the Asian side, sharply reducing travel time between the two and helping 
relieve the city of the growing traffic congestion, carrying 75.000 passengers an hour. The project 
is scheduled for completion in April 2009, and expected to enhance air quality and cut noise nu-
isance, but also help to tackle climate change by improving energy efficiency and reducing CO2 
emissions.23
A Technical Assistance to Transportation Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA) project is 
conducted within the National Pre-accession Financial Assistance Programme for Turkey, using 
the TEN-T guidelines (1692/96/EC). The objective of the project was to assess the infrastructure 
needs, in order to develop a multi-modal transport network within Turkey for accession and the 
extension of the European Union’s TEN-T to candidate countries to enable sustainable transport 
mobility across Europe. The project included determination of transport infrastructure that will 
integrate Turkey with EU Countries, project prioritisation according to TEN-T criteria and traffic 
forecast for 2020. Construction of railway lines and ports on future TEN-T networks are given 
priority.
3.2.2.2. Regulatory Overview
The Turkish Ministry of Transport is responsible for planning rail transport demands and needs; 
defining the basic principles and policies regarding the arrangement of rail transport systems and 
regulating the relations with international railway organisations. The DG Construction of Rail-
ways, Ports, Airports (Devlet Limanları ve Havameydanları İnşaatı) is responsible for construction 
of new railway lines and preparation of the plans and programs of the railways and the facilities 
and equipments regarding these. The DG for Land Transport is responsible for ensuring that rail-
way transport is carried out in accordance with the national security, economic, technical, social 
needs and aims; promotes rail transport in harmony with other modes and co-ordinates all inter-
national activities in the field of railways.
21 http://euromedtransport.org/fileadmin/download/maincontract/ts4/ts4_tcdd_day2.pdf 
22 http://www.marmaray.com/index.asp 
23 http://www.eib.org/news/press/2006/2006-023-eib-lends-eur-400-million-for-urban-transport-in-istanbul.
htm
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Turkey has fallen behind in the reform process through which most EU or OECD countries 
have liberalised their rail transport markets since the 1980s, shifting from public ownership of 
railway companies, to a greater reliance on market mechanisms and incentives. Reform in Turkey 
has been initiated in 2005 with an EU financed project for technical assistance in the Re-structu-
ring and Strengthening of the Turkish Rail Sector.
The current regulatory framework for railways is not satisfactory. Currently there is no instituti-
onal structure or process for proper licensing. The railway industry needs laws that restructure and 
liberalise the market and institutional structures to implement the legislation. Vertical separation 
of TCDD is a necessary step for rail reform in order to allow service companies to compete with 
equal access rights to infrastructures at non-discriminating charges.
A draft law entitled “Railway Framework Law” was prepared to establish the legislative and 
institutional framework in accordance with the EU acquis. It aims to deregulate the railways mar-
ket and harmonise legislation with the EU. TCDD is hence to be renamed Turkish Rail (Türk 
Demiryolları – TD) and restructured as an independent and commercially managed railway un-
dertaking. The task of infrastructure capacity allocation (similar to slot allocation) and charging 
will be separated from the bodies or firms that provide rail transport services.
Infrastructure Management and Operations will be separate Directorates General under the 
common roof of a holding structure:
• Infrastructure Manager - Network and Rolling-Stocks Business Units
• Railway Undertaking - Passenger and Freight Business Units
The Framework Law establishes the railway authority, independent from any railway underta-
king, to ensure fair competition in the rail services market, supervising the railway companies and 
infrastructure manager on safety issues, licensing and interoperability.24
The Framework Law also establishes:
• Regulatory Body of Access to Infrastructure: Independent from Allocation and Charging Body 
(Infrastructure Manager) and railway undertakings, will ensure free, fair and non-discrimi-
nating access to railway infrastructure; solve disagreements concerning capacity allocation, 
charging between Infrastructure Manager and Railway Undertakings.
• Safety and Licensing Body: Independent from Railway Research and Accident Investigation 
Department, infrastructure manager and railway undertakings, will define Railway Safety 
Framework and monitor; Issue a Safety Authorization to and Safety Certificate to and issue 
operational licenses to infrastructure manager and railway undertakings. 
• Railway Research and Accident Investigation Department (DAKIK): Independent from Safety 
Authority, Infrastructure Manager and Railway Undertakings, will investigate serious rail-
way accidents and incident in order to prevent railway accidents)
Furthermore General Railway Framework Law determines:
• The safety requirements for railway undertakings and safety managers,
• The basic principles for organization of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers,
• Provisions for public service obligations (PSOs) and access rights to railway infrastructure.
Bylaws have been drafted on safety, license, interoperability and free access regulation. The sa-
24 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/14/SC14DET_Railway-Market%20and%20Infrastructure%20
Access.pdf 
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fety regulation regulates safety requirements for railway undertakings and infrastructure managers; 
establishment of a safety management system, safety certificate and safety authorization, access to 
training facilities. The license regulation sets out provisions necessary for obtaining licenses. The 
interoperability regulation sets out processes to be observed in order to get an authorization of 
technical interoperability and the necessary Turkish Standards annex to this regulation. The free 
access regulation provides for regulation on free access as a cornerstone of the legislative package, 
free access to the infrastructure and lays down the process of train path allocation and sets the rules 
for charging.
3.2.2.3. Market Overview: The Overhaul of the State Owned Service 
Provider
Both the 8th Five Year Development Plan for 2001-2005 developed by the State Planning Or-
ganization in 2000 and the 9th Seven Year Development Plan for 2007-2013 developed in 2006 
clearly put forward the goals of separation of infrastructure management from provision of trans-
port services, the restructuring of the TCDD with a commercial mindset, in order to increase 
its performance and to allow for private sector enterprises to compete in provision of transport 
services.25
Yet, as of August 2007, TCDD still does not operate on commercial principles. TCDD is a 
State Economic Enterprise. Its capital is wholly paid by the State. With 849 locomotives, 1,038 pas-
senger and 16,858 freight rail cars, TCDD benefits from monopoly rights on management of the 
infrastructure and on provisions of railway services, is the sole owner of railway infrastructure and 
the main player in the railway market in Turkey. TCDD is vertically organized; there is neither 
structural nor accounting separation of infrastructure management and provision of transport 
services. TCDD:
• Operates and renews railways, ports and piers
• Guides and coordinates affiliated companies
• Carries out all kinds of complementary activities regarding rail transport: maritime, land 
transport including ferry operations
• Manufactures rolling-stock and similar vehicles, sets up warehouses, depots, passenger facili-
ties
• Undertakes railway construction works as a contractor in Turkey and abroad
Firms wishing to use their rail cars to carry goods apply to TCDD to obtain approval; TCDD 
evaluates applications based on operational and technical criteria. Today, around 30 firms have 
signed a contract with TCDD to obtain their own rail cars, and there are 3,173 rail cars active on 
TCDD rails.26 Large logistics companies are building their rolling stock and providing services 
both domestic as well as international transport. Within the framework of agreements signed 
with different countries, block trains pulled by TCDD locomotives, are operated towards Europe 
(Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovenia), East (Iran, Syria and Iraq) and Central Asia 
(Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan).27 170 block trains per day, both domestic and international, are 
25  www.dpt.gov.tr 
26  http://www.tcdd.gov.tr/yuk/sahibineaitvg.htm 
27  Block trains are where freight is transported uninterruptedly, from the loading to the unloading station, with-
out changing locomotive and wagons, and without interval freight loading and unloading
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being operated.28 29 Most of these companies also own and operate railway stations and warehouses 
that they use for storing and handling freight. Private companies account for about 20% of total 
freight transport by rail in 2006. Thanks to block freight train transportation, an increase of 35% 
in freight transportation quantity and an increase of 109% in freight transportation income have 
been achieved in 2006 in comparison to the figures of 2002.
In 2005, a project was launched by the TCDD to open the railway market, to establish the le-
gislative framework in accordance with the EU acquis and to re-structure the TCDD. This is a 4,2 
Million € project, funded by the EU. The project has three parts: Twinning Project with Germany, 
Service Project and Financial Management Information System (FMIS).
The objectives of the project are to:
• Establish the legislative and institutional framework for the rail sector in accordance with 
the EU acquis. (as described in section above)
• Define a stable financial relationship between TCDD and the Government that satisfies the 
requirements of the acquis.
• Develop / customise a Financial Management Information System (FMIS), and provide the 
necessary IT platform for the functioning of the system, to measure financial performance 
(profit and loss) and to monitor actual performance.
The project also entails:
• Training of TCDD managers for increasing level of knowledge and gaining new capabilities 
to be eligible on commercial conditions
• Preparing proposals for capacity improvement of employee, training programs and budgets
• Defining employee and sources to be transferred to new business units and programming 
mobility of such personnel
• Defining targets and aims of business units and management
• Defining budgets and 5-year activity plans of business units
• Defining Public Service Contracts (PSCs) between Government and TCDD and prepara-
tion of draft contracts 
• Defining separate accounting for infrastructure, operations and Public Service Obligations 
(PSOs); with principle of non-transferability of funds between services.
Infrastructure Charging
TCDD tariffs for carrying goods are determined based on distance, type and weight of load. 
Prices are published on the TCDD website and apply equally to all customers.30 A protocol may 
be drawn between the customer and TCDD for regular transportation of goods by TCDD rail 
cars; or rail cars can be arranged upon request. Currently, freight can be transported with rail cars 
owned by private companies at prices 45% below those of TCDD rail cars.
The cost accounting system of TCDD does not allow for calculation of unit costs related to 
28  UNECE Working Party on Intermodal Transport and Logistics, Forty-seventh session, Geneva, 5 – 6 March 
2007
29  Most such companies are members of Demiryolu Taşımacıları Derneği (Association of Railway Carriers – 
DTD) http://www.dtd.org.tr/uyeler.asp# 
30  http://www.tcdd.gov.tr/mnbt/bilgi.asp 
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infrastructure.31 Its revenues or losses cannot be accounted for. Since there is no accounting separation 
between infrastructure management and transportation services; or between transportation of freight 
or passenger, there is no information available on true costs of transport. Consequently, corporate 
customers have no understanding of whether or not TCDD prices actually reflect the costs. 
Financial Situation and State Aid
TCDD revenues from passenger transport and freight transport have been increasing steadily over 
the past five years. Increase rate in revenues from freight transport is significantly higher than that 
for passenger. TCDD also has revenues from port handling. 32
Table 3-3: Breakdown of TCDD revenues and annual change rates
2001 2002
% 
change
2003
% 
change
2004
% 
change
2005
% 
change
2006 
(Est�)
% 
change
Passenger Transport  
(Million Persons) 52 48 -0,08 50 0,04 51 0,02 52 0,02 60 0,15
Passenger Transport 
Revenue (Million €)             58 56 -0,03 62 0,11 62 0,00 77 0,24 104 0,35
Freight Transport  
(Million Tons) 14,6 14,6 0,00 15,9 0,09 17,9 0,13 19,2 0,07 20,4 0,06
Freight Transport Revenue  
(Million €) 89 105 0,18 125 0,19 146 0,17 173 0,18 208 0,20
Port Handling  
(Million Tons) 34,6 36,3 0,05 41,5 0,14 46,7 0,13 44,6 -0,04 50 0,12
Port Handling Revenue  
(Million €) 179 186 0,04 195 0,05 195 0,00 212 0,09 242 0,14
Source: TCDD
However TCDD remains a loss making institution and has been regularly receiving state aid. 
Table 3-4: Summary of income statement for TCDD
Million Euro 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total revenue 1065,35 828,03 849,80 815,25 1183,11
Total Expenditure 2086,77 1356,34 1226,72 1227,81 1318,06
Balance (Deficit) -1021,42 -528,31 -376,92 -412,55 -134,95
Source: TCDD
TCDD receives four types of subsidies;
• for track maintenance and repair from Ministry of Transport
• for some uneconomic lines from the Undersecretariat of Treasury (UT)
• for some express trains from the UT
• for ferry traffic on Van Lake from the UT
3.2.2.4. Productivity Impact Assessment
The adoption of the EU acquis in rail transport is likely to give rise to increased sectoral produc-
tivity on account of the introduction of competition and an ensuing increase in investments. But 
given the nature of rail transport which acts as an input for the production process of many other 
31 http://www.abgs.gov.tr/tarama/tarama_files/14/SC14DET_Railway-Market%20and%20Infrastructure%20Access.pdf 
32  See section on Marine Transport.
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industries, increased efficiency in this area will also have a positive impact on the cost efficiencies 
of a diverse range of industries. In order to clarify these linkages, the Input/Output table of the 
Turkish economy33 was utilized to prepare two different sets of tables. Table 3-5 lists the industries 
which are going to be most affected by any change in the sectoral productivity of rail transport. 
Table 3-6 lists the industries which will have the most significant impact on the overall productiv-
ity of the national economy. In other words, the second table ranks industries according to their 
intensity of rail transport usage weighted by their share in national value added.
Table 3-5: Ranking of industries according to rail transport usage as a share in production inputs
Industry Index
Refined petroleum products 1
Manufacture of railway, rolling stock 0.309811
Other service activities 0.296395
Electricity 0.242705
Medical equipment 0.129387
Financial services 0.122893
Insurance 0.0855453
Electrical machinery 0.064865
Renting of machinery 0.059348
Pharmaceuticals 0.056159
Motor vehicles sales 0.056063
Motor vehicles manufacturing 0.052936
Office equipments 0.048007
Water distribution 0.03573
Cosmetics 0.033462
Water transport 0.029498
Coal mining 0.02319
Gas distribution 0.018498
Furniture 0.014392
Ceramic products 0.012183
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
Table 3-6: Ranking of industries according to the overall productivity impact on the national economy 
on account of a productivity increase in road transport
Industry Index
Refined petroleum products 1
Financial services 0.251214
Electricity distribution 0.148247
Motor vehicle sales 0.045564
Other service activities 0.024859
Motor vehicle manufacturing 0.020203
Electrical machinery 0.011463
Pharmaceuticals 0.009687
Insurance 0.007366
Water transport 0.005873
Water distribution 0.005579
Telecommunications 0.004378
Cosmetics 0.003956
Ready wear 0.00395
Hotels 0.002813
Vegetable production 0.00251
Coal mining 0.002454
Medical equipment 0.002199
Metal products 0.002117
Furniture 0.001852
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
33  The latest available Input Output table is for the year 1998.
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3.2.2.5. Evaluation
De-regulation and liberalisation of rail services is a complex and difficult process. It has happened 
gradually in the EU. Even now, the process is still continuing and its implementation are fraught 
with difficulties mentioned in the previous sections. Vertical separation, accounting or institu-
tional, constitutes the backbone of EU harmonisation in railway sector. This is complemented by 
allowing free and non-discriminatory access to the railway network and enhanced by the separa-
tion of accounting for transport services (passenger & freight) and PSOs. 
Yet this is not the only option. Vertically integrated railway companies engage in competiti-
on, as in the USA or Canada, where high capacity freight lines and large volumes seem to justify 
duplication of tracks. However, in general track and signalling infrastructure are considered non-
competitive, whereas operation of trains and maintenance facilities are considered to be activities 
which are potentially competitive.34
As in the other network industries, Turkey uses the EU acquis as a blueprint for its own regula-
tory reforms. An ambitious framework law has already been drafted for that purpose and is awai-
ting Parliamentary approval. The initial targets are to accomplish the overhaul of TCDD and allow 
non-discriminatory access to the railway network. Even if infrastructure management remains a 
monopoly, the following benefits can be expected by reforming Turkish rail:
• Level playing field conditions for competition in the market, free competition for provision 
of rail transport services – leading to provision of better quality services at competitive prices 
for the customers,
• Increased focus on core competences, improved ability for innovation in service creation 
and delivery,
• Transparency, accountability and competence for the management of infrastructure and 
operation of railway transport services, fostering an environment for better performance,
• Better monitoring of business costs and revenues; thereby better identification of inefficien-
cies and loss making operations; being able to develop better strategies and solutions for 
handling them,
• Preventing the cross-subsidisation of competitive activities from non-competitive ones for 
predatory purposes,
• Higher cost awareness and better cost management for all businesses – including infrastruc-
ture management; thereby lower operating costs, increasing profit margins or developing 
better loss control strategies.
Financing of investment in tracks and rolling stocks should be framed according to PSO and 
state aid principles. 
Although the adoption of the EU acquis in rail transport may indeed provide these benefits, 
the implementation of the acquis is set to give rise to significant challenges in the Turkish setting. 
First of all, it should be recalled that vertical separation bears some risks that should be taken into 
account. There will be a natural tendency for the infrastructure manager to favour the rail trans-
port service provider business unit of the TD. The infrastructure manager should be discouraged 
from using its monopoly position to discriminate against its existing rivals or new entrants (in 
access charging, slot allocation or by creating asymmetries of information) with regulation that 
eliminates the incentive to discriminate. 
34  OECD Report to the Council on Experiences on the Implementation of the Recommendation Concerning 
Structural Separation in Regulated Industries, 2006
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The creation of the infrastructure manager and the business units is a significant organisational 
change for Turkish Rail. The new organisation should be streamlined to meet service levels com-
mitted. As in any structural organisational change, there will be difficulties arising from resistance 
to change. Transforming to a new culture of customer oriented, high service quality and competi-
tive mindset should be regarded as part of the change process and dealt with in a proactive man-
ner. When two or more business units need to work in tandem with each other, when previously 
they were only departments of the same institution, there may be problems related with changing 
working culture. 
The new environment will be one in which the TD will coexist with other transport service 
providers in a “co-opetitive”35 environment; where the infrastructure manager is the main supplier 
of all the service providers and needs to cooperate; while the transport business unit of the TD 
competes with other service providers. Non-cooperative behaviour from the incumbents’ side may 
be detrimental to efforts to create an efficient cooperation among the infrastructure manager and 
other service providers. 
Training and re-skilling of staff should be a priority in the transformation. Any staff reduction 
should be conducted in a socially acceptable manner (redundancy payments or early retirement). 
It will take time for these organisational and cultural issues to be resolved and there may be service 
level problems in the transition period that need to be proactively handled.
Vertical separation is also costly project in itself and this cost has to be taken into account both 
in business cases and consequent pricing strategies of the resulting institutions. Vertical separati-
on has the potential to make operations more complex and costly. Operational planning for ever 
complicating schedules on congested lines and involvement of more institutions with separate 
performance targets may increase complexity and the need for synchronisation among service and 
infrastructure providers may drive coordination costs higher. This cost may be difficult to reflect 
in pricing strategy. 
Furthermore, loss of economies of scope from integrated operation may inflate costs during 
the transition period, so business cases need to be prepared accordingly. Whereas a certain degree 
of cross-subsidisation could occur between highly and scarcely used routes under the same opera-
tor, if routes are served by different operators, this option has to be substituted by state subsidies; 
which will require the route to be accepted as a PSO. When routes are split as such, new entrants 
naturally have a tendency to cherry pick profitable routes.
The second category of challenges relates to the crucial but transitory phase of the introduc-
tion of competition in rail services. Given the monopolistic character of the rail infrastructure, 
ensuring fair and equal access to this indispensable asset is a sine qua non for fostering a degree of 
competition. Access charges, which determine the price at which entrants will be granted access 
to the network of a vertically integrated incumbent, play a crucial role in the success or failure 
of entry in competitive services. For the new entrants, it is financially impossible to replicate the 
facilities of the incumbent, so access charges have to be regulated. Access charges need to be set at 
a level that reflects underlying costs and allow entry of competitors that are at least as efficient as 
the incumbent in supplying services. 
The third category of challenges relates to the new agencies such as the safety and licensing 
body or the body of access to infrastructure that will be setup according to the draft framework 
law. Ensuring a close collaboration between independent bodies possibly managed with separate 
performance standards will require due attention from public authorities. Otherwise there could 
be a tendency for each one to avoid accepting the blame in the case of problems (delays or even 
accidents). 
35  Co-opetitive – competitive and cooperative at the same time.
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It is a necessity to have an independent body to resort to in case of resolving conflicts, for ins-
tance about path allocation decisions. Furthermore the multiplication of these agencies will bring 
to the fore already existing problems related to human resources. The regulatory setup envisaged by 
the draft law and foreseen by the EU acquis requires an even larger pool of qualified personnel to 
enforce the amended legislation. Given the generally poor human resources policies of the Turkish 
public service, this requirement may indeed pose a serious difficulty at the implementation phase.
Finally, the PSO dimension of rail services need to be regulated in a more transparent and 
competition friendly manner. The lack of a framework legislation dealing with PSOs in general is 
a liability in this respect. Although rail services specific PSO provisions can certainly be adopted, 
the establishment of a more general framework for PSO obligations would be helpful in setting 
up the regulatory frame for all PSOs. Sector specific legislation can then incorporate specific PSO 
provisions in line with the general principles enshrined in the general PSO framework.
3.3. Road Transport
3.3.1. Road Transport in the EU
Road transport has a critical role in the European economy. In 2006, road transport services ac-
counted for 1.6% of the EU’s GDP and employed about 4.5 million people in the EU. The whole 
economy and society depends heavily on efficient road transport; 44% of the goods are moved by 
trucks and 85% of the persons by cars, buses or coaches.
Technology and infrastructure of road transport best meets the demand for high levels of mobi-
lity and flexibility. It is largely unconstrained by the difficult European topography or the disper-
sed settlement structure. It can provide flexible services regarding departure time and destination 
and it is the fastest transport mode for distances up to 500 km.
Road transport companies have to compete against each other and against other modes. As 
operating costs increase, undertakings may tend to side-step the rules on working hours, authori-
sations or even the basic principles of road safety, in order to survive in an extremely competitive 
environment. In the past few years EU completed creating a level playing-field for all players in the 
sector. According to the Road Transport Policy, the EU is committed to high common standards 
in social rules for road haulage, including revised regulations for driver working time, driving 
hours and rest periods and increased checks on lorries. The new legislation, adopted in 2006, 
should prevent unfair competition in the road transport industry and reinforce safety standards 
throughout Europe.
3.3.1.1. EU Regulations in Road Transport
Access to Market
The Commission is committed to maintain an open market in road transport as a means of sup-
porting the EU’s internal market for all goods and services. As EU focuses ever more strongly on 
the economy and employment as laid down in the Lisbon strategy, it is ever more vital that road 
transport promotes growth.
For the efficient functioning of the market in a non-discriminatory way, a huge effort by the 
Union and member states is required in terms of harmonising rules and regulations on a range of 
issues that relate to road transport ensuring that road transport operators receive fair and equitable 
access to the single market.
Admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and road passenger transport operator 
in the European Union is a very important component of the market access, which is governed 
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by Directive 96/26/EC as amended by Directive 98/76/EC36. According to these directives, the 
operators must fulfil three qualitative criteria of good repute, financial standing and professional 
competence. 
• Good repute: professional operators are expected to comply with rules and regulations, the 
ones who do not obey must be weeded out. Thus, this criterion shall ensure the adequate 
entrepreneurial ethical behaviour;
• Sound financial standing: hauliers and passenger transport operators must be able to guaran-
tee the viability of their businesses. The financial standing for operators requires have capital 
assets of at least € 9.000 for the first vehicle and € 5.000 for each additional vehicle.
• Professional competence: to ensure via a list of practically oriented subjects, with common 
exam arrangements, marking and certificates, that customers receive safe, reliable transport 
services, operators have to show a level of competence in their business and check their ve-
hicles. Operators must hold a Community certificate of professional competence. 
Regular checks at least every five years ensure that undertakings continue to satisfy these three 
criteria. These criteria are justified for several reasons37: 
• to halt the proliferation of unscrupulous firms which seek to gain market share by skimping 
on safety. 
• to achieve greater harmonisation of standards between Member States, particularly as re-
gards levels of financial standing required and the standard of professional competence ex-
pected 
• to facilitate the establishment in other Member States and the mutual recognition of profes-
sional status 
• to improve the overall professional standing and quality of road transport 
EU transport operators need to obtain a Community licence from their home member state 
which allows them to carry out international transport activities throughout the Union and must 
be renewed every five years. Operators must carry a certified copy of this document in their vehic-
le. It shows that they comply with the national traffic requirement of their country in accordance 
with the relevant EU regulation. 
According to the impact assessment study of the European Commission38, a number of prob-
lems relate directly to EC road transport legislation, notably the lack of clear principles for appl-
ying in a consistent manner the rules laying down the requirements for entering the market and 
the profession and performing the associated controls and monitoring. This legislative framework 
comprises the following legal acts:
36  Council Directive 96/26/EC of 29 April 1996 on admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and 
road passenger transport operator and mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications intended to facilitate for these operators the right to freedom of establishment in nati-
onal and international transport operations, and Council Directive 98/76/EC of 1 October 1998 amending 
Directive 96/26/EC on admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and road passenger transport 
operator and mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications in-
tended to facilitate for these operators the right to freedom of establishment in national and international 
transport operations
37  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/policy/access_market/rules_admission_occupation_en.htm 
38  European Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules concerning the conditions to be complied with 
to pursue the occupation of road transport operator, 2007. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/legislation/doc/
sec_2007_635_impact_full_en.pdf 
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i. Directive 96/26/EC aims to ensure that authorisations, usually in the form of national or 
Community licences giving access to the Community market, are issued only to competent 
and reputable operators. It establishes minimum standards as regards good repute, financial 
standing and professional competence. It applies to all operators that carry goods or passen-
gers for commercial purposes, including both those operating within the domestic markets 
and those engaged in international transport. It also puts in place a system for the mutual 
recognition of the corresponding documents.
ii. Regulation No 881/92 establishes the freedom to provide international carriage of goods by 
road for hire and reward for the undertakings that hold a Community licence, while the first 
Council Directive identifies certain forms of transport which are exempted from all kinds of 
authorisation. Regulation No 3118/93 allows undertakings holding a Community licence 
granted by a Member State to carry out national road services in another Member State 
(cabotage) under the condition that this service is provided on a temporary basis. Commu-
nity licences can be issued only to undertakings established in a Member State which satisfy 
the requirements in accordance with Directive 96/26/EC.
iii. Regulation No 684/92 opens up access to the market in international carriage of passengers 
by coach and bus. The provision of occasional services is subject only to a Community li-
cence while international regular services additionally require a special authorisation. Regu-
lation No 12/98 authorises cabotage operations where they are carried out in the course of 
an international transport service.
As an outcome of various studies and consultations with the stakeholders, the impact assess-
ment study sheds light on complexities and problems in seven main areas:
• Difficulties to monitor properly companies without stable and effective establishment; 
• Non-comparable certificate of professional capacity and financial capacity requirements for 
being admitted to the occupation;
• Unclear link between the holder of a certificate of professional capacity (“transport man-
ager”) and the undertaking using his/her certificate to obtain the licence giving access to the 
market;
• Unclear definition and control of temporary cabotage;
• Burdensome procedure for authorising international regular passenger services;
• Heterogeneity of a number of control documents;
• Uneven level of monitoring of compliance.
Road Haulage
Since 1 January 1993, any road transport operator wishing to carry out an operation between 
Member States – that is to say between at least two Member States – must hold a Community 
license, issued by the Member State of establishment. This document gives him free access to the 
whole single market. To obtain it, operators must meet the conditions of Council Regulation 
881/92 of 199239.
On 1 July 1998 road cabotage in the movement of freight has been fully liberalised. The legal 
39  Council Regulation No 881/92 of 26 March 1992 on access to the market in the carriage of goods by road 
within the Community to or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or 
more Member States.
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basis for cabotage in goods transport is Council Regulation No. 3118/9340 which lays down the 
conditions under which non-resident carriers may operate national road haulage services within 
a Member State. Essentially, cabotage means the transportation of goods within one country by a 
haulier from another country.
With the aim of increasing transport efficiency and reducing the number of empty journeys, 
cabotage transport was gradually introduced from 1990 onwards. Quantitative restrictions (qu-
otas) were imposed on cabotage transport from the outset through a system of granting autho-
rizations. Intra-Benelux cabotage was completely liberalised in 1992. The cabotage regime was 
extended to the EFTA countries on 1 July 1994 with the exception of Austria, which joined on 1 
January 1997, and Switzerland.
The study conducted by ECORYS Nederland41 showed that, although the number of quotas 
increased yearly, these quotas were largely underused and had not attracted ‘unscrupulous’ ope-
rators into specific national markets. In accordance with article 12 of Council Regulation No 
3118/93, most cabotage restrictions have been lifted since 1 July 1998 in the 15 Member States 
of the EU. From that date onwards Regulation No 3118/93 on freight transport cabotage sti-
pulates that any non-resident carrier who is holder of the Community authorisation is entitled 
to operate, on a temporary basis and without quantitative restrictions, national road haulage in 
another Member State without having a registered office or other establishment in that state. 
Following their accession to the EU on 1 May 2004 restrictions have been lifted for hauliers from 
Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia as well. Now, cabotage is allowed ‘on a temporary basis’ in the EU. 
This means that these transports must not be carried out over a long period time continuously 
or systematically. To clarify the notion of ‘temporality’, the Commission issued an interpretative 
communication. 42
The new member states will be able to enjoy the right to cabotage services after a transitional 
period. There were anxieties in the sector about the possible adverse effects of running cabotage 
services. These focused on potentially unfair competition from lower-wage countries which could 
undercut operators who have to bear with greater costs in a more tightly regulated environment. 
However, cabotage does not seem to have undermined the national operators of good repute. At 
the moment, cabotage makes up about 1.2% of the road transport market. Moreover, the recent 
legislation related to driver times, rest periods and checks will provide equal social conditions and 
prevent transport companies being unfairly undercut. 
Another important aspect in road haulage is the driver attestation, which is a uniform docu-
ment certifying that the driver of a vehicle carrying out road haulage operations between Member 
States is lawfully employed by the Community transport operator concerned in the Member State 
in which the operator is established, or lawfully placed at the disposal of that operator. Every driver 
from a non-EU country driving an EU operator’s vehicle while carrying out cross-border haulage 
activities within the Union must carry the correct driver attestation. This document enables ins-
pecting officers in all the Member States to check the employment status of drivers carrying out 
transport operations between Member States in Community vehicles and with a Community li-
cense, thereby helping the authorities to combat effectively the use of irregularly employed drivers 
and the resulting distortions of competition. 
The driver attestation has been introduced by Regulation (EC) No 484/2002 of the European 
40  Council Regulation No 3118/93 of 25 October 1993 laying down the conditions under which non-resident 
carriers may operate national road haulage services within a Member State.
41  ECORYS Nederland, Study on Road Cabotage in the Freight Transport Market, Framework Contract TREN/
A1/56, 2004. http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/studies/doc/2006_03_road_cabotage_study_en.pdf 
42  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/policy/marketaccess/roadhaulage/doc/18612-en.pdf 
EdamENG.indd   143 1/3/08   2:19:55 PM
144
Parliament and of the Council of 1 March 2002 amending Council Regulations No 881/92 and 
No 3118/93 and it only applies to drivers who are nationals of third countries.
Road Charging
One of the major causes of imbalances in transport stems from the variety of charging policy 
across the Union. Different modes of transport do not always and everywhere cover the costs they 
generate. Rates for use of infrastructure, annual road tax and fuel duties vary across the Union. 
This unequal situation distorts the competition in Europe’s road haulage sector and stands contra-
dictory to the aim of creating a fair and transparent open market.  
For the roads, the Commission has proposed a so-called ‘Eurovignette’ directive adopted in 
199943 and afterwards modified in 200644 to modernize the existing taxation system of heavy 
goods vehicles. The 1999 directive covers vehicle taxes, tolls and user charges imposed on vehicles 
intended for the carriage of goods by road and having a maximum permissible gross laden weight 
over 12 tonnes45. By the 2006 revision, this threshold will fall by the year 2012 to 3.5 tonnes.
The aim of the Eurovignette Directive is defined as:
• To further develop both the functioning of the internal market and the approximation of 
the conditions of competition in the transport sector by reducing the differences in the lev-
els and in the systems of tolls and user charges applicable within Member States;
• To take better account of the principles of fair and efficient pricing in transport by provid-
ing for greater differentiation of tolls and charges in line with costs associated with the road 
use;
• To further move towards the principle of territoriality.
And the key points of this directive are as follows:
• Tolls should be levied according to the distance travelled and type of the vehicle; user charg-
es should relate to the duration of the usage of the infrastructure. Tolls and user charges may 
vary according to congestion and vehicle emission class;
• As a general rule, distance-based tolls and time-based user charges shall not be applied on 
the same stretch road;
• Both tolls and user charges can only be imposed on users of motorways or multi-lane roads 
similar to motorways as well as on users of bridges, tunnels and mountain passes;
• National tolls and charges should be non-discriminatory, and should be easy for the motor-
ist to understand, so as to avoid unnecessary hold-ups and problems at toll boots. Manda-
tory checks at the EU’s internal borders should also be avoided. 
With this directive, especially after the 2006 revision, Member States are able to differentiate 
43  Directive 1999/62/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 1999 on the charging of 
heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures
44  Directive 2006/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 amending Directive 
1999/62/EC on the charging of heavy goods vehicles for the use of certain infrastructures
45  The Eurovignette Directive does not cover vehicles carrying out transport operations exclusively in the non-
European territories of the Member States, vehicles registered in the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, the 
Azores or Madeira and carrying out transport operations in these territories or between these territories and 
Spain or Portugal.
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tolls according to a vehicle's emission category ("EURO" classification46) and the level of damage 
it causes to roads, the place, the time and the amount of congestion. This makes it possible to 
tackle the problems of traffic congestion, including damage to the environment, on the basis of the 
“user pays” and “polluter pays” principles. It also aims to shift freight away from roads onto other 
modes of transport such as rail and waterways.
The Directive fixes a maximum level for user charges in accordance with the given period and 
with the environmental performance of the vehicle, where the annual charge is determined as:
Table 3-7: EURO types and current annual charges 
Fuel/Weights maximum 3 axles minimum 4 axles
NON-EURO € 960 € 1550
EURO 1 € 850 € 1400
EURO 2 € 750 € 1250
Not later than 10 June 2008 the thresholds will be increased according to the following table, 
while the daily charge is 11 € for all vehicle categories47.
Table 3-8: EURO types and annual charges from 10 June 2008
Class maximum 3 axles minimum 4 axles
NON-EURO € 1332 € 2233
EURO 1 € 1158 € 1933
EURO 2 € 1008 € 1681
EURO 3 € 876 € 1461
EURO 4 and less polluting € 797 € 1329
Member states are also given extra flexibility on how to levy tolls or charges. In particular, these 
can now be raised on the entire road network, not just motorways, when they are part of the Trans-
European Network (TEN)48:
• toll revenue should be used for the maintenance of the road infrastructure concerned or to 
cross-finance the transport sector as a whole;
• as of 2010, countries which already apply tolls or user charges will be obliged to vary their 
prices according to vehicle pollution standards (Euro standards series) in order to favour the 
cleanest ones;
• authorities may decide to exempt isolated areas or economically weak regions from applying 
tolls or user charges;
• an extra 15% 'mark-up' charge can be levied to finance new alternative transport infrastruc-
ture projects such as rail or inland waterways (the mark-up can be raised to 25% for cross-
frontier projects in mountainous regions);
46  According to the stages of carbon dioxide emission standards determined by the European Commission, 
where;
Euro 1 (1993): For passenger cars - 91/441/EEC , also for passenger cars and light trucks - 93/59/EEC. 
Euro 2 (1996) for passenger cars - 94/12/EC (& 96/69/EC) 
Euro 3 (2000) for any vehicle - 98/69/EC 
Euro 4 (2005) for any vehicle - 98/69/EC (& 2002/80/EC) 
Euro 5 (2008/9) for any vehicle - (COM(2005) 683 - proposed)
47  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/policy/road_charging/charging_tolls_en.htm
48  http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/eu-agrees-greener-truck-tolling-scheme/article-150935
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• urban areas are finally not included in these extra mark-up charges. However, local authori-
ties can still be raise them under a provision taken from article 9 of the current Eurovignette 
directive (which for instance allowed the city of London to apply such charges);
• rebates will be possible for frequent users.
Social Provisions
The opening up of the markets has made it possible to improve the quantity and quality of the 
transport services. Competition policy is on the edge to guarantee that this development will 
not take place in a way that is detrimental to certain enterprises. But it is also needed to make it 
certain that this progress will not come about at the expense of working people in the sector. This 
involves warranting that some enterprises are not charmed to neglect social legislation in order to 
lower costs. 
Community rules for maximum daily and fortnightly driving times as well as daily and weekly 
minimum rest periods for all drivers of road haulage and passenger transport vehicles are determi-
ned by the Regulation (EC) No. 561/200649. The scope of operations regulated includes passenger 
transport and road haulage operations, both international and national, long and short distance, 
drivers for own account and for hire and reward, employees and self-employed. The aim of the Re-
gulation is to avoid distortion of competition, improve road safety and driver working conditions 
within the Community.
Directive 2002/15/EC sets down minimum requirements with regarding working time for all 
mobile workers performing road transport activities. It also supplements the provisions of Regulati-
on (EC) No. 561/2006 which lays down common rules on drivers’ driving time and rest periods.
Mainly, the directive contains the following general provisions and the rules are applicable to 
all mobile workers from 23 March 200550. 
• Definitions of working time, periods of availability, place of work, mobile worker, self-em-
ployed driver, week, night time and night work 
• Maximum working week: 48 hours (this can be extended to 60 hours provided an average 
of 48 hours per week is not exceeded in any 4 month period) 
• Breaks: not more than 6 hours should be worked consecutively without a break (at least 30 
min when 6 to 9 hours are worked per day) 
• Rest time: the provisions of Regulation (EC) No. 561/2006 are maintained 
• Night work: not more than 10 hours in any 24-hour period.
Another important development in terms of social provisions in road transport is the compul-
sory use of digital tachograph in new vehicles, having a mass of more than 3,5 tonnes (in goods 
transport) and carrying more than 9 persons (in passenger transport)51.  In many ways, the digital 
tachograph, which records all the vehicle’s activities, for example distance, speed and driving times 
and rest periods of the driver, is a more secure and accurate recording and storage device than the 
analogue tachograph.
49  Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the har-
monisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) 
No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85
50  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/road/policy/social_provision/social_working_time_en.htm 
51  The use of the fully digital tachograph is introduced with Council Regulation (EC) 2135/98, which amends 
Regulation (EEC) 3821/85. Installing the digital tachograph has been obligatory since 1 May 2006.
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Connections with Non-EU Countries
Road transport between the EU and non-EU countries is still largely based on bilateral agree-
ments. Specifically, the EU has reached agreements with EFTA countries52 and Switzerland53 on 
road transport issues that are prior over those bilateral agreements.
Road Safety
Among all modes of transport, road transport is the most dangerous and the most costly in terms 
of human lives. In 2005, nearly 41200 people lost their lives in road accidents across the EU and 
approximately 1 million and 600 thousand people are injured. The prime concern of the Union is 
to make Europe’s highways as safe as possible.
In its 2001 Transport White Paper, the Commission proposed the ambitious goal to halve the 
number of fatalities in the European roads by 25000 setting year 2010 as target. This target is 
meanwhile approved by the European Parliament and all Member States. In 2003, the Europe-
an Road Safety Action Programme was tabled, containing many concrete measures proposed to 
achieve this goal. And in February 2006, the Commission has issued a mid-term review on the 
common accomplishments to halve road fatalities. In short, Europe has achieved a lot in the last 
five years, but still more is needed to be done to achieve this objective. 
3.3.2. Road Transport in Turkey
Road transport has been the predominant mode of transport in Turkey for the last 50 years. Even 
though state development plans have set the target to increase weight of rail transport, road trans-
port has de facto continued to be the major mode of investment for transport since the 1950s. The 
automotive industry has been the backbone of Turkey’s industrialisation and is among the leading 
sectors of export.
Turkey’s road transport vision for 2013 is to build a road transport system that abides by na-
tional and international law, prioritises road safety, environment friendly, contributes to national 
economy and social life, uses advanced technology, provides high service quality, competitive in 
market conditions, makes good use of Turkey’s geography and natural resources, integrated with 
other modes of transport in a fair and balanced way.54 
There are 5 types of roads in Turkey: highways (motorways), state roads, provincial roads, villa-
ge roads and inner city roads (under the responsibility of municipalities). According to data provi-
ded by the General Directorate of Highways, highways are 1.775 km (3%), state roads are 31.446 
km (50%), provincial roads are 30.368 km (47%). There are also 322,288 km of village roads.55
Table 3-9: Length of highways in Turkey 
Year 1973 1984 1990 1993 2005
Highway length (km) 24 76 286 1104 1775 (2004 with connections)
Source: State Planning Organisation, 9th Development Plan – Road Transport Special Commission Report, 2006
52  Annex 13 of the EEA Agreement
53  EC/Switzerland land transport agreement
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_114/l_11420020430en00910127.pdf 
54  State Planning Organisation, 9. KALKINMA PLANI - KARAYOLU ULAŞIMI ÖZEL İHTİSAS 
KOMİSYONU RAPORU, 2006
55  Source: State Planning Organisation, 9th Development Plan – Road Transport Special Commission Report, 
2006
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Investment in highways over the past 20 years has rendered Turkish road network comparable 
with most EU countries of similar size56.
Turkey’s geographical position makes it a natural land passage between Europe and Asia. Road 
transport is a flexible and fast mode of transport for freight, especially for distances up to 300-
350 km.; but there is significant and growing dominance of road transport in Turkey over other 
modes. 
Table 3-10: Share of road transport in domestic freight transportation in Turkey 
 Tons kilometers Share (%)
1960 - 37,8
1980 - 81
1997 139.789 93.0
1998 152.210 95.0
1999 150.974 89.9
2000 161.552 89.9
2001 151.421 90
2002 150.912 92
2003 152.163 91
2004 156.853 94
2005 166.770 95
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, 2006; KGM Türkiye Karayolları İstatistik Yıllığı 1999-2000, 2001-2002
Lack of sufficient rail and marine port infrastructure has made road transport a preferred op-
tion and led to the growth of the Turkish road transport industry. Dominance of road transport 
bears the consequences of heavy road traffic, air and noise pollution, high rate of accidents, fast 
deterioration of roads, as well as dependence on carbon fuels for transportation, which are predo-
minantly imported. 
Nevertheless, the Turkish road transport sector today is a 12 billion Euro sector, with a capa-
city exceeding 2 billion tons, carrying 90% of the domestic freight and is an important enabler in 
carrying Turkey’s import and export volumes (10,4% of foreign trade by volume and 30,4% by 
value in 2006).57
Table 3-11: Number of registered road vehicles in Turkey 
Type of vehicle Number
Automobiles 5,882,575
Motorcycles 1,547,145
Bus 167,382
Minibus 343,704
Pickup Truck 1,537,444
Lorry 688,879
Vehicles for special purpose 31,492
Tractor 1,258,004
TOTAL 11,411,562
Source –Turkish Statistical Institute, 2006
Compared with EU countries, the number of vehicles in Turkey is significantly high.
56 Source: ERF World Road Statistics on Europe, 2006.
57  Turkish Statistical Institute, 2006
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3.3.2.1. Market Overview
Market Structure
The Turkish road transport market for freight can be segmented by geographies served: the do-
mestic market, European markets and the Eastern markets (namely Middle East and Russia and 
other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries). Each of these markets is served by 
different types of vehicles operated by institutions with different business models. 
Due to regulatory requirements of the EU with increasing concern over environmental impact 
of road transportation (EURO classification of vehicles according to emission category, quotas 
according to EURO classification), vehicles with better emission standards carry the goods to and 
from European countries. Because investing in better quality vehicles requires higher institutio-
nal capacity (in terms of management capability and financial strength), the European market is 
served by more institutionalised businesses, able to coordinate larger fleets with newer vehicles 
within the Transport Internationaux Routiers (TIR) convention. Social provisions envisaged are 
best safeguarded for drivers working between Turkish and European destinations.
Less strict regulation in the Middle Eastern countries, Russia or the CIS countries allows older 
vehicles of lower qualification to serve these markets. Accordingly, because ownership of lower 
quality vehicles requires less institutional capacity, these markets, especially the Middle Eastern 
markets are often served by “one man – one truck” companies. Social provisions or even safety 
regulations can be disregarded by such companies.
The domestic road transport market is a combination of the two structures and a reflection 
of the structure of the Turkish economy. 90% of domestic freight transport in Turkey is by road. 
There are different types of road transport companies that meet the different needs in the Turkish 
market. The Turkish private sector consists of players with different business models, ranging from 
the highly institutionalised multinational companies to very small family owned enterprises; the 
transportation requirements of these players are met by transport companies at similar standing. 
In Turkey, small enterprises are in very large numbers (96,32% of the total number of enter-
prises employ less than 10 people)58 and generate large numbers of transportation job orders that 
are then processed by smaller, less institutionalised, low cost carriers, with older and lower quality 
vehicles. Small enterprises also constitute an important section in the unregistered economy in 
Turkey. Failing to attain capital structures and cash flows that allow them to realise their opera-
tions in a registered way, small enterprises tend to operate totally or partially in an unregistered 
way, including their procurement of freight transportation services. This demand has been the 
reason for very high numbers of trucks in Turkey, carrying most of the domestic transportation by 
road. The exact number of trucks in Turkey is not known; but estimates are that there are around 
1,200,000 commercial trucks in Turkey that are less then 3,500 tons. This number is close to the 
total number of such trucks in EU25. This segment of the sector is less institutionalized and less 
organized as a profession. Truck drivers often own and run the company. These companies are 
not financially strong, have very little overhead costs and therefore are able to live on small profit 
margins. This segment is expected to shrink, transforming into larger institutions by mergers and 
acquisitions, institutionalisation, employing not only drivers but also management and adminis-
trative staff. This transformation is one of the objectives of the 2004 Road Transport regulation, 
which will be discussed below.
Medium sized enterprises with growing transportation needs for both domestic and internati-
onal freight transport work with a range of transport companies that operate one or several TIR 
vehicles. These are often companies that originated as a one man–one truck company, then grown 
58  Turkstat GSİS, 14/10/2003
EdamENG.indd   149 1/3/08   2:19:57 PM
150
financially to invest in a TIR vehicle. They often sell their services directly to medium sized en-
terprises for domestic, but increasingly for international transportation. Newer vehicles that are 
able to meet EU requirements travel to the European countries. After about four years, vehicles 
are sold to carriers that serve Eastern countries, especially Iraq. 59 This segment of road transport 
sector has grown significantly as Turkey’s import and export volumes have grown. It is expected 
to grow further as Turkey’s southern neighbours such as Iraq and Syria gain further importance as 
trading partners.
Table 3-12: International transport vehicles and capacity
1993 1994 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Number of companies 472 587 667 911 899 892 934 1.083 
Number of trailers 7.043 7.607 7.990 23.402 20.782 21.026 25.197 31.798 
Number of semi trailers 8.585 9.063 9.404 28.542 24.084 24.265 28.434 35.656 
Number of trucks 2.319 5.351 5.332 5.436 3.061 2.880 6.119 12.339 
Number of tankers 225 245 268 57 371 880 8.271 12.941 
Total capacity (tons) 217.200 282.088 296.007 792.078 699.793 710.873 990.373 1.367.451 
Source: Ministry of Transport, Land Transport DG
The EURO profile of international transport vehicles reflects the distribution of trucks working 
towards Europe and the East. There are 16,826 EURO I trucks (38.3%), 12,354 EURO II trucks 
(28,1%), 14,597 EURO III (33,2%) and 150 EURO IV trucks (0,34%). (Source: Ministry of 
Transport, DG Land Transport, 2005)
With high volumes of complicated logistical and transportation requirements, both domestic 
and international, large businesses in Turkey view transportation as one function in the manage-
ment of their supply chain and increasingly outsource their logistical operations to third party 
logistics (3PL) companies. Trying to find the optimal solution to their transportation and logistics 
needs in terms of cost and delivery time, such businesses use a mixture of transport modes (land, 
rail, marine and air); and work with the more institutionalised form of land carriers, operating 
with better vehicles. The urge of such companies to minimize logistic costs and optimize use of dif-
ferent modes of transport is clearly becoming a driving force in Turkey for investment in logistics 
infrastructure, such as warehouses, integrating road with rail, marine and air transportation, also 
creating combined modes of transport, such as Ro-Ro. Furthermore, the higher environmental 
consciousness of large businesses leads them to search for more environmentally friendly modes of 
transport; using trucks with better emission standards or choosing modes such as rail or marine.
Turkish road transportation companies transport 53% of Turkish exports and 24% of Turkish 
imports. Turkish companies have a dominant market share in international road transport. Howe-
ver, since 2005, even though Turkey’s import – export volumes are growing, international land 
freight transport market has stayed flat. 
Freight forwarders play an increasing role in the Turkish transport market. As freight forwar-
ders play a major role in European markets for selecting the optimal mode and route of transport 
for their customers, and assume more and more role in their supply chain operations, this is the 
way the larger businesses in Turkey operate. 60
59  Transport companies that operate internationally are better organized as an industry. There are two sectoral 
organizations with over 1000 members each, UND (International Transporters’ Association) and RODER 
(Ro-Ro Vessel Operators and Combined Transporters Association) , who are working to solve problems of 
their members, provide training programs, track data and create statistics regarding international road trans-
port and represent their members both domestically and internationally. 
60  Most multinational freight forwarding companies have set up offices or joint ventures in Turkey. In order to 
differentiate themselves among competitors and provide value added services, local transportation companies 
EdamENG.indd   150 1/3/08   2:19:57 PM
151
Small company size, fragmentation and inability to reach economies of scale are among the 
main challenges of Turkish economy. Small and even medium sized companies with low capital 
strength find it hard to cope with day to day cash flow problems and are not able to invest to grow 
their businesses. There are no incentives for them to join forces with companies of similar size to 
become more cost efficient. This is a vicious cycle which is one of the major reasons for the unre-
gistered economy in Turkey. This has repercussions in the transport sector; fragmentation of trans-
portation demands of businesses, frequent but smaller shipments lead to companies wanting to 
meet transportation requirements in the least costly way, without seeking quality in transporters. 
Pricing
Transport prices are determined by the market. Different operators bid for a service and the cus-
tomer can pick the one they wish to work with. 
Possible lack of appreciation of all fixed and variable costs related with road transport may lead 
operators, especially those with less managerial skills, to consider only fuel costs, ignoring costs 
like depreciation, tire, maintenance and overhead when quoting a price, thereby lowering prices 
to very low margins. 
Utilisation rate of trucks is critical for viability of business. When there is a contract for a truck 
to carry a good from Turkey towards any destination, the operators are willing to take any load 
back, however low the price may be, instead of the truck returning empty. This is another reason 
for prices to drop to very low profit margins and is a contentious issue among international com-
petition. 
Domestic transportation of goods by small trucks can cost up to 25% less than transport by TIR. 
If goods can be secured for two ways, a discount of up to 15% can be provided by the transporters.61
Combined Transport
Combined transport whereby trucks are transported by other vessels, namely boats or trains, over 
long distances, is gaining importance around the world, as well as in Turkey. Combined transport 
presents the opportunity to reduce road traffic related problems such as congestion and pollution; 
while providing cost savings related with fuel, wearing out of vehicles and tires, and driver related 
efficiencies. 
Ro-Ro Transportation
Turkey is well positioned to benefit from Ro-Ro transportation, both in the Mediterranean and 
in Black Sea. The war in Yugoslavia which during the early 1990s prevented Turkish companies 
from transporting goods to and from Europe, led Turkish road transport companies to join forces 
under the UN-Ro-Ro initiative to establish Turkey’s first Ro-Ro line between Istanbul / İzmir and 
Trieste in 199262. This Ro-Ro line has been a pioneer for the industry and was followed by others. 
Although some lines have not been profitable and have had to close down over the years, many 
Ro-Ro lines are still actively used63. 
have also started to invest in human resources and IT infrastructure, in order to expand their services to inc-
lude more functions related with logistics. Their level of activity increases as companies need for door-to-door 
transportation in the most effective way increases.
61  Phone interviews with various road transport companies as potential clients.
62  6 Ro-Ro ships from Pendik, 3 from Ambarlı and 3 from Çeşme sail to Trieste, carrying complete units or only 
semi-trailers.
63 Active Ro-Ro lines from Turkey: Haydarpaşa-Trieste (Italy), Ambarlı-Trieste (Italy), Çeşme-Trieste (Italy), 
Çeşme-Brindisi (Italy), Zonguldak-Odessa (Ukraine), Zonguldak-Skadovsk (Ukraine), Samsun-Novoros-
sisky (Russia), Trabzon-Sochi (Russia), Rize-Poti (Georgia).
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Turkey has the world’s fourth biggest Ro-Ro fleet which is also the second one in Europe. 
Availability of scheduled lines has enabled exporters to plan their shipments accordingly, reduced 
total transportation costs and led the Balkan countries to revise their transit fees. Transport of TIR 
drivers is done by airlines.
Today, Ro-Ro is seen as an integral part of road transportation sector, although there is no re-
gulation that regulates Ro-Ro operations as intermodal transportation; Ro-Ro boats are operated 
under marine law. In order to further increase efficiency of Ro-Ro transport, it is necessary for 
regulation to facilitate utilisation of this intermodal transport and investment to be made for Ro-
Ro ports and terminals. 
Ro-La Transportation
Transport of trucks by train (Ro-La) is gaining importance in Europe and international Ro-La 
projects are being considered as extension of Turkish rail network. By integrating rail services and 
local truck pick up and delivery in a seamless network, rail transport can play a role in offering 
door-to-door delivery services to customers.
TCDD has launched Ro-La transportation between Halkalı and Wels in 2006, in collaboration 
with on-route railway administrations. Halkalı – Wels is the longest Ro-La line to date, with a 
track of 1,979 km, over the route of Turkey- Bulgaria-Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia-Austria.64
Barriers to Market in Europe
As Turkish road hauliers are taking on more and more of the road freight transport between Euro-
pean countries and Turkey, Turkish companies are facing increasing challenges such as temporary 
changes in implementation of Schengen visa procedures, or restriction in the number of transit 
permits through European countries. 
Within the European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT) framework, where every 
country determines the number of permits for non-EU countries, the permits allocated to Tur-
kish trucks are often depleted before the end of the year. Through bilateral negotiations, Turkey is 
allowed to obtain the right to use permits of the following year before the end of the year. This is 
only a temporary solution and the problem recurs the following year. 
It is clear that European transport policy is trying to shift transport weight from road to other 
modes, particularly rail and marine. Turkish sector representatives and officials are aware of this 
situation and intend to adapt to this policy. Yet, when limiting the number of permits to Turkish 
trucks is seen to function as a way to keep Turkish companies out of the market, there is great dis-
comfort within the sector. Even though Turkish exports to EU countries have increased by 103% 
between 2003-2006, quotas for Turkish trucks have only increased by 32%. It is even perceived 
that there may be the intention to limit Turkish exports by limiting the access of Turkish trucks 
to European markets. As Europe tends to lift quotas all together, the gradual elimination of the 
restriction on Turkish trucks should be envisaged as well.
3.3.2.2. Regulatory Overview
The New Road Transport Law65 has been introduced in 2003 and the New Road Transport66 and 
64  According to the UNECE Working Party on Intermodal Transport and Logistics, March 2007, the maximum 
weight of the Ro-La train is 1,100 tons and the maximum length is 520 meters. The train has a capacity of 20 
TIRs and presently operates once a week. It is planning to be operated 3 times a week. Total time of transport 
by the train is approximately 70 hours which is almost same with transportation by road. 
65  Yeni Karayolu Taşıma Kanunu, No. 4925, 10.7.2003
66  Yeni Karayolu Taşıma Yönetmeliği, 25.02.2004
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Road Transport Professional Training Bylaws67 have followed in 2004. These laws and bylaws have 
been prepared in order to regulate the large market transport market, ensuring EU harmonisation. 
Even though the regulation could be fine tuned for full harmonisation with the EU, it does ad-
dress many of the shortcomings of the sector. 
Market Access
Access to road transportation market in Turkey is regulated by the New Road Transport Law and 
introduces the requirement for operators to obtain a license, based on the criteria of good re-
pute, financial standing and professional competence, as in the EU regulation, Council Directive 
96/26/EC of 29 April 1996 on admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and road 
passenger transport operator. The licence has to be renewed every 5 years. 
Even though the New Road Transport Law and its bylaws have targeted EU harmonisation, 
there are several pertinent issues that differ from EU regulation: the multiplicity and complexity 
of license types and the cost of obtaining licences.
EU Council Directive 96/26/EC on admission to the occupation of road haulage operator and 
road passenger transport operator defines ‘the occupation of road haulage operator` as the activity 
of any undertaking transporting goods for hire or reward by means of either a self-contained mo-
tor vehicle or a combination of coupled vehicles. 
However, the Turkish Road Transport Law has defined 15 different roles and 39 different types 
of license for the types of operations. The Licence Application Form68 displays the complexity 
that road operators have to deal with. Different licenses are required for freight and passenger 
transport. Freight transport is categorized as intra - province, domestic and international. Each 
category requires another type of license. If an undertaking is engaged in more than one type of 
activity, it is required to apply for and to obtain each of the licenses individually.
The argument for establishing this complex licensing structure has been to separate the low qu-
ality small truck business from the international transportation business. By establishing different 
licenses, it has been possible to keep out hundreds of thousands of trucks from conducting inter-
national haulage. This is expected to create an incentive for small, one man-one truck companies 
to seek economies of scale by merging and increasing their financial strength and entering larger 
segments of the market with more institutional business structures. However, the complexity of 
the license types constitutes a difficulty for implementation; control authorities need to be trained 
on the structure of the license requirements for the type of activities undertaken for effectiveness. 
This is facilitated by implementation of Ministry of Transport Automation System (U-NET), an 
information system that records types of license required with the vehicles license plate.
As regulated by the Foreign Investment Law of 2003, non-Turkish nationals can invest in the 
road transport sector in Turkey, provided they obtain the proper licenses required for the type of 
activity they envisage.
Financial Standing
The financial standing for operators in the EU requires have capital assets of at least € 9.000 for 
the first vehicle and € 5.000 for each additional vehicle. However, the Turkish Road Transport Law 
bases submission of licenses not on financial capacity of the undertaking, but on ownership of 
vehicles, high fees and bank guarantees to submit the licenses. The level of fee and bank guarantee 
is so high that it impacts the working capital level of most truck operators and endangers further 
investment into the business. Type of licenses and costs are listed in Table 3-13. Licenses have to 
67  Karayolu Taşımacılık Faaliyetleri Mesleki Yeterlilik Eğitimi Yönetmeliği, 03.09.2004
68  Yetki Belgesi Başvuru Formu, http://www.kugm.gov.tr/dosyalar/diger/dosya5.pdf 
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be renewed every five years, paying a percentage of the original cost, currently 50%.
Table 3-13: Fees and capital requirements for selected types of licenses (1 YTL = 1,76 Euro, Aug�6, 
2007)
Type of license 
Number of 
vehicles
Capital
Requirement
(000 YTL)
Letter of 
Guarantee 
(000 YTL)
License
Fee
(000 YTL)
International road haulier (C2) 10 100 - 40
Commissioner for international 
goods transport (H2) - 40 100 6
Domestic road haulier (K2) 1 - 0 5
International logistics services (L2) 150 tonne capacity 500 350 200
Organiser of international goods 
transport (R2) - 500 400 200
Source: Yeni Karayolu Taşıma Yönetmeliği
Professional Competence
Turkish road transportation sector would benefit significantly from enhancing the professional 
competence of sector personnel, both managers as well as drivers. Changing dynamics of the trans-
portation sector and increasing complexity of regulation, related for instance with the transporta-
tion of dangerous materials, requires that personnel are aware of the body of knowledge required 
and able to implement the skills.
The condition relating to professional competence required by the EU is the possession of skills 
demonstrated by passing a written examination, which may take the form of a multiple-choice ex-
amination, organized by the authority or body designated for this purpose by each Member State.
The Turkish Road Transport Law as well identifies managerial and professional competence as a 
requirement for licensing and designates institutions as authorised for training and certification 
of operators. There are around 20 training centres accredited for this purpose. Examination for 
certification is conducted by Ministry of Transport, Land Transport DG.
The Directive 2003/59 that addresses the professional training requirements for drivers for entry 
and continuation in the profession have not been taken into the Turkish National Accession Pro-
gramme. However, it is necessary for professional training for drivers to be regulated as soon as 
possible for enhanced road safety. 
EU Twinning Project
There is an ongoing EU twinning Project in road transport sector, “Assistance to the Turkish Road 
Transport Sector”. Started on May 11, 2006, the project is expected to run until November 2007. 
The project will review legislation over all in conformity with EU legislation and will: draft legisla-
tion, where appropriate, propose a fleet renewal scheme, propose an information management and 
monitoring scheme, recommend a licence system, propose transparent institutional arrangements 
and improved coordination.
Implementation of the Regulation and Unfair Competition
There is a protocol among the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Interior regarding the im-
plementation of the new regulation in road transport. Licensing and certification of land transport 
operators is ongoing. Effective control is important to ensure implementation of the regulation. 
Until the regulatory requirements are fulfilled by all the operators, those operators who meet the 
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financial and managerial requirements of the licenses are faced by the unfair competition of those 
who do not. Avoiding the financial burden of obtaining the license, non-licensed operators are 
able to reduce prices below levels which are not profitable for licensed operators.
Statistics in Road Transport Sector
There is significant difficulty in obtaining reliable and up to date statistics about the road trans-
port sector. Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSAT) and the Land Transportation DG automa-
tion system provide some data. However, none of these are able to provide the detailed statistics 
or analysis of Turkish road transport sector. Detailed on line data on loading point, destination, 
types and quantities of goods carried are required in order to monitor the transport industry, 
identify the problems and develop strategic solutions. 
3.3.2.3. Productivity Impact Assessment
The adoption of the EU acquis in road transport is likely to give rise to increased sectoral produc-
tivity on account of the consolidation of the industry and the growth of larger scale players able 
to benefit from economies of scale. Furthermore, given the nature of road transport which acts 
as an input for the production process of many other industries, increased efficiency in this area 
will also have a positive impact on the cost efficiencies of a diverse range of industries. In order 
to clarify these linkages, the Input/Output table of the Turkish economy69 was utilized to prepare 
two different sets of tables. The first table lists the industries which are going to be most affected 
by any change in the sectoral productivity of road transport. The second table lists the industries 
which will have the most significant impact on the overall productivity of the national economy. 
In other words, the second table ranks industries according to their intensity of road transport us-
age weighted by their share in national value added.
Table 3-14: Ranking of industries according to road transport usage as a share in production inputs
Industry Index 
Refined petroleum products 1
Confectionary 0.76
Rubber products 0.48
Motor vehicles manufacturing 0.47
Motor vehicles retailing 0.42
Sugar 0.16
Health services 0.12
Sea transport vehicles 0.09
Gas distribution 0.08
Telecommunications 0.07
Financial institutions 0.06
Water distribution 0.05
Wholesale trade 0.03
Publishing 0.03
Research and development 0.02
Electricity production and 
distribution 0.01
Soft drinks 0.01
Office equipment 0.01
Forestry products 0.01
Machinery products 0.01
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
69  The latest available Input Output table is for the year 1998.
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Table 3-15: Ranking of industries according to the overall productivity impact on the national economy 
on account of a productivity increase in road transport
Industry Index 
Refined petroleum products 1
Financial services 0.094226
Motor vehicles manufacturing 0.029319
Motor vehicles sales 0.015495
Telecommunications 0.009486
Confectionary 0.008854
Rubber products 0.003563
Electricity 0.002807
Wholesale trade 0.001124
Insurance 0.000978
Sugar 0.000741
Other business activities 0.000587
Water distribution 0.000441
Health services 0.000396
Other service activities 0.000264
Catering services 0.000183
Printing 0.000159
Manufacturing 0.000139
Ready wear 0.000136
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
3.3.2.4. Evaluation
Road transport is the primary mode of transport in Turkey. The road network is quite developed 
and the sector boasts a considerable number of service providers. As a result, the sector remains 
competitive with regard to alternative modes of transport. Yet, price competitiveness comes at a 
cost. The cost is twofold: the abundance of small scale and unregistered players prevents the con-
solidation of the industry. As a result, the market structure remains divided between the larger, 
institutionalized players and the smaller informal players. This state of affairs delays the transition 
witnessed in other European countries where companies grow to a critical mass and are able to 
invest in fleet upgrades and technological services. The second general cost relates to externalities 
such as increased traffic, pollution and road congestion. Because of the prevalence of small scale 
players, road haulage involves more transport vehicles than necessary leading to the rise of these 
external costs.
On the other hand, there has been a serious progress in terms of harmonising the Turkish road 
transport legislation with the EU acquis. A new Road Transport Law was adopted in 2003. This 
law and following bylaws have created a similar regulatory framework for road transport servi-
ces. There are nonetheless some residual differences in the regulatory framework stemming from 
the difference of the market structures. The vast number of small scale road transport operators 
existing in Turkey compelled domestic policy makers to change some of the provisions of the EU 
acquis to design a framework law more suited to Turkey’s present needs. The Road Transport Law 
and Bylaws addresses the fact that the sector is too fragmented and the vast majority of players are 
too small. As a result, market access rules and licensing provisions are adapted to Turkish market. 
The proper implementation of the law would lead to consolidation, help the transformation of 
the sector and allow market players to achieve economies of scale. However, the complexity of the 
licensing scheme makes it difficult to implement properly. Due to the vast number of existing servi-
ce providers, the institutional capacity for the proper enforcement of the new rules is still lacking. 
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3.4. Air Transport
3.4.1. Air Transport in the EU
Of all transport modes, air transport has shown the largest growth with a cumulative average 
growth rate of 7.4 % since 1980. Growth rates in freight transport and passenger transport) in 
aviation sector are recorded as 31.1% and 48.8% for the period 1995-2004 period, respectively70. 
Having more than 130 airlines, a network of more than 450 airports and about 60 service sup-
pliers, almost 3 million workers in the sector and an activity accounting for almost 1.5 % of the 
EU GDP, the community owes much to the successful liberalization of the air transport market 
in 1990s. 
3.4.1.1. EU Regulations in Air Transport
Market Access and Competition
Air transport sector in the EU was liberalized through three successive liberalization packages 
adopted in 1987, 1990 and 1992 respectively. With the third package adopted in July 1992 and 
applied as from January 1993 the liberalization process across the EU is completed. 
The first package of measures started to relax the established rules. For intra-EU traffic, it li-
mited the right of governments to object to the introduction of new fares. It gave some flexibility 
to airlines concerning seat capacity sharing. The second package opened up the market further, 
allowing greater flexibility over the setting of fares and capacity-sharing. It also gave all EU carriers 
the right to carry an unlimited number of passengers or cargo between their home country and 
another EU country. Finally, the third package included three legislative measures71:
• The introduction of harmonised requirements for an operating license for EU airlines 
• The open access for all EU airlines with such an operating license to all routes within the 
EU, where at the same time, national governments have the possibility to impose public 
service obligations on routes which are essential for the regional development. 
• The full freedom with regard to fares and rates. Airlines are no longer required to submit 
their fares to the national authorities for approval. Safeguard measures may be introduced, 
but thanks to the good functioning of the market this has never been necessary in practice.
This package gradually introduced freedom to provide services within the European Union 
and led in April 1997 to the freedom to provide cabotage. However the inconsistent application 
of third package across the member states and some restrictions on intra-Community air services 
have distorted the level-playing field of the airlines and limited competition in some parts of the 
internal market. As a result, the European Commission was compelled to adopt a proposal and 
published an impact assessment report in July 2006 for the revision of third package measures, in 
order to increase market efficiency, to enhance the safety of air services and to improve passenger 
protection.
The Commission categorized its proposals under the following headings72:
70  European Commission DG Energy and Transport, Energy & Transport in Figures, 2006
71  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/internal_market/competition_en.htm 
72  European Commission, Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Proposal for a regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the operation of air services in the European Community, 
2006 
http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/competition/doc/doc_travail_version_complete.pdf 
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• Requirements for the operating license:
o Stricter requirements as to the information to be provided by air carriers
o Stricter conditions for submission and approval of financial accounts
o More regular review of the air carriers meeting the requirements of the operating li-
cence, especially for start-ups
o Introduction of a clearer procedure for revocation of an operating licence
o Enhancement of Commission powers for revocation of an operating licence
• Stricter requirements for leasing agreements, especially for wet-leasing
• The link between the internal aviation market and air services to third countries
o Access to intra-Community routes by non-Community carriers only through agree-
ments to which the Community is a contracting party
o Free code-sharing and fare setting on routes to third countries
• Public service obligations (PSO):
o Clearer legislation, better description of the conditions attached to PSOs
o Longer concession periods: four years instead of three (five years in the case of ultra-
peripheral regions)
o Improvement of the Commission’s information on the context of PSO impositions
• Fares transparency:
o Transparency of fares information
o Provisions for ensuring non-discriminatory fares with respect to place of residence
o Leave price setting to market forces subject to general competition rules
According to the Commission study, the measures are expected to increase competition and re-
duce market distortions, although the ensuing market consolidation needs to be followed carefully 
along competition rules in order to avoid abuses on some routes. Air carriers would benefit from 
the creation of a level-playing field although the operating costs might be slightly increased by 
the stricter requirements concerning the operating licence. Consumers would enjoy higher safety 
levels and reduced air carrier bankruptcy risk. Overall, the increased competition and greater price 
transparency should lead to lower fares and more services offered.
Thus, these reforms in the regulations offer clear economic and social advantages by reinfor-
cing the internal market by accelerating market consolidation and thereby creating a competitive 
environment for European air carriers capable of taking on their international competitors and by 
presenting clear advantages for passengers by enhancing the market forces that lead to lower fares, 
better services offered and higher safety levels.
International Aviation: Open Skies
International aviation relations are based on specific rules which include issues like number of 
airlines allowed to fly, the points that can be served and the number of flights per week that may 
be operated. For the internal market, these rights were gradually liberalized in 1992 and 1997 as 
mentioned above. But the case is different for air relations with third countries.  
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In this respect, the ‘open skies’ judgment of the European Court of Justice transposes interna-
tional air relations to the community context and constitutes an external aviation policy for the 
EU. According to ‘open skies’ judgments, member states can not act in isolation when negotiating 
international air service agreements. Hence there existed the need for the adaptation of the exis-
ting bilateral agreements in order to bring them into line with Community law. 
In 2005 the Commission agreed on an agenda which is based on three columns on the basis of 
the Commission proposal COM (2005)73:  
• Amending approximately 1500 existing air services agreements through horizontal agree-
ments in order to ensure that third countries accept the principle of a European air carrier.
• The creation by 2010 of a Common Aviation Area composed of the EC and its partners 
located along its southern and eastern borders, aiming a high degree of economic and regu-
latory integration of aviation markets in this area. 
• The commencement of targeted negotiations trying to achieve global agreements in the 
major regions of the world, with the aim of ensuring fair competition in the most dynamic 
world markets and helping to reform international civil aviation and promoting European 
regulations and industry. 
There was a significant rise in the number of “Open Skies” deals reached worldwide during 
2005, with sixteen such bilateral agreements being concluded, increasing the total number to 
118. In all, some 86 bilateral air services agreements were concluded or amended in 2005, with 
over 70% featuring more liberal arrangements. In December 2005 a multilateral agreement was 
reached between the Commission and eight south-east European partners (Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, 
and Montenegro and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo) to establish a European Common 
Aviation Area74, where Iceland and Norway were also parties to the agreement. 
The EU signed an aviation agreement with Morocco, started negotiations on a common avi-
ation area with Ukraine, and agreed on abolition of € 300 million Siberian over flight payments 
with Russia. Recently, the EU and the United States signed the EU-US Air Transport Agreement, 
which is defined by Jacques Barrot as “both a centre piece for today’s reinvigorated transatlantic relati-
onship and a big step forward in international aviation. By allowing new services to be launched from 
airports right across Europe, it will shake-up both the transatlantic market and the European airline 
industry itself. Already, the European airline industry is feeling its effects in a positive way, with plans 
for new services and signs of a much more flexible and dynamic approach to airline investment among 
European carriers”75
Airports
A problem coming along with the liberalization of air transport services and increase in air traffic 
growth is the pressure on the capacity available at airports for aircraft movement. When airport 
management is in question, the basic difficulty for new airlines to enter to the market is slot alloca-
tion. Regulation 95/93 was the first step towards setting common rules for the allocation of slots 
in Community airports on a transparent and non-discriminatory basis. In particular in order to 
enable new airlines to enter to the market, the allocation of slots had to be based on the rule that 
at least half of the newly created slots had to be reserved for newcomers. 
73  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/pillars/index_en.htm 
74  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/doc/reference/background/com_2006_0113_en.pdf 
75  http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/international/pillars/global_partners/doc/us/press_release_signatu-
re_30_04_07.pdf 
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Ground handling service, comprising ticketing and baggage handling, ramp handling, fuelling 
and de-fuelling operations, aircraft maintenance and the provision of catering services, contribute 
much to the efficient use of airport infrastructure. This market which is gradually opened up to 
competition by the Directive 96/67 provided declining prices and improved quality as a result of 
competition. 
The European Commission has adopted an “airport package”76 in January 2007 consisting of 
three key initiatives: a proposal for a directive on airport charges, a communication on airport ca-
pacity, efficiency and safety in Europe and a report on the implementation of the ground handling 
directive. The package focuses on the role of airports in the further development and competitive-
ness of the European internal aviation. 
Aviation Safety
The indirect factor which impacts aviation safety is the accelerated growth of air traffic. Currently, 
Community legislation reflects the standards drawn up by the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA) a 
part of which is rendered to Community law. Regulation 3922/91 provides mechanisms to trans-
mit joint aviation requirements (JARs) on the harmonisation of technical requirements and ad-
ministrative procedures in the field of civil aviation which is amended by Regulation 1899/2006.
As air traffic continues to grow a common initiative is needed at the European level to keep 
air transport safe and sustainable. With the aim of this, Regulation 1592/2002 is adopted intro-
ducing an aviation safety agency which develops common safety and environmental rules at the 
European level. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is established as of July 2002 and main 
tasks currently carried on by the agency are as follows: drafting safety legislation and providing 
technical advice to the European Commission and to the Member States; inspections, training 
and standardization programmes to warrant uniform implementation of European aviation safety 
legislation in all Member States; safety and environmental type-certification of aircraft, engines 
and parts; approval and oversight of aircraft design organisations world-wide as and of production 
and maintenance organisations outside the EU; data collection, analysis and research to improve 
aviation safety. Right along with, the Commission adopted a proposal in November 2005 to ex-
tend the tasks of EASA to ruling civil aviation operations; licensing of crews in the Member States 
and certification of non-Member State airlines. 
Air Transport and Environment
Air transport industry has made significant improvements to aircraft technology and efficiency 
in terms of reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), but still these improvements have 
not been sufficient to compensate for the negative effects of rapid growth of global air traffic on 
environment. 
Since 1990, CO2 emissions from aviation, which are directly related to the amount of fuel 
consumed, have increased by 87% and now account for around 3.5% of total ‘human activities’ 
contribution to climate change and it is estimated that this share will grow to 5% by 205077.
To date, the aviation sector has not been required to do much to address climate change as inter-
national aviation is excluded from the Kyoto Protocol. Still, the European Commission has decided 
to take unilateral action. Several policy options were examined, including aviation taxes, but they 
were opposed by the aviation industry. But the Commission concluded, in its 2005 Communicati-
76  http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/78 
77  http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/environment/climate_change.htm 
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on Paper78, that bringing aviation into the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions trading system (EU-ETS) 
would be the most cost-effective way of reducing the climate change impact of aviation. 
3.4.2. Air Transport in Turkey
3.4.2.1. Regulatory Overview
In Turkey, the Ministry of Transport determines civil aviation policy. The Ministry is assisted by the 
Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGCA), a specialized government agency in the implemen-
tation and enforcement of civil aviation rules. The DGCA has the also the responsibility for licens-
ing air carriers. The third institutional actor is the State Airports Management Authority (SAMA) 
which operates almost all Turkish airports and provides Air Traffic Management services.
The rules and regulations governing air transport are quite liberal. The licensing regime for 
air carriers stipulates objective criteria related to the technical and financial capacity of potential 
market entrants. For domestic or international scheduled flights, the air carrier is required to have 
at least 5 aircraft that have 100 or more seat-capacity. Aircrafts can however be leased and there 
is no requirement of ownership. Similarly for domestic or international non-scheduled flights, 
the operator is required to have at least 2 aircraft that have 100 or more seat-capacity. For cargo 
operations, the aircraft requirement is dropped to 1. Provided that these conditions are fulfilled, a 
market entry license can be obtained. 
Operators then need to apply for flight permits for individual routes and also obtain relevant 
slots at each airport. Flight permits are awarded by the Ministry of Transport. Slots are allocated 
by an independent Slot Coordinator79 in consultation with the Commission for Evaluation of Slot 
Allocation (CESA). CESA is a consultative body comprised of representatives of national and in-
ternational air carriers, of the airport management authority and of ground handling companies. 
Given the importance for maintaining a contestable market, the slot allocation procedures allow 
for new market entry by defining and protecting the rights of new entrants. “New entrant” means 
an air carrier requesting slots at an airport on any day and holding or having been allocated fewer 
than four slots at that airport on that day. After slots are allocated to the historic slots and hour 
changes in the slots, 50 % of the remaining capacity is allocated to new entrants.
Tariffs for air transport services have been de-regulated since 2001. Air carriers can set their 
own tariff. There are no minimum tariff requirements80. Tariffs have nonetheless to be approved 
by the Ministry of Transport.
3.4.2.2. Market Overview
The tariff liberalisation bill introduced in 2001 enabled the fast development of the airline in-
dustry. The following figures81 which sketch the development of the industry in the last 3 years 
illustrate this growth trend:
• The number of planes increased from 150 to 261
• The number of domestic passengers increased from 9,1 million to 28,8 million
78  European Commission, Communication Paper, Reducing the Climate Change Impact of Aviation, 2005
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0459en01.pdf 
79  The Slot Coordinator is appointed by the DGCA
80  This freedom is severely criticized by passenger road transport companies who face statutory minimum tariffs 
and therefore claim unfair competition from air carriers.
81  Press statement of the Minister of Transport, Binali Yildirim on 31 March 2007 as reported by the daily Hür-
riyet on 1 April 2007.
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• The number of international passengers increased from 25,3 million to 32,9 million
• Seat capacity increased from 27.124 to 42.894
• The number of domestic flights increased from 156.301 to 343.956
• The capacity of domestic airports increased from 50 million to 91 million passengers/year
• The number of domestic destinations increased from 25 to 38
Table 3-16 – Number of domestic airline passengers in Turkey 
Year Domestic passengers % increase
2002 8700 ..
2003 9128 4,92
2004 14438 58,17
2005 20502 42,00
2006 28800 40,47
Source : SAMA
There are at present 19 airline companies operational in Turkey. 6 of those companies operate at 
the domestic level while the rest fly solely on international routes.
Table 3-17: Air carriers operational in Turkey (2007)
Turkish Airlines (THY) Corendon Saga Airlines IzAir
AtlasJet Airlines Free Bird World Focus Kuzu
Pegasus Airlines Inter Airlines Golden Airlines MNG
Onur Air Kibris Turk Airlines T&T Airlines ACT
Sun Express Sky Airlines Best Air
Source : Business Week Türkiye, 28 January 2007. Carriers serving domestic routes highlighted 
Table 3-18: Market share of main carriers on domestic routes (2006)
Name Number of passengers Number of planes
THY 14.921.733 106
AtlasJet 4.440.366 16
Onur Air 4.400.267 31
Pegasus 1.818.989 17
Source: SAMA
Table 3-19: Market share of domestic routes (2007)
Carrier Domestic route market share (2007)
THY 59%
Atlas Jet 17%
Onur Air 17%
Pegasus 7%
Source : SAMA.
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3.4.2.3. Airport Capacity and Development
The public private partnership model and in particular the build-operate-transfer option has been 
espoused by Turkey as the favourite method for developing the airport capacity of the country. 
As a result, private sector investments to the tune of 1.15 billion USD were channelled in the last 
couple of years for airport construction. 
In Turkey currently there are 62 airports among which 15 is being used for both domestic and 
international flights, while the rest is utilized purely for domestic flights.
Table 3-20: New airports construction under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model
Name Investment size (million USD)
Istanbul Atatürk 398
Antalya International Terminal I 65
Antalya International Terminal II 86
Dalaman International 92
Ankara Esenboga 325
Izmir Adnan Menderes 180
Total 1150
Source: Own compilation from press sources.
The main criticisms regarding the BOT model originate from airline operators. They claim that 
this model forces concession owners to charge high passenger service and other fees. Although the-
se fees are regulated and set out in the tender specifications, the tender specifications are not pub-
licly available. So air carriers allege that with the entry into operation of new terminal buildings 
financed under the BOT scheme, they suddenly face higher service fees which they cannot transfer 
to their tour operator customers given that they conclude long term or seasonal agreements with 
these operators.
It is also interesting to note that Istanbul Atatürk Airport which is the hub of the national 
carrier THY is among the leading airports in Europe in terms of passenger traffic. It is also the 
European leader in terms of traffic growth in the past year.
Table 3-21: Passenger traffic at major European airports (Passengers carried arriving and departing and 
in transit (counted once))
Airport
(million passengers)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
% 
change 
‘05/04
LONDON / HEATHROW UK 64.29 60.45 63.04 63.21 67.11 67.68 +0.9 
PARIS / CHARLES-DE-GAULLE FR 48.25 47.92 48.26 48.01 50.95 53.38 +4.8 
FRANKFURT / MAIN DE 48.96 48.20 48.08 48.02 50.70 51.79 +2.1 
AMSTERDAM / SCHIPHOL NL 39.27 39.31 40.59 39.81 42.42 44.08 +3.9 
MADRID / BARAJAS ES 32.71 33.87 33.70 35.37 38.15 41.72 +9.4 
LONDON / GATWICK UK 31.95 31.10 29.51 29.89 31.39 32.69 +4.1 
MÜNCHEN DE 22.87 23.41 22.88 23.95 26.60 28.45 +6.9 
ROMA / FIUMICINO IT 26.29 24.33 24.20 25.47 27.16 27.78 +2.3 
BARCELONA ES 19.44 20.54 21.16 22.49 24.35 27.02 +10.9 
PARIS / ORLY FR 25.40 22.99 23.14 22.45 24.05 24.85 +3.3 
MANCHESTER UK 18.32 19.07 18.61 19.52 20.97 22.08 +5.3 
LONDON / STANSTED UK 11.86 13.65 16.04 18.71 20.91 21.99 +5.2 
PALMA DE MALLORCA ES 19.25 19.12 17.76 19.11 20.36 21.22 +4.2 
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Airport
(million passengers)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
% 
change 
‘05/04
KØBENHAVNS / KASTRUP DK 18.11 18.04 18.19 17.57 18.89 19.82 +4.9 
MILANO / MALPENSA IT 20.72 18.46 17.33 17.48 18.42 19.49 +5.8 
ISTANBUL / ATATÜRK TR  12.60 11.36 11.92 15.60 19.29 +23.7 
DUBLIN IE 13.66 14.13 14.84  17.03 18.33 +7.6 
ZÜRICH CH   18.07 16.88 17.13 17.88 +4.3 
STOCKHOLM / ARLANDA SE 18.45 18.30 16.50 15.10 16.25 17.16 +5.6 
BRUSSEL / BRUSSELS BE 21.60 19.36 13.55 15.10 15.45 15.95 +3.3 
3.4.2.4 Regulation and Competition: Salient Features
Licensing and Pricing Regulations
The Turkish licensing for air transport services is compatible with the EU legislation. The licens-
ing requirements are clearly set out in the relevant Turkish legislation. The licensing authority is 
the Ministry of Transport. Enforcement of the prevailing legislation is ensured by the Directorate 
General for Civil Aviation, a government agency with financial and operational independence. 
However akin to the situation prevailing in the EU market, Turkish air carriers complain that the 
licensing regime fails to prevent the build up of excess capacity. They also claim that if the growth 
of seat capacity is left unchecked, the sector might face a serious economic crisis down the road 
triggered by price wars. Viewed from this perspective, the proposed changes in the EU air trans-
port legislation which would usher in more stringent conditions for granting and maintaining 
licenses for commercial air transport would also be welcomed by Turkish airline operators. 
Flight Permits and Slot Allocation
One of the critically important factors in enabling a level competitive field in air transport relate 
to the question of flight permits and slot allocation. An appropriate allocation of flight permits 
and landing slots, especially at busier airports is instrumental in preventing market closure by 
the traditionally dominant players and creating room for new entrants. Because slots are finite, 
the objective should be to set the conditions for the creation of a contestable market in specific 
routes. 
Turkey follows a methodology of slot allocation that is in general compatible with the EU 
approach. Whereas until 2002, slot allocation was carried out by a governmental agency, newly 
introduced rules led to the creation of the independently run Slot Coordination Center where 
private operators are also represented. Private operators claim however that the workings of the 
Slot Coordination Center are not entirely transparent. They contend that they cannot see all the 
requests for specific slots. The impression is that positive discrimination vis a vis THY remains in 
existence. 
In order to increase the efficiency, fines have been introduced to prevent operators from vi-
olating their arrival and departure schedules. The new regulations aim to avoid unrealistic slot 
requests. Operators also face the risk of losing their slots if they fail to comply with allocated slot 
schedules82. 
For a flight to be realized, the air carrier must have obtained both a flight permit for that route 
and a slot allocation for the airport. In Turkey; the flight permit is awarded by the Ministry of 
Transport and the slot allocated by the independently run slot coordination center. Private opera-
82  Radikal Daily, 13.11.2006
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tors contend that Ministry’s approach to granting permits is not very clear nor transparent. They 
claim that sometimes the Ministry fails to substantiate its negative decisions. Indeed the Minister 
has apparently declared that no additional flight permits will be issued for any route until the load 
factor on average reaches 85%. Although this may be a sensible approach, it is not a transparent 
rule based policy since there is no corresponding legislation or guideline to support it. Furthermo-
re the flight permit procedure is incompatible with the EU acquis where once a carrier is awarded 
an operating license, the principle of open access applies. There is no additional need to obtain a 
permit for specific routes.
Pricing
Since the tariff liberalisation measures of 2001, airline operators are free to set their own tariffs. 
However they should obtain the approval of the Ministry in advance and they are under the 
obligation to advertise their new tariffs at least 3 days before they are implemented. Following 
the liberalisation of the market, prices have substantially come down especially in routes open to 
higher competition.
As regards the pricing strategies of the national carrier THY, private operators claim that THY 
abused its dominant position in some routes and engages in predatory pricing practices. There is 
however no readily available financial data pertaining to THY with specifically differentiated cost 
items which would be necessary to test these claims. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests however that THY may indeed pursue a low price strategy in do-
mestic routes where it faces competition from other carriers83. Whether THY’s low price strategies 
are also below the cost pricing strategies remain to be determined on a case by case basis. 
Public Service Obligation
The Turkish legislation allows for a public service obligation (PSO) in respect of air travel services. 
However neither the relevant provisions of this legislation nor the actual practice is compatible 
with EU rules. In Turkey, the PSO used to be fulfilled by THY. After the liberalization of the 
market, PSOs were imposed on other carriers in a less than transparent way. More often than not, 
these obligations were enacted by linking the permit to fly requested routes to the obligation to fly 
to government imposed destinations. 
Therefore harmonisation with EU rules will require the overhaul of the PSOs of air carriers in 
Turkey. Accordingly, state authorities should determine the specific routes which will fall under 
the PSO regime, allocate and disclose the planned amount of state aid and launch competitive 
tenders for servicing these routes. 
The lack of transparency currently prevailing as regards PSOs of air carriers should be seen as an 
invisible cost item for the industry. Because of the current structure of the industry where supply 
outstrips demand, these invisible costs are probably not fully reflected in the end user pricing 
strategies of the carriers. The combination of high sunk costs and excess supply induces market 
players to adopt very competitive prices. However if and when a consolidation of the domestic 
players is realized, the externalisation of the currently invisible costs of PSOs would allow for more 
sustainable pricing strategies.
International Air Transport Agreements
Access to international routes is regulated by bilateral or multilateral international air transport 
83  Whereas a private operator was recently serving a city in eastern Anatolia (Kars) from Istanbul for a price of 
140 million YTL, THY entered this market with a ticket price of 70 million YTL which led the first operator 
to quit servicing this route.
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agreements. Turkey has bilateral agreements with 84 different countries. Some of these agree-
ments restrict market access to the signatory states’ respective national carriers. A legal duopoly is 
therefore created for the specific international routes covered by these Agreements. These statutory 
market access restrictions benefit Turkish Airlines to the detriment of all the other domestic carri-
ers who are prevented from flying to the international destinations covered by these Agreements. 
As a result, THY is able to obtain monopoly rents by charging supra-competitive prices for tickets 
on these routes. Tariff differences on similar length routes and between routes open to competition 
and routes governed by restrictive bilateral air transport agreements can reach 60 %84. 
In addition, domestic carriers complain that the existence of these international air transport 
agreements which give THY unfair advantage allows the incumbent carrier to engage in cross subsi-
disation. In other words, THY is alleged to subsidize some of its domestic routes through the profits 
it generates on some of its regulated international destinations. Therefore the restrictions regarding 
market access for international markets undermine fair competition in the domestic market. 
State Aids
Although Turkey has as of yet no state aids monitoring legislation, there are a number of areas that 
can be considered to run afoul this pillar of competition rules. In particular,
• Past treasury guarantees granted to THY have reduced the financial burden for the company 
of servicing its accumulated debt related to airplane purchases. Given that debt repayments 
in 2006 amounting to 140 million USD made up to 5 % of THY’s yearly revenue and 100 
% of its net income85 , the impact of this state aid may be quite significant.
• THY is exempted from paying a yearly maintenance reserve fee for each airplane it owns 
whereas other domestic carriers have to pay 2 million USD per plane per year.
• The advantages granted to THY as a result of the bilateral air transport agreements con-
cluded by the Turkish state. 
• The special consumption tax exemption awarded to air transport carriers in their fuel pur-
chases is also a state aid to the benefit of the sector. The same exemption exists for sea trans-
port companies but not for road transport operators.
Ground Handling
Given the importance of ground handling services for efficient and cost effective air transport 
services, access to the ground handling market remains a critical issue. Unlike the relevant EU 
legislation, the Turkish legislation does not stipulate a minimum number of service providers. On 
the contrary, it sets forth a maximum number depending on the number of passengers. As a result, 
the scope for competition remains limited. As things stand, there are 2 ground handlers in all Turk-
ish airports falling under the scope of the EU ground handling services Directive except Istanbul 
Sabiha Gökçen where ground services are provided by the airport operator. The situation at Sabiha 
Gökçen is therefore incompatible with EU rules. As regards remaining airports, the presence of 2 
ground handling operators complies with the EU requirements. But the regulatory regime does not 
guarantee the sustainability of this duopoly and in any case prevents the emergence of a more com-
petitive market structure. The Turkish legislation should therefore be amended so as to introduce a 
legal threshold for the minimum number of service providers as envisaged by EU legislation.
84  A comparison of THY ticket prices to Paris and Riyad illustrates this phenomenon. 
85  THY yearly income statement and balance sheet as submitted to the Istanbul Stock Exchange.
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3.4.2.5. Productivity Impact Assessment
The adoption of the EU acquis in air transport is expected to have a relatively small impact on 
the Turkish air transport industry given that the industry is already liberalized. As mentioned in 
this section, there are nonetheless a few areas where further reform would enhance sectoral pro-
ductivities. Given the nature of air transport which acts as an input for the production process of 
many other industries, increased efficiency in this area will also have a positive impact on the cost 
efficiencies of a diverse range of industries. In order to clarify these linkages, the Input/Output 
table of the Turkish economy86 was utilized to prepare two different sets of tables. The first table 
lists the industries which are going to be most affected by any change in the sectoral productivity 
of air transport. The second table lists the industries which will have the most significant impact 
on the overall productivity of the national economy. In other words, the second table ranks 
industries according to their intensity of air transport usage weighted by their share in national 
value added.
Table 3-22: Ranking of industries according to air transport usage as a share in production inputs
Industry Index
Refined petroleum products 1.0000
Hotels 0.5678
Aircraft manufacturing 0.5306
Motor vehicles sales 0.3894
Financial services 0.3360
Telecommunications 0.1124
Meat production 0.1104
Motor vehicles manufacturing 0.0762
Soft drinks 0.0681
Alcoholic beverages 0.0590
Insurance 0.0566
Other business activities 0.0424
Research and development 0.0383
Animal farming 0.0283
Cereal growing 0.0270
Vegetable production 0.0141
Paper and paper products 0.0135
Ready wear 0.0113
Confectionary 0.0111
Electricity 0.0099
Starch product 0.0077
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
86  The latest available Input Output table is for the year 1998.
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Table 3-23: Ranking of industries according to the overall productivity impact on the national economy 
on account of a productivity increase in air transport
Industry Index
Refined petroleum products 1
Financial services 0.6868
Motor vehicles sales 0.3165
Hotels 0.2619
Telecommunications 0.0710
Cereals 0.0385
Motor vehicles manufacturing 0.0291
Animal farming 0.0275
Other business activities 0.0241
Meat production and processing 0.0090
Aircraft manufacturing 0.0081
Electricity 0.0060
Alcoholic beverages 0.0058
Insurance 0.0049
Ready wear 0.0044
Soft drinks 0.0027
Catering 0.0020
Paper and paper products 0.0018
Confectionary 0.0015
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
3.4.2.6. Evaluation
Although, the Turkish legislation in the area of air transport is compatible in many respects with 
the EU acquis, full harmonisation should bring additional benefits to enhance the competitiveness 
and productivity of air transport services in Turkey. The main areas of impact are the following:
Increased Competition
Full harmonisation with the EU acquis would mean the incorporation of Turkey within the Single 
European Space. As a result, EU carriers can begin to service the Turkish market including flying 
between domestic destinations. Likewise, Turkish carriers can then operate between and within 
EU countries without any discrimination. This freedom would translate into increased competi-
tion over Turkish skies with ensuing benefits for the Turkish consumer in terms of still lower prices 
and wider consumer choice as witnessed by the experience in EU countries as regards the liberali-
sation of air transport services. 
The external dimension of the EU’s Single Sky policy also requires the amendment and re-ne-
gotiation of the EU Member States’ bilateral air transport agreements so as to eliminate designa-
tion clauses reserving routes to national carriers. This clause is to be replaced by a reference to all 
EU carriers. In addition price fixing arrangements should also be abolished. Harmonisation with 
the EU acquis in this area would then mean that Turkey should also review its range of bilateral 
air transport agreements so as to implement these changes. As a result, the external market for 
privately held Turkish carriers would also be liberalized. They would then have the possibility of 
flying to hitherto closed destinations. 
The competition impact of the possible ending of the block exemption granted by the Com-
mission to IATA tariff conferences should also be addressed. In the area of competition, Turkey 
is bound by the Customs Union to adopt and maintain substantially similar rules as the EU. The 
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Customs Union however covers only trade in goods and not the trade in services. In addition, the 
competition chapter under the ongoing full membership negotiations remains unopened due to 
the opening benchmarks of state aids legislation and the restructuring of the Turkish iron and steel 
industry. Thus, there is as of yet, no legally binding commitment for Turkey to follow the potential 
Commission decision to end the IATA block exemption. On the other hand, Turkey’s integration 
with the Single European Space would require such a regulatory harmonisation. In that case, tariff 
fixing between EU and Turkish destination would also become illegal, ushering in a period of 
increased price competition for EU-Turkey routes.
A full regulatory harmonisation would also allow a more competitive ground handling services 
market to emerge. The necessary changes in the Turkish legislation would enable the market entry 
of new competitors. 
Cost and Quality of Regulation
The adoption of the EU air transport acquis will also have a significant impact on the implementa-
tion cost and quality of the prevailing regulation. The current opaque system of imposing public 
service obligations on air carriers as a condition to grant route permits would be replaced with 
a more objective and transparent set of conditions governing the public service obligation rules. 
Operators can then focus on the routes they actually want to serve. They may also bid for routes 
covered by PSOs knowing in advance all the service requirements as well as the foreseen financial 
compensation.
Another item related to the cost effectiveness of air transport services is Turkey’s participation 
in the Single European Sky Agreement which aims to rationalize air navigation services in Europe. 
A reduction of the fragmentation of the European air space and a consequent shortening of de-
signates air corridors would translate into substantial cost savings for air carriers. IATA claims for 
instance the cost for European airlines of the fragmentation of the European air space resulting in 
delays and longer routings cost airlines 3.3 billion € per year87. However it should also be indicated 
that Turkey’s participation in the European Single Sky Agreement is made difficult by the long 
standing political dispute in Cyprus. 
Regulatory harmonisation would also alleviate some of the concerns related to the current system 
of slot allocation in Turkey. In particular, the level of transparency would be increased. Should the EU 
decide to allow the secondary trading of slots, the establishment of a proper market mechanism for 
slot trading would also benefit Turkish carriers wishing to extend their services in congested airports. 
Similarly, if the draft EU Directive on airport charges is adopted, then regulatory harmonisation in 
this area with the foreseen mechanism of mandatory consultations between airport managers and air-
lines as well as the envisaged establishment of an independent authority to mediate and resolve price 
disputes between airports and airlines would also be beneficial for the Turkish air transport industry. 
A caveat in this respect, at least in terms of the cost of regulation, are the proposed EU measures 
in the area of environmental protection and air passenger’s consumer rights. The introduction of 
a carbon tax for air carriers is certainly bound to increase Turkish carriers’ cost of operation. The 
extension of the current scope of passenger rights would have a similar consequence.
Fair Competition
The adoption of the EU air transport acquis by Turkey would also create a more level playing field 
for air transport operators. As mentioned in the previous section, a regulatory harmonisation would 
87  “Fear of flying: a special report on air travel”. The Economist, 16 June 2007. In a recent meeting, Commission 
representatives claimed that the establishment of a Single European Sky would translate into up to 7 % of 
cost savings in fuel for airlines.
EdamENG.indd   169 1/3/08   2:20:03 PM
170
require Turkey to amend its existing bilateral air transport agreements and do away with the legal 
duopolies and price fixing arrangements created on some international routes to the benefit of the 
national flag carrier THY. This would enable other privately owned air carriers to compete on a more 
equal footing with THY on these routes. It would also eliminate current concerns that THY is subsi-
dizing its domestic operations through the economic rents it generates from these agreements.
The adoption of a state aids monitoring legislation by Turkey would also help the creation of a 
more transparent and fair regulation and government practice in the area of air transport. Current 
problems associated with state measures giving an unfair advantage to the national carrier can then 
be properly addressed.
3.5. Maritime Transport 
3.5.1. Maritime Transport in the EU
Nearly 90% of the EU’s external trade and more than 40% of its internal trade goes by sea; on the 
whole nearly 2 billion tons of freight is loaded and unloaded at EU ports each year. 25% of the 
world fleet sails under EU Member States’ flags and 40% is controlled by EU-owned companies; 
the majority of EU trade is carried on vessels controlled by EU interests. The EU’s maritime indus-
tries covering shipbuilding, ports, fishing and related activities and services employ about 3 million 
people. Over the years, maritime transport has grown as strongly as road freight transport, experi-
encing a growth of 34.6% while road transport has grown by 37.9% between 1995 and 200588.
Maritime transport has a huge potential in the sense of forming an alternative to the road trans-
port. It can help to relieve congestion and environmental pressures on other modes provided that 
pollutant emissions from shipping are reduced. 
Table 3-24: World merchant fleet by world region
Total controlled fleet
dwt (million)
On 1st January 1995 2000 2004 2005
Europe* 311.2 350.1 383.2 400.9
of which: EU-25 217.2 253.4 290.2 314.1
of which: EU-15 207.5 247.5 282.2 305
North America 51 49.4 49.7 45.4
Latin America 18.7 15.7 12.6 14.4
Asia/Oceania 246.7 292.7 329.5 361.3
Africa 6.7 7.1 4.7 5.1
Unknown 37.9 38.1 52.6 52.7
TOTAL 672.4 753.2 832.2 879.9
EU-25 control of total 32.30% 33.60% 34.90% 35.70%
EU-15 control of total 30.90% 32.90% 33.90% 34.70%
EU-25 : Foreign flag share ** 56.00% 67.40% 67.40% 67.40%
EU-15 : Foreign flag share ** 57.70% 67.70% 67.00% 67.00%
Notes: only ships of 1000 gt and over 
*: In this table Europe includes EU-25, Bulgaria, Romania, EFTA, Monaco, Gibraltar, Andorra, Turkey, Western Balkan countries, 
Russia, Ukraine and Moldavia 
**: foreign flag share includes ships registered by EU countries in other EU countries 
Source: European Commission DG Energy and Transport, Energy and Transport in Figures, 2006
88  European Commission DG Energy and Transport, Energy & Transport in Figures, 2006
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3.5.1.1. EU Regulations in Maritime Transport
Market Access and Competition
The maritime transport services between Member states or between member states and third 
countries have been opened to competition by the Regulation 4055/8689. This regulation applied 
the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States and 
third countries and abolished the restrictions on EU ship-owners after a transitional period. It 
prohibited future cargo-sharing arrangements with third countries other than for liner shipping in 
exceptional circumstance.
Following that, the Council adopted a package of measures in 1992 to phase in the liberalisa-
tion of cabotage in maritime transport. Council Regulation 3577/9290 laid down definitively the 
principle of liberalisation of cabotage from 1 January 1993 for Community ship-owners operating 
vessels registered in a Member State. The liberalisation process was completed on 1 January 1999. 
By the regulation 3577/92, maritime transport is liberalised between the ports within the same 
member state and made it possible for any Community ship owner to provide maritime services 
in a member state other than the one in which he is established. 
The principles of competition in maritime transport have been regulated by Regulations 
4056/86 and 4057/8691 as part of the maritime package. The first of these regulations laid down 
the procedures for applying the rules on competition to international maritime transport to or 
from one or more Community ports and aimed to ensure that competition was not distorted by 
means of agreements. Regulation 4057/86 provided for a redressive duty to protect Community 
ship-owners against unfair pricing practices adopted by certain third-country ship-owners.
In 2004, the Commission adopted a White Paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86, appl-
ying the EC competition rules to maritime transport. There it concluded that there was no longer 
any justification for retaining the exemption for liner conferences, as price stability could also be 
achieved by other forms of cooperation which would distort competition less. The Commission 
also submitted revised guidelines for State aid to maritime transport.
Regulations and Reforms on Maritime Safety
In recent years, especially following oil slicks that devastated European coasts in the past decade, 
maritime safety has been a central concern to the EU. About 1 billion tonnes of oil enter the EU 
ports or cross the waters surrounding its territory, and 350 million passengers are transported on 
European ship journeys each year. In this sense, the Commission is taking further action to im-
prove maritime safety by preventing accidents and pollution and better controlling their effects. 
The aim is to eliminate substandard shipping, increase the protection of crews and passengers, 
reduce the risk of environmental pollution and ensure that operators obey the safety rules in a way 
that any of the operators are advantaged by the evasion of the rules. 
Although some legislative action was taken in the last half of the 1970s, the Commission pro-
duced its first set of measures in 1993 with a maritime safety programme entitled ‘A Common 
Policy on Safe Seas’ with the aim to ensure that all ships sailing under the flag of an EU Member 
89  Council Regulation (EEC) No 4055/86 of 22 December 1986 applying the principle of freedom to provide 
services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries
90  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide 
sevices to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage)
91  Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986 laying down detailed rules for the application 
of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty to maritime transport, and Council Regulation (EEC) No 4057/86 of 22 
December 1986 on unfair pricing practices in maritime transport
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State or entering a European port comply with international safety standards.
After that regulation, two accidents -the accidents of 25-year old oil carriers Erika (in 1999) 
and Prestige (in 2002) which leaked around 22.000 and 20.000 tonnes of oil into the sea- pushed 
the Commission to adopt a series of preventive measures, known as the Erika 1 and 2 packages92, 
to reduce the risks of accidental pollution by ships. The Erika 1 package came into force in July 
2003 with measures aimed at improving existing port state control measures; strengthening the 
legislation as regards classification societies which conduct structural safety checks on ships on 
behalf of flag states; and developing a timetable to phase out the use of single-hull oil tankers 
worldwide. The subsequent Erika 2 package, introduced three new steps to improve safety:
• The creation of a European Maritime Safety Agency that is responsible for improving draft-
ing and enforcement of EU rules on maritime safety;
• The setting-up of a Community maritime monitoring and information system for vessels 
sailing in European waters;
• A mechanism to increase compensation for victims of oil spills. 
In November 2005, the third safety package has been adopted by the Commission in order to 
supplement and improve existing rules. In this package, there are seven key measures:93
• Improve the quality of European flags – the aim is to ensure that all Member States uphold 
international rules on ships that sail under their flags.
• Review legislation on port state control – this should improve the quality and effectiveness 
of inspections and target less well-run ships.
• Amend the directive on traffic monitoring – strengthening the legal framework to help ships 
in distress, and supporting the continued development of SafeSeaNet94.
• Improve rules relating to classification societies – the aim is to improve the quality of work 
carried out by these societies, which are responsible for visiting, inspecting and certifying 
ships.
• Develop a harmonised European framework for accident investigation, improving the ef-
fectiveness, objectivity and transparency of investigations, and making investigating bodies 
more independent.
• Introduce regulations ensuring fair compensation to passengers in the event of an accident.
• Introduce a directive on ship-owners’ civil liability coupled with a mandatory insurance 
scheme.
3.5.2. Turkish Maritime Transport
Surrounded by the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea in the North, the Aegean Sea in the West and 
the Mediterranean Sea in the South Turkey is a peninsula. With the three main seas having ac-
cess to international waters and the Marmara Sea functioning as the passage between water ways 
through the straits, Turkey has an important potential in national and international maritime 
transportation. 
92  http://www.ec.europa.eu/transport/maritime/safety/2000_erika_en.htm 
93  European Commission DG Energy and Transport, Maritime Transport Policy, 2006
94  http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/2282/5637 
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3.5.2.1. Sea Ports: Management, Capacity and Pricing
In Turkey, ports have traditionally been managed by the state. In most instances, the Turkish 
Railways (TCDD) was entrusted with the management of port services. Remaining ports were 
operated by the Turkish Maritime Services. The prevailing regulatory regime was characterized by 
red tape with an understandably negative impact on the efficiency of port services. Moreover, port 
revenues were not necessarily used to invest in port improvement projects. Rather, those revenues 
have been mostly directed to unprofitable railway projects95.
Port privatization started out in earnest in 1994. The privatisation model adopted by Turkey 
was the granting of a concession for the operating rights for up to 30 years. Since then 16 ports 
were privatized: Tekirdağ, Hopa, Giresun, Ordu, Sinop, Rize, Antalya, Alanya, Marmaris, Çeşme, 
Kuşadası, Trabzon, Dikili, Mersin, Antalya and İzmir. Privatisation seems to have led to a rise in 
the quality of service and investments in the privatized port’s physical infrastructure. 
The total handling capacity of Turkish ports is concentrated in a few ports. According to 2005 
figures, for TCDD operated ports, Izmir had a share of 45% followed by Mersin with 35 % and Hay-
darpaşa with 20%96. The Port of Haydarpaşa is mainly focused on import cargo and the ports of Izmir 
and Mersin are export-oriented. These ports can be regarded as Turkey’s most active container ports. 
It should be noted that the Mediterranean trade is one of the fastest growing container sectors worl-
dwide.97 Although, this growth has not translated into a significant increase on Turkish ports’ worklo-
ad, via strategic planning and good management, those ports might profit from further growth. 
The capacity of Turkish ports is far from being efficiently used. According to 2004 figures, only 
around 59% of handling capacity was used actively in Turkish ports in 2004. This figure amounts 
to 186 million tonnes whereas total handling capacity is around 314 million tonnes according to 
2001 figures. When compared to European Ports, the amount is fairly low. For instance, French 
ports handle more than 345 millions of tonnes a year. 
Table 3-25: General specs and capacities of the TCDD ports 
Ports Berth length (m)
Total Ship Call Capacity Cargo Handling Capacity
Cargo Passenger Dry bulk / General (000 tons/year)
Containers (000 
tons/year)
Containers 
(TEU/year)
Bandırma 2,788 1,037 3,240 2,636 - 40,000
Derince 1,132 1,105 - 1,799 - 40,000
Haydarpaşa 2,765 2,651 - 2,834 3,082 354,000
Iskenderun 1,427 640 - 3,224 - 20,000
Izmir 2,959 2,389 1,246 1,469 4,082 443,000
Mersin 3,180 2,650 623 2,639 2,855 266,000
Samsun 1,756 1,130 - 2,189 - 40,000
Total 16,007 11,602 5,109 16,790 10,019 1,203,000
Sources: Turkish Chamber of Shipping 2000; TCDD 2000; Yercan and Yeni 2001.
95  Akarsu M. & Kumar S. “Turkish Container Ports: An Analysis of Problems and Potential Opportunities” 
The paper has been anonymously peer reviewed and accepted for presentation by the IAME Panama 2002 
International Steering Committee. Panama (2002).
96  Since privatization is a rather new application for Turkish ports, the statistics of ports after privatization is not 
available. Therefore, ports should be considered as TCDD ports when considering the statistical information.
97  Akarsu M. & Kumar S. “Turkish Container Ports: An Analysis of Problems and Potental Oportunities” The 
paper has been anonymously peer reviewed and accepted for presentation by the IAME Panama 2002 Inter-
national Steering Committee. Panama (2002).
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In the international context, in terms of actual workload, Turkish ports fall behind the major 
hub Mediterranean ports. It can be claimed that Turkey’s distance from major shipping lanes in 
the Mediterranean acts as a liability in attempts to increase the market share of Turkish ports when 
compared to other Mediterranean ports like Marsaxlokk, Gioia Tauro, and Damietta98 which have 
become significant hubs.
Table 3-26: Major container ports in the Mediterranean region
Name of the Port 2001 2000 1999 1998
Gioia Tauro 2,488,332 2,652,701 2,253,401 2,125,640
Algeciras 2,151,770 2,009,122 1,832,557 1,825,614
Genoa 1,600,000 1,500,632 1,233,817 1,265,593
Barcelona 1,400,000 1,387,570 1,235,000 1,092,920
Valencia 1,371,884 1,308,010 1,170,191 970,758
Marsaxlokk 1,300,000 1,033,052 1,044,972 1,071,669
Piraeus 1,200,000* 1,161,099 964,902 933,096
La Spezia 974,646 910,000 843,233 731,882
Haifa 901,000 870,000 800,000 832,377
Marseilles 740,000 726,000 667,000 644,000
Damietta 696,693 583,201 433,697 309,671
Alexandria - 505,049 559,127 495,777
Port Said 544,094 503,793 422,177 - 
Leghorn 531,814 501,339 478,643 576,682
Ashdod 510,292 479,786 441,272 363,781
Izmir 460,000* 470,000 435,962 396,619
Naples 440,976 396,562 333,638 319,577
Haydarpaşa - 298,000 277,233 322,596
Mersin 301,000* 293,890 251,188 241,865
*Figures are estimates. 
Source: CI Yearbook (2000), CI Online (15 May2002), Woodbridge ( 2002c).
However, it should be noted that beyond the geographical context, operational efficiency, cost, 
conveniences, and efficient intermodal connections to the interior points play a significant role in 
attracting ships to specific ports99. The main problem regarding the efficiency of port services in 
Turkey are related to the red tape encountered in state run ports. In addition, these ports suffer 
from a lack of investment in the physical infrastructure as well as in human resources. As men-
tioned in the section on rail transport, even some of the TCDD owned ports do not have rail 
connections.
The uncertainties and various legal obstacles encountered during the privatisation process pro-
longed the initial schedule envisaged for the privatisation of Turkish ports. However ports that 
were slated for privatisation were faced with the problem of a lack of state investments. The invest-
ments in physical infrastructure were to be undertaken by the port’s new private owners. 
The impact of operational efficiency is evident in the case of Ambarlı Port. Inadequate opera-
tional efficiency, conveniences and intermodal connections led one of Turkey’s highest capacity 
ports, the Port of Haydarpaşa to fail to cope with the competition from the privately owned 
container terminals in the region. As a result, Haydarpaşa experienced a significant decrease in 
demand. According to the CI Online 2002, Ambarlı is moving towards becoming the second big-
98  Ibid.
99  Ibid.
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gest container port in Turkey after the Port of İzmir100.
Pricing
TCDD ports charge pilotage, tug assistance, quay dues, waste removal, sanitary dues, light dues, 
a chamber of shipping fee, an agency fee, and an attendance/supervision fee in addition to other 
cargo-related such as transhipment fee, a commission on inward freight, freight tax, forwarding 
fees and harbour dues, etc. 
The pricing tariff for Turkish port services is recommended by the “Maritime Association of 
Ship-owners and Agents” (MASA)101 for each particular service type and major port. There might 
be deviations from the pricing proposed by MASA made by each Port authority. State ports apply 
different pricing tariffs to Turkish and foreign flagged ships. Pricing tariffs favour Turkish flags 
over the foreign flags. 2007 tariff list illustrates that foreign flags are charged around double of 
Turkish flags 
It should be noted nonetheless that there is not yet an EU wide consensus on cost based port 
pricing. The Commission Proposal for a Directive on Market Access to Port Services indicates that by 
cost oriented pricing policy, the prices might fall by 3,5%-10%.102 Along with the privatization 
process, the quality and efficiency of the service given in the ports should be one of the determi-
ning factors in pricing. 
In view of the above, the main problems of Turkish ports can be summarized as follows;
Managerial problems:
• Inadequacy of well trained port personnel. 
• Port congestion resulting from not using the port area efficiently
• The lack of promotional activities and the insufficiency of port marketing efforts
• Port tariffs not being cost-driven
• The inadequacy of insurance coverage for the cargoes and ships 
Legal problems:
• The complexity and inadequacy of legal regulations related to port services
Physical and technical problems
• The lack of connecting roads and railways in ports
• The inadequacy of pollution prevention equipment
3.5.2.2. Shipping Market Overview
Out of the 1379 ships operating in Turkey, only half of them (702 ships) carry a Turkish flag 103. 
Since 1996, the place of Turkish national sea fleet in the world decreased from 16th place to 24th. 
This drop is more considerable when viewed in perspective with the rankings of neighbouring 
100  CI Online 2002
101  “Maritime Association of Ship-owners and Agents” founded in 1902 in Istanbul.
102  “Complementary Economic Evaluation Study on The Commission Proposal for a Directive on Market Ac-
cess to Port Services” Final Report, European Commission
103  Türkiye’nin Deniz Ticaretindeki Gelişmeler, “Deniz Ticaret Odası Raporu” (2005). www.denizticaretodasi.
org.tr
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countries with Greece at number 3 and Iran at number 22. 
Most of Turkish foreign trade transportation is carried out by foreign flagged ships. 
The figures of 2005 show that only 20.4% of Turkish exports and 25.1% of imports were car-
ried by ships having national registration. Container shipping is carried out by Turkish-foreign 
partnerships often under international flags. 
Moreover, Turkish maritime companies sailing in international waters prefer to have internati-
onal flags in order to avoid detention by port states. According to the Paris MoU (Memorandum 
of Understanding), port states have the right to detain a ship until safety related technical requ-
irements are all fulfilled. Traditionally Turkish ships were viewed as having difficulty in fulfilling 
these internationally mandated safety and security requirements. As a result, Turkey was part of 
the “black” list of the Paris MoU. Hence Turkish flag ships were detained in EU ports for safety 
inspections more often than ships carrying the flag of other third countries not part of the “black 
list”. For the Turkish shipping industry, this state of affairs meant additional operational costs and 
lower quality of service due to unexpected delays. Because modern and well endowed ships were 
given the same treatment and faced the same time consuming inspections as the sub-standard 
ships, various ship-owners preferred to leave the Turkish flag so as to eliminate these additional 
costs. As a result, the competitiveness of the whole industry was harmed. 
With the improvement of Turkey’s institutional capacity and enforcement regime in the area of 
maritime safety and security, Turkey moved from the “black list” for the first time in 2006 to the 
“grey list”, meaning Turkish ships are now listed in the medium to high risk category. The deten-
tion rate of Turkish ships by port states has recently decreased to 7.5%. 
Table 3-27: Age distribution of the Turkish maritime fleet
Age distribution of the Turkish maritime fleet
0-9 years 36%
10-19 years 12%
20-29 years 42%
30+ years 10%
 
Another obstacle regarding the competitiveness of the Turkish maritime fleet is the high num-
ber of over aged Turkish ships. The average age of Turkish maritime fleet is 21,13 years. As 20 years 
is considered as an over-age for international sails, most of the Turkish investors face difficulties 
to operate in the international market104. This prevents Turkish armatures from competing in the 
international market. 
Turkish ports are undertaking handling for transit, cabotage, short sea shipping and ocean shipping. 
Transit105
Geographically speaking bridging the core trade zones from West to the East, from South to the 
North, Turkey is well positioned for transit transportation. However, due to the technical inef-
ficiency of Turkish ports, their share in transit carriages is far behind neighbouring ports106. For 
instance most of Turkish imports are first being handled in the Greek port of Pireaus where big con-
104  Ibid.
105  Transit Transport is the type of transport conducted not by a party of trade contract but by a third party. 
Lojistik ve Dış Ticaret Sözlüğü
106  Kurumsal Yapısı, Yasal Çerçevesiyle Ulaştırma Sektörü (2007) TUSIAD. www.tusiad.org.tr
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tainer ships are discharged and the freight is loaded onto smaller ships to be sent to Turkish ports. 
Cabotage
Cabotage refers to the right of sea and inland sea transport between the ports of a state. This right 
is given particular to national flagged ships in most of the states. With a 8333 km long coast line, 
Turkey has a promising potential for cabotage carriages. Turkish ports are serving for cabotage 
carriages as well. However maritime cabotage in Turkey is not capable of competing with land 
transport for the same distance travels.
Export and Import Carriages
Table 3-28: Export by mode of transport (US $)
Year Total Sea Rail Road Air Other
2006 85 528 416 42 655 303  909 991 35 151 977 4 863 452 1 947 692
2005 73 476 408 35 425 856  756 935 31 602 012 3 978 592 1 713 013
2004 63 167 153 31 259 851  577 822 27 104 284 3 906 835  318 361
2003 47 252 836 23 233 359  394 459 20 306 073 3 227 575  91 370
2002 36 059 089 17 013 192  249 366 16 416 566 2 339 331  40 634
2001 31 334 216 15 521 220  173 592 13 219 437 2 263 689  156 277
2000 27 774 906 13 080 017  93 957 12 013 620 2 338 492  248 819
Source: 2006 figures, TUİK
According to 2006 figures, 87.6% of Turkish foreign trade volume was carried by maritime trans-
port. However, this percentage equals only 59% of Turkish port capacity. Remaining capacity 
might be used for increasing the poor amount of transit and cabotage carriages.
Besides the physical constraints, the Turkish regulatory framework hampers the growth of ca-
botage and transit transportation because of time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. The hand-
ling and long bureaucratic process for transit carriages and cabotage carriages may take up to one 
week in Turkish ports, whereas global benchmarks in ports like Rotterdam and Dubai, are a couple 
of hours or at most a couple of days107
Table 3-29: The amount of total handling operated in Turkish ports108
Total 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Transit 30,770,006 28,723,744 23,435,730 0 4,826,449
Export 32,291,101 40,633,756 39,065,012 41,476,801 47,058,194
Import 85,956,955 72,780,602 86,179,840 98,673,637 104,697,120
Cabotage 37,327,805 26,281,398 0 0 29,218,352
Total 186,345,867 168,419,500 148,680,582 140,150,438 185,800,115
Source: TUSIAD
3.5.2.3. Regulatory Overview
In maritime transport, there are two general categories of regulations. The first group of regula-
tions that essentially deal with issues such as safety and security are in general international rules 
and regulations adopted within the umbrella of international organisations such as the Interna-
tional Maritime Organisation (IMO). Nation states, including Turkey, transpose these rules into 
their national regulations. In return, rules regarding competition and market entry are decided by 
107 SDD Lojistik Sektörüne Bakış, UTIKAD (2006), http://www.sedefed.org/default.aspx?pid=24918&nid=11400
108  Kurumsal Yapısı, Yasal Çerçevesiyle Ulaştırma Sektörü (2007)pg. 146 TUSIAD. www.tusiad.org.tr 
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domestic authorities. In the Turkish case, the pertinent state authorities are the Ministry of Trans-
port and Undersecretariat of Maritime Affairs.  
International Rules and Regulations
Under the umbrella of International Maritime Organization several conventions on the matters related 
to maritime sector have been concluded.  Turkey is a member of International Maritime Organisation 
since 1958. Turkey has signed several conventions including the SOLAS 74 (International Conven-
tion for Safety of Life at Sea) and other 45 bilateral agreements on mutual assistance and cooperation 
in the maritime field.109 The adoption of the EU acquis will also require Turkey to become signatory 
to additional IMO Conventions including SOLAS 78, 88, Load Line 88 and Mar-Pol. 
Customs
Turkish ports have customs facilities similar to European ports. However, custom procedures are 
much more bureaucratic and time consuming than European ports. For Turkish ports approval 
by more than 10 different authorities is needed for the completion of customs procedures. This 
translates into a waiting period of almost a full week whereas in more efficient ports elsewhere, 
this procedure can be completed within 1-3 days. The average length of customs procedures also 
represents an impediment to the growth of transit trade. 
Cabotage
In Turkey, ships having Turkish International Ship Registry and Turkish National Ship Registry 
can enjoy cabotage rights. The Turkish maritime cabotage law aims to protect domestic maritime 
transport sector from foreign entry since 1926. However, the protectionist approach is not suffici-
ent to enable Turkish ships to become competitive in relation to other modes of transport. When 
compared to land transport, domestic maritime transport still remains more expensive and time 
consuming due to inefficient customs regulations.
Ship Registry
There are two types of ship registries in Turkey, namely Turkish International Ship registry and Na-
tional Ship Registry. According to the provisions of the law on Turkish International Ship registry 
the ownership conditions for registration are as follows: 
• Ships owned by Turkish citizens, 
• Ships owned by foreigners who reside in Turkey
• Ships owned by companies established in Turkey 
The captain should nonetheless be a Turkish citizen. If the owner is a Turkish citizen, 51% of 
crew members shall be Turkish citizen, too. Ships registered in Turkish International Ship Registry 
can benefit from cabotage rights, provided that; 
• Ship-owner is a Turkish citizen.
• Majority of the shares belong to Turkish citizens
• Majority of partners are Turkish citizens.
These are incidentally the conditions set out for registration in the National Ship Registry.
109  Screening Chapter 14, Maritime Transport/ International Relations pg.2
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3.5.2.4. Productivity Impact Assessment
The adoption of the EU acquis in sea transport is expected to have a relatively large impact on the 
Turkish sea transport industry on account of an increase in competition in cabotage services, and 
a lessening of red-tape in port services and customs procedures. Given the nature of sea transport 
which acts as an input for the production process of many other industries, increased efficiency in 
this area will also have a positive impact on the cost efficiencies of a diverse range of industries. In 
order to clarify these linkages, the Input/Output table of the Turkish economy110 was utilized to 
prepare two different sets of tables. The first table lists the industries which are going to be most 
affected by any change in the sectoral productivity of sea transport. The second table lists the 
industries which will have the most significant impact on the overall productivity of the national 
economy. In other words, the second table ranks industries according to their intensity of sea 
transport usage weighted by their share in national value added.
Table 3-30: Ranking of industries according to sea transport usage as a share in production inputs
Industry Index
Refined petroleum products 1.0000
Ready wear 0.4977
Fabricated metal products 0.2138
Financial services 0.1735
Ship building 0.1012
Telecommunications 0.0945
Insurance 0.0833
Vegetable production 0.0808
General purpose machinery 0.0776
Electrical machinery 0.0719
Other business activities 0.0644
Metals casting 0.0441
Confectionary 0.0155
Water distribution 0.0100
Other business activities 0.0099
Gas distribution 0.0099
Paper and paper products 0.0084
Electricity 0.0071
Wood and wood products 0.0051
Printing services 0.0049
Meat products 0.0043
Ceramics 0.0042
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
110  TURKSTAT, input-output data for Turkish economy (1998).
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Table 3-31: Ranking of industries according to the overall productivity impact on the national economy 
on account of a productivity increase in sea transport
Industry Index
Refined petroleum products 1
Financial services 0.3547
Ready wear 01939
Telecommunications 0.0597
Vegetables production 0.0584
Fabricated metal products 0.0386
Electrical machinery 0.0127
General purpose machinery 0.0078
Insurance 0.0072
Other business activities 0.0057
Other service activities 0.0054
Electricity 0.0043
Animal farming 0.0024
Confectionary 0.0020
Metal casting 0.0017
Water distribution 0.0016
Ship building 0.0014
Catering 0.0012
Paper and paper products 0.0011
Ceramics 0.0004
Wood products 0.0004
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
3.5.2.5. Evaluation
Turkish maritime sector is in a transition phase characterized by a gradual shift from state run and 
state held assets to private enterprise. In the area of port management, the privatization process is 
well under way and some of Turkey’s main ports have been successfully privatized. In the area of 
maritime transport, the focus is on the need for a more business friendly regulation so as to elimi-
nate the current impediments to the growth of cabotage as well as transit trade. As mentioned in 
the Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey regarding maritime transport, progress remains lim-
ited to the degree of the adoption of the EU acquis. The full range of IMO’s sea safety and security 
regulations including SOLAS 78, SOLAS 88, Load Line 88 and Mar-Pol are yet to be adopted by 
Turkey. In terms of market entry regulations, the discriminatory provisions of the ship registry are 
to be overhauled. In addition, the current system which allows national flagged ships of an excise 
tax exemption on their purchases of fuel can be challenged on the grounds that it is incompatible 
with state aids rules. 
The adoption of the EU acquis would also alleviate some of the difficulties related to the imp-
lementation of the customs legislation which hinders the operation and efficiency of Turkish ports 
and maritime services in Turkey. Finally additional investments in institutional enforcement capa-
city would lead to an enhanced reputation for Turkish ships travelling in international waters. The 
corresponding decrease in detention rates would increase the competitiveness of the Turkish fleet 
in providing international maritime transport services. 
3.6. Annex: Examples of Rail Sector Organisation in Selected 
Member States
Examples of how some member states have implemented the EU acquis illustrates the possibility 
for variations that exist.
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United Kingdom (UK) 111
UK represents the most extreme case of privatisation and fragmentation of the railway sector. In 
contrast to other countries in Europe, the UK no longer has one leading national company. Both 
passenger and freight services are fragmented among different operators. There are 25 main train 
operating companies and several smaller operators. Some, such as Virgin and GNER, operate a 
national service on what was called the ‘inter-city’ routes under nationalised British Rail. The 
other companies generally provide local services. There are five companies active in the rail freight 
sector. 
Track length is approximately 16,900 km, 5,000 km are electrified.
Figure A-1: Main public institutions in UK rail sector
 
Sweden112
Sweden was one of first countries in Europe to liberalise the railway market. In 1999 the former 
national railway group Statens Järnvägar (SJ) was split up in different independent companies: SJ 
AB for passenger transport, Green Cargo AB for freight transport, Euromaint AB for maintenance 
services and TraffiCare AB for station services.
SJ AB became a joint stock company with 100 % of shares owned by the state on 1 January 
2001. Infrastructure activities continue to be the responsibility of a government authority, Ban-
verket. A large number of private operators are active in the Swedish railway market capturing 45 
% of market share.
The new independent government agency, the Swedish rail agency Järnvägsstyrelsen, was estab-
lished in July 2004 and has its main office in Borlänge (Järnvägsstyrelsen, 2005).
The agency is divided into five divisions:
• infrastructure – issues permits, monitors markets and supervises safety issues for infrastruc-
ture managers;
• rail company – issues permits, monitors markets, supervises safety issues for rail companies, 
and manages vehicle registers;
• technical – Technical Specifications Interoperability (TSI), essential requirements, exemp-
tions, the coordination of Article 21, approval of vehicles and sub-systems, matters concern-
ing OTIF (Intergovernmental organisation for international carriage by rail);
111  Profile of the rail transport sector in the United Kingdom, European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, 2006
112  Profile of the rail transport sector in Sweden, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, 2006
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• legal – regulations, investigates accidents, follows and studies accident investigations, pro-
duces accident statistics, and decides on health exemptions;
• administrative – accounting, personnel, office premises, IT support, operational planning.
Track length is approximately 15,400 km, 7,200 km are electrified.
The Netherlands113
The Dutch rail market has been extensively liberalised and thus opened to competition in long 
and short distance passenger transport as well as freight transport. This process will continue in the 
coming years as further open tender procedures are planned or ongoing. The former monopolist, 
Nederlandse Spoor (NS), has separated infrastructure operation and maintenance from transport 
services and has created 10 independent subsidiaries. NS was transformed into a joint stock com-
pany, the shares are owned by the state.
Track length is approximately 2,800 km, 73% electrified.
Figure A-2: Main public institutions in Dutch rail sector
Germany114
The German rail system is characterised by strong decentralisation and heterogeneity of the deci-
sion-makers at very different levels. These levels are mainly a result of Germany’s federal structure, 
which consists of the federal states’ (Bundesländer) governments and the federal government. 
Structure and responsibilities of the ministries differ from one state to another. In addition, some 
responsibilities lie with the municipalities and sector associations.
Germany is the biggest market for rail transport in Europe. Accordingly, the impact of restru-
cturing activities in the past decade has been far-reaching.
The privatisation of the formerly state-owned federal railways has been a long process. It started 
off with the railway reform on 1 January 1994 with the creation of the joint-stock corporation 
Deutsche Bahn AG (DB AG). The German government is the only shareholder of DB AG. Alt-
hough the sector is officially privatised by now, there is still a distinction between so called state-
owned railways and non-state-owned railways. ‘State-owned’ is the label used for those companies 
whose shares are exclusively or predominantly owned by the German government, like the DB AG 
and its subsidiaries. The non state-owned companies operate according to their concession as part 
of the public or private transport systems. They may in part be publicly owned by municipalities 
or federal states (Bundesländer).
Track length is approximately 43,000 km, 21,000 km are electrified.
113  Profile of the rail transport sector in the Netherlands, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions, 2006
114  Profile of the rail transport sector in Germany, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, 2006
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Figure A-3: Main public institutions in German rail sector (Source: SCI Verkehr GmbH, 2004)
Italy115
The last 15 years have seen the transformation of Ferrovie dello Stato into a holding with several 
specialised companies. In the Italian railway market, the Ferrovie dello Stato group has maintained 
a leading position and employs around 95% of railway workers in Italy. The Ministry of infra-
structure, together with the Ministry of Treasury, exercises the shareholder power in Ferrovie dello 
Stato.
Few new players are currently active in the freight transport with a small but increasing market 
share. First tenders and increase in traffic on regional lines are showing the growing importance 
of this market segment. Here, the Ferrovie dello Stato group competes and sometimes cooperates 
with small regional companies, which are starting to expand beyond their original network.
The main tasks within the Ministry of infrastructure regarding railways are as follows:
• responsibility for management of the infrastructure and definition of the contract;
• definition of the contract with long-distance transport operators;
• establishing ticket prices for long-distance railway transport in co-operation with the inter-
ministerial committee for the economic programme, CIPE;
• defining the track fee and the rules to allow access to the network and assigning tracks to the 
railway operators;
• establishing safety standards;
• coordination and supervision of the railway transport in order to ensure safety.
The other relevant body within the Ministry of infrastructure is the Office for the regulation of 
railway services (Ufficio per la regolazione dei servizi ferroviari).
The national authority for the market and competition (AGMC) is responsible for ensuring 
competition and good market conditions. This authority can also intervene in the railway sector.
Track length is approximately 19,400 km, 10,900 km are electrified.
115  Profile of the rail transport sector in Italy, European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Wor-
king Conditions, 2006
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4.1. Introduction
In the past few years, Turkey has undertaken major reforms aimed at narrowing the scope of re-
gulation and ensuring that regulations better serve public interests. Although there are important 
differences across industries, the reforms have generally included market opening, privatisation, 
liberalising restrictions on entry, prices and normal business practices as well as ensuring competi-
tive access to bottleneck facilities. 
This study focuses on regulatory reform in key network infrastructure industries (telecom-
munications, energy and transport). The regulation of these industries is important for the per-
formance of the whole economy due to the “knock-on” effects of regulation at the sectoral level. 
Sectoral regulation in these industries do not only have a direct influence on market conditions 
in these particular sectors but also affect indirectly many other sectors where firms use the output 
of these industries as intermediate inputs in their production process. Moreover given the shift 
towards a services based economy in many developed countries, the linkage between the micro 
performance of key infrastructure sectors and the macro performance of the national economies 
is gaining strength. As a consequence, the appropriate regulation of these industries is acquiring 
even more importance. 
That is also why the current debates on economic growth tend to underline the need for mi-
cro and sectoral reforms. The challenge for most policy makers is to concentrate on removing 
the productivity bottlenecks at the sectoral level, usually called second generation reforms, and 
introducing regulatory frameworks that are both growth-friendly and supportive of public service 
obligations. This is a major challenge. Regulatory reform, especially in network industries, is dif-
ficult and improvements in overall welfare critically depend on the country’s capacity to design, 
implement and enforce regulatory frameworks which promote competition on the one hand and 
curtail anti-competitive behaviour on the other. 
In the Turkish case, the scope and impact of regulatory reforms in the network infrastructure 
industries have been uneven. In some sectors, the process of regulatory reform is well advanced 
whereas in others Turkey is still at the early stages of reform. The same observation can be made 
in connection with EU harmonisation. The accompanying set of papers which analyze the state 
of play and impact of these reforms in three particular service industries, namely telecommunica-
tions, energy and transport demonstrate clearly the asymmetric nature of these sectoral reforms. 
This aim of this chapter as follows: First, on the basis of analysis presented in the previous chap-
ters, the chapter presents a synopsis of where Turkey stands in terms of regulatory reform in gen-
eral and harmonization with the EU acquis in particular. Second, the chapter describes elements 
of business environment, such as foreign direct investment (FDI), competition policy, state aids 
and public service obligations that affect the impact of regulatory reform. It also identifies cross-
cutting factors that help explain progress so far and which may provide the basis of cross-cutting 
policy recommendations. Hence the objective will be to shed light on the different factors which 
have a bearing on the regulatory reform process in Turkey so as to better understand the sectoral 
differences that have emerged over time. A related objective would be to analyze prevailing short-
comings of Turkey’s approach to service industry regulation which may negatively affect sectoral 
productivities. In particular, we would like to underline the idea that even in cases where harmo-
nization is more or less advanced, implementation and enforcement, and consequently obtaining 
the desired impact of regulations, may face problems because institutional and governance-related 
factors. Finally, a set of recommendations to enhance the regulatory governance of the Turkish 
economy, based on the analysis carried out at the sectoral level as illustrated by the accompanying 
papers, will be set out. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief introduction 
to factors that have led Turkey to undertake regulatory reform. Section 4.3 summarizes the degree 
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of harmonization in the sectors covered in this study and points out that the gap between Turkey 
and Europe in terms of impact is likely to be higher than the gap in terms of harmonization. Sec-
tion 4.4 focuses on FDI in the infrastructure sectors. The next three sections examine competition 
law and state aids, public service obligations and privatisation, respectively. Section 4.8 analyzes 
institutional factors that affect the performance of the regulatory agencies. Section 4.9 provides 
recommendations and concludes.
4.2. Background to Regulatory Reform
Why engage in regulatory reform? There are two types of answers to this question. The first set of 
answers relate to the rising need for regulatory reform in a global perspective. The OECD (1999) 
gives a list of reasons why a global trend has developed in favour of regulatory reform in network 
infrastructure industries. The first and most important is a growing appreciation that significant 
efficiency gains can be realised by giving greater play to market forces through relaxing govern-
mental restraints on technology choice and on new entry or new forms of competition. Under a 
rigidly controlled system, players simply lack the information and incentives to encourage the use 
of best available technologies and the discovery of improved technologies. Alongside the growing 
recognition that regulation can reduce economic efficiency, there is an accompanying realisation 
that in many network infrastructure industries, technological change has altered the natural mo-
nopoly aspect of the network and has allowed the introduction of various forms competition into 
segments that were previously considered to be non-competitive (e.g. the local loop in telecommu-
nications). Moreover, once the possibility of “regulatory failure” is admitted, economies of scope 
might seem less important. A third reason for the trend towards regulatory reform is growing 
resistance on the part of business to pay rising compliance costs. This is closely related to a fourth 
source of pressure for regulatory reform which is rooted in growing globalisation. 
The second set of answers relate to Turkey’s own conditions. The Turkish model of economic 
development traditionally relied on a strategy of import substitution and state guidance. This 
model was predicated on the existence of a private sector protected from international competi-
tion by high tariffs, in tandem with state economic enterprises which were operational in many 
sectors of the economy. The state’s involvement in economic activity was explained by the scarcity 
of private capital. Indeed, the model was certainly unconducive to the inflow of foreign capital. 
Turkish etatist political philosophy which ascribes economic tasks to the state was also a factor 
which facilitated the involvement of the state in business.
Following the oil shocks of the 1970s, the model ran into trouble and the country started to ex-
perience serious balance of payments difficulties. In January 1980, the first radical transformation 
of the Turkish economy was initiated with a far ranging liberalisation package. Import substitution 
policies were replaced by an export oriented growth strategy. Trade and investment policies were 
overhauled. Turkey’s economy reacted positively to these reforms and economic growth resumed. 
Liberalisation nonetheless remained incomplete as the weight of state economic enterprises in the 
national economy remained unchanged. Privatisation efforts stalled due to political and economic 
instability, legal inconsistencies and strong ideological opposition.
The completion of a customs union with the EU in 1995 ushered in a second wave of economic 
liberalisation and modernisation. Trade policies were fully harmonised with the EU and a compe-
tition policy was adopted. It is really after this date that Turkey started to contemplate in earnest 
a more fundamental reform of its economic structure with a focus on selling state held assets and 
companies to private investors. In short, the customs union which epitomizes the integration of 
Turkey’s economy with the European economy can be seen as the stimulus for the initiation of an 
ambitious privatisation program. 
The second reason why privatization and regulatory reform gathered pace in Turkey relates to 
the economic adjustment program that the country has implemented with the support of the IMF 
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since 2001. The economic crisis of 2000-2001 was overcome with an economic program designed 
to restore and maintain strong fiscal discipline. Privatisation was a critical part of the program. 
Privatisation would also help to obtain much needed foreign investments. 
Since then, privatisation gathered pace and a number of state-held industrial and service com-
panies including former public utilities like Türk Telekom were sold off. The privatisation drive 
brought to the fore the need for regulatory reform. In other words, as in many other developing 
countries, it was the feared outcome of transferring a public monopoly to private hands which 
fuelled the debate on regulatory reform. 
Finally, it should be underlined that the EU full membership objective represents a strong an-
chor for regulatory reform in Turkey. The EU acquis provides a detailed blueprint for regulatory 
changes in candidate countries. The same is true for Turkey. The Turkish experience in regulatory 
reform has significantly been influenced by the need for the adoption of the EU acquis. Even 
before the start of accession talks in 2005, the EU blueprint was used by Turkey to underpin its 
regulatory convergence. The publication the Commission’s yearly report on Turkey which sets out 
the progress achieved within a year on the convergence with EU laws and regulations represented 
a useful tool in this regard. 
4.3. Progress with Harmonization
Table 4-1 summarizes the state of play regarding the degree of regulatory harmonisation in the key 
network infrastructure industries.
Table 4-1: Degree of regulatory harmonisation
Sector Degree of harmonisation
Degree of market 
competition
Weight of state incumbent
Electricity High Medium High
Natural Gas High Low Very high
Telecommunications High Medium None*
Land transport Medium High None
Sea transport Low High Low
Rail transport Low Very low Very high
Air transport High Medium High
* As majority of TTAŞ shares have been privatized, the weight of state incumbent is interpreted as none. 
Source: Own evaluation. 
As can be seen, there are marked inter sectoral differences in terms of the regulatory conver-
gence as well as market outcomes. These differences are also reflected on sectoral productivities. As 
highlighted in the accompanying studies, sectoral productivity and efficiencies are closely related 
to the degree of market competition enabled by the regulatory regime. 
De-regulation and liberalisation of rail services is a complex and difficult process. It has hap-
pened gradually in the EU. Even now, the process is still continuing and its implementation is 
fraught with difficulties. Vertical separation, accounting or institutional, constitutes the backbone 
of EU regulation in the railway sector. This is complemented by allowing free and non-discrimi-
natory access to the railway network and enhanced by the separation of accounting for transport 
services (passenger & freight) and PSOs. In Turkey, despite the longstanding goals of separation 
of infrastructure management from provision of transport services and the restructuring of the 
TCDD with a commercial mindset, the TCDD does not operate on commercial principles. There 
are private sector enterprises that provide more and more rail transport services; yet they are de-
pendent on TCDD for locomotives. Railway Package is being prepared in line with EU Directives, 
not only to vertically separate the TCDD, but also to liberalise the railway services market.
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In road transport market in Turkey, there has been a serious progress in terms of harmonis-
ing the Turkish road transport legislation with the EU acquis. A new Road Transport Law and 
the following bylaws adopted in 2003 and 2004 have created a similar regulatory framework for 
road transport services; and defined market access rules based on the criteria of good repute, fi-
nancial standing and professional competence, as in the EU. There are nonetheless some residual 
differences in the regulatory framework stemming from the difference of the market structures. 
The Road Transport Law and Bylaws addresses the fact that the sector is too fragmented and the 
vast majority of players are too small. As a result, market access rules and licensing provisions are 
adapted to Turkish market. The proper implementation of the law is expected to lead to consolida-
tion and transformation of the sector, and allow market players to achieve economies of scale. The 
sector would then be able to assume the EU Directives more precisely.
The Turkish legislation in the area of air transport is compatible in many respects with the EU 
acquis. However, full harmonisation should bring additional benefits as increased competition, 
productivity and transparency, and positive impact on cost and quality. The incorporation of Tur-
key within the Single European Space will increase the competition in the sector as EU carriers 
can begin to service the Turkish market as Turkish carriers can then operate between and within 
EU countries without any discrimination. The current opaque system of imposing public service 
obligations (PSOs) on air carriers as a condition to grant route permits would be replaced with a 
more objective and transparent set of conditions governing the PSO rules which would have a sig-
nificant impact on the implementation cost and quality of the prevailing regulation. A regulatory 
harmonisation would also require Turkey to amend its existing bilateral air transport agreements 
and do away with the legal duopolies and price fixing arrangements created on some international 
routes to the benefit of the national flag carrier THY. This would enable other privately owned air 
carriers to compete on a more equal footing with THY on these routes.
Turkish maritime sector is in a transition phase characterized by a gradual shift from state 
run and state held assets to private enterprise. In the area of port management, the privatization 
process is well under way and some of Turkey’s main ports have been successfully privatized. In 
the area of maritime transport, the focus is on the need for a more business friendly regulation 
so as to eliminate the current impediments to the growth of cabotage as well as transit trade. 
As mentioned in the Commission’s Progress Report on Turkey regarding maritime transport, 
progress remains limited to the degree of the adoption of the EU acquis. The full range of sea 
safety and security regulations of the International Maritime Organization including SOLAS 
78, SOLAS 88, Load Line 88 and Mar-Pol are yet to be adopted by Turkey. In terms of market 
entry regulations, the discriminatory provisions of the ship registry are to be overhauled. Finally 
additional investments in institutional enforcement capacity would lead to an enhanced reputa-
tion for Turkish ships travelling in international waters. The corresponding decrease in detention 
rates would increase the competitiveness of the Turkish fleet in providing international maritime 
transport services. 
In the Turkish telecommunications industry, regulatory reform was jumpstarted in 2000, with 
the enactment of Law No. 4502 which established the Telecommunications Authority and stipu-
lated that the monopoly rights of the incumbent operator, Türk Telekomünikasyon AŞ, would 
be abolished at the end of 2003. Initially the regulatory framework in Turkey was modelled after 
the EU 1998 package. After the 2003 framework was launched in Europe, the Telecommunica-
tions Authority based its own secondary legislation increasingly on that new framework, specify-
ing ex-ante regulatory obligations on the basis of market analyses and identification of operators 
with Significant Market Power. However, significant divergences remain, especially in the area of 
authorizations, which in Turkey is still governed by an individual licensing regime. 
Actual competition in the telecommunications industry has been slow to develop. This was 
partly due to delays in regulatory actions. Delays occurred both because of the initial inexperience 
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of the Authority as well as a perception that speedy development of competition could hurt the 
revenues that could be raised by the prospective privatization of the incumbent operator, which 
took place in 2005. Competition is expected to pick up with the implementation of unbundled 
access to the local loop, carrier pre-selection and number portability. 
The milestone development in the regulatory reform in the electricity industry was the enact-
ment of the Electricity Market Law (EML) in 2001. At the time of its enactment, the EML pro-
vided close to full harmonization with the EU Directives: The law established an independent reg-
ulatory authority (currently called the Energy Markets Regulatory Authority, EMRA), organised 
state owned generation, transmission and distribution into separate legal entities, and introduced 
eligible consumers who would be free to choose their suppliers. The consumption level thresholds 
for eligible consumers would be set by the regulatory Authority, with projected full liberalization 
in 2011. Currently the main gap in terms of harmonization with the EU acquis is that the same 
legal entity can engage in generation, distribution and retail supply only subject to accounting 
separation. A Competition Authority decision stipulates that distribution and retail supply will 
need to be legally separated after the privatisation of distribution companies.
Despite much progress in terms harmonization, however the expected investment by the pri-
vate sector has not been forthcoming and the country is likely to suffer from shortages in 2-3 years. 
As discussed in the chapter on energy the original strategy has failed to deliver because of delays in 
privatization of distribution assets and inconsistent pricing policies. 
In the gas industry as well the Natural Gas Market Law which was enacted in 2001 provided 
significant steps in terms of harmonization with the 2003 EU directive on gas. The law stipulated 
regulated third party access and introduced eligible consumers. The law fell short of legal un-
bundling and introduced accounting unbundling for the incumbent operator BOTAŞ as well as 
private sector actors; however, it also envisaged that BOTAŞ would be legally unbundled by 2009. 
Private sector entry is significant in the city distribution of gas. However, there is practically no 
competition anywhere in the market mainly because of long term contracts BOTAŞ holds with 
international suppliers such as Russia, Iran, Algeria, etc. Plans to release contracts and/or volumes 
to the private sector are seriously delayed.
To summarize, then, Turkey’s progress in terms of harmonization with the EU acquis has been 
uneven, but overall, not too disappointing. It seems that compared with the gap in the legal frame-
works, the gap in implementation and more importantly, in terms of impact, that is, the degree of 
development of effective competition is larger, especially when Turkey is contrasted with success-
ful examples in Europe in this regard. In the rest of this chapter we examine further elements of the 
legal and institutional environment and search for factors that may help explain this divergence.
4.4. Regulation, Productivity and the Foreign Direct Investment 
Environment
There is a close relationship between regulation and productivity. Several studies have demonstra-
ted that in sectors where the prevailing regulatory regime allows the establishment of a competi-
tive or contestable market structure, market efficiency improves1. Levels and rate of growth per 
capita GDP tend to be higher in countries where local markets have higher entry and competition 
(World Bank, 2003). Analysis of data for another sample of countries finds that net market entry 
can account for more than 30 % of productivity growth (Khemani, 2006). New entrants stimulate 
incumbent firms to increase productivity to maintain their profits. Likewise firms facing strong 
competitive pressures are at least 50 % more likely to innovate than those not subject to such 
pressure (World Bank, 2005). The challenge for policy makers is to introduce pro-competitive 
regulation in network industries which partially exhibit natural monopoly characteristics. 
1  See for instance World Bank (2003).
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In addition to pro-competitive regulation, foreign direct investments (FDI) represents an ad-
ditional dimension linking regulatory reform and productivity. FDI is generally believed to have 
a positive impact on sectoral productivity. Empirical work has typically shown that foreign affili-
ates tend to be more capital and skill intensive and invest more in research and development than 
domestic firms in the same industry (Keller, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2003; OECD, 2001). As a 
result, foreign affiliates tend to grow more quickly and make a larger contribution to productivity 
growth in comparison to domestic firms (Criscuolo, 2005). Foreign affiliates may also contribute 
indirectly to higher productivity growth by disseminating better management practices, diffusing 
new know how and educating the labour force.
Therefore a regulatory climate conducive to FDI should also contribute to higher productivity 
growth. Indeed as shown by Nicoletti et. al. (2003), regulatory policies that restrict market ac-
cess or reduce the potential returns to foreign investment negatively influence the share of foreign 
investment in OECD countries. Conway et. al. (2006) have for instance shown that regulatory 
restrictions to domestic competition and FDI have a significant negative effect on the amount of 
FDI. They indicate that by raising barriers to entry, anti competitive product market regulation 
discourages the establishment of foreign affiliates and their propensity to increase employment. 
They conclude that regulatory settings have a relatively large impact on the cross-country variabil-
ity foreign affiliates’ employment shares2.
Viewed from this perspective, the adoption of the EU acquis in the network industries should 
enable Turkey to significantly enhance its potential for attracting foreign investment in those in-
dustries. The Turkish sectoral legislation still contains a number of barriers to foreign investments 
as summarized in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: Residual barriers to foreign investment in Turkey 
Sector Investment barrier
Sea transport Cabotage limited to domestic ships where in order to fly the Turkish flag, the shipping companies must have the majority of 51 per cent Turkish shareholders.
Air transport Air carriers operating on domestic routes must be owned by Turkish citizens
Electricity Foreign natural or legal persons cannot have a market share that would give them a ‘control power’ in the electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors (Electricity Market Law Art. 14).
For the Turkish case, the impact of the disincentive for foreign investments stemming from the 
statutory restrictions imposed by the regulatory regime can also be seen from the following tables 
which show the FDI intensiveness3 of the main sectors for 2001 and for 2006. 
2  Their regression estimates imply that product market regulation explains around 10 % of the cross country 
variation in the data wheras direct restrictions on FDI account for a further 13 %.
3  FDI intensiveness is defined as the ratio of the sectoral shares in total yearly inflows of FDIs to the sectoral 
shares in GNP.
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Figure 4-1: FDI intensiveness (2001)F DI Intens ivenes s  - 2001
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Source : Own calculations. Compiled from TUIK, OECD Communications Outlook 2007 and Turkish Treasury statistics.
Figure 4-2: FDI intensiveness (2006)F DI intens ivenes s  - 2006
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Source : Own calculations. Compiled from TUIK, OECD Communications Outlook 2007 and Turkish Treasury statistics.
In the 5 year time frame, the FDI intensiveness of the communications sector increased con-
siderably. This is the result of a combination of regulatory reform, liberalisation and privatisation 
which was carried out in this sector. The FDI intensity of the transport sector also registered a 
slight increase on account of the public private partnerships in airport construction and operation. 
In energy, the FDI intensity is still low as a consequence of enduring restrictions in the regulatory 
framework and the lack of progress in opening the sector to full competition especially in the area 
of distribution. 
The adoption of the EU acquis is set to lead to the elimination of these regulatory restrictions 
on foreign investments in the network industries and the consequent removal of existing disincen-
tives for FDI. As a result, these sectors may attract increased inflows of FDI with concomitant 
benefits in terms of productivity growth. 
4.5. Competition Law
The regulation of competition is an intrinsic part of the overall regulatory approach. Therefore the 
implementation of competition rules as well as the nature of the relationship between the compe-
tition authority and the sectoral independent regulatory authorities have a significant impact on 
sectoral policies. 
In Turkey, competition law is an area where significant progress has been made. The Competi-
tion Law was adopted in 1997 and a Competition Authority was setup in 1997. Since then the 
Competition Authority established itself as a highly competent and efficient regulatory body. The 
work of the Turkish Competition Authority was commended in the Commission’s yearly Progress 
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Reports. Similarly, the 2005 OECD review of competition policy in Turkey also underlined the 
good performance of the Turkish Competition Authority stating that “the Turkish Competition 
Authority can take justifiable pride in its reputation as one of Turkey’s most effective and best-
administered agencies. It has pursued its mission with energy, imagination, and integrity and has 
won respect and support from leaders in the business community. The Competition Authority’s 
particular strengths include its devotion to articulating and efficiently implementing sound com-
petition policy; its focus on due process and transparency; and its attention to developing and 
training expert staff. Its fiscal and administrative autonomy and the absence of substantive govern-
ment interference in its work, also contribute significantly to its efficacy.” 
In short, the regulatory framework of competition rules is well established in Turkey. However 
problems remain in essentially three areas: a) Relationship between the competition authority and 
other regulatory bodies b) State aids and c) Judicial review. The first two are covered in here and 
the third is discussed in section 8. 
4.5.1. Relationship Between the Competition Authority and Other 
Regulatory Bodies
As discussed, one of the aims of regulatory reform in network industries has been the introduction 
of competition in hitherto state held sectors. Given the relevance of establishing and safeguarding 
the right competitive framework in ensuring the best long term outcome for industrial perfor-
mance, the nature of the relationship between the different administrative bodies that have been 
entrusted with a regulatory responsibility acquires importance. In other words, the definition of 
the jurisdiction and relationship between the Competition Authority and the Independent Regu-
latory Authorities (IRAs) is critical in ensuring good and market- friendly regulation. 
Competition policy is mainly ex post whereas industry regulation is primarily ex ante. Thus 
it is important to provide a way for cooperation between these administrative bodies preferably 
through statutory measures. The allocation of work in between these institutions does not only 
depend on the best models of competition policy and regulation and the capabilities of the in-
stitutions but it is also shaped under the limitations of the legal and administrative systems and 
sometimes even bureaucratic culture and traditions of the country concerned (Öz, 2006).
In Turkey, the legal provisions concerning the relationship between the Competition Authority 
and IRAs are incomplete and relatively ineffective. A communiqué had been issued in 1998 and 
repeated in 2001 by the office of the Prime Minister encouraging other agencies of the government 
to consult with the Competition Authority in advance about proposed regulations and decisions 
that had implications for competition policy. Given that the Prime Ministry’s communiqué is not 
viewed as being obligatory and there are no sanctions if an agency fails to notify the Competition 
Authority of an important regulation, compliance in the Turkish administration with these stipu-
lations has been limited and haphazard. 
As regards the regulatory bodies, the telecommunications law both obliges the Telecommu-
nications Authority to consult with the Competition Authority about certain matters (such as 
investigations of Türk Telekom and preparation of proposed regulations) and provides that the 
Competition Authority should consult with the Telecommunications Authority before taking any 
decisions respecting the telecommunications sector. In September 2002, a cooperation protocol 
was signed between the Competition Authority and the Telecommunications Authority to pro-
mote cooperation and coordination between the two agencies with respect to law enforcement 
investigations, merger review, and exemptions and negative clearances. But the protocol has not 
been effectively implemented. 
The OECD (2005) reports that meanwhile, private sector telecommunications firms complain 
that, due to overlapping jurisdictions, they are subject to penalties by both the Competition Au-
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thority and the Telecommunications Authority for the same conduct. It is also possible that a firm 
could be subject to directly conflicting rules. For example, telephone service providers face both 
the Competition Law’s prohibition of resale price maintenance and the Telecommunication Au-
thority’s regulations barring price discrimination in sales of phone services to end users. 
Ironically, the situation in the area of energy is quite the opposite. The sector laws on electricity 
and natural gas, do not contain analogous provisions requiring consultations between the Com-
petition Authority and the Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA). Yet, the two agencies 
have willingly concluded an agreement laying down specific consultation and collaboration rules. 
They have thus been able to coordinate the consideration of common issues even without legisla-
tive direction. 
According to the European Commission4, “Although the Competition Authority has exclusive 
competence to enforce anti-trust rules, it has not been able to intervene in distortions of competi-
tion which arise from other legislation containing anti-competitive provisions… The sector regulatory 
authorities such as the Energy Markets Regulatory Authority, the Telecommunications Authority, the 
Banking Regulatory and Supervision Authority do not ensure efficient cooperation and use of consulta-
tion mechanisms with the Competition Authority in order to prevent any competition distortions in 
their respective regulated markets yet”. The screening report on the competition chapter5 highlights 
a similar problem : “However, the enforcement record in this area is also hampered by the competing 
responsibilities of sector regulatory authorities such as the Energy Market Regulatory Authority, the Tel-
ecommunication Authority, and the Banking Regulatory and Supervision Authority.”
In order to remedy this deficiency, the new draft bill on competition prepared by the Competi-
tion Authority sets forth a provision expressly requiring public institutions and organisations to 
obtain the Board’s opinion concerning “any acts, by-laws and regulations … which shall affect com-
petitive conditions in markets for goods or services in the whole or a significant part of the territory.” State 
agencies would not be obliged to accept the Competition Authority’s opinion, but failure to obtain 
it would render the resulting measure unenforceable as a matter of law. This measure would be most 
effective if opinions so provided are made available to the public and if the originating agency is 
required to address publicly issues which have been raised by the Competition Authority.
The uncertainties created for businesses by the twin implementation of competition and secto-
ral legislation and the existing overlap of this set of legislation is a critical problem. The codifica-
tion of the relationship between the Competition Authority and the IRAs should be achieved to 
eliminate the resulting barriers to investment. In this respect, the law should introduce a consulta-
tion requirement with clearly defined deadlines. The law should also clearly spell out the division 
of tasks between the Competition Authority and IRAs. To the extent that multiple responsibilities 
remain in matters related to the enforcement of competition rules in network industries, a provi-
sion for resolving the potentially conflicting views of the regulatory authorities should be devised. 
The High Administrative Court could be authorized for instance to adjudicate in case of conflict-
ing views. The opinion of the said Court would be binding on the regulatory institutions. 
4.5.2. The Issue of State Aids
The control and monitoring of state aids is a critical element of the EU acquis. For the creation of 
a EU wide level playing field, the anti trust provisions of the Rome Treaty were accompanied with 
provisions seeking to limit the ability of individual governments to hinder competition through 
state aids. The state aids regime in the EU fulfils this critical role. Nonetheless, over the years the 
enforcement of state aids rules have been among the most sensitive and problematic areas of Com-
munity law. This is certainly understandable given that the state aids regime curtails the capacity of 
4  2005 Progress Report.
5  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/turkey/screening_reports/screening_report_08_tr_internet_en.pdf
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governments to support specific firms or industries. As such, the state aids regime acts as a barrier 
to populism and clientelism in economic policy.
Turkey had assumed the responsibility with the Customs Union Agreement to adopt similar 
rules by 1997. Since then no progress was made. The question of state aids is the most blatant 
failure on the Turkish side related to the implementation of the Customs Union. This state of af-
fairs has to do with the political economy of controlling state aids. Unlike the EU countries where 
the supranational dimension of the Rome Treaty has enabled the European Commission to obtain 
and fulfil the role of a watchdog, the Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU is es-
sentially an intergovernmental agreement with no supranational provisions. As a result, there are 
no joint institutions operating on the basis of sovereignty sharing. This is also why, in the area of 
state aids no common body could be created nor the Commission could be entrusted with the role 
it fulfils vis a vis the Member States. The monitoring of state aids had to be accomplished under a 
purely national setting. The creation of an independent body with the prerogative of enforcing the 
state aids legislation has proved to be contentious in a setting where the responsibilities regarding 
state aids were diffused among several competing state authorities (State Planning Organization, 
Treasury, Foreign Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Industry, TÜBİTAK, Eximbank etc.). 
Turkish policy makers were unable to overcome the institutional reticence to adopt a state aids 
monitoring legislation so as to comply with the Customs Union commitments of the country. The 
adoption of state aids legislation has now become a benchmark for the opening of the competition 
chapter of the full membership negotiations.
The lack of a proper state aids monitoring regime creates a series of difficulties for Turkish 
economic operators. First of all, the regulatory regime does not give any guarantees against acts 
or practices of state authorities which may undermine competition. Practices such as Treasury 
guarantees for the national flag carrier in air transport, facilities provided by local authorities to 
state owned electricity producers or even the tax benefiting the public broadcaster TRT imposed 
on the retail sale of electricity cannot be challenged under the current Turkish legislation. This 
uncertainty acts as a barrier to investment. 
This is all the more important in the network industries where the role of the state continues 
to be dominant or where state held incumbents continue to enjoy significant market shares. The 
state aids legislation is indeed an inalienable part of the EU regulatory framework in the network 
industries and it provides the foundation for tackling some of the state related anti-competitive 
practices. The application of rules regarding universal service or services of public interest relies on 
a significant extent on the existence of appropriate rules regarding state aids. The pro-competitive 
regulation of state owned companies in Turkey will therefore remain incomplete as long as a state 
aids control mechanism is not properly established.
4.6. Regulation of Public Service Obligations
De-regulation and the introduction of competition in some service sectors usually triggers the 
question of the continued universal availability of these services. Indeed the traditional state mo-
nopoly model in service industries such as telecommunications or transport services relied on a 
tacit cross subsidy to maintain services to non-profitable areas or consumer groups. The monopoly 
rents derived from the more affluent segments of the market subsidized the supply of services to 
the more disadvantaged areas. This model cannot be sustained once full competition is introdu-
ced. The commercially minded and profit oriented companies can engage in “cherry picking” and 
choose to service the profitable part of the market to the detriment of potentially loss making con-
sumers. This would be the case for telecommunications services to remote and sparsely populated 
areas or air transport services to small towns. 
The EU has developed a specific strategy to deal with the supply of services of general interest 
under a competitive framework. State owned or even private companies can be entrusted with a 
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public service obligation provided that the loss making part of the business is financed in a trans-
parent and non discriminatory manner6. This framework ensures that the level playing field is 
maintained for service providers while the universal availability of core services is ensured.
Turkey lacks a specific framework dealing with this critical issue. The question of public service 
obligations is not treated in a uniform and transparent manner. Regarding the telecommunica-
tions industry, a Universal Service Law was enacted in 2005, followed by implementing second-
ary legislation adopted in 2006. These require that providers of universal service be designated 
through a tender mechanism and on the basis of calculations of net cost of service. However, these 
principles are not yet applied. The problem in the telecommunications industry is not severe as the 
universal availability of core telecommunications service has not been a sizeable problem (though 
there are still many villages which do not have access to basic telephone services) . However in 
the area of air transport, public service obligations are allegedly carried out without a rule based 
system. As indicated in the accompanying Chapter on transport services, air carriers claim that 
the granting of requested permits for specific routes are made conditional to their acceptance of 
regular scheduled flights to loss making destinations. Principles of public service obligations in 
electricity are not clearly spelled out either, an issue that is clearly going to raise problems once 
distribution companies are privatized. 
A legal and regulatory framework for public service obligations is a critical component for 
regulatory reform as it attempts to minimize potential conflicts between social objectives and the 
development of competition. The lack of a proper regulatory framework applicable for all service 
industries which takes into account the need to implement a rule based and transparent public 
service obligation methodology leads state authorities to apply ad hoc solutions for safeguarding 
the widespread availability of core services. This increases costs at best and induces rent seeking 
behaviour at worst. It is also doubtful that universal access can be achieved through such ad-hoc 
means. The absence of a state aids monitoring legislation compounds this problem by failing to 
establish a legal procedure for repealing the anti-competitive ad-hoc decisions of state authorities 
concerning public service obligations. In addition, the lack of an overall framework on public 
service obligations introduces uncertainties for economic operators in the network industries who 
may at any time face new constraints or conditions imposed by public authorities aiming to attain 
universal service goals. 
4.7. Privatisation
A key component of regulatory reforms in the network industries has been the privatisation pro-
cess. EU law is in fact agnostic regarding the nature of ownership. In other words, there is no requ-
irement in EU law for the privatisation of state companies or monopolies. The EU acquis is more 
concerned with the introduction and regulation of competition in previously state held industries. 
Therefore the requirement to adopt the EU acquis has not been a factor in Turkey’s approach to 
privatisation in the network industries.
Successive Turkish governments’ approach to privatisation has rather been influenced by the 
need to raise revenues to assist the maintenance of fiscal balance. This attitude may be viewed as 
natural in a country where traditionally fiscal profligacy tended to cause frequent economic crisis. 
So raising revenues for the Treasury became a supremely important political and economic objec-
tive. Even though Turkey underwent a successful economic reform and significantly improved 
6  For additional information refer to Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Ar-
ticle 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest Official Journal L 312, 
29.11.2005, p. 67-73 and the Community framework for State aid in the form of public service compensa-
tion Official Journal C 297, 29.11.2005, p. 4-7 
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its fiscal situation, the approach to privatisation has not changed fundamentally. The primary 
objective of the government is still to raise a maximum amount of revenues. This downside of this 
approach is the lack of proper attention to the ex-post regulatory framework. Indeed as long as 
privatisation revenue remains the overriding concern, insufficient attention is devoted to achiev-
ing longer term efficient market outcomes in the industry concerned. At least in the short run the 
objective of revenue maximization may conflict with measures that need to be taken in order to 
ensure the development of competition in those sectors. 
In the Turkish case the authorities seem to have resolved this trade-off in favour of revenues 
with less regard for competition. Evidence for this argument exists in both the telecommunica-
tions and electricity industries as discussed in chapters ahead. In the former, some competition 
enhancing measures were delayed until after the privatisation of the incumbent fixed line operator. 
In the latter, unbundling of distribution activities was curtailed in order to make the privatization 
of distribution assets “more attractive.”
The following table summarizes the main privatisation deals in the network industries:
Table 4-3: Privatisation deals in network industries 
Sector Nature of the deal Name Date Revenues (USD)
Air transport
Selling of concession rights for airport 
construction and management
Istanbul Atatürk 10.06.2005 2.900.000.000
Istanbul Sabiha Gökçen 10.07.2007 1.932.000.000
IPO of flag carrier THY THY
03.12.2004 191.279.167
18.05.2006 207.820.151 
Block sale of state shares held in Cyprus 
Turkish Airlines KTHY
09.09.2005 33.000.000
Sea transport Selling of concession rights for seaport construction and management
Mersin 11.05.2007 755.000.000
Kusadasi 07.07.2003 30.000.000
Antalya 10.08.2006 60.000.000
Çeşme 28.05.2003 11.250.000
Telecommunications State incumbent operator Türk Telekom Türk Telekom 14.11.2005 6.550.000.000
Electricity 
distribution
Selling of concession rights for regional 
electricity distribution
Başkent Elektrik Dağ. A.Ş.
31.08.2006Sakarya Elektrik Dağ. A.Ş.
Istanbul Anadolu Yakası    
Elektrik Dağıtım A.Ş.
Natural gas 
distribution
Selling of concession rights for regional 
electricity distribution
Esgaz 10.03.2004 43.000.000
Bursagaz 19.04.2004 120.000.000
Total revenues 12.625.529.167
Source : Privatisation Administration 
As can be seen, Turkey has been able to generate a not insignificant sum of revenues from the 
privatisation of network industries or network industry related assets. Moreover, the privatisation 
process is still continuing. In the near future, it is expected to gather pace especially in the energy 
sector with the slated selling of concession rights for regional electricity and gas distribution com-
panies while the port privatization process is set to continue. These privatisations will radically 
transform the industry structure and pose new challenges for regulatory authorities. 
Privatisation plays an especially crucial role in the reform strategy in the electricity industry. The 
sequencing is such that distribution assets are to be privatised first, followed by the privatisation of 
generation assets. The apparent reason for this intriguing sequencing which puts bottleneck seg-
ments ahead of competitive segments is to render distribution companies as credible counterparts 
for bilateral contracts with generation companies. The consequence of this excessive dependence 
of the reform strategy on privatisation has been that delays in privatisation of distribution assets 
have led to significant delay in the introduction of competition in the generation segments.
Overall, it can be said that the authorities seem to discount the importance of competition in 
generating social welfare gains out of ownership changes. There is one factor which compensates 
for this gap, which is Competition Authority’s review of privatization transactions. As discussed in 
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the OECD peer review mentioned above, this review has played an important role in privatisation 
transactions in infrastructure industries.
4.8. Regulatory Authorities
It should be underlined from the outset that Turkey’s experience with independent regulatory aut-
horities (IRAs) is a relatively recent phenomenon. In fact, the prevailing political environment has 
not traditionally been conducive to the sharing of executive and quasi-legal power by independent 
regulatory bodies. On the contrary, the political prerogatives were safeguarded and populist in-
terferences in economic policies were all too common. The establishment of IRAs is a by-product 
of Turkey’s willingness to undertake regulatory harmonisation with the EU. The blueprint provi-
ded by the EU acquis which called for the establishment of IRAs was utilized to prepare the new 
sectoral legislation in the network infrastructure industries. In addition, the deep and frequent 
economic crises of the 1990s led to a change of perception regarding the role of IRAs in general. 
Public acceptance of this form of governance increased as a reaction to the political corruption and 
incompetence associated with traditional public policy institutions. 
Table 4-4: Summary table of regulatory authorities 
Name of 
regulatory 
body
Date of 
establishment
Board Members 
proposed by
First Appellate 
Body
Decisions 
Published
Budget 
(2006) 
million 
YTL
Staffing
Statutory Professional 
Requirements for 
Board Members
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
27 January 
2000
- Ministry of 
Transport
- Ministry of Industry 
and TOBB**
- Telecoms industry 
Administrative 
Tribunals N 138 128*
- University degree
- 10 year experience 
in private or public 
sector
- Sufficient 
experience in the 
telecoms industry
En
er
gy 20 February 
2001 Not specified 
High 
Administrative 
Court
N 67 573
- University degree
- 10 year experience 
in private or public 
sector
C
om
pe
tit
io
n
27 February 
1997
- Competition Board
- Ministry of Industry
- Minister of State 
in charge of State 
Planning
- High Administrative 
Court
- High Judicial Court
- Inter-university 
Council
- TOBB
High 
Administrative 
Court
Y 32 321
- University degree
- 10 year experience 
in private or public 
sector
* number of white collar personnel 
** TOBB : Union of chambers and commodity exchanges 
Source : TUSIAD, 2002 and own research.
As can be seen from the previous table, Turkey now boasts a range of IRAs. These bodies have been 
setup in accordance with the relevant EU legislation and they have significant competences in regulat-
ing the industries in question. The effectiveness of the IRAs have therefore a sizeable impact on market 
outcomes and the overall performance of the industries concerned. Even though a full operational as-
sessment of the IRAs in Turkey would fall outside the scope of this study, it may nonetheless be useful 
to at least underline the most salient deficiencies observed in relation to the IRAs.
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4.8.1. Policy Versus Regulation
It is generally accepted that making choices between major policy alternatives belongs to the 
political and not the administrative realm. Hence, IRAs can function effectively only when there 
is political responsibility and ownership for a clearly defined overall policy agenda. This has not 
been the case in Turkey, especially for the telecommunications and energy sectors. If there was a 
general expectation that creation of regulatory agencies with significant rule making power would 
be sufficient to pursue the objectives of regulatory reform, the Turkish experience has proved such 
expectation wrong and showed that success in regulatory reform requires clear ownership at the 
political level. Even when IRAs have substantial administrative and rule-making capacity, the 
effectiveness of such authority can be greatly diminished when governments, in their capacity as 
policy makers and owners of assets that remain under public ownership, take decisions that do 
not support or worse remain in conflict with the overall objectives of regulatory reform. Hence as 
discussed in the following chapters, reform in the telecommunications industry was significantly 
delayed because of perceived conflicts between privatization and increasing competition. Attrac-
ting private investment in a competitive framework was one of the main objectives of reform in 
the electricity industry. However, such response has been mute basically because the government 
did not seem willing to allow wholesale prices to be determined in a competitive manner. 
Regulatory reform is a complicated process with actions on many interrelated fronts. Hence 
often adopting a policy is only a first step. For success, the policy needs to be translated into an im-
plementation strategy and this strategy needs to be clearly and credibly communicated to the play-
ers. These both ensure that the components create an internally consistent package and, in areas 
where success needs actions by non-government players, that such actions are forthcoming. The 
chapters on telecommunications and energy both suggest that this strategic aspect of regulatory 
reform has been weak in Turkey. Both chapters suggest that one instrument that may be useful in 
that respect is “white papers”, prepared perhaps by the cooperation of ministries and regulators, 
which clearly spell out the objectives of reform, provides justifications for the measures adopted 
and presents the intended sequencing between different policy regulatory measures.
4.8.2. Regulating the Regulators
The performance of regulators critically depends on the degree to which they are transparent and 
accountable. Admittedly, most regulatory agencies are more accountable and transparent than 
the traditional line ministry agencies; however, significant improvements are possible. There are 
various well known measures that ensure accountability and transparency. One institutional me-
asure is consultation, that is, soliciting the opinions of stakeholders while preparing regulations. 
The quality and effectiveness of new legislation can certainly be enhanced by certain common and 
binding rules which would improve the transparency of the rule making process while allowing 
for the opinion of other public and private stakeholders to be taken into consideration. In Turkey 
there are no uniform rules imposing consultation requirements with other governmental bodies 
or interest groups in drafting new legislation; whatever rules that do exist are not implemented 
effectively. For example, the Prime Ministry’s communiqué mentioned above requiring govern-
ment agencies to solicit the opinion of the Competition Authority before finalizing primary or 
secondary legislation is not uniformly applied, if anything because in some cases the originating 
agencies fail to appreciate that their interventions may have competitive implications. The CA, the 
TA and EMRA routinely put draft regulations on their website for consultative purposes. Howe-
ver, a) they rarely disclose opinions they send to other agencies, b) they do not disclose opinions 
received from public agencies or private parties, and c) they do not disclose how they use those 
opinions.  
7  Currently IRAs are requested to send their draft legislation only to the State Planning Organisation which 
checks the compatibility of this legislation with the goals set out in 5 year development plans. Consultation 
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Another important measure is to force regulators to make public their decisions8 and the jus-
tifications behind them. All three agencies mentioned above publish secondary legislation issued 
by them on their web sites. However only the CA is legally obliged to publish all decisions of the 
Board, and it is required to publish justifications as well. The TA and EMRA currently are not 
required to provide any justifications for decisions. Finally neither provide sufficient justifications 
(or preambles) or provide any impact analysis for the regulations they adopt. All three publish an-
nual reports but these reports provide little analysis if any in terms of impact assessment. 
4.8.3. Selecting the Regulators
According to Smith (1997), although complete independence of the IRAs may not be attainable 
in practice, desirable requirements may include i) providing the regulator with a legal mandate, ii) 
ensuring that it is structurally separated and autonomous from government, iii) defining a multi 
party process for its appointment involving both the executive and legislative bodies, iv) protec-
ting it from arbitrary removal, v) defining its professional standards and adequate renumeration 
levels, vi) designing a reliable source of funding (e.g. through industry fees instead of government 
budgets). A majority of these criteria deal with methodology adopted for choosing the manage-
ment of the regulatory institution. It can indeed be claimed that the genuine independence of 
an IRA from government, special interest and private industry can only be ensured if the Board 
Members are sufficiently qualified to regulate the IRA’s area of competence. There are however no 
generally accepted best solutions to this thorny question. Countries adopt a method best suited 
to their political, economic, social and cultural needs and traditions. Even in the EU, there are 
no uniform rules in this regard. In Turkey, there are not even uniform rules covering all the IRAs. 
Rules regarding the selection of the IRA’s board members are different for almost every regulatory 
body. As a result, the selection process becomes too open to political interference and politically 
motivated appointments. The Board Members who are so appointed cannot contribute to the 
work of the IRA in a meaningful manner. There is therefore a need to ensure that a minimum 
standard of professional knowledge and experience is kept when new board members are to be ap-
pointed at the helm of IRAs. Common rules should be adopted to guarantee that the governance 
of IRAs is entrusted to a group of “wise men”. 
One noteworthy rule would be to increase the transparency of the selection process. Applicants’ 
resumes may be made public, so that a public discussion may be held about them in the media. A 
short list of applicants may be questioned in the parliamentary committee for their competence. 
Irrespective of who makes the ultimate appointment, such measures may enhance the average 
quality of appointments.
4.8.4. Controlling the Regulators
The judicial review of IRA’s decisions represents another dimension of good regulation. Ideally, the 
judicial review mechanism should provide for a clear, fast and efficient path for appealing IRAs 
decisions. In addition, judicial reviews are also instrumental in creating the jurisprudence in a 
regulated area. In Turkey, there is no single rule concerning the judicial review of IRA’s decisions. 
For some IRAs, like the Telecommunications Board the appeal mechanism is administrative courts 
while for some others like the Competition Board and the Energy Board it is the High Adminis-
trative Court (Danıştay). In either case, the main problem is the lack of qualified and experienced 
personnel within the judicial review organs to deal with the issues posed. The insufficiency in 
terms of human resources of the judicial review bodies undermines the effectiveness of the IRA’s as 
well given that the appeals process then becomes an option for effectively challenging and possibly 
with the line Ministries is not required.
8  We refer to decisions that are related to issues concerning their main regulatory duties, rather than , for 
example, purely administrative or organizational decisions.
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evading the implementation of the IRA’s verdicts. For instance most of the Competition Board’s 
decisions imposing significant fines have been appealed, and many of the appeals are still pending. 
OECD (2005) lists inexperienced judicial review as one of the factors that slows down the enfor-
cement of competition law. To address the problems posed by Turkish judges’ unfamiliarity with 
competition law, legislation in 2004 created a special chamber in the High Administrative Court 
to deal with appeals against the Competition Authority’s rulings.
For the judicial review mechanism to operate flawlessly, the procedural aspects of the sectoral 
regulation as it relates to the operational aspects of IRAs should be clarified. For instance, the provi-
sions on agenda setting rules; rules regarding the frequency of Board meetings; criteria related to the 
type, scope and nature of information needed for decisions; the procedural issues including timing 
and deadlines related to internal decision making should be clearly set out in the regulation.
Another problem with judicial review in Turkey is that there is no obligation to publish the 
decisions of the High Administrative Court. Some decisions are published in the Court’s journal 
and found in the database in the Court’s website, but others are merely provided to the parties 
involved in the specific case. This lack of transparency creates unnecessary costs and limits public 
discussions of individual cases.
The lack of an agreement between Turkey and the EU on services trade is a difficulty which 
limits the value of the relevant EU jurisprudence in domestic judicial review. As a result, for the 
implementation of regulatory provisions in the network industries, the EU body of law has not 
played the crucial role that is fulfils in EU countries where the twin principles of the precedence 
of Community law and the doctrine of direct effect has greatly facilitated the uniform application 
of regulatory rules at the national level. It is worth recalling that the Turkey-EU Customs Union 
agreement not only foresees the harmonisation of Turkey’s legislation with the EU acquis but also 
stipulates that the decisions of the European Court of Justice will be taken into consideration in 
the interpretation of the Agreement’s provisions. As a result, ECJ decisions on issues related to 
the free movement of goods can have an impact on the Turkish regulatory and judicial sphere. 
However, the Customs Union only covers trade in manufactured goods and processed agricultural 
products. It specifically excludes services. Therefore the linkage between the EU jurisprudence and 
the Turkish jurisprudence in the area of services in general and the network industries in particular 
is much weaker. This is certainly a significant deficiency which undermines legal certainty in the 
implementation of regulatory rules in Turkey. 
4.8.5. Overall Capacity to Design and Implement High Quality 
Regulation
IRAs recruit most of their entry level professional staff (called “assistant experts”) through exams. 
In order to obtain a promotion to the “expert” level, staff needs to successfully conclude an expert 
thesis, a procedure that allows staff to gain in depth competence in a specific field. As a result of 
such measures, the average quality of professional staff is relatively high, especially in comparison 
to other government agencies. Still, there are improvements that can be made to enhance human 
capital. Compared to advanced examples in the EU, the degree to which IRAs in Turkey can tap 
and mobilize academic competence is very low. In addition, the general level of competence for 
economic analysis in the IRAs is not high. This is especially of concern since the role of econo-
mic analysis has been increasing significantly in both areas of competition law and regulation of 
network industries. The number of staff holding Ph.D.’s in economics is very low. One way to en-
hance the agencies’ capacity to undertake economic analysis is to create in each agency the position 
of a chief economist that would be held by a person holding a postgraduate (preferably doctoral) 
degree in economics. In addition, IRAs can play an important role in encouraging universities to 
train more economists and undertake more research in the areas of industrial economics, compe-
tition law and regulation of network industries.
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4.9. Overall Productivity Impact of Enhanced Regulation
This analysis focused on the assessment of the Turkish regulatory framework in the key network 
industries in light of the ongoing effort to harmonise Turkey’s legislation with the EU acquis. It 
was also underlined that the enhancement of the regulatory framework would bring important 
benefits from the standpoint of sectoral productivities and efficiencies which still lag behind the 
well performing EU countries as illustrated by the accompanying reports. 
However regulatory reform in the key network industries will also have a productivity enhanc-
ing effect on the overall economy on account of the “knock on” effects of improved productivity 
in these sectors which affect indirectly many other sectors where firms use the output of these 
industries as intermediate inputs in their production process. In order to better demonstrate this 
phenomenon, we have constructed a cost incidence index based on Turkey’s input/output tables9. 
The cost incidence index is a normalized figure computed as the product of the share of the cost of 
the network industry’s output in a particular industry’s total input and the share of that industry 
in total production. The following table therefore shows the overall linkages between productivity 
improvements in the network industries and the most significant cost efficiencies for the overall 
economy10. 
Table 4-5: Sectoral cost inter-linkages 
Transport Energy Telecommunications
Index Industry Index Industry Index Industry
0,86 Petroleum products 1,00 Mining of coal and lignite 0,891 Land transport
0,49 Sales motor vehicles 0,39 Financial intermediation 0,397 Commission trade
0,46 Restaurants 0,34 Petroleum products 0,104 Electricity distribution
0,44 Hotels 0,24 Electrical  machinery 0,037 Medical instruments
0,15 Manufacture of motor vehicles 0,20 Other manufacturing 0,031 Financial intermediation
0,15 Financial intermediation 0,14 Fabricated metals 0,031 Education
0,08 Ready wear 0,09 Cement 0,022 Petroleum products
0,08 Confectionary 0,09 Land transport 0,017 Communications equipment
0,07 Telecommunications 0,07 Hotels 0,013 Water distribution
0,06 Vegetable production 0,05 General machinery 0,011 Hotels
0,05 Wholesale trade 0,04 Other business activities 0,007 Paper products
0.04 Health and social services 0.03 Telecommunications 0.006 Electrical machinery
0.03 Rubber products 0.02 Ready wear 0.006 Cleaning products
0.03 Insurance 0.02 Insurance 0.006 Printing services
0.02 Aircrafts and equipment 0.01 Special purpose machinery 0.003 Machinery renting
0.01 Electricity production 0.01 Real estate 0.002 Motor vehicles
0.01 Ship building 0.01 Furniture 0.002 Other business activities
0.01 Sugar manufacturing 0.01 Rubber products 0.002 Gas distribution
0.01 Other business activities 0.01 Cosmetics 0.001 Cereals
0.01 Retail trade 0.01 Plastics 0.001 Restaurants
0.01 Metal products 0.01 Other textiles 0.001 Coal mining
Source: Calculations based on TURKSTAT input-output data for Turkish economy (1998)
9  The basic data was obtained from the supply and use tables of 1998. Available from TUIK http://www.turks-
tat.gov.tr/PreIstatistikTablo.do?istab_id=180
10  In doing the calculations the sectors have been weighted according to their share in the economy. Therefore 
there might actually be other sectors which would benefit more from a productivity increase in telecommu-
nications for instance, but they would not appear in this table due to their low share in the overall economy 
of the country.
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It can therefore be contended that the improvement of productivity through enhanced regula-
tion and EU regulatory harmonisation in the key network industries will have a considerable im-
pact on the cost structure of many other industries. For instance, more efficient transport services 
would decrease productions costs in the manufacturing of petroleum products, followed by motor 
vehicles sales activities, catering and accommodation businesses and the manufacturing of mo-
tor vehicles. Productivity increases in the energy sector would lead to lower costs in coal mining, 
financial intermediation, production of petroleum products and the manufacturing of electrical 
machinery. Likewise improvements in the performance of the telecommunications will affect the 
overall economy primarily by the cost efficiencies introduced in land transport, electricity distri-
bution, manufacturing of medical instruments, financial services and even education services.
4.10. Conclusion
A combination of both domestic and global factors triggered the move towards regulatory reform 
in Turkey in the past few years. The key feature of the regulatory reforms in network industries 
was a gradual shift from the coercive use of public policy instruments such as strict regulation or 
the public ownership of enterprises to a greater reliance on market mechanisms as well as private 
investment. The design of the new competitive framework had three main dimensions: liberalisa-
tion, state retrenchment and new regulatory design. Liberalisation involved the liberalisation of 
prices and access to markets which had previously been restricted by legal and regulatory barriers. 
State retrenchment implied a wave of privatisations so as to allow the private sector to overtake 
activities that had been run partially or completely by the government. Finally new regulatory 
design was concerned with achieving the concurrent objectives of:
• Definition of rules to make access to the non-competitive segments of the industry by a 
plurality of service providers possible and efficient, 
• Creation of new markets where liberalisation had involved the unbundling of vertically inte-
grated monopolies to replace transactions that were previously taking place within the state 
run firm,
• Implementation of public service obligations in industries where market failures could po-
tentially undermine the supply of a service which had to be universally available,
• Replacement of the regulation by public ownership by arms’ length regulation (OECD 
2001).
In all these areas, the EU acquis provided a blueprint for Turkey’s own regulatory reforms. Tur-
key’s record in implementing these reforms is however mixed. As the accompanying reports dem-
onstrate, legal harmonisation is most advanced in telecommunications, air transport and energy. 
There are nonetheless implementation issues that remain unresolved even in these sectors. Road 
and rail transport are the two industries where even legal harmonisation is at an early stage.
This study aimed to uncover the different institutional and political economy factors which 
could explain the variance in the implementation of regulatory reforms. Some of the salient issues 
can be summarized as follows:
Improvements can be obtained in the performance of IRAs. Given the importance regulatory 
bodies have in implementing the new competitive framework, their performances have a signifi-
cant impact on the performance of the regulated industry. The track record of the independent 
regulatory authorities in Turkey has been mixed. Improvements in appointment mechanisms to 
guarantee the establishment of a governance structure consisting of professional and knowledge-
able “wise men” would improve the performance of the IRAs. The performance of the regulatory 
authorities depended on the effectiveness of the individuals which happened to be appointed to 
the governing board. The Competition Board for instance was able to establish itself very quickly 
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as an able and competent body. It gave priority to fostering an institutional culture. It also in-
vested heavily in enhancing its human resources. Remaining problems with the implementation 
of competition rules in Turkey was essentially an external problem from the standpoint of the 
Competition Board to the extent that it involved issues such as a lack of statutory powers for the 
Competition Board as in the case of state aids, or the inefficiencies related to judicial review caused 
by Turkey’s administrative law system. Improvements in the appointment mechanisms can be 
obtained by making the process more transparent and creating platforms whereby candidates can 
be questioned by stakeholders. Additional measures that would improve the quality of the design 
and enforcement of regulations include: Further increasing transparency and accountability, in 
particular requiring IRAs to present justifications for their decisions; improving the quality of con-
sultative mechanisms and increasing the technical capacity of the IRAs, especially in economics, 
possibly by creating the position of a “chief economist”. Finally, clarification of the jurisdictions of 
the competition authority and sectoral regulatory agencies would also contribute to reduce regula-
tory uncertainty. 
The absence of state aids legislation in Turkey acts as a serious barrier to the development of 
competition in infrastructure industries. Given the prevalence of state ownership in infrastructure, 
state aids legislation is necessary to ensure that state actions do not have anti-competitive effects. 
Requiring public agencies to solicit the Competition Authority’s opinions on proposed laws and 
regulations (and making such opinions public) would also contribute to limiting public inter-
ventions with anti-competitive effects. To complete the picture, it is also necessary to establish a 
framework for the provision of public service obligations. The universal service legislation enacted 
in the telecommunications industry is a step in the right direction. The absence of a framework 
for public service obligations create incentives for governments to adopt non-transparent means 
to serve constituencies; creation of such a framework would both ensure better access and possibly 
reduce costs.
Reform in infrastructure industries can improve welfare only if it is guided by a clearly ar-
ticulated strategy and strong political ownership. The Turkish experience suggests that without 
the support of these two components regulatory reform may be seriously delayed in generating 
benefits, or, worse, it may not generate them at all. Hence one of the crucial recommendations for 
success of regulatory reform is clear ownership of reform efforts at the political level. But owner-
ship is not sufficient. Reform policy needs to be translated into an implementation strategy. One 
instrument that may help generate credibility in that regard is to issue strategy documents that 
articulate policy objectives and the means to achieve them.
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